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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
This doctoral study explores the generative factors that help to explain how middle-class 
citizens respond when confronted with sudden impoverishment in the aftermath of external 
economic shocks. Focusing on the actions taken by millions of ‘new urban poor’ during the 
2002 economic crisis in Argentina, I examine why some resisted their sudden pauperisation 
and potential proletarianisation by participating in the bourgeoning protest movements and 
collective actions at the time, whilst others confined their responses to private strategies of self-
improvement or to subtle acts of individual dissent. 
In this study, I undertake an extensive and critical review of the literature, together with 
quantitative research methods. A statistical analysis of World Bank household survey data is 
conducted in order to identify newly poor citizen responses in the first instance. I then explore 
the underlying political opinions and social attitudes that may have informed these actions 
using LatinoBarómetro survey data. 
Motivations for engagement in selected responses are analysed at both the collective group and 
private individual level. 
First, I find that the process of impoverishment itself was not sufficient to stimulate their 
involvement in collective action as a response on its own and that explanations were instead 
multicausal. By comparing the in-group behaviour and social and political attitudes of newly 
impoverished citizens in 2002 to those of their cohorts during the period of neoliberal reforms 
in the mid-1990s and then during the macroeconomic boom years since 2005, I offer four 
alternative contextual processes and explanations which account for the increased tendency 
towards participation in collective protests or self-improvement rather than simply private 
responses in 2002. These include 1) that the scale of the economic crisis led to the forming of a 
collective identity and sense of suffering which disposed them more towards participating in 
resistance actions alongside others, 2) that the simultaneous crisis of representation reduced 
their political tolerance of their hardship and so made protesting a more likely course of action, 
3) that opportunities for individual self-improvement in the labour market and macroeconomy 
were undermined just at the time that the spaces to engage in social movements and collective 
self-help experiments increased and 4) changing ways of thinking and trends in underlying 
social and political attitudes at the time militated in favour of partaking in actions that brought 
the new urban poor together in solidarity actions with other social sectors against the 
government. 
Fluctuating diachronic patterns of political mobilisation are therefore observed and using 
Gramsci’s theories of cultural hegemony, ideology and false consciousness as a theoretical 
framework, I contextualise resistance activities under the specific conditions of economic crisis 
and loss of political legitimacy of 2002. Patterns of change in in-group behaviour are 
attributed to the oscillating consent of this new urban poor social stratum to being controlled by 
the dominant class on the one hand and the extent to which citizens encountered a shared class 
iv
consciousness as a basis for resistance with other elements of the organised working class and 
the unemployed on the other. 
I discuss and critique a range of explanatory mechanisms, including whether the experience of 
pauperisation and social descent was either internalised (generating subsequent feelings of self-
blame, demoralisation and alienation), or whether culpability was attributed to systemic 
factors, the government, other institutions and capitalist processes, whereby collective 
identities and grievances were more likely to form in the process. The impact of these 
subjectivities upon action is also explored. 
Then, citizens’ private considerations as individuals and as household members are examined. 
I find that the resistance activities adopted by the new urban poor were shaped by several 
factors including the respective impacts that relative deprivation and absolute impoverishment 
had on protest and self-improvement actions, the combinations of responses creating a 
polarised sense of either activism or disengagement and one’s biographical characteristics such 
as their prior exposure to community organisational involvement and localised opportunities to 
participate in collective or individual actions.
Finally, having identified deficiencies in traditional Rational Choice, Resource Mobilisation 
and Political Opportunity social movement theories as explanatory models for new urban poor 
involvement in protest, I conclude the thesis by building on a Marxist theory of social 
movements. I demonstrate how the forming of grievances, targeting of anger, measuring of
demands and form of resistance that these citizens adopted derived heuristically from their 
daily experiences of class struggle. Then, in seeking to remain true to and reinvigorate the 
principle of self-organisation which was at the core of their resistance to capitalism during 
2002, the perceived unsustainability of Argentina’s nascent autonomist movements is analysed. 
Suggestions are made as to ways in which social movements could stimulate solidarity between 
the new urban poor, the organised working class and the structural poor, whilst at the same 
time increasing the durability of collective resistance through alternative mobilising vehicles 
and political and economic models. 
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1CHAPTER 1 - INTRODUCTION AND RESEARCH OBJECTIVES
Why is it always us who have to suffer?’ She yelled indignantly. ‘The common people, the 
lower middle-class I mean. If war is declared, if the Franc is devalued, if there is 
unemployment or a revolution or any type of crisis, everyone else is able to work things out 
so that they land on their feet. We are the ones who end up getting crushed! We always pay 
for everyone else’s mistakes.’ Enraged, she continued; ‘Of course they don't fear us. The 
workers fight back, the rich are powerful. We are the lambs to the slaughter. 
Irene Nemirovsky, French Suite p. 177, Vintage Books, New York, 2007
Ever since its conceptualisation as an area of academic research two decades ago, ‘new urban 
poor’ studies that analyse how middle-class households deal with dramatic and sudden 
declines in material wellbeing following external shocks, have focused almost entirely on
their individual self-improvement strategies (Katzman 1989, Minujín et al. 1993), whilst 
rarely understanding the ‘new urban poor’ as a source of political agency. 
A range of disciplinary approaches have been employed to understand how individuals cope 
with impoverishment. Work has assessed the psychological (Masseroni & Sauane 2002), 
cultural, civic (Minujín 2007; Adamovsky, 2009) and above all economic behaviour exhibited 
by this social stratum. 1 ‘Economic’ responses themselves may take one of two forms, either 
as ‘adaptive’ responses, for example how the impoverished middle class modify their 
                                                            
1I deliberately refer to the new urban poor as a ‘social stratum’ throughout this thesis because I see them as a 
transitional social group that despite possessing some middle-class characteristics, have sunk into the ranks of 
the working class after having lost their workplace autonomy and prior economic and social conditions.Writing 
in the Marxist tradition ‘class’ is still considered the basic element of the social structure of society, but later I 
shall argue that whilst many rejoined the middle class during Argentina’s economic recovery from 2003 
onwards, a significant proportion of its post-crisis ‘new poor’ did not simply become ‘impoverished’ but 
actually suffered downward social mobility to the extent that they have been proletarianised. For reasons of 
simplicity I refer to the ‘new urban poor’ and ‘impoverished middle class’ interchangeably.
2consumer behaviour to cope with macroeconomic meltdown (Feijóo 2003; Zurawicki & 
Braidot 2005) or ‘active’ strategies by which human, social and cultural capitals accumulated 
during their non-poor pasts, are utilised to explore self-employment opportunities (Feijóo 
2003; Menni 2004; Kessler & Di Virgilio 2008), expand domestic production and utilise 
social networks to gain advantages in terms of employment opportunities (Lokshin & 
Yemtsov, 2004). Perhaps most importantly, Kessler and Di Virgilio’s eminent (2008) study 
of the extent to which newly impoverished people are able to utilise their superior social and 
cultural capitals (that were accumulated during their non-poor pasts) once they have become 
pauperised has helped to contribute towards a more profound understanding of the economic
decisions that are taken under such circumstances and how these differ to those of the long-
term poor. 
However, these studies have neglected to examine how and why poverty is also resisted 
through engagement in collective and protest responses, especially during periods of 
economic crisis (Richards & Gelleny, 2006:777). Indeed, growing empirical evidence in 
recent years suggests that protest responses are widely practiced as a reaction against social 
descent and pauperisation. As the advanced capitalist societies experience what the IMF 
describe as the ‘deepest financial crisis since the Great Depression’ (2009), a prolonged credit 
crunch, series of sovereign debt bailouts, cycle of austerity programmes and state welfare cuts 
then soaring unemployment,2 falling wages and low growth have been met with an 
outpouring of millions of highly educated, ‘squeezed’ and sometimes unemployed middle-
class citizens who are participating in radical protest movements such as the Indignados 
protest camps in Spain, the daily demonstrations and vigils in Syntagma Square and across 
                                                            
2 Joblessness has grown from 16 million to 26 million in the European Union between 2008 and 2013 (Eurostat)
3Greece, the Occupy Wall Street movement in the USA and as well as mass strikes and 
demonstrations against pension reforms and austerity in France, Hungary, Romania, Bulgaria 
and many other countries in Europe (Mason, 2012). Therefore, instead of focusing 
exclusively on their economic self-improvement responses, in this thesis I seek to understand 
why citizens may not merely react to their deteriorating personal circumstances that financial 
shocks cause as neoliberal advocates assume (by acting solely as economic agents and 
rational decision makers who carry out private and economic responses) but instead, using 
Argentina and its citizens’ responses to economic crisis in 2001-02 as a case study, I focus on 
the domestic agitation (collective protest) that such crises provoke and ask why and how 
newly impoverished people decide to join protest movements to confront their descent – an 
approach that has generally been ignored in the academic literature. 
Although many in Argentina’s struggling middle class (particularly teachers, civil servants 
and small had medium-sized business owners) had participated in street mobilisations 
throughout 2000 and 2001 as the economy plunged into a prolonged recession (Adamovsky, 
2009), the turning point came when President De la Rúa declared a State of Siege on 19th
December 2001 in response to widespread lootings and food riots, especially in Greater 
Buenos Aires. However, his decision merely served to evoke memories of the despised 
dictatorship that had been removed two decades earlier and prompted hundreds of thousands 
of citizens, (including many who had recently been impoverished) to spill out onto the streets 
to express their fury under the slogan ‘¡Qué se vayan todos!’3 [Get rid of the lot of them] as 
the economic crisis turned into a crisis of political legitimacy. Demanding the overthrow of 
                                                            
3Abbreviated to QSVT in this thesis.
4the entire political establishment, the following two days marked the first major Cacerolazo4
protests, which were neither pre-planned nor organised by any particular political party or 
union5 (Vilas, 2005:252). Despite the brutal reaction of the state and the murder of dozens of 
protestors by the riot police (Delich, 2002:9); it was during these events that many 
Argentineans received an epiphany about the power of collective action. De la Rúa was 
forced to flee the demonstrators from the roof of the Casa Rosada (Presidential Palace) in a 
helicopter and promptly resigned from office the following day. 
These protests helped to spark many cross-class, grassroots forms of community organisation 
throughout 2002 as the collapse in confidence of the country’s political system led to the 
establishment of hundreds of neighbourhood assemblies, mainly in the City of Buenos Aires 
(Nueva Mayoría, 2006), in which citizens actively participated in horizontal political 
decision-making at the local level and discussed solutions to the local and national problems 
that their politicians could not resolve. Ongoing street protests, community kitchens, as well 
as a surge in the level of participation in barter (5,356 clubs were formed around the country 
and were used by millions of citizens (Gomez & Helmsing, 2008:2496). Meanwhile, just 
weeks earlier million had also abandoned the ballot box with half of voters either spoiling 
their ballot papers, abstaining completely or voting for revolutionary left-wing parties during 
the legislative elections of October 2001 (Pérez, Armelino & Rossi 2005:389). For a time it 
even seemed as if capitalist social relations were also under threat, as scores of factories and 
workplaces were taken over by their workers and ‘recovered’ under worker’s control. In this 
thesis I stop short of arguing that 2001-02 represented a revolutionary situation, however, 
                                                            
4 A popular method of protest in Argentina which involves the banging of pots and pans.
5The two trade union confederations, the CGT and the CTA organised a General Strike on 13th December 2001 
but were not formally involved in coordinating the cacerolazos, which occurred without any formal degree of 
organisation.
5because it recognises that no situation of dual-power existed at the time (Astarita, 2008) 
despite attempts to articulate an Inter-Neighbourhood Assembly in order to coordinate local-
level assemblies on a national scale. 
The new urban poor played a significant part in these movements and displayed admirable 
creativity and resilience in terms of developing innovative political, economic, social and 
cultural responses to the decline in their material wellbeing (Minujín, 2007:6). The sense of 
solidarity that reverberated through society at the time, the exceptional atmosphere of 
political discord, ideas of autonomy (Dinerstein, 2007) and ultimately, sheer economic need 
combined to ensure that collective self-improvement responses and collective protests 
featured prominently among the actions that a significant proportion of households engaged 
in when responding to impoverishment during 2002. This is what makes an analysis of new 
urban poor reactions in Argentina particularly intriguing. 
1.1 The Economic and Social crisis in Argentina 2001-02 as a Paradigmatic Case Study for 
Analysing New Urban Poor Resistance
The Argentinean social and economic crisis of 2001-02 has been chosen as the principal case 
study country for a variety of reasons. First of all, the scale of its mass pauperisation is 
unparalleled in a capitalist liberal democracy in recent times (Grimson & Kessler, 2005:87), 
with 7. 3 million well-educated, often affluent citizens falling below the poverty line in the 
space of a year (according to INDEC, Argentina’s national statistics agency) and who tended 
to either enter unemployment or low-skilled work. 
Secondly, in terms of its relevance for the study of new poverty in Western societies and thus 
responses to it, Argentina shares many contextual, historical and institutional features with 
6other advanced capitalist economies. To start with, the characteristics of the protest 
movements its new poor citizens participated in closely match those of their European and
North American counterparts today. The occupation of ‘public space,’ involvement in 
innovative, non-hierarchical, horizontal organising structures, the general assembly and 
consensus-building as key decision-making mechanisms and the rejection of interference by 
political parties or other forms of institutionalisation are universal protest methods that were 
pursued in Argentina a decade ago (Sitrin, 2010) are extraordinarily similar to those that are 
taking place in the West today (Parkinson, 2012). 
Arguably, these ‘new urban poor’ subjects in North America and Europe have not only been 
moved to take to the streets to manifest their discontent by their own downward mobility, 
deteriorating living conditions or concern for their future occupational prospects, but just as 
in Argentina in 2001-02 they have also done so due to their sense of having been abandoned
by their political representatives and by the failure of representative democracy - to respond 
to their preoccupations. 6 The consequence of decades of neo-liberalism has been to generate 
a market-driven society whereby cultural and social production is increasingly subject to the 
process of commodification. Yet, despite modern capitalism’s ever expanding obsession with 
being able to offer greater economic, cultural and social ‘choices’ (increasingly differentiated
products available for consumers, greater tolerance of one’s choice of religion or sexuality, a 
wider variety of options for educating one’s children etc.), citizens are also confronted with a 
stark contradiction in terms of their narrowing political(as well as often economic) choices as 
                                                            
6 This perceived growing schism between the demands of the people and the actions of their national 
governments and political institutions is made explicit in the 2011 Manifesto of the Real Democracy Now!
Movement in Spain http://www.democraciarealya.es/manifiesto-comun/manifesto-english/ and the Declaration 
of the Occupation of New York City by Occupy Wall Street
http://www.nycga.net/resources/documents/declaration/
7the narratives and proposed solutions of political parties, and presidential and parliamentary 
candidates from different political traditions, coalesce around a neoliberal consensus that only 
seem to benefit multinational corporations, wealthy elites and global capital. Thus the growth 
of today’s movements in the West are borne out of this contradiction and is developing into a 
crisis of political legitimacy similar to that which Argentina experienced over ten years ago. 
Thirdly, like North American and Europe, Argentina boasts a deeply entrenched welfare state 
tradition and is one of the few nations in the southern hemisphere with a significant middle-
class population. The impact that the retreat of the state has had in terms of the consequent 
downward social mobility of part of a once thriving middle class draws many parallels with
the experience of the middle sectors throughout the OECD economies. 
Furthermore, Argentina’s political as well as its industrial relations structures also have much 
in common with those in Western countries. These enable or constrain spaces for its people 
to respond to pauperisation. The Peronist blueprint for the country’s hegemonic corporatist 
mediating relationship between labour, business and state institutions that prevails today was 
based on the Italian and German corporatism that preceded it in the 1930s (Lewis, 2006:131). 
In particular, the historic alignment between the CGT union confederation and the 
Justicialista (Peronist) Party purposely replicates the British Labour Party’s relationship with 
the TUC (Rock in Bethell, 1991:69). 
An additional reason why the Argentinean case is especially useful to examine is that the 
World Bank’s ISCA (Social Impact of the Crisis in Argentina) Survey (2003) is one of the 
few available national household surveys that incorporates data on both self-help and protest 
actions in a post-crisis situation. This makes it a hugely valuable resource in terms of 
8observing the full range of possible responses to pauperisation, which are acutely lacking 
elsewhere. 
Finally, the participation of the Argentinean new poor in protest movements in 2001-02 took 
place in relative international isolation compared to the more recent episodes of new urban 
poor rebellion such as in Greece or Spain. This makes it an especially useful case study 
political mobilisation under pauperisation was not influenced by a global contagion of 
resistance as current movements are (Mason, 2012), thus in the absence of exogenous 
contributing factors such as these, the findings may be more generalisable to different country 
contexts. 7
1.2 Research Gaps in the New Urban Poverty Literature: The New Poor as Political Agents
This thesis seeks to fill a number of gaps in the ‘new urban poor’ literature, especially by 
providing an analysis of how decisions are made about whether to participate in self-
improvement and protest actions in response to economic shocks and how economic 
grievances can become politicised. As mentioned in Section 1.1, the lack of existing 
research, particularly that of a quantitative nature, is itself attributable to a range of factors. 
Principally, the nationally representative annual household survey data that is presently 
available in different countries concentrates almost entirely on economic (and to a minor 
                                                            
7The uprisings in Argentina broadly coincided with the birth of the alter-globalisation movement and the Seattle 
(1999) and Genoa (2001) protests. However, these very much targeted global capital and major international 
summits like the G8 during periods of relative economic prosperity. In contrast, the recent revolts in Europe and 
have occurred within very specific national contexts during the global economic crises but which have been 
inspired by broader global uprisings (Mason, 2012). Argentina’s revolt falls into the ‘national context’ typology, 
but was almost a lone case on the international stage in terms of the timing of the rebellion.
9extent) social activities, without asking participants about how they responded to such 
external shocks in terms of their protest actions. The University of North Carolina’s 
Longitudinal Monitoring Survey in Russia is a case in point. 
Secondly, the theoretical complexities involved in demarcating those households that one can 
classify as belonging to a ‘new urban poor’ social stratum within large and nationally 
representative survey datasets have militated against any quantitative studies of this nature 
having been conducted before. Indeed, the qualitative characteristics that conceptually 
distinguish ‘new urban poor’ households from the ‘structural poor’- those who had survived 
in such conditions throughout their lives and had unmet basic needs(see Minujín et al. 1993) -
are often so profoundly obscured within the core data that this fact alone has proven sufficient 
to deter analyses that are of a statistical complexion. The notion of ‘new poverty’ and its 
conceptual significance will be discussed in Chapter Two. 
Thirdly, whilst the overwhelming majority of qualitative studies that have been conducted 
into how households and citizens cope with internal or external economic shocks focus on the 
structurally poor (usually in the least developed countries in the world), of the few that have 
turned their attention to non-structural poverty, most have tended to treat the sample of their 
study as a homogenous social group which is usually referred to rather blandly as ‘the middle 
class’ (Briones & Mendoza, 2003; Zurawicki & Braidot 2005), regardless of whether they 
actually experienced severe declines in living standards during these economic crises. In
doing this, scant attention is paid to the diversity within this ‘class’ that makes the nuanced 
responses of its members to such shocks so intriguing. In any case, the precise meaning of 
‘the middle class’ is so vague that just who constitutes part of it has been highly contested 
ever since Gino Germani conducted the first large-scale study of social class in Argentina -
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‘Estructura Social en la Argentina’ - in 1955. The polemic about its definition has also 
prevented a sizable number of studies about it from being conducted, especially in recent 
years (Irazuzta, 2008:93). Notable exceptions to this tendency to homogenise middle-class 
responses include work by Aguirre on new urban poor reticence towards enrolment in 
assistentialist8 aid programmes (2008), Mazzoni’s publications on how a limited 
understanding of citizenship rights restricted new urban poor political activism in the post-
crisis period (2007, 2008) and, Kessler and Di Virgilio’s paper on how the new urban poor 
utilise their social, cultural and human capital in different ways to the structural poor when 
faced with material hardship (2008). 
Fourthly, a quantitative study is also needed to consolidate upon and frame the qualitative 
research that has been conducted in a variety of disciplines that have explored individual 
responses to the crisis in terms of their ‘coping strategies’.9 Yet amidst this body of work, the 
political dimension of pauperisation and how it is resisted by the middle class through 
collective behaviour and protest actions (especially during periods of economic crisis), has 
been largely neglected (Richards & Gelleny 2006). I therefore hope that the quantitative data 
analysis undertaken here will assist qualitative new poverty researchers, because it identifies 
some of the initial (and quantifiable) behavioural patterns that are observed among recently 
pauperised people. These can be understood further when subsequently subjecting them to 
qualitative research methods. Indeed, readers are cautioned against taking the empirically-
tested results of this research as ends in themselves. 
                                                            
8 From the Spanish asistencialismo which describes paternalistic, passive forms of aid whereby the subject 
merely ‘turns up’ to receive a material benefit whilst neither understanding its source, nor providing anything in 
return.
9 These qualitative sources are outlined on pp.1-2 of this thesis.
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It should be noted that each of these contributions, whilst valuable in its own academic 
discipline, makes few connections between households’ economic coping strategies and how 
they interplay with the decision to engage in political protest as an alternative response. A
notable exception to this trend is Mazzoni’s (2007) discussion of the impact that 
impoverishment had on beliefs about politics among the new urban poor during Argentina’s 
post-crisis period. Yet, whilst insightful, she neither focuses on the process of their 
politicisation, nor the empirical link between the self-improvement and protest actions that they 
took in response. 
Alternatively, Nancy Powers (1999) has argued that material concerns become understood as a 
‘political’ problem when personal tolerance of pauperisation declines, stating that such 
situations may arise when citizens are either unable to find sufficient economic coping 
mechanisms to maintain a desired level of needs satisfaction (if they are undermined or 
unsuccessful), if one’s poverty is experienced more intensely (invoking greater anger), or when 
economic and political contexts shape citizens’ evaluation of their material interests. She adds 
that when frustrated economic aspirations are prolonged, or lifestyle sacrifices move beyond 
the realms of acceptability, then citizens begin to examine the structural reasons for their 
descent, exorcise themselves of culpability for their hardship and so become more inclined to 
protest their condition instead. However, the context of her work is relevant to situations of 
gradual and atomised impoverishment, like that which occurred following neoliberal reforms in 
the 1990s, rather than sudden mass pauperisation like that which exploded somewhat abruptly 
in Argentina in 2001-02. Further, like Mazzoni, Powers limits the scope of her study to how 
impoverishment impacts upon ‘political interests’ rather than involvement in collective and 
protest action itself. 
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This thesis therefore seeks to fill these gaps by asking why individuals chose to engage in one 
category of action over another. For this reason, the principal aim of this research is to identify 
how members of such households responded to pauperisation in terms of their economic self-
improvement and political protest actions during and since 2002 and the factors that impacted 
on their decision to participate in them. Also under scrutiny will be whether the members of 
such households perceived that their objectives were more likely to have been achieved through 
private individual action or through cooperation with other members of the community, either 
for their own benefit or for that of the collective good. 
Aside from its contribution to the new poor literature, this thesis also helps to bridge an 
important deficiency in the social movement literature. I adopt a Marxist perspective to claim 
that existing dominant theories often fail to produce usable knowledge for those seeking 
change and are therefore barely relevant for the very movements that they seek to illuminate 
(Flacks, 2004:138; Bevington & Dixon, 2005:186). Consequently, another key objective is to 
provide social movement activists and theorists who are interested in mobilising the new 
urban poor in the future (or those from 2001-02 who have since slipped back into individual 
self-improvement responses), with a better understanding of how to do so. This will involve
empowering them to regain control of their own lives through collective action, as they did so 
effectively during the economic and political crisis of 2001-02. Thus the goals of this 
research are not solely theoretical but also practical. As Karl Marx stated in Thesis on the
Feuerbach (1888), ‘Philosophers have only interpreted the world in different ways; the point 
is to change it!’
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1.3 What is to be Done? Thesis Structure and Research Questions
This study is composed in the following way: Chapter 2 defines the concepts under scrutiny 
in this research by elaborating upon what is meant by the term ‘new urban poverty,’ looking 
at its origins internationally and its emergence as a phenomenon in Argentina. Chapter 3 
further develops the rationale for promoting research that simultaneously explores both 
economic and political responses to impoverishment and examines why it is important to 
investigate the generative conditions under which protest is also pursued. The different 
measures that may be taken to confront it are categorised here in order to distinguish the 
different actions that are under scrutiny in this research. 
Drawing upon events that have occurred internationally in Iceland, Russia, South Africa, 
Argentina and, to a lesser extent, Greece and Spain during the past fifteen years, I ask why 
there has been resistance among academics to such an approach, which also looks at the 
politicisation of confronting pauperisation and proletarianisation in the past. The theoretical 
weaknesses of existing elite social movement theories are then discussed and the case is made 
to formulate an Open Marxist framework for understanding such movements – especially 
those with emancipatory goals - and which seek to construct alliances between the 
proletarianised middle class and the working class. In Chapters 4 and 5, new poor responses 
to the 2002 crisis are explored in more detail and depth. I review the literature and establish 
hypotheses for testing in order to help answer the following research questions:
a) What factors explain the diachronic shift of this stratum (as an in-group) towards collective 
and political resistance in 2002 compared to new urban poor waves of prior decades, and 
what factors account for its (relative) demobilisation since 2003 (Chapters 4 and 7)? 
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b) What factors influenced whether individual new urban poor responses remained confined 
to the economic sphere as self-improvement strategies or were instead politicised and 
manifested themselves as protest actions (Chapters 5 and 8)?
c) Throughout, I consider why new urban poor radicalism was ignited during the 
Argentinazo10 and remained potent throughout much of 2002, yet died away towards the end 
of that year and into 2003? In this study, I draw upon Gramsci’s concept of hegemony 
(1998[1929-1935]) in order to try to understand the fluctuating levels of new urban poor 
mobilisation at different stages after the imposition of the neoliberal project in Argentina. 
d) Thus I ask what are the lessons from the experiences of newly poor Argentineans’ 
involvement in social movements so that involvement in collective action can be stimulated
and the momentum that radical social movements gain during an organic crisis of capitalism11
like that in Argentina during 2001-02 does not fade away once hegemonic control by the 
dominant class is restored? What are the implications for social movements now, in terms of 
how they should seek to mobilise newly impoverished citizens and what kind of mobilising 
vehicles and strategies are most likely to succeed in furthering emancipatory aims (Chapters 5 
and 10)?
                                                            
10Often used to describe the social uprisings that occurred during 19th and 20thDecember 2001. However, it 
should be noted that the term is often deliberately avoided by left-wing scholars and commentators for its 
exaggerated and misleading revolutionary signifiers.In reality the 2001 uprising did not represent a 
‘revolutionary moment,’because a situation of ‘dual power’ did not exist (Astarita, 2008). Further, the uprisings 
had their roots in a series of territorialised protests against neo-liberalism in Argentina in the 1980s and 1990s so 
were part of the cycle of contentious politics rather than a one-off, spontaneous event. Nevertheless, the term is 
occasionally used in this thesis for want of an alternative way to describe the very specific events of those two 
days.
11Whereby social classes detatch themselves from the elite institutions of political power.
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e) Finally, I build upon Nilsen’s (2009) and Barker’s (2008) valiant efforts to construct a 
Marxist theory of social movements which as yet have been surprisingly neglected by Marxist 
academics (chapters 3 and 10). 
In Chapter 6, the Data Collection procedures and methodology are outlined before the results 
are discussed in Chapters 7, 8 and 9. I conclude the thesis in Chapter10, with an assessment 
of the implications of the research findings for the Argentinean new urban poor. I also offer a
theoretical framework, which can be used to help identify and explain under what 
circumstances the new urban poor respond to material hardship by either enacting economic 
coping strategies or resorting to political protest, in both their individual and collective forms. 
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CHAPTER 2 - CONCEPTUALISATION OF NEW POVERTY AND ITS 
INTERNATIONAL AND ARGENTINEANCONTEXT
Concerns about the emerging phenomenon of new poverty were originally discussed in 
Western Europe in the 1980s as a consequence of the end of welfare capitalism and the goal 
of ‘full-employment.’ As economies in the European Community experienced restructuring 
and moved towards the neoliberal model, unemployment rose substantially from 2.4% in 
1973 to 11% in 1989 (Castel, 1995). Its twelve member-states also soon experienced a 
combined increase in the number of their citizens living in poverty from 38. 6m in 1975 to 49. 
3m in 1985 (O’Higgins & Jenkins, 1989). As widespread, long-term joblessness became a 
permanent feature of the social landscape, it prompted a reconfiguration of the existing 
welfare state. This, in tandem with the ideological turn towards neo-liberalism, was 
transformed and went from providing universal welfare coverage to targeting beneficiaries. 
As many people lost traditional social protections or their household’s main source of 
income, it became clear that poverty was no longer simply a problem for vulnerable groups 
that had always received social protection such as the fractionally unemployed, the elderly or
families with large numbers of children. Instead, poverty was now affecting much broader 
sectors for the first time, including people of working age, single-parent families and middle-
class households with high levels of personal debt (Kessler & Di Virgilio, 2008:33). 
In this chapter, the international origins of new urban poverty are examined in more detail
and the way that it was subsequently conceptualised by early theorists is outlined. Following 
this, I begin to introduce the Argentinean case study as the focus of this thesis and in
particular I describe the processes by which its citizens became poor in three distinct ‘waves’
during the last thirty years. 
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2.1 The International Origins of New Urban Poverty under Neo-liberalism
By the late-1980sthe consequences of a decade of neoliberal reforms in Western Europe and 
North America had led many economists and sociologists to conclude that poverty was 
becoming a more fluid condition that households could slip in and out of (Katzman, 1989). 
Whilst marketisation sometimes created upward social mobility, the combination of external 
shocks, (continued cycles of economic crisis that were triggered by events such as the 1973 
oil shock or the 1992 Exchange Rate Mechanism crisis in Europe) and internal shocks to the 
household (due to wide-scale unemployment, the removal of welfare safety nets, etc) meant 
that periods of upward mobility were sometimes followed by episodes of acute decline in 
living standards and pauperisation. 
Katzman also observed that those in the middle class who enjoyed comfortable lifestyles yet 
had been subject to financial shocks as a result of loss of work, illness or divorce for example, 
often became so accustomed to luxury consumption patterns that they found it difficult to
reduce their expenditure in accordance with their recently reduced incomes. This often meant
that they soon moved from being moderately off to being vulnerable to impoverishment, as
savings erode and they assumed greater indebtedness (Dorling, 2010:120). Although such 
individuals convinced themselves that they were being frugal, in reality they become 
increasingly ‘poor’ as they feel that they have to maintain their dignity and social standing, 
and spent what they could not afford in the process by continuing to take overseas holidays 
rather than cancelling them, travelling around in their car as opposed to cheaper public 
transport, or dining out with friends in restaurants instead of saving money by cooking at 
home. Dorling also explained that indebtedness can thus perpetuate itself and intensify the 
impoverishment process, as households descend into ever-decreasing levels of social 
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existence, which he describes as the process of moving from ‘vulnerable’ to ‘poor,’ then from 
poor to ‘core poor.’
Meanwhile, across Western Europe and the Anglo-speaking West, governments were elected 
that pursued Thatcherite and Reganist agendas to varying degrees during the 1980s and 
1990s. Structural adjustment and the policies of economic ‘liberalisation’ which were 
implemented created unprecedented aggregate wealth in these societies and a flourishing but 
relatively small ‘new middle class.’ However, for many others, these policies of privatising 
state industries, drastically reducing public spending (Pressman, 2007) and attacking the 
power of trade unions (Katzman, 1999) resulted in rising vulnerability and pauperisation 
(Pizarro, 2001). In addition, the primary institutions of socialisation - like the family and 
community – deteriorated, and social problems logically followed (Filgueira, 1999; Katzman, 
1999). Pensions shrank and social security disappeared as universal welfare was withdrawn 
(Katzman, 2000; Minujín, 1998), and mass unemployment became a feature of the social 
landscape (Pressman, 2007). 
The first attempts to conceptualise new poverty were made in response to an appeal from 
Ruben Katzman (1989) at the UN’s Economic Commission for Latin America and the 
Caribbean (CEPAL) for the development of a conceptual model that could encapsulate the 
differential impact of neo-liberal economic reforms on those households that had recently 
been pauperised and which distinguished them from the structurally poor. 
This call was answered by the Argentinean sociologist Alberto Minujín and his colleagues 
when they wrote Cuesta Abajo [Going Downhill] in 1993. In this groundbreaking work, the 
authors profiled a socio-demographic group (whom they christened ‘new urban poor’), which 
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had fallen into income poverty during the early-1990s global recession but which, despite
sharing a number of social problems with the structural poor derived from their recent 
hardship (low-incomes, unemployment or underemployment, difficulties with social 
integration and deteriorating personal relationships), also possessed distinct personal 
characteristics from their non-poor pasts and comparatively superior social, cultural and 
physical capital assets. These heavily impacted on their behaviour when adjusting to their 
new social reality. Accordingly, and influenced by these distinct life experiences and the 
middle-class habitus (Bourdieu, 1977) that shaped their cultural values, attitudes and beliefs, 
it was found that they responded in a different way from the long-term poor once they were 
pauperised in terms of their consumer responses, labour trajectories and lifestyle choices. 
These qualitative features included having their basic needs satisfied (Minujín, 1995:159),
adequate housing conditions, high nutritional standards as well as access to water, gas and an 
electricity supply, possessing superior levels of education and employment experience (often 
in a managerial or professional capacity) and being accustomed to conspicuous rather than 
subsistence consumption habits (Kliksberg, 2000:105). More recent sources have detected a 
preference for proactive responses to dealing with their hardship (especially labour market 
reinsertion), rather than immediate, adaptive, consumer-orientated measures, which tend to be 
favoured by the structurally poor (Lokshin & Yemtsov, 2004). Other sources suggest that 
newly impoverished people tend to try to retain elements of symbolic cultural capital, such as 
private education or membership of an exclusive country club, even to the detriment of more 
immediate health needs in order to maintain a pretence that ‘all is well’ to their peers (Kessler 
& Di Virgilio, 2008:41). It has also been found that they often reject charitable or state aid,
despite having fallen below the breadline, because they do not want to be seen as ‘good for 
nothings’ (Aguirre, 2008:49-54). 
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Minujín’s model thus provided a welcome effort to construct a more comprehensive analysis 
of the increasingly complex nature of poverty. Although designed initially as a means by 
which the impact of Washington Consensus policies upon the middle sectors in Latin 
America could be scrutinised (Salas & Sains, 2006:100), its application was also useful for 
societies that had undergone similar restructuring in the West. A key hypothesis of this thesis 
is that the possession of these differentiated capital assets and life experiences did not just 
mould new poor citizens’ coping strategies in Argentina in 2001-02 but their distinctive 
protest behaviours too. 
Figure 2.1 below, illustrates how impoverishment becomes more demographically 
heterogeneous in societies that either suffer from macroeconomic shocks, experience a retreat 
of the welfare state, encounter reduced public spending or face increased unemployment. It
reflects the changing composition of poverty in Latin America during the 1980s and 1990s. 
Area A represents the size of the structural poor (who live below the poverty line and also 
have unsatisfied basic needs). They are joined below the (diagonal) income poverty line by 
those in Area C – who despite being income impoverished have their basic needs satisfied. 
Area B represents the non-poor (usually the majority of the population). The main 
transformation between time period 1 (pre-shock) and time period 2 (post-shock) is that Area 
C increases in size (C1 to C2) as those who ‘have their basic needs satisfied’ and are often 
(but not always) middle class, swell the ranks of the poor. The increase in the size of Area C 
from C1 to C2 represents those who have become ‘new poor’ as a result. 
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Figure 2.1 – Growth of New Impoverishment after Economic Shocks
Source: Adapted from Minujín 1995:159-160
Another reason that social scientists identified for the growth in new urban poverty was that 
from North America and Western Europe to Latin America, anti-poverty initiatives in the 
neo-liberal age had consistently targeted the structural poor but neglected the vulnerable non-
poor. Minujín et al’s (1993) conceptualisation of the new urban poor social stratum therefore 
served as a plea to policy-makers to also consider the qualitative characteristics of both the 
non-poor who were susceptible to impoverishment, and the recently pauperised, alongside the 
structurally or long-term poor when designing future welfare initiatives. Enacting new 
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policies that utilise the sophisticated capital assets that the new urban poor possess in 
abundance would aid their recuperation more effectively than existing policies that have 
failed to distinguish between whether the impoverished household being targeted resides for
example on a council estate/in a shantytown or if they are home-owners in a gentrified 
neighbourhood. Or, to use another example, whether the household in question was full of 
unskilled labourers who have not worked for ten years, or consist of a highly-educated 
married couple whose business has gone into liquidation. 
Writing in the early-1990s, it was easy to see why the early new poverty and transition-
country theorists were optimistic that the recently pauperised would soon recover their prior 
socio-economic status (Silverman & Yanowitch, 2000). The chaos that was unfolding in 
Eastern Europe during the transition to capitalism sparked mass impoverishment, but this was 
expected to dissipate once ‘inefficiencies’ had been cleared from the system (ibid.). However, 
outside of the former command economies, in capitalist states, it was also anticipated that 
new poverty would be of a temporary nature because it was felt that those affected by it 
would be able to use their superior capital assets to quickly recover once economic growth 
was restored (Minujín, 1995). Yet, sadly over a decade later, the appeals that they made for 
revised policy initiatives have remained largely unheeded, so whilst some programmes have 
been effective in lifting large numbers of people out of poverty, an equally large group have 
been pauperised according to the UNDP (2004). Many of the new urban poor do of course 
emerge from poverty and retrieve their old positions, but others fail to do so and become 
increasingly marginalised in the longer term (Tikhonova, 2004:142). 
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2.2 The Emergence of New Urban Poverty in Argentina since the 1980s and Post-2001
This research concerns itself specifically with the actions that were taken by those in 
households that became impoverished during the 2002 economic crisis. However, this 
episode was merely the most recent of three severe ‘waves’ of impoverishment in the country 
that date back to the late-1970s. Each of these waves can be understood as having emanated 
from the replacement of the country’s traditional Import-Substitution Industrialisation (ISI) 
development model12 with successive ‘stages’ of the neoliberal project. Known in Latin 
America as the New Economic Model (NEM), this three-phase process was replicated across 
the continent. Although the IMF claimed that such action was required to ‘save’ Latin 
America from economic volatility and the Debt Crisis, critics argue that it was in fact a 
politically motivated project (Green, 2003:28). 
The process entailed 1) an initial period of macroeconomic stabilisation through the reduction 
of public deficits, 2) A second stage, which consolidated upon the first and involved the 
enactment of structural adjustment reforms so as to open the economy up to trade, 
privatisation and financial liberalisation, 3) A third and final stage, which sought to attract 
overseas investment and increase productivity (Bulmer-Thomas, 1996:1). Although the NEM 
was ‘agreed’ between the World Bank, IMF and the continent’s respective national political 
leaderships, many commentators contest that the latter were subject to enormous external
pressure (especially as they recalled the numerous western-backed coup d’états of the 1970s 
                                                            
12A nationalist economic development policy under which high tariffs were placed on imported goods so as to 
encourage autarky and domestic production.It was most famously (although not initially) pursued by General 
Juan Peron during his first Presidential term, between 1946 and 1952.
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and 80s) to impose fiscal, monetary and political discipline so that in reality they had little 
choice but to accept these measures (Green, 2003). 
At the time the NEM was conceived three decades ago, Argentina boasted the largest and
most influential middle class in the region. Having prospered under ISI since the 1930s 
(Wirth, 2001), the fortunes of its middle sectors began to dwindle during the late-1970s and 
early-1980s when the military Junta which seized power from Isabel Peron, initiated the first 
stage of the NEM. By freezing public sector wages to control inflation, the first ‘wave’ of 
new poverty was unleashed, the eventual consequences of which were so severe that real-
terms salaries plummeted by 40% between 1980 and 1990 (Kessler & Di Virgilio, 2008). A 
second, less discernible but equally damaging wave of downward social mobility followed in 
the 1990s, as a consequence of President Menem’s neoliberal economic reforms and 
structural adjustment that ‘squeezed’ the middle class during that decade (Grimson &Kessler, 
2005:87). 
Most recently during the 2001-02 crisis, a more sudden and profound third wave of mass 
impoverishment was sparked by capital flight, sovereign debt default and currency 
devaluation as GDP plummeted 20% between 1998 and 2002 (INDEC). It was during this 
period that the Corralito13 was implemented by the government, when savers were either 
denied access to their personal savings or had a large proportion of them confiscated by the 
banks in a similar way to the problems faced by depositors in Cyprus in 2013. Given that this 
                                                            
13Translates as ‘play pen’ in Spanish and is used to describe Minister of the Economy Domingo Cavallo’s 1st 
December 2001 Decree that the banks restrict depositor’s withdrawals to $250 per week for a period of 90 days 
in order to prevent a run on the banks when Argentina defaulted on repaying its sovereign debt.Meanwhile, the 
Corralón refers to the enforced conversion of savers’ dollar deposits into Argentinean pesos after the currency 
devaluation.These savings consequently lost up to three times their original value (Blustein, 2005), meaning that 
many Argentineansforfeited thousands of dollars in life savings.
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happened at the height of a severe recession, the impact was exacerbated further, as the 
principal safety net that many citizens would have otherwise relied upon to avert 
impoverishment was denied to them. 
Unemployment soared to 21.5% in May 2002 according to the Argentinean Ministry of 
Labour (in Fiszbein et al. 2003), thousands of businesses closed and in the urban centres, 
poverty rose from 38.3% in October 2001 to 53% in May 2002 (ibid. 2003). With millions 
falling into poverty, the middle class was almost extinguished overnight. The monumental 
scale and profundity of the economic crisis in 2001-02 was unprecedented in Argentinean 
history and unlike the North American new urban poor, who had their parents’ or 
grandparents’ experiences of the Great Depression to draw upon to help them to 
psychologically cope with such sudden impoverishment, the Argentinean middle class (who 
were largely second or third generation immigrants) had witnessed three generations of 
upward mobility, so knew nothing other than greater prosperity than their parents (Kessler & 
Di Virgilio, 2008:40). As Shutz describes, with no ‘stock of knowledge’ (1987) about how to 
deal with impoverishment, unlike the traditional poor, the new urban poor suffered not only 
economic poverty but also the painful psychological effects of their newfound situations. 
The extent to which Argentineans were subject to proletarianisation and social descent into 
the working class during the shift towards neo-liberalism also becomes apparent in the 
following figures. It is estimated that the size of the country’s middle class (using one’s 
occupation among the professions and as small business owners as the criteria) peaked at 
47.4% of the population in 1980, but slumped to 32% by 1991 during the ‘Lost Decade’ 
(when economic growth in Latin America stagnated), before dipping further to just 21% by 
2001 (Torrado, 2005:1085). In this thesis, the term ‘working class’ will refer to those who 
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have to sell their labour power for a wage that makes profit for someone else, and whom do 
not control the means of production (or have control over their own working practices), whilst 
those in the middle class are highly autonomous professionals, small and medium-sized 
business owners and those who make a living based on the labour of others. 
Figure 2.2 illustrates how ‘new poverty’ became a prominent feature of the Argentinean socio-
economic landscape. It conveys a transformation in the country’s poverty map, with its ‘poor’ 
population no longer simply being restricted to those with unsatisfied basic needs, but from 
1991 onwards - and especially after the 2001-02 crisis - also those who were increasingly likely 
to become income poor, while having their basic needs fulfilled. The Unsatisfied Basic Needs 
figures are taken from INDEC’s periodic survey data to assess housing conditions, education 
levels and employment dependency ratios within households as an indicator of ‘structural 
poverty. 14’Therefore the space above this line on the graph (but below the ‘percentage under 
the poverty line’ one) represents where ‘new urban poor’ households are situated. Although
‘new poverty’ remains a largely temporary and cyclical phenomenon from which citizens are 
eventually largely reabsorbed into the labour market, a third of Argentineans still belong to the 
‘impoverished middle class’ today and approximately one million who descended into poverty 
during the 2001-02 crisis remain so, in spite of the strong macroeconomic recovery since 2003 
(Grupo CCR, 2009). 
                                                            
14See the Encuesta Permanente de Hogares (EPH) http://www.indec.gov.ar
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Figure 2.2: Argentinean Population under the Poverty Line but with Basic Needs Satisfied: 
1974-2006
Source: Aguirre, 2008
In this chapter I have traced the international origins of new poverty to the neoliberal 
processes that were practiced in the West since the late-1970s and identified the three waves 
of the phenomenon in Argentina since the implementation of the Washington Consensus and 
New Economic Model. The most recent and severe of these waves was that which followed 
the economic crisis in 2001-02. The need to re-conceptualise poverty in light of structural 
adjustment in the 1980s and 1990sand its consequent impoverishment of millions of non-poor 
citizens whom possessed superior capital assets, home ownership, higher education and 
distinct life experiences was highlighted. The importance of distinguishing ‘new’ from 
‘structural’ poor in order to enact suitable policy responses in each case was discussed, 
because it is these differentiated characteristics that mean that the coping strategies enacted 
when pauperised are profoundly different. In the next chapter I begin to consider how the 
middle-class backgrounds, beliefs and ways of life that such citizens possess may also 
contribute towards explaining their distinctive attitudes towards collective and protest 
behaviours which thus characterised Argentinean new poor responses to the crisis in 2001-02. 
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CHAPTER 3 - RESISTING PAUPERISATION: BETWEEN SELF-IMPROVEMENT 
AND PROTEST ACTIONS IN THE PRIVATE AND PUBLIC REALMS15
In this theoretical chapter, the ways in which pauperisation has been or can be confronted are 
examined. Attention initially turns to how these responses have been classified in the 
literature before the question is posed about why academic research on the subject has seldom 
previously been framed in terms of the whether citizens engage in economic self-
improvement strategies or political protest actions. As noted in the opening Chapters, one of 
the focuses of this research is to explore the generative factors that contributed to the political 
mobilisation of newly poor citizens in 2002. I therefore provide an overview of the key social 
movement theories that frame these collective and politicised responses. The production of 
empirical research about social movements and involvement in political protest has been one 
of the scholarly growth industries in western social science in the last thirty years (McAdam 
et al., 1996:2), but some of the deficiencies of these elite social movement theories are 
outlined here and the case is made for the need to develop a Marxist theory of social 
movements. The thesis’ Gramscian theoretical framework is then articulated and his concept 
of ‘hegemony’ is adopted to help to account for how new poor citizens responded to their 
social descent at the time. 
During the peak of Argentina’s economic crisis, the opportunities available to engage in 
income-generating activities were severely restricted, not just because of the scarcity of 
available work but also the acute shortage of currency in circulation following the limits 
                                                            
15Note that the terms ‘coping’ and ‘self-improvement’ strategies are used interchangeably in this thesis.
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placed on cash withdrawals during the Corralito. This meant that there was no flow of 
liquidity from which to actually earn or spend ‘money,’ which arguably prompted households
to move beyond the traditional parameters of self-contained survival strategies towards 
cooperation with others in the community to achieve self-improvement such as the barter 
clubs (Bombal, 2002). 
Concurrently, the political crisis of legitimacy that followed three years of economic 
mismanagement by the government and a series of high profile corruption cases stirred up a 
cauldron of distrust in the political establishment, which was viewed as incompetent and self-
serving. Argentina’s traditional ‘delegative democracy’ model of political participation 
(O’Donnell, 1994:55-69) was also strongly criticised, due to the fact that it offered little
accountability and few mechanisms for active citizen involvement in the democratic process
between elections. These all became key grievances of the movement. 
Whilst it must be recognised that many new urban poor did not take part in any collective 
actions at all, a significant proportion of the impoverished middle class were deeply involved 
in both its protest and self-improvement forms, including those which overthrew four 
Presidents in two weeks in late-2001 and early-2002 (López-Levy, 2004:98-101). Their 
participation in cacerolazos, escraches (pickets of banks and judicial institutions by savers 
who had their money confiscated in the Corralito) and neighbourhood assemblies are just 
some examples of the collective actions that erupted around the country during this period in 
which impoverished middle-class citizens became the protagonists (López-Levy, 2003). 
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3.1 Classifying Responses to New Urban Poverty in Argentina and its Limitations
This thesis focuses on whether the new urban poor chose to engage in a) self-improvement or 
protest activities and b) if these actions were taken individually or collectively. Academic
research that frames new urban poor responses in this way has not been conducted before. 
Prior to examining the relevant literature and formulating hypotheses about the research 
questions outlined in the Introduction, the four overarching categories of response must be 
defined in terms of their constituent actions. Table 1 lists how responses are classified in the 
thesis. 
Table 1 – Classification of Different Response Actions in Argentina During 2002
RESPONSE CATEGORY INDICATORS OF ACTION
INDIVIDUAL SELF-
IMPROVEMENT
Work, self-employment/business, rent or dividends, receipt 
of gifts from non-household members, income from 
redundancy or insurance, taking up a pension, receiving 
charitable aid, privately exchanging goods, buying on trust, 
loans from friends/family, bank loans, savings, obtaining 
credit, sale or pawn of assets, becoming a cartonero16, 




School soup kitchen, public soup kitchen, communal 
purchasing, barter clubs, bric-a-bracs, cooperative collective 
business, neighbourhood job centre, community fundraising, 
babysitting, negotiating for public welfare, public works 
projects, communal occupation of buildings, communal 
security
INDIVIDUAL PROTEST Voting
COLLECTIVE PROTEST Cacerolazos, strikes, neighbourhood/popular assemblies, 
pickets, demonstrations, public meetings, protests organised 
by a church or social group or other collective protests such 
as internet use
                                                            
16‘A cardboard collector’ – whereby businesses and local councils pay people to rummage through public waste
to search for cardboard and other recyclable materials.
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This research recognises that new urban poor household members may have been motivated 
to participate in any of the above actions for a range of different reasons. Indeed, motivations 
are often multidimensional and driven by a blend of self-interest, altruism, idealism or 
collective concerns. For example, the members of one household may have joined a barter 
club as part of an idealistic project to help the community (North, 2010), while another may 
have done so purely due to the need for individual survival (Seyfang, 2001:989). For 
statistical purposes and to maintain face validity, the actions above have been categorised in 
accordance with how they were described17 by the ISCA Survey’s designers - OPSM, a
market research agency that collected data on the World Bank’s behalf (see Table 1). Thus,
in characterising the action as ‘individual, collective, protest or self-improvement,’ in this 
way, the subjective reasons that survey respondents may have ascribed to their own 
participation (but which were not actually recorded in the data itself), are removed from the 
equation. 
Particular actions have therefore been categorised objectively - as ‘collective’ if the action 
itself involves a ‘joint commitment’ to a single outcome by multiple households, whereby 
each individual plays their part in making it happen (Gilbert, 1989). In other words, they are 
actions which are not reducible to individual intentionality (Searle, 1990). For instance, the 
goal of a ‘barter club’ is for multiple households to gain from it because each relies on the 
production of goods and services by another participant, in order for the exchange to take 
place. In cases in which individual households pursue their particular goals independently of 
those of other households (such as in the receipt of state aid), they are deemed to be 
                                                            
17 The only difference was that the Survey referred to what I call collective actions, as ‘community’ strategies.
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‘individual’ responses. These usually take place in physical isolation (like a voting booth or 
an office) and could be performed regardless of the participation of others. 
Similarly in terms of defining ‘self-improvement’ or ‘protest’ actions, they are classified as 
the former here only if the action itself seeks immediate material enrichment. In reality, all 
protest ultimately seeks self-improvement (unless one protests on behalf of a third party) but 
if those desired improvements need to initially traverse a political stage through the process 
of ‘demand-making’ to a third-party authority (Lipsky, 1968: 1145), then they are judged here 
to be ‘protests.’ For example, participation in a strike involves such a process, so is 
understood to constitute a protestaction even though its ultimate goal is ‘self-improvement’. 
In addition, self-improvement actions are categorised here as only those that encompass 
‘proactive’ strategies, in the sense that they either create additional resources for the 
household or make increased use of their available physical, financial and human assets. 
‘Reactive’ strategies, in which households respond by simply reducing consumption (Lokshin 
& Yemtsov, 2004), are not considered in this research. This decision was taken firstly on the 
basis that passively reducing one’s spending does not constitute ‘self-improvement’ and 
secondly because from a policy perspective, what is of interest is to observe how the new 
urban poor and middle class utilise their superior capital assets relative to the structural poor -
to enact strategies that enable them to escape poverty (Sumarto et al, 1998). 
Voting responses were taken from LatinoBarómetro and recorded as ‘Individual Protest’ 
because such data was unavailable from ISCA. Further, it should be noted that the range of 
responses under observation are limited by the questions asked in the surveys themselves. 
These almost exclusively asked participants about ‘formal’ ways of organising their political, 
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social and economic strategies, whilst informal expressions of protest or survival were simply 
overlooked. For example, no data was available about looting, graffiti or other cultural 
protest actions, nor about criminal activity (which can be understood as a form of highly 
individualised protest against one’s financial circumstances or alternatively as an individual 
self-help activity), or even acts such as dissenting conversations in which dissident views 
were expressed. These forms may all have served as important examples of individual protest 
or self-help action in their own right but cannot be accounted for in the Survey results. 
3.2 Dominant Myths: The Eternal Economic Boom and Middle-Class Political Docility
In Section 1.2, I considered the breadth of literature covering responses to pauperisation and 
the research gap that was identified in terms of understanding the new poor as potentially 
political agents who also engage in protest as a means of confronting hardship. The paucity 
of such sources can be ascribed to the prevalence of two myths which have until very 
recently, convincingly dismissed the potential for protest responses from the middle classes, 
thus seeming to render such investigation unnecessary and irrelevant for Western societies. 
The first of these myths was the misguided belief that major macroeconomic shocks in the 
advanced capitalist economies had become a thing of the past and that there were therefore no 
grounds to suppose that sudden and widespread outbreaks of impoverishment – a precursor 
for mass political resistance to capitalism – could occur. In particular, following sixteen 
successive years of annual growth in the US and UK between 1993 and 2008, it was widely 
believed among politicians, academics and economists that the US-led housing market bubble 
and deficit-led boom would continue unabated in the West(Wade, 2009b). For example, 
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when the sub-prime mortgage crisis began to hit the financial sector, Alan Greenspan, Head 
of the Federal Reserve admitted that he ‘really didn’t get it until late in 2005’ (Wroughton, 
2007), whilst on the other side of the Atlantic, between them, former British Prime Minister 
Tony Blair and then Chancellor of the Exchequer Gordon Brown publically made no less than 
sixteen separate references to the fact that the Labour Government had ‘ended the cycle of 
boom and bust’ between 1997 and 2007 (HM Treasury Records; Parliamentary and Labour 
Party Annual Conference archives). 
Yet, this myth definitively lost credibility during the current global crisis of capitalism. 
Moreover, based on the premises that i) the impact of the global credit crunch is expected to 
endure for many years in Western societies (Avgouleas, 2009), ii) the IMF has stated that 
even after the global economy begins to recover, growth will remain low (Felsenthal, 2009) 
and iii) soaring national debt will lead to long-term public spending cuts and high interest 
rates (Laubach & Williams, 2003), it is almost certain that conspicuous consumption – a key 
tenet of middle-class identity construction – a will be significantly curtailed for a generation. 
In addition, millions of middle-income and professional households in the West are being and 
will be exposed to the threat of impoverishment (Roubini 2008; Warren 2007). 
The second myth was that, even if something were to go ‘terribly wrong’ and the middle class 
were to experience mass pauperisation or downward mobility, those in this class would 
acquiesce and, unlike the organised working class, would ‘go quietly’, confining themselves 
to private and passive response measures. It was assumed that extra-parliamentary middle-
class discontent would be channelled through campaigning structures such as established 
NGOs or would be reduced to protest voting at elections. For example, a June 2008 
Euromonitor International Report (Eghbol, 2008) on how Western Europe’s middle class has 
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been squeezed by inflation, stagnant wages and the credit crunch concluded that because 
‘middle-class workers’ are less likely to be trade union members, they ‘are most likely to 
express their frustration through the ballot box.’
Neo-liberalism and its advocates understand humans as exclusively rational economic agents 
and thus tend to ignore or dismiss the social and political impacts of economic shocks, 
focusing purely on economic coping strategies at individual or household level. Further, 
authors such as Phelps Brown (1990) – who have suggested that there has been a shift away 
from the principles of collectivism toward acquisitive individualism in terms of how people 
defend themselves against attacks on their material conditions – are selective in the national 
examples that they refer to in reaching such a conclusion. 
In other words, cross-national contextual differences can be identified to help explain whether 
pauperised middle-class citizens respond to their circumstances in terms of either self-
improvement or protest actions, depending upon the extent to which respective regimes are 
able to enact defensive strategies of control in order to maintain consent to rule from the 
population. To use Hirschman’s terminology (1970), it must be noted that the preference for 
the new urban poor to enact ‘loyalty actions’ (those that support the existing regime by
seeking to preserve the status quo) or ‘exit actions’(whereby citizens merely adapt to the 
changing situation in a politically ‘passive’ way), rather than ‘voice responses’– by which 
they actively speak out against the policy of the ruling regime, or oppose it through protest –
can largely be explained by the mitigating power structures and political processes that are 
specific to country contexts (Rucht, 1992). 
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For example, in South Africa in the immediate post-Apartheid era during the mid-1990s, the 
tens of thousands of White ‘new urban poor’ who had lost their jobs as a result of ‘affirmative 
action’ legislation which imposed a legal obligation upon companies to favour Black job 
applicants, were paradoxically greeted with ‘anticipatory compliance’ despite causing great 
anxiety and resentment (Kanya, 1997:32). Far from outwardly protesting their anger, the 
overwhelming response from highly-skilled, White professional South Africans came in the 
form of ‘exit strategies,’ namely emigration or early retirement. This lack of political 
resistance to confront their downward social mobility needs to be contextualised in a 
particular society where these policies were universally understood to be a remedial strategy 
to address the legal and historical exclusion of the Black majority. 
Meanwhile in Russia, in the wake of the 1998 financial crisis, a significant part of the middle
class was afflicted by the painful experience of proletarianisation. Yet, the defensive 
strategies which were enacted by the ruling elite included a combination of physical coercion
(to break the few strikes and roadblocks that were conducted by, in particular, teachers, 
doctors, pensioners and scientists at the time) with appeasement, as Yvgeny Primakov was 
appointed Prime Minister in order to unite the country’s political elites. In addition, the 
fundamentally minimalist form of democracy that evolved during the transition from state 
socialism to capitalism has resulted in a weak civil society and acute lack of available 
opportunities for the new urban poor to manifest their political discontent. Here, a lack of 
credible alternatives to capitalism – given the discrediting of communism – and an overriding 
sense of powerlessness have led to widespread alienation among the country’s new urban 
poor. Rather than fuelling action, discontent with their own quality of life after the 1998 
crisis translated into either self-blame or political apathy among Russian citizens who 
principally seek private solutions to collective problems. It was found that only 3% were 
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prepared to join a protest march at the time, just 8% would sign a petition and, where ‘voice’ 
was expressed, it was manifest ‘silently,’ through the ballot box (25%) (Willie, 2001:222). 
Evidence from numerous other countries in recent years demonstrates that impoverished 
households do consider engaging in political protest actions alongside simply pursuing 
economic self-improvement strategies. Iceland was the most developed country in the world 
in 2007 according to the UN Human Development Index, and median household income was 
almost US$70,000 - 1. 6 times that in the United States. Its people were also the happiest in 
the world (World Values Survey, 2006). Yet in late 2008, thousands of impoverished middle-
class citizens rose up to overthrow their government during the Kitchenware Revolution 
(Wade, 2009a). The Indignados movement made up of largely white-collar, young and 
highly qualified people who occupied city squares throughout Spain in 2011 and 2012, and 
the ongoing rebellion against austerity and pauperisation in Greece, are other cases in point 
that have laid this second myth of middle-class docility to rest. These country examples 
negate the myth of middle-class political docility but also attest to Galbraith’s warning in The 
Culture of Contentment (1992), that those who belong to it in industrialised societies would 
only continue to tolerate gross income inequality and the prolonged destitution of what he 
called ‘the functional underclass’ – with whom they would refuse to negotiate class alliances 
– for as long as it was in their self-interest to do so. 
3.3 The Poverty of Elite Social Movement Theories: Towards an Open Marxist Framework
Now the case has been made that economic crisis, mass pauperisation and middle-class 
political rebellions are all real and highly significant issues, I attempt to explain new urban 
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poor political mobilisation using the existing elite social movement theories: Rational Choice 
Theory (RCT), Resource Mobilisation Theory (RMT) and Political Process Theory (PPT). 
However, in this section I describe how all these theories have been found to be deeply 
flawed, both intellectually and empirically - in this instance, when they are applied to the 
Argentinean uprisings of 2001-02. Following the evaluation of these, I attempt to construct a 
Marxist theory of social movements that overcomes the theoretical deficits described. 
3.3.1 Rational Choice Theory
(RCT) explains that people choose the action that they think is best to maximise individual 
wellbeing from a given set of feasible options, and that these actions are independent of each 
other. However, it is more appropriate to understand that structural forces shape the spaces 
available for agency. Individual agents are never truly ‘free’ to make their own decisions, 
because these are subject to the logic and constraints of the capitalist system. Therefore, the 
action that is eventually decided upon is made as the outcome of opposing pressures that 
create and constrain opportunities to act in other ways. Rather than existing independently of 
each other, these pressures are in fact shaped by each other (Elster, 1986: 25), so that the 
resulting action occurs as the outcome of a ‘balance of forces’. 
Rational Choice assumptions have also been criticised as atomistic and over-individualistic 
(Kelly & Breinlinger, 1996), because such an approach assumes that (impoverished) citizens 
exist in a social vacuum, so discounting the possibility that they may develop a sense of 
shared identity, forge collective grievances with others who have also become poor, or 
recognize the power that solidarity and collective action could have in resisting their social 
descent (Tajfel & Turner, 1986). Citizens then seek to advance these interests by using both 
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collective economic and collective political channels (McCoy, 1980). When this occurs, the 
subsequent articulation of political demands is typically expressed through collective protests 
to government, judicial and financial authorities (Lipsky, 1968). Therefore, in order to fully 
understand the impact of economic crisis and subsequent impoverishment, it is necessary to 
acknowledge that economic processes cannot be divorced from the social and political 
consequences that they reap. 
Nor can the rationale for joining protest movements be limited to questions of self-survival; it 
can also be a manifestation of political expression and feelings of “solidarity” and “hope.”
The protest movements in 2001-02 were characterised by an expansive political edge and
were inspired by the ideas of autonomy, removal of hierarchy and the promotion of horizontal 
decision-making (Dinerstein, 2007), as the people demanded the removal of the entire 
political class. ‘Economic’ strategies of resistance must therefore be analysed alongside 
“political” resistance and protest. The question of how these theoretical considerations have 
played out in Argentina is elaborated upon later. 
A further linkage between these self-improvement and protest responses is that under liberal-
democratic regimes, protest will only ever achieve limited material enrichment, due to the fact 
that the realm of legitimate political contestation is limited to the existing boundaries that are 
established and reproduced through the system’s liberal-democratic structures, such as 
parliament, trade unions and lobby groups. Politics is deemed to ‘happen’ only in these 
spaces (Santos & Avritzer, 2005) and citizens are socialised into conforming to the status quo 
as liberal-democratic power relations become naturalised in citizens’ minds (Williams, 1977: 
100). Therefore, after a certain period of protest and when concessions are gained, (or the 
movement is crushed or dies away) the expectation is to resort to ‘self-improvement 
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strategies’ in order to achieve further material gain. For these reasons neither protest nor self-
improvement actions are usually sufficient to satisfy material wants on their own, but the 
decision to participate in either one or the other can be dependent on how effective 
involvement in the alternative action has been. 
Based on work by Powers (1999:525), one proposition that will be tested later is how this 
relationship between economic self-improvement and political protest actions is reinforced 
when one considers that material interests are more likely to become ‘political’ when citizens 
are unable to find sufficient mechanisms to cope with pauperisation. Tolerance of one’s 
economic hardship will decline when coping strategies are undermined or when social, 
economic and political contexts shape citizens’ evaluation of their material interests and 
either help or hinder them seeing their material conditions in political terms. Indeed, as Marx 
and Engels explain in The Holy Family (1844), when human agents are forced into 
recognising that the potential for their capacities to flourish has been constrained and they are 
less able to fulfil the needs to which they are accustomed, rather than developing new, more 
sophisticated needs (something which until that point has become human nature to them), 
they instead experience deteriorating quality of life and, so downwardly reconfigure their 
needs (akin to ‘adaptive coping strategies’). This reconfiguration of needs is something 
which is acutely painful to accept and can generate demoralisation, as well as feelings of 
anger and the desire for resistance but that this depends upon the political, economic and 
social contexts in which their circumstances have occurred. It is only after reflection upon 
this context that they decide how best to confront their economic (mis)fortunes and consider 
the extent to which they understand themselves to be at fault for their own impoverishment or 
whether others are deemed to be responsible, given the existing social and political climate. 
If the latter is decided upon, then they observe to what extent they are able to undertake 
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specifically non-economic (political) responses to their economic decline. Where one is 
analysing national political or economic contexts in which it is perceived that the dominant 
class has lost the consent to rule and sufficient political spaces exist to respond in alternative 
ways, actions that would have played out in the economic realm become ‘political’. 
3.3.2 Resource Mobilisation and Political Process Theories
At the core of Marxist thought is the idea that capitalism forms a ‘system’ with its own 
specific characteristics and powers of development and its generative effects therefore 
dominate those who are subject to its workings in every aspect of modern social life. 
Ultimately, unless movements confront and challenge its very essence, the workings of 
capitalism will continue to undermine and negate the transformative efforts of movements 
(Barker, 2008:3). Effectively, any reforms that movements or the individuals participating in 
them gain from having won some kind of ‘campaign’ or ‘policy’ victory can only be 
understood as temporary, because they can simply be reversed by governments, the courts or 
private enterprises at a later stage. Under neo-liberalism, the rolling back of many labour 
rights gained through past working-class struggles is an obvious example. 
In this sense, it seems almost intellectually futile to lead the new urban poor down a blind 
alley by merely advocating a specific set of ‘temporary’ policy initiatives that could alleviate 
their hardship without such awareness. Even if a significant part of the new urban poor 
emerge from their impoverishment, the business cycle of boom and bust is an unavoidable 
feature of capitalism. In particular, Argentina’s historic susceptibility to periodic episodes of 
economic crisis (the early-80s debt crisis, 1989 hyper-inflation and 2001 default are the most 
recent examples) means that another wave of new poverty is just around the corner, to which 
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both the long-term poor and the vulnerable middle class will be exposed. It logically follows 
that although reformist agendas should be supported by serious Marxists, they can only earn 
limited and time-sensitive gains. The only way for new poor citizens to fundamentally 
overcome their exploitation and free themselves from vulnerability in a meaningful, long-
term way is by working alongside other social sectors in social movements that target and 
seek to transform the social totality that created their impoverishment in the first place. 
Notably, the agendas of the dominant western social movement theories fail to see the target 
of such movements as the social totality, instead viewing them as isolated and independent 
struggles. This refers namely to: i) Resource Mobilisation Theory – RMT (McCarthy & Zald, 
1977), which focuses on the way that social movement organisations mobilise money and 
elite support and ii) Political Process Theory - PPT, which looks at the way that movements 
use political opportunities in their interaction with established political institutions (Tilly, 
1978; McAdam, 1982; Tarrow, 1988 and 1998). 
Because social struggles are ultimately atomised, the practical result for the movement in 
question is that even if short-term gains are made, when one set of citizens is subject to an 
exploitative relationship with capital gain, they often do so to the detriment of another group, 
because of the limited resources available (such as state or private funding, access to welfare 
institutions or employment programmes and so on), or because of the limited legislative room 
for manoeuvre that capitalist liberal democracy allows. Yet these two approaches do not 
explicitly call for the targeting of the social totality so that all working and middle-class 
movements will gain through systemic change that requires establishing links with each other, 
fostering channels of joint assistance and identifying a common class enemy.   In the absence 
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of this, a zero-sum game inevitably results and the elites perpetuate their control. For this 
reason RMT and PPT are arguably elite social movement theories. 
Whilst studying new urban poor involvement in the movements that have emerged from 
Iceland to Argentina, it is vital to see their struggles as part of the same one that other existing 
movements are also part of, whether they are trade unions, unemployed worker’s movements, 
pensioners’ campaigns, ethnic or national minority groups’ organisations. Subjectively, these 
different groups may not believe it to be in their interests to cooperate with one another, nor 
that they share a mutual interest and class ‘enemy.’ However, if the new urban poor could 
(aided by social movement coordinators) start to see how their own exploitation and 
economic descent has occurred as a result of the capitalist processes that enforce their 
subjugation and promote the hegemony of the dominant class, then, I claim there would be far 
greater potential for them to develop more radical and expansive forms of collective action. 
The narrowness of mainstream conceptions of social movements can be overcome by 
recognising that the making and unmaking of social structures of human needs and capacities 
are the outcomes of struggles between dominant and subaltern groups. All attempts to 
reshape them are part of a historical process of demand-making from below and constraint-
setting from above (Nilsen, 2009). 
Hegemonic actors seek to preserve the social structure and perpetuate entrenched human 
material desires through neoliberal think-tanks, elite ‘multilateral’ organisations like the 
World Economic Forum, WTO and the World Bank as well as political parties and other 
liberal-democratic organs. These end up agreeing what is to be produced, how and for whom 
and how workers can be exploited so that they produce a surplus (Callinicos 1988: 50). The 
role of the social movement should therefore be to act as an organisation of counter-
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hegemonic actors, challenging the elites in their endeavour to maintain these patterns of 
domination. The ultimate aim would be to transform and replace these patterns so that history 
can develop differently, rather than simply reforming existing structures, which will end up 
reproducing the same relationships of exploitation (Cox, 1999:99). 
A further problem with both RMT and Political Process Theory is their focus on the 
interactions that the movement has or should have with the existing state institutions and 
structures. These authority of these institutions are taken as ‘given’ and their functions are 
rarely questioned in themselves. There is scant focus on how society needs to be 
systematically re-ordered to confront capitalism as the broader root cause of the injustice that 
prompted the movement’s formation (e.g. for gender equality or citizenship rights) in the 
first place. Colin Barker (2008) argues that the failure of mainstream social movement 
theories to develop a sufficient critique of the existing structures in society is a result of the 
original environment from which this emerged as a topic of academic research in the 1960s in 
North America and Western Europe. 
Despite the militancy of the Civil Rights and student movements for example, generally these 
made few practical attempts to challenge the hegemony of the existing system and 
consequently, academics working in this field today tend to restrict their analysis of social 
movements to advocating that they should be allocated greater spaces within the parameters 
of the existing bourgeois liberal democracy, instead of questioning the system’s foundations. 
In this thesis, the state is therefore understood, not as a neutral set of institutions that reflect 
the ‘general interest’, but rather one which helps to reproduce and protect the interests of the 
dominant class in a divided society (Marx & Engels, 1845; Miliband, 1969). In this research, 
practical solutions for the new urban poor will be sought that either circumvent the state 
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entirely or, if interacting with it, do so in a way that will either avoid its co-optation or 
minimise dependency on it. 
For example, the grassroots movements that emerged during the 2001-02 – including most of 
the popular assemblies – rejected any kind of alliance with the state and refused to collaborate 
with what its participants viewed as ‘agents of the political system’. Instead, they 
purposively organised outside of the established structures, although some neighbourhood 
assemblies adopted less radical social commentaries and did take pragmatic decisions about 
whether to engage with groups such as NGOs or municipal governments (Rossi, 2014; 
Svampa & Corral, 2006:146). However, all the assemblies were founded on the principle of 
horizontal decision-making, rather than relying on a ‘leadership’ and rigid organisational 
structure, especially in their initial mobilisations (Pérez et al. 2005). 
RMT theorists describe how movements are formed because they are able to acquire and 
utilise a set of resources that help to attract citizens’ involvement in them. Yet, the capture of
such resources was in many ways notably absent from the social mobilisations that took place 
during the 2001-02 uprisings in Argentina. For instance, elite support was generally 
repudiated and collective actions were fuelled by an anti-institutional sentiment, so they 
rarely attempted to raise money, use established media or even appeal to existing labour 
movements or left-wing parties (Svampa & Corral, 2006). RMT is simply too elitist to be 
applied to explanations of either new urban poor involvement in such actions or those of the 
movement in general. 
That is not to say that the structures and institutions of the dominant social groups should be 
ignored altogether. On the contrary, these must be analysed in order to understand how the 
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dominant class seeks to negotiate with movements from below so as to preserve its dominant 
social position and hegemonic control (Nilsen, 2009). Further, it is important to observe how 
the structures and institutions of the ruling class can offer opportunities for resistance to 
mobilise, so that the end result of social movement actions is not merely the reproduction of 
the existing hegemony. This issue will be explored further in Section 3.4. 
These dominant western social movement theories also contain a further flaw, in that they are 
subject to a theoretical deficit. In determining the motivating factors that encourage citizens 
to join collective actions, both RMT and PPT mistakenly assume that rationality overrides 
other influences that are at the core of the movement (Nilsen, 2009). For example, they 
exclude or downplay the importance of the moral visions pursued, the emotions that 
accompany political activities and the ‘direct pleasures of protest’ (Jasper, 1997:33), that both 
encourage initial involvement and longer-term ‘dedication to the cause’. Moreover, these 
social movement literatures fall into the trap of political reductionism, presenting collective 
actors as merely searching for political inclusion, whereas in reality a great deal of social 
movement activity seeks to address the need for self-realisation in everyday life, both for the 
participants themselves and broader society (Melucci, 1989:23). 
With reference to Argentina, the initial experience of pauperisation during the start of the 
economic crisis destroyed the self-esteem of many newly poor people as they lost the jobs that 
defined their sense of self. Many abandoned hope of a brighter future during the descent from 
a comfortable lifestyle to one of economic hardship, often for the first time in their lives 
(Masseroni & Sauane 2004:244). The desire ‘to belong and have their talents recognised by 
others again’ on the one hand, and the need to gain solace on the other, was what moved 
many to participate in collectivist actions like the cacerolazos, barter clubs, assemblies, 
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worker-‘recovered’ factories and group therapy sessions. Often, involvement in these actions 
also helped them to restore confidence in their own abilities and as Svampa and Corral 
concluded (2006:138), the solidarity that the new urban poor encountered in these forums 
helped them to ‘feel euphoric to be part of a larger social movement in which they could 
establish new friendships and become part of a ‘collective’. 
3.3.3 Towards an Open Marxist Theory of Social Movements
The process of new impoverishment that has been experienced by many of those in the 
middle sectors under neo-liberalism since the 1990s, and in particular during the current 
global crisis, is an inevitable consequence of the logic of capitalist development. Like Marx 
before her, Rosa Luxemburg (1906:30) explained that the advance of capitalism leads to a 
hollowing out of the majority of the middle class and results in their proletarianisation. 
However, although a polarisation between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie in terms of their 
class ‘position’ occurs, I refute both positivist readings of Marx and the economic 
determinism of Luxemburg’s theory of ‘sponteneism’ (that’s to say the inevitable unity of the 
economic and political struggle). 
I instead align with Laclau and Mouffe’s (1985:12) critique in Hegemony and Socialist 
Strategy, in which they highlight the limitations of Luxemburg’s assertion by explaining that 
although one may experience proletarianisation in terms of objective class ‘position,’ the 
acquisition of a corresponding proletarianised political subjectivity and class consciousness 
cannot be assumed, precisely because the material and institutional processes in capitalist 
societies mask the true relations of forces between the classes. Thus, citizens who experience 
proletarianisation in terms of their position (in relation to the production process), often adopt 
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a ‘false consciousness’ due to the ideological control to which they are subjected by the 
dominant class. Often, no direct confrontation between the bourgeoisie and the proletariat
emerges, as Luxemburg would have implied. Rather than Marx and Luxemburg’s prediction 
that 'revolutionary' social change in modern societies would depend on the spontaneous 
awakening of critical class consciousness,this change is instead based upon the prior 
formation of a new alliance of interests, an alternative hegemony that has already developed a 
cohesive world view of its own (Williams, 1977:27). The new revolutionary agent in this 
case is not only the existing working class, but also the unemployed and ‘proletarianised’ 
middle class, which is the principal focus of this research. 
This is where Marxism can not only overcome the theoretical deficiencies mentioned in 
sections 3.1 and 3.2 (because unlike them it targets the social totality, links up separate 
struggles, diverges from ‘rational choice’ assumptions and rejects the necessity of co-
operating with the elites) but also helps to provide explanations of new urban poor 
involvement in collective action that go beyond them by accounting for the development of a 
consciousness about how the social world works and one’s own position within it. By
unravelling the hidden basis for resistance that hegemonic control by the ruling class 
obscures, because the ‘established ways of doing things have become naturalised in peoples’ 
minds’(Williams, 1977:100) mobilising theories that are informed by Marxism can encourage 
newly poor citizens to come to terms with what is - for many - a horrifying reality that their 
objective economic conditions have become much more akin to those of their working-class 
peers, especially for those who have not simply suffered a brief and transitional period out of 
work or in low-skilled employment, but who experience a more sustained decline in material 
living standards, financial prosperity and employment status. 
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From a Marxist perspective, through their underemployment, unemployment, and loss of 
workplace autonomy or ability to control the means of production, many of the Argentinean 
new poor have become ‘working class’ (Wright, 1978:63) or, proletarianised, even if it is 
psychologically too painful for them to accept that they now share similar class interests with 
unskilled workers on a factory production line. For instance, it is typical for newly poor 
people to desperately seek justifications for why they can still claim to hold a ‘middle-class 
identity.’ These range from ascribing it to the fact that they socialise with middle-class 
people, to referring to their own superior level of education (Ozarow, 2008), through to 
announcing that ‘there has been a devaluation of the term ‘middle class’, so we still belong to 
it’ (Cuore Consumer Research-Grupo CCR, 2009). 
Seeking a means to overcome this false consciousness and also changing how they perceive 
the poor and working class (so that accepting the have become part of it becomes more 
tolerable), is key to developing a Marxist theory of new urban poor mobilisation, because of 
the central importance of creating solidarity and linkages between the new urban poor 
movements with those of the working class (trade unions) and the unemployed (piqueteros). 
Indeed a significant proportion of the new poor did precisely this and sought emancipatory
and autonomous solutions to their problems in order to establish an alternative to the existing 
neoliberal capitalist order in 2001-02. Therefore, identifying the means by which 
impoverished middle-class citizens can become conscious of the nature of their 
proletarianisation and then understand the systemic (rather than contingent) reasons behind it, 
is deemed central to achieving the goal of reigniting their political resistance. 
The Marxist theorist, Georg Lukács (1920), contends that the cognitive movement away from 
this false consciousness towards a true awareness of one’s conditions of exploitation by the 
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capitalist class is aided by both the experience of economic crisis and also an understanding 
of Marxist theory, because together these enable workers to develop a clearer understanding 
of the social totality. However, he also argues there is a need for the presence of a 
revolutionary party to organise the struggle against the capitalist class and to ensure that both 
bourgeois and working-class reformism are avoided in order to achieve social transformation 
(Eyerman, 1981:49). Whilst I am in agreement with the first two propositions, I am not with 
the third. Rather than the necessity of having an operational Marxist-Leninist revolutionary 
vanguard party, later on I argue that alternative, less authoritarian and elitist politicising 
vehicles can be drawn upon to aid the process of class consciousness and that instead, 
fostering involvement in practical social projects that are grounded in the labour experience 
can also help citizens to understand their own situation as part of an exploited class. Once 
they have undergone this transformation in their own subjectivity and recognised the injustice 
to which they are subject, they will be more likely to participate in more radical action to 
confront the systemic reasons for their pauperisation and so seek to effect permanent change 
that reverses the downward mobility they have suffered. 
During the Argentina crisis, the governing class started to disintegrate, which created the 
opportunity for those in the subordinate classes to transcend their limitations and construct a 
broad movement that was capable of challenging the existing order and even achieving 
hegemony (Gramsci, 1998). Further, in this thesis I recommend that attempts should be made
to avoid the complete institutionalisation or co-optation of grassroots movements by the 
capitalist state. Such mechanisms, especially segmented neo-corporatism, have been
traditionally enacted by Peronist governments in order to demobilise and gain control over 
potential challenges from below (Etchemendy & Collier, 2007). 
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I ask how this may be most effectively achieved by examining the approaches of different 
schools of Marxism. Marxist-Leninism’s proposal that the movement necessarily requires the 
leadership of a workers’ vanguard party, whereby an elite group of holders of knowledge 
must disseminate their revolutionary wisdom by organising the masses will be evaluated is 
refuted. By contrast, the twenty-first century is an age in which the masses have themselves 
become the producers of knowledge due to popular internet access and mass availability of 
the media and communications. The value of creating alternative Autonomist mobilising 
vehicles whereby hierarchical organisation is not seen as necessary to achieve these ends, will 
also be assessed here (Holloway, 2002; Hardt & Negri, 2004). If the latter is favoured as an 
approach - as it appears to have been during the 2001-02 uprisings – I ask how these 
movements can remain sustainable during periods of economic recovery when they usually 
dissipate, even if the core ideas remain. Thus, the thesis will look at what lessons can be 
learned from the intersection between Marxist-Leninist and Autonomist approaches that 
could help strengthen such emancipatory movements in the future. 
Marxism can also help to account for new poor political mobilisation in terms of to whom 
blame is attributed to for material loss and social descent. In trying to understand the 
immediate reaction of many of those new urban poor who had to sacrifice or readapt their 
lifestyles to meet their new social reality in Argentina in 2001-02, the dialectic needs to be 
utilised to frame the analysis. Asserting that all processes in nature are in a constant state of 
development and are subject to opposing forces and contradictions, history develops as a 
result of the outcome of these forces. The current state of affairs (a thesis), gives rise to its 
reaction, (an antithesis), which contradicts or negates the thesis, and the tension between the 
two is resolved by means of a synthesis. In the instance of personal downward mobility like 
that experienced by Argentina’s new urban poor, in the words of Hegel (in Geuss, 1981), 
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indignation at their abasement is ‘driven by the contradiction between their human nature 
[‘the thesis’ by which they enjoy a comfortabe way of life they have become used to] and 
their new conditions of life [‘the antithesis’ which here is manifest as downward mobility and 
a struggle to make ends meet], which is an outright, resolute and comprehensive negation of 
that nature’. The reaction from the new urban poor is to wish to annihilate ‘the 
negation/antithesis.’ In this case, the ‘antithesis’ is their impoverishment and their response is 
to protest against its perceived cause. 
In other words, if they see themselves as ‘the cause’ of their own pauperisation during the 
economic crisis and they accept the dominant class’ ideology that such cycles of crisis are 
‘the natural order of things,’ then they are likely to turn in on themselves and the 
psychological reaction to this would be one of denial, depression or anxiety (Mafud, 1985). 
However if the cause is seen as ‘external’ – due to some kind of institution or process which 
they do not see as inevitable then, as I will show later, for a sizeable part of the new urban 
poor during the economic and political crisis in Argentina, this opposition to the ‘antithesis’ 
was manifest through near-insurrectionary means. 
Whilst Argentina’s new urban poor have been largely demobilised since 2003, one of the key 
tenets of dialectical thought, which is crucial to a Marxist understanding of events, is that 
phenomena are only ever ‘in the process of development.’ So, the present level of political 
activity among the struggling middle class, is broadly speaking one of docility or even of 
reaction and conservatism (see Section 3.4.2). However, the status quo is never seen as the 
end point in history (Barker, 2008). Instead, I take the current situation as the starting point 
of new developments and examine the potential that is contained within the current latent and 
non-explicitly ‘political’ forms of new urban poor resistance to capitalist exploitation, such as 
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the dissenting conversation with a colleague, absenteeism (the deliberate late arrival to or 
absence from work), participation in spaces that defy capitalist logic and are seemingly 
innocuous, such as the stroll through a public park or a dinner meeting with friends that is 
based upon friendships and social bonds that contrast with the authoritarian relationships of 
domination that are demanded by capitalism (Holloway, 2002). 
I will discuss how these apparently passive or apolitical events can be transformed through 
praxis (the application of knowledge and skills from theory to human interaction with their 
social world) to develop new capacities and subjectivities that enable people to change their 
modes of behaviour so as to directly and purposively confront capitalism. Therefore, even 
though today’s new urban poor have lost their militancy - in line with national trends that 
suggest that by 2004 the level of social conflict had dropped back to below 1990s levels 
(Grimson & Kessler, 2005:151) - what I seek to do here is identify what are the underlying 
causes and seeds that are embedded within this passivity are, that have the potential to 
blossom into action rather that those that are overt and political. I advocate several means 
which could be achieved. 
3.4 Hegemony and Spaces for the Emergence of Social Movements
One final piece of the jigsaw must be added for the completion of our Marxist interpretation 
of how social movements organise, carry out their activities and develop their ideas. In this 
way, the differing degrees to which the new urban poor have joined such movements across 
time and space will be better understood. As discussed in Section 3.3.1, individual citizens’ 
options to resist impoverishment are not created in a vacuum but are shaped by the pressures 
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that create and constrain opportunities to act in other ways. In the same manner, the ways in 
which grassroots movements emerge and conduct their actions are not simply shaped by 
members’ own experiences, but also by those of their opponents and the structures and 
institutions to which they are subject (Barker, 2008:18). 
Gramsci’s theory of cultural hegemony (1998 [1929-1935]) describes how dominant social 
groups maintain their position in society and are able to manage the antagonistic class 
relationships that develop as a result of capitalist production. These antagonisms would 
otherwise form the basis for resistance from the working class and other deprived social 
groups, but by exercising hegemony at all levels of society – backed up by the threat of 
coercion (through violence and juridical control) by the state – the dominant class is able to 
achieve consent from the masses to govern society in its own interests. Often, workers and 
other groups will come to believe that they share interests with those of the ruling class, 
without the latter even having to resort to physical repression. Instead, this ability to achieve 
consent derives partly from the capacity of ruling elites to promulgate ideologies of 
dominance through a variety of channels. Gramsci (1998:157) describes how ‘cognitive 
horizons’ (belief systems) operate, whereby the existing order is represented as ‘natural’ and 
purposive and therefore legitimate. The majority thus work to defend the interests of capital, 
which manages to preserve its domination over the masses, who themselves reproduce and 
consolidate the hegemony of elite interests without even realising it. 
Gramsci built on many of the early ideas of Marx and Engels, who in their theories of 
‘ideology’ and ‘false consciousness’ – which are described perhaps most clearly in the 
German Ideology (1845) – identified how the actions of capitalists and intellectuals create a 
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distortion between workers’ social reality (their objective class interests) and their social 
consciousness (what they subjectively believe those interests are). 
The application of these concepts then evolved in three stages. For Marx and Engels, the 
problems of false consciousness and ideology are limited entirely to the realm of the 
superstructure, state and culture, and in particular to the elite producers of ideas, who delude 
the working class into believing that they, as elite idea-formers, are the only ones who can 
make history. Thus, because the working class are excluded from the superstructure, they are 
also unable to be ‘the producers of knowledge,’ and their own actions with this regard are 
confined to the base (Eyerman, 1981:45). 
Lenin then developed these concepts in What is to be Done (1902), by applying them more 
closely to the working class who, he claimed, could directly experience false consciousness 
too. He explained how the strain of being subjected to daily exploitation during their working 
lives under capitalism generates short-termist goals in their minds, so they therefore to try to 
‘get the best out of a bad situation’ in the workplace. For this reason, they tend towards 
seeking immediate material gain and a trade unionist or reformist consciousness rather than a 
revolutionary one and solutions which could produce their emancipation. For Lenin this 
‘false consciousness’ posed a huge danger, as it represented a political strategy that brought 
the working class into the superstructure of capitalist society through parliamentary politics 
and reformist policies and thus under the ideology of the bourgeoisie. 
Gramsci then developed these notions further. Unlike Marx, not only did he add a new 
dimension to Marxist analysis by applying the concept of false consciousness directly to the 
working class (like Lenin), but he was also concerned with how the superstructure into which 
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the working-class were now embedded, along with religion and culture, impacted upon 
working-class consciousness. He was also more precise than Marx and Engels in terms of 
describing the methods that the bourgeois use to ideologically dominate the working class, 
explaining that they either use force or hegemony (see Figure 3.4 below). In addition, he 
sought to map out how strategies to change society can be achieved under different political 
circumstances (Eyerman, 1981). 
But first, it is important to ask what strategies do the dominant social group use to maintain 
elite control? It must be remembered that the hegemony of the elites does not exist as a 
permanent form of dominance, but is subject to resistance and so must be constantly 
defended, renewed and modified in order to guarantee stability. The right-hand side of Figure 
3.4, below, illustrates how the dominant class usually uses a combination of ‘defensive’ 
strategies of accommodation (concessions) and repression or ‘offensive,’ repressive strategies 
which are delivered to varying degrees depending on the political system in place at the time. 
The state is their principal medium through which these strategies are applied, when faced 
with challenging groups from below. The elites also enact ‘offensive’ strategies when it is 
perceived that a threat may emerge in the future, by attacking the past concessions that have 
been gained by the working class so as to weaken what is understood as the ‘threat’. 
Crucially, the significance of the left-hand side of the diagram is emphasised especially 
strongly by Gramsci. For him, the extra-economic models of domination that work to reduce 
the disruption caused by the antagonistic tendencies in the workings of capital and labour 
(particularly during times of economic crises) are not confined purely to those of the 
bourgeois state, but also extend to the institutions of civil society. 
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Figure 3.4 – Defensive and Offensive Strategies Used by Elite Groups to Preserve Hegemony
Source: Based on ideas in Nilsen (2009)
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Unlike Marx, Gramsci did not locate civil society at the socio-economic ‘base’ of the state, 
where productive forces and social relations are taking place. Instead, he described it as part 
of the political superstructure and the place where the ideological capital emanates from. The 
latter is required to generate the consensual practices needed to fortify the state and protect the 
elites from subversive challenges. It is within this realm of civil society that the reproduction 
of capitalist hegemony is integral and so by implication, is the understanding of what creates 
and prevents revolution (Burawoy, 2008:23). 
A range of authors have expanded on Gramsci’s work by examining how hegemony is 
reproduced through these institutions of civil society. These include the mass media in 
Herman and Chomsky’s Manufacturing Consent (1988), by which they explain how the need 
to capture advertising revenue from big business inevitably shapes an editorial bias in favour 
of the ruling class in terms of what they feature and how they report news stories. 
Meanwhile, social theorists such as Albert Reiss (1951) and F. Ivan Nye (1958) focus on the 
role of the family as a means of achieving social control and Marx himself (1844) famously 
declared religion to be the ‘opium of the people’ in his critique of Hegel’s idealism and 
overtures towards the Church because for him, religion was an obvious diversion from the 
class struggle. 
Certainly the state also plays an important role in guaranteeing the consent of the people. In 
particular, the existence of the welfare state provides the mechanism by which a healthy and 
educated workforce is maintained, which is essential for capitalism to be able to perpetuate 
itself. On the other hand, this reinforces the idea that citizens should remain loyal to their 
country, because it seemingly ‘protects’ them (Miliband, 1969). The state is also necessary 
for the reproduction of capitalism and the preservation of elite interests, because it actually 
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helps to reproduce the exploitation of the working class and the poor by protecting property 
rights as the foundation of the legal system, and the capitalist processes which create the 
conditions of their poverty in the first place (Gough, 1979). Therefore, through the support of 
state, elite interests come to be seen as the general interest of all social groups, including 
using nationalism, which has traditionally been applied by the ruling class to proliferate the 
idea that the working class’ interests should be aligned with the domestic bourgeoisie against 
a foreign enemy. 
In Pedagogy of the Oppressed, Paulo Freire (1970) discusses how the education system and 
the classroom are used to stimulate oppressive attitudes and practices in society. By instilling 
subordination and discipline from an early age, students are viewed as ‘empty bank accounts’ 
that must remain open to deposits made by their teachers. Education is used as a means to 
consciously shape them and can only become emancipatory through the process of developing 
a critical awareness of one’s social reality through reflection and action. 
Some authors, such as Anderson (1976), have criticised Gramsci for underplaying the role of 
the threat of state violence in securing consent, because Gramsci himself insists that it is 
‘culture’ which is the preferred mechanism through which bourgeois power is asserted. 
However, this is to misunderstand Gramsci’s writings, because Anderson overlooks the fact 
that he understood that ultimately the threat of state coercion will always be executed when 
consensual practices fail. Gramsci’s own experience of incarceration made him well aware of 
this, when in a situation of hegemonic crisis in Italy during the 1920s, the ruling elite was 
struggling to maintain ideological domination through subjugation and accommodation, so 
resorted to force to subdue challenges. 
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Anderson mistakenly suggests that the consensual nature of bourgeois authority resides in the 
state alone, because it is the only locus where the public interest is seen to be represented and 
legitimacy constructed. However, given that he was writing in the mid-1970s, it is likely that 
Anderson’s views were influenced by contemporary currents of thought and the social and 
political events of the time. During an era which represented the ‘golden age’ of welfare 
capitalism, state interventionism and redistribution of income (Middleton, 2000:3), it is easy 
to understand why Anderson may have attributed an elevated level of importance to the state 
as a medium for reproducing the hegemony of the dominant class. Today, by contrast, one 
can observe how many state functions have been devolved to civil society organisations as a 
result of the neo-liberal project, such as NGOs, schools and healthcare. Considering this, 
Gramsci appears to have shown an impressive degree of foresight in highlighting how 
important it is for us to examine the role of civil society organisations in reproducing elite 
control. 
Anderson’s view that the state effectively has the monopoly on class violence is further 
undermined when one considers how in reality, civil society organisations, private firms and 
individuals have also each been accorded the right to legitimately carry out coercive acts 
during the twentieth and early twenty-first centuries. For example, the Church and other 
religious establishments have traditionally used mythology to legitimise violence in order to 
secure consent (Arbuckle, 2004). Parents commonly, and legally in most societies, use 
smacking (or worse) to enforce their authority on their children, and as recently as the 1980s, 
the traditional practice of ‘fagging’18 at British boarding schools was encouraged by the 
authorities, relics of which continue even today (Byron, 2009). Private security firms have 
                                                            
18Whereby younger pupils are required to act as personal servants to more senior boys, who are permitted to 
mete out physical punishment as depicted in the British cult-movie If... (1968).
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been granted greater powers to protect private property and the private sector now enforces 
some areas of legislation, including those which used to be covered by the state police (Joh, 
2005).   In the UK meanwhile, the current government is planning to outsource investigating 
crimes, patrolling neighbourhoods and even detaining suspects to private companies (Travis 
& Williams, 2012). 
Yet, ‘violence’ does not have to be physical. As discussed, the mass media constantly resorts 
to forms of symbolic violence, such as ridicule, in order to delegitimize counter-hegemonic 
ideas (Bourdieu, 1998). Whilst Anderson makes the case for the predominance of state 
coercion over the manufacturing of cultural consent through civil society, Gramsci’s emphasis 
on the latter, through his theory of cultural hegemony, has particular resonance for this 
research in terms of studying the opportunities available for political resistance in Argentina. 
Whereas Marx and Engels (1848) argued that that the revolution would initially occur in more 
advanced capitalist societies like Britain, France and Germany, because the industrial 
conditions for working-class insurgency were ripe, they overlooked the fact that within a few 
decades of their deaths it would be precisely these societies that would be able to develop 
stronger reformist institutions. This would permit a superior role for civil society 
organisations like trade unions to work within the parameters of capitalism in order to bring 
about progressive reforms in the name of the people. Thus, the elites would find themselves 
able to gain the consent of the masses to continue imposing their capitalist ideology, in 
particular that of liberalism and representative democracy. Therefore, as Gramsci explained 
in his analysis of the backwardness of the liberal character of the Italian state following the 
Risorgimento (1998 [1929-1935]), it is for this reason that in reality revolution is more likely 
to occur in less developed states. In these states, civil society has not evolved to such an 
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advanced level and the consent to rule has not been gained as much through ideological as 
through physical domination by the state. Had Marx focused upon this, he would surely have 
reached a very different conclusion when predicting where the first socialist revolutions 
would occur. 
3.4.1 Hegemony, Argentina, its Historically Exclusionary Corporatist Model and the 2001-02
Rebellion
In Argentina, the elites have historically found it difficult to perpetuate their ideological 
domination, as a consequence of the country’s history of class relations, its unusual pattern of 
capitalist development and in particular, the arrested political development of its liberal 
bourgeoisie (Waisman, 1999). It is in this context that the crisis of neoliberal hegemony that 
became arose during the Argentinazo and which opened spaces for different forms of 
resistance can be better understood. I will first examine its history. 
The import-substitution industrialisation (ISI) model of state-centred development was 
adopted in the 1930s to protect the economy against its foreign dependency in the wake of the 
Great Depression. One of the main impacts of this was that it led to a rapidly expanding and 
powerful and potentially revolutionary urban working class which was heavily influenced by 
exiled Spanish, Italian and Russian immigrant labourers whom were often communist or 
anarchist in persuasion (Munck, 1987). Following a series of unsuccessful uprisings (which 
were supported by the Radical Civic Union Party) against the military or Conservative 
governments, the labour movement became perceived as a threat to the capitalist order at the 
time. Given that, due to its size and militancy, it was impossible to crush, the ruling class 
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realised that its political power could only be contained through the establishment of 
corporatist state apparatus. 
On 17th October 1945 massive trade union demonstrations in Buenos Aires forced the ruling 
military to release General Juan Peron from prison and marked the birth of the Peronist 
movement in Argentina. 19 One of the main effects of the protests and the affirmation of his 
popularity among the population was that it persuaded the army to turn in Peron’s favour and 
henceforth the bulk of the labour movement (CGT union federation) established an alliance 
with military, the domestic industrial bourgeoisie and (initially), the Church. This created a 
model of class relations that left such a profound imprint that it endured long after Peron was 
exiled in 1955, continuing to this day (ibid.). 
However, an important consequence of establishing corporatist class relations at a relatively 
early stage in the country’s industrial development, was that its liberal bourgeoisie was unable 
to secure political superiority or implement a liberal democratic programme. To some degree
this explains why Argentina’s modern history has been littered with dictatorships – fascist or 
otherwise – and why only quasi-democratic institutions have developed since (Waisman, 
1999). For example, its trade union movement has failed to gain ‘independence’ from 
Peronist domination and the loyalty of its urban poor has been assured through the cynical use 
of clientelist practices by Peronist and other political parties and politicians. It is the presence 
of such class relations at ‘the base’ that has meant that at the level of the ‘superstructure’, the 
mediating civil society institutions (unions, political parties, etc) that have emerged and those 
of the state (judiciary, police, etc) have been weak. Consequently, liberal democracy has 
                                                            
19 The Labour Party was established by trade union leaders just days after the protests, and together with two 
other political parties that supported Peron’s return, united to form the Peronist Party a few months later.
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never fully developed. As Guillermo O’Donnell (1994) explains, the kind of democracy that 
was established during the country’s political transition in the 1980s was ‘delegative’, in the 
sense that only minimalist notions of political involvement were enacted and the electorate 
was supposed to subordinate itself to its leader’s decisions in between elections. Not only did 
this system fail to provide accountability or opportunities for direct participation in the 
decision-making process, but was also reinforced by President Menem’s government in the 
1990s. During this period, provincial caudillos were financed by federal government, 
bolstering sub-national authoritarianisms, as well as their corruptive practices (Armony & 
Armony, 2005:30). 
The other effect that it had was that it led to Peron’s democratic election in February 1946. At 
a time of immense political polarisation, middle and upper-class, white anti-Peronists of 
European descent, viewed the elevation of the largely working-class, dispossessed and often 
darker-skinned immigrant Peronists20 to power with horror (Adamovsky, 2009). Although 
racial and class identities had been conflated in Argentina ever since President Sarmiento had 
first outlined his national vision as one of ‘civilisation’ (a white, European-looking, urban-
centred culture) as opposed to ‘barbarism’ (the rural, Indian, gaucho), the Peronist victory 
reconfirmed it. This historical tendency to associate one’s class with racial background
contributed to the false consciousness possessed by many new urban poor Argentineans after 
the 2001-02 crisis whom, due to racial stigmatisation, failed to realise their shared class 
interests with mestizo (mixed-race) workers. Exploiting these deep-seated racial divisions 
also aided the dominant class to re-establish control after 2003 by demonising and 
scapegoating the shantytown poor (see Section 3.4.2). 
                                                            
20 Whom they pejoratively labelled the ‘cabecitas negras’ (the little black heads).
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Drawing upon Gramsci once again, I propose here that it was this inherent weakness in the 
institutions of Argentinean civil society that, during the crisis of 2001-02, was a key reason 
why a crisis of political legitimacy developed and momentarily created a crisis of neoliberal 
hegemony, which still has not been fully resolved. It is important at this juncture to be 
precise about some semantic intricacies. First, 2001-02 did not represent a full-blown “crisis 
of hegemony” in its cultural and political forms. Despite sincere and widely supported 
attempts to create new political models based upon participatory democracy through the 
popular assemblies and forms of economic production (workers’ self-managed companies) 
and exchange (barter clubs), the survival of capitalism itself was never actually challenged in 
practice, nor even in public discourse (outside of far-Left circles). 
Indeed, in terms of the ownership of production and social relations, a situation of ‘dual 
power’ – which is necessary for a hegemonic crisis to exist – was absent in Argentina 
(Astarita, 2008). Only a fraction of workers (10,000 out of a working population of 
approximately twenty million) participated in the recovered companies’ movement, for 
example (CEPAL, 2011). Furthermore, not even this movement represented an attack on the 
foundations of capitalist production (private property), as it only sought workers’ control once 
the bosses had abandoned their factories and workplaces. At no point was the overthrow of 
capitalist domination seriously contemplated, not even during the height of the economic 
collapse and crisis of political legitimacy in 2001. Nor was there a single instance of workers 
seizing control of their factory and overthrowing their managers whilst the firm was operating 
under normal, profit-making conditions. It is beyond doubt that capitalist ideas still 
dominate, just as they did in 2001-02. Ultimately, no alternative hegemony was able to 
replace it. 
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What was under threat at that time, instead, was a specific set of neoliberal policies. It was 
these policies, together with the abandonment of the state, which could be most easily 
identified as having caused suffering in citizens’ daily lives (structural adjustment, 
unemployment, etc). It is in this sense – with both these policies and the representative model 
of democracy being the focus of attack – that the crisis of legitimacy also represented a crisis 
of neoliberal hegemony, rather than a hegemonic crisis per se. 
Further, whilst the economic model to emerge from the crisis under kirchnerismo has 
displayed a range of continuities and wholly neoliberal characteristics that have embedded 
Argentina even more deeply in the international capitalist economy (Wylde, 2011), other 
policies have meant that the economic model that has resulted from the crisis has at worst 
started to break from neo-liberalism and at best may represent an ‘intermezzo’ (Schaumberg, 
2014). Some of these policies include: the expansion of local participatory budgeting 
(Rodgers, 2007); the state’s promotion of thousands of cooperative businesses, which today 
account for 10% of the country’s GDP (Silveira, 2011); the part-nationalisation of key 
industries such as the Spanish-owned oil company, REPSOL, in 2012; and the government’s 
insistence on distributing aid programmes to millions rather than paying off international 
creditors (Weisbrot, 2012). Therefore, whilst social movements have been unable to fill the 
political vacuum left by the 2001-02 uprisings with their own new social and political order, 
they have sought to condition the rehabilitation of the capitalist state and the incoming 
reformist Kirchner government. 
In terms of the practical outcomes of the rebellion, Argentina’s economic and political 
structures have been significantly reformed, albeit firmly within the parameters of capitalism. 
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The persistence of some of the uprising’s emblematic features – most notably collective 
decision-making by assembly – are the most visible rudimentary forms of organising a new 
social and political order that may assert themselves internationally if the current global crisis 
deepens. For these reasons, I describe the events of 2001-02 as a ‘crisis of neoliberal 
hegemony’ or a ‘crisis of legitimacy’ in this thesis, rather than as a ‘crisis of hegemony’ per 
se. 
During 2001-02, the mediating role that would normally have been fulfilled by state and civil 
society institutions like the Church, reformist political parties and trade unions in order to 
secure consent from the population to be governed by the ruling class was conspicuous in its 
absence. This led to vast swathes of the new urban poor circumventing these institutions 
(which they had completely lost faith in) and identifying the other side of the political 
superstructure (the state), as being the source of their national problems. This tendency to 
blame ‘the state’ had already been identified by Menem in the 1990s as he too, tried to 
distance himself from ‘the political class’ during his election. This sentiment was especially 
strong because of the feeling that politicians had failed to deliver Argentina to its historic 
destiny of ‘greatness’ (Armony & Armony, 2005:49),a notion is discussed further in Section 
4.3. 
This hegemony in Argentina, has historically secured consent through the implementation of 
a segmented neo-corporatist model (Etchemendy & Collier, 2007) that has proved to be 
highly exclusionary in social and political terms (O’Donnell, 1973). In demobilising and 
asserting control over potential challenges from below, it has led to periods of ‘bureaucratic 
authoritarian’ regimes and even when under democracy, has prevented significant parts of 
organised labour, social movements and social sectors from being able to further their 
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political and economic goals. The legacy is a highly polarised society where the political 
steaks are enormous. 21 Another effect of this was that Argentina’s political legitimacy has 
been quantitatively declining for decades but suddenly experienced a qualitative loss of 
support, as resistance from below exploded during the Argentinazo. The economic crisis thus 
acted as a ‘tipping point’ during this period of ‘organic crisis’ in 2001-02. Impoverished 
citizens were moved from passivity into action and tried to rebuild economic and political 
structures through the establishment of neighbourhood assemblies, factory cooperatives, the 
barter system as a means of exchange and so on. This process draws some parallels with how 
Gramsci and his comrades attempted to build factory councils in Italy in the 1920s, although 
as described earlier, the nature of social relations were not threatened to the same extent. In a 
similar way to how Italian capitalism was only weakly supported due to the exclusionary 
nature of state formation after the Risorgimento, so the Argentinazo demonstrated that the 
hegemony of Argentinean capitalism had also not been firmly secured. This opened up 
spaces for transformative political responses at the time. 
Consequently, I have shown that Gramsci’s theory is absolutely pivotal to understanding how 
and why newly poor citizens decide to either politically resist or passively accept their 
declining social conditions. Where dominant groups successfully ensure that individuals 
perceive their pauperisation as a natural consequence of ‘how things are’, or as a result of 
their own deficiencies as human beings – or even as a ‘temporary state’ which will soon be 
overcome (as the new urban poor were more inclined to believe in the 1990s) – then they will 
                                                            
21Nevertheless, the landowning class (terratenientes) has remained unthreatened ever since Argentina’s 
independence in 1810, in spite of domestic industrial and international financial bourgeoise being favoured or 
sidelined at different points in time by successive governments. Even under Peron’s reforms and redistributive 
income policies, land was never expropriated as it was in most other latin American countries, hence capitalist 
hegemonic control has endured.
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be far more likely to internalise their problems and adopt remedial self-improvement 
measures from among the economic opportunities available. However, where these dominant 
elites are unable to gain consent to implement their own preferred ideology, citizens begin to 
question their allegiances and become conscious that they have been supporting the dominant 
class’ interests rather than their own. 
For example, in the 2001-02 climate, impoverished citizens despaired and could see little 
hope of recovering their status (Briones & Mendoza, 2003). They began to attribute their 
hardship to the failings of their political masters and to neoliberal capitalism in general, rather 
than to their own shortcomings. Both their economic security and middle-class identity were
deemed to be under permanent threat, so with less to lose than in the 1990s, it was at this 
point that they moved from political passivity to collective demands that challenged the 
existing social narrative and language, and political frameworks. When citizens begin to 
become aware that their demands are too radical to fit within the exhausted parameters of 
liberal bourgeois democracy and capitalism, and that their interests are not actually served by 
them, this process can precipitate a potentially revolutionary situation (Gramsci, 1998:210). 
It is now easier to understand the reasons behind some of the cross-national differences in 
new urban poor action that were identified earlier. In several parts of Latin America in 2001-
02, Iceland in 2008 and Greece in 2010, responses became politicised because the ruling elite 
lost its legitimacy to promulgate its ideologies of neoliberal dominance. 
3.4.2 The Revolution Defeated and Recovery of Hegemony Post-2003
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For a time, the 2001-02 crisis mobilised newly poor citizens, but the initial failure of the 
ruling class to maintain its consent to rule was soon overcome through a combination of 
accommodative and repressive strategies. Most importantly, despite the profound level of 
political crisis, although significant and broadly supported counter-hegemonic experiments in 
popular democracy (the inter-neighbourhood assembly) and non-capitalist forms of 
production (factory cooperatives, the barter system etc) started to emerge in 2002, as 
mentioned earlier, ultimately no alternative hegemony (socialist or otherwise) was able to 
replace the existing one. This spoke more about the widespread level of alienation and 
exasperation (that things could not change) among Argentinean society and of the lack of 
ideological coherence that was articulated from the grassroots opposition forces, than the fact 
that people were content with carrying on with a reformed version of the way things were. As 
Schaumberg contends (2008:383), the state’s reconstruction of clientelist networks and 
political co-optation was what shifted popular consensus from the widely used slogan of 
‘¡Qué se vayan todos!’ during the uprisings of 2001-02 to resignation and ‘all that can be 
done now is electing the mal menor [the lesser evil]’ by 2003. 
It should be of little surprise that the most important policies of appeasement and social 
control that were enacted to restore the dominant class’ ideological hegemony after 2002 were 
implemented by the state itself. As the guarantor of private property rights in the means of 
production and labour power, the enforcer of contracts, the power that eliminates barriers to 
the mobility of capital and labour, as well as supporting the stabilisation of the money system, 
state power is essentially capitalist because it maintains the conditions necessary for capital 
accumulation (Harvey, 2001:274). Indeed, not only in Argentina but in all the other countries 
mentioned in Section 3.2 where mass pauperisation has arisen, state power was the principal
medium through which the hegemonic order was preserved. 
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In Argentina, strategies of appeasement that affected the new urban poor varied in terms of 
their success. For example, the expansion of welfare benefits was generally not taken up by 
the struggling middle class, nor was the Programme for Unemployed Heads of Households
(Plan Jefes), which was targeted at pacifying the indigent poor (Roca et al., 2003). These 
policies helped break down the cross-class solidarity that was so crucial to the success of the 
uprisings, because it atomised the various social struggles that existed and also opened up 
tensions because it came to be seen by those in the impoverished middle class as a reward for 
idleness (Adamovsky, 2009). However, other strategies were highly successful in terms of 
appeasing impoverished middle-class savers and encouraging them to desist from further 
collective action. 
These included firstly, from mid-2002 the government announced that those who had personal 
debts to the banks in dollars (in the form of mortgages or loans) could repay these debts in 
depreciated pesos at a rate of one US dollar to one peso. This benefited many individuals, 
especially those who had accumulated debt during the 1990s when credit was so easy to 
obtain, because with the exchange rate now at almost four pesos to the dollar, the value of 
their personal debts disintegrated overnight. Meanwhile, the international banks with 
branches in Argentina bore the brunt of the losses (Blustein, 2005:192). This was apparently 
a pragmatic decision by the Duhalde government which, like that of his successor Néstor 
Kirchner, seemed less interested in supporting international financial capital and instead 
created an alliance with the domestic bourgeoisie. 
Secondly, in March 2003 the Supreme Court issued a landmark ruling that overturned a 
government decree that forced US dollar denominated bank accounts to be converted to 
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pesos. This paved the way for hundreds of thousands of savers to legally reclaim the deposits 
that had been taken from them in the Corralón. This removed the raison d’être of the 
escrache protests (organised by several savers’ groups, including the ABAE - Argentinean 
Association of Defrauded Bank Depositors), which many of the new urban poor participated 
in until that point. 
Thirdly, although export-driven in the early months immediately after currency devaluation, 
an impressive investment and private consumption-led macroeconomic recovery from late-
2002 onwards (Weisbrot & Sandoval, 2007) meant that from early-2003 more jobs were 
becoming available and the disastrous anticipated consequences of the crisis were avoided. 
This removed the sense of chaos and Armageddon that had fuelled the protests of earlier days 
(Vilas, 2005:258). Unemployment fell from 22% in 2003 to just 13% in 2005 (INDEC). 
Whilst millions of jobs were created, most were low-skilled and low-paid (Beccaria et. al, 
2005), so the new urban poor (with their possession of higher human and cultural capital) 
usually stood at the front of the queue to secure them whilst displacing the structural poor in 
such jobs (Porcú, 2003; Ozarow, 2012). 
The unemployed among the new urban poor were thus provided with work and, as the months 
went by, the daily grind to make ends meet became the principal preoccupation as many 
rebuilt their livelihoods. For many of those who had become politicised through their own 
impoverishment (having transferred their blame for it from their own failings to that of the 
government, IMF etc), I propose that the need for radical political transformation was no 
longer understood to be a necessary precondition for an improvement in their living standards
because, from 2003 they once again believed that this was possible within the existing 
political and economic system. The new poor began to retreat into private responses again 
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during the strong macroeconomic recovery of that period, focusing on self-improvement 
strategies (opportunities for which had considerably improved), even if profound 
disillusionment with the ‘political class’ remained after 2003 (Armony & Armony, 2005). 
Whilst the idea that a return to the labour market like this diluted, rather than increased, the 
threat to capitalism after 2003 may seem out of place in a Marxist analysis, it must be 
remembered that the low-skilled jobs that newly poor Argentines tended to acquire at the time 
were almost exclusively un-unionised, service sector roles where relatively little damage 
could be exerted by withdrawing their labour. The threat of their militancy was further 
reduced due to the fact that in 2003, a large reserve army of unskilled labour (mainly the 
unemployed structural poor) remained, waiting in the wings to replace them and thus 
instilling discipline among newly poor (and other) workers at that time. Furthermore, by 
being offered work it meant that those in the newly pauperised stratum not only had less spare 
time to engage in political activities, but this also ensured the severance of any potential 
involvement in piquetero groups of unemployed workers. These, via their road-blocking 
protest tactics in urban centres, were able to paralyse the production process by impeding the 
circulation of transport, preventing workers from arriving at work or the necessary supply of 
goods to be delivered to factories, shops and businesses for production. It was they, rather 
than traditional trade unions, who were causing more political and economic damage at the 
time. 
Fourthly, many of the counter-hegemonic structures that newly poor citizens helped to create 
were soon co-opted by the state. For example, the City of Buenos Aires Government and 
municipal governments across the country introduced and sponsored participatory budgeting 
(Rodgers, 2007) as a gesture to show that it wanted to incorporate the will of its residents into 
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local decision-making, even if in practice the extent to which participatory budgeting reflected
the ‘popular will’ was more questionable (Centier, 2012). Furthermore, some of the piquetero
groups with whom the new urban poor stood shoulder to shoulder were partially demobilised 
as its leaders like Luis D’Elia (of Federación de Tierra y Vivienda) accepted an invitation to 
join the new Kirchner government’s cabinet in 2003. By granting major concessions to the 
less autonomous and anti-capitalist elements of the social movements whilst ignoring or 
punishing its more radical elements, the state apparatus delivered a textbook example of how 
to successfully split the challenging movement from below, as depicted in Figure 3.4, above. 
The attempted containment or repression of autonomous movements confirms the Kirchners’ 
famously-stated desire for the restoration of ‘normal capitalism’ after the crisis. It also 
exemplifies a return to traditional, segmented, neo-corporatist practices of social control that 
Peronist governments have historically implemented (Etchemendy & Collier, 2007). 
Finally and perhaps most crucially, it was the election of Néstor Kirchner as President in May 
2003 that re-secured hegemonic control for the bourgeoisie. He was also able to gain the 
support of many of the new urban poor (Mazzoni, 2007:188), despite general continued 
disdain for politicians who had been indicted by the middle class. Kirchner successfully 
managed to pose as an ‘anti-establishment candidate’, even though as a Peronist he 
represented the hegemonic and most institutionalised political force in Argentina (Munck, 
1987). His personal popularity has been attributed only in small part to the rapid 
macroeconomic recovery that coincided with the start of his Presidency. Instead, he found 
favour because he managed to present himself as the antithesis of everything that had 
preceded him and all the characteristics of dishonesty, pretension, excess and frivolity that 
Menemismo stood for, even creating a new electoral centre-left Peronist ticket – Frente para 
la Victoria – to distinguish his brand of Justicialismo from that of Menem. He also toned 
75
down references to the legacy of Peron and alluded to a new generation of leaders, so as to 
convey sufficient distance between himself and the old political establishment and, finally, in 
responding to the civic mobilisation of 2001-02, he successfully convinced the people that he 
was prepared to listen to their concerns (Armony & Armony, 2005). 
Yet, the state also responded with repressive tactics against those involved in collective 
action, especially under the Duhalde Presidency during 2002 and early 2003. The main 
targets were the more radical or autonomous actions, such as those piquetero groups that 
refused to be co-opted by the government. One example of this was the CTDV, which
organised a roadblock at the Pueyrredón Bridge, Avellaneda, on June 26th 2002. During this 
protest, two young unemployed CTDV activists, Maximiliano Kosteki and Darío Santillán, 
were assassinated by the Greater Buenos Aires police, while another ninety were injured and 
more imprisoned. Several of the most emblematic worker-recovered companies were also 
symbolically targeted – like the Zanon Factory in Neuquén, Patagonia and the Bauen Hotel in 
Buenos Aires – because they acted as a ‘threat of a good example’ and demonstrated that 
alternative ways of producing without a management hierarchy were possible. 
So what has happened since Néstor Kirchner’s election? Despite nearly 2,000 cacerolazos
being recorded in the weeks following the Corralito, the level of social conflict dwindled so 
acutely during early 2003 that by the time of Kirchner’s election in May that year, political 
resistance had largely shifted from the streets to the ballot box (see Figure 4.1 in Chapter 4). 
The insurrection was over, not least in terms of involvement from the new urban poor, and 
capitalism had survived intact. As Argentinean historian De Lucía (2002:102) described, ‘this 
is a country where the mechanisms of social integration that enable a return to the hegemonic 
consensus have proved themselves to be highly efficient.’
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These ideas are encapsulated by Petras (2010), who describes how across Latin America, a set 
of ‘post-neoliberal regimes’ have been established in the early 21st century. He argues that 
although they are the product of mass movements and uprisings which categorically rejected 
not just neoliberal ideology but also its elites, the dominant class has in each case skilfully 
managed to gain broad support for its political project, despite representing an ideological 
continuity that promotes distinctly capitalist interests. Features of these regimes include the 
return of developmentalist strategies through which state intervention has been used to 
stimulate growth by diversifying export markets, while generally avoiding the re-
nationalisation of privatised industries, implementing land reform or tackling class 
inequalities. Meanwhile, ‘crisis management policies’ have been used to de-radicalise the 
social movements that serve as their electoral base by promoting state-business-social 
movement corporatism and introducing targeted poverty programmes and small business 
subsidies in order to secure political and social stability. 
First Néstor Kirchner and then, following his untimely death, his wife Cristina Fernández de 
Kirchner’s administration since 2007, have managed to overcome their ideological ambiguity
by presenting themselves as ‘on the side of the movements.’ For example, both governments 
have attacked the financial elites and speculative capital, which they blame for the economic 
crisis. They have also taken several measures to regulate the economy and protect domestic 
industry, such as providing generous subsidies to domestic industry (Rivera-Quiñones, 2014),
but going further than Petras’ model by also part-nationalising the Spanish-owned oil 
company YPF/REPSOL, taking the pensions system back into state hands. 
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Yet, in reality – as Petras claims –Kirchnerismo also delivers ideological continuity by
helping to embed the Argentinean economy in global capitalism. It has reproduced an 
unequal class structure through the promotion of commodity exports, transference of the 
national debt burden onto the pensions system and maintaining a low proportion of workers 
within the collective bargaining system (Wylde, 2011). In other words, the government has 
entered into alliances with both domestic and foreign manufacturing and agro-mineral elites, 
but the baton of hegemonic control has passed from one faction of the ruling class (the 
international bourgeoisie) to another (the domestic bourgeoisie). What seems clear is that it 
was this ‘post-neoliberal’ project which managed to salvage the capitalist hegemony, but that 
it has still only been weakly consented to since 2001-02 given the persistently low confidence 
in its governing institutions (according to LatinoBarómetro polling data). Furthermore, the 
capitalist accumulation model that underpins it is heavily dependent on high global market 
prices and demand for agro-exports as well as continued growth in China. For example, 10% 
of the country’s GDP currently emanates from the soya industry, most of the demand for 
which comes from the Chinese (Rivera-Quiñones, 2014). If these favourable conditions are 
reversed at any point, the cracks in the hegemony may start to open up and will be exposed to 
new challenges. 
For now, the emancipatory and radical goals of those protests of 2001-02 and the solidarity 
that was constructed between the structural and new urban poor, which was such a prominent 
feature of it, seem to have been quickly forgotten by many in the latter stratum. When 
preoccupations about crime and the sanctity of private property were fuelled by a wave of 
high-profile kidnappings, including the murder of student Axel Blumberg, it spilled over into 
a sizable protest movement during the Blumberg demonstrations of 2004 and 2006. These 
attracted a strong middle-class presence around the authoritarian demands for harsher penal 
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laws, a transfer of power to the police and security forces and a repressive clamp-down on 
crime. The shantytown poor were scapegoated, which suited the struggling middle class, as 
this symbolic violence (Guano, 2004) against the poor also served to reconstitute the rapidly 
disappearing social boundaries that had left them facing the reality of their downward social 
mobility until that point. 
Then, in 2008, when Cristina Kirchner’s government attempted to raise export taxes 
(retenciones) on agricultural producers from 35% to 44%, the lower-middle class again 
poured out onto the streets in opposition (Adamovsky, 2009). The aim of this move had been 
to raise revenues for social investment by increasing the government's share of returns from 
rising world grain prices, while reducing domestic food prices to lower the cost of living for 
the poorest. 
More recently, in September and then November 2012, hundreds of thousands of people took 
part in anti-government cacerolazo protests, largely promoted by social networking sites 
(without the intervention of political parties). These took place in several cities around the 
country. Again with a significant struggling middle-class following, they promoted
reactionary objectives, with many participants accusing the poor for rising insecurity, 
opposing the government’s proposals to limit the Clarín Group’s monopoly in the media so 
that independent media have a greater voice, as well as the government’s restrictions on dollar 
transactions (Goni & Watts, 2012). 
Argentina’s government is currently losing popularity fast, as underlying economic problems 
begin to surface, inflation spirals and growth stalls. Further, the trade union federations, 
including both the former Kirchner ally the General Confederation of Labour (CGT) and
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factions of the Argentinean Workers’ Centre (CTA) have responded to the spiralling cost of 
living with general strikes in pursuit of wage rises. Whilst the political parties that oppose the 
government remain highly divided, the country’s political future remains uncertain. 
Crucially, important questions need to be asked about how the social attitudes, political 
stances and protest actions of the proletarianised middle class degenerated from their highly 
progressive, emancipatory, class solidarity-inspired and autonomist nature in 2001-02, to the 
arguably conservative, reactionary politics of self-defence by 2012. In the following section 
the case is made for alternative mobilising that support the continuity of any movement’s 
political and social aims so as to prevent them from disappearing or de-radicalising during 
post-crisis years. The cognitive processes which may define one’s subjectively understood 
class interests are also described as are why these are vital to prompting participation in 
revolutionary movements. 
3.4.3 The ‘Hidden Consciousness,’ Resistance to Hegemonic Domination and the need for 
Alternative Mobilising Vehicles
As mentioned earlier, one of the main aims of this thesis is to inform social movement leaders 
about how to most effectively mobilise newly impoverished citizens and stimulate their 
involvement in political resistance to their proletarianisation. The success of this endeavour 
will rely on the unravelling of capitalism’s mechanisms and structures, which help to 
perpetuate hegemonic control and which cloud these citizens’ recognition of their new social 
reality and shared ‘class interests’ with other exploited groups. Any proposals for new urban 
poor action should therefore be ones that help identify mechanisms which: i) foster an 
awareness and acceptance of their new social reality and their shared interests with the 
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working class and structurally poor (because downward social mobility is often 
understandably denied, a false consciousness of their class interests means that many see their 
own interests as conflicting with these), ii) build solidarity with these exploited groups, and 
iii) encourage the new urban poor to engage in collective action with other newly 
impoverished citizens, as well as workers and unemployed movements, (iv) expose the 
contradictions of the capitalist system and create more fertile ground for non-capitalist 
alternatives to it to emerge. 
The approach I take is a heuristic one, through which the forming of their grievance, targeting 
of their anger, measuring of their demands and, ultimately, the shape of their resistance are all 
based upon their daily experiences, something that Gramsci terms their ‘experiential 
rationality’ (Nilsen, 2009). He explains that this consists of two contradictory states of mind. 
Firstly, they are guided by their ‘good sense’, that’s to say their consciousness about the 
reality of their position within the social world and the submerged aspects of working-class 
consciousness which serve as a basis for resistance that guides their instinctive behaviour. 
However, I have already discussed how hegemonic projects that are imposed from above by 
dominant social groups mystify one’s social position and manufacture the consent of 
exploited groups. When the new poor become subject to this and accept their own 
subjugation as ‘the natural way of things,’ their behaviour is guided instead by a second but 
predominant state of mind which he labels ‘common sense’ (Gramsci, 1998:327). 
A pivotal issue which must be overcome in order to foster the politicisation of the new urban 
poor lies in first overcoming their false consciousness (through encouraging actions that help 
them be guided by their ‘good sense’ rather than by their ‘common’ sense), as well as 
dissolving their insistence on falsely identifying with ‘middle-class’ rather than working-class 
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interests, because this isolates them from the rest of the masses. I therefore aim to seek 
mechanisms to achieve this, and which evoke what Cox describes as ‘the local rationality’ 
(1999), through actions that promote ways of doing, thinking and being that citizens develop 
to oppose the conventional wisdoms that constitute the hegemonic elements of ‘common 
sense.’
The experience of millions of newly poor Argentineans indicates that from a Marxist 
perspective, they have become proletarianised. That is to say, that many have slipped from 
the middle into the working class due to their estrangement from their previous professional 
employments and their entry into low-skilled, low-autonomy jobs. In this research I seek to 
cultivate moments of progressive self-consciousness, when this process of proletarianisation 
and shared class interests with workers and other poor peoples’ movements are realised – in 
short - when local rationalities become the basis for direct confrontation with those who 
defend dominant class interests (Nilsen, 2009). 
Indeed, in the case of 2001-02, the new urban poor tended to join protest movements that they 
deemed to be ‘middle-class’ manifestations of discontent, such as the cacerolazos and 
assemblies (Svampa & Corral, 2006:119). However, this distinction ultimately served to 
weaken, not strengthen, the overall outcome of the uprisings, because the movement was 
internally divided, not in terms of who it saw as its enemy, but its internal coherence and 
subjectivity. If means can be found to aid the new poor’s acceptance of their 
proletarianisation into the working class, then they will be able to connect with their ‘good 
sense’ (which, as Gramsci posits, uniquely resides in the ‘working class,’ as the only true 
revolutionary agent). 
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One caveat should be added here. Despite the need to aid the development of a shared class 
consciousness with the structural poor, it must be recognised that in reality one’s subjective 
class consciousness is likely to be partial, possibly even ‘confused’ or ‘multiple’ and 
contradictory. This not only applies to the new urban poor, but across ‘classes.’ With respect 
to the impoverished petite bourgeoisie, who – it is claimed here – has also sunk into the ranks 
of the working class, its members will certainly maintain their attachments to middle-class 
culture, their home ownership and distinct understanding of political citizenship, all of which 
differ enormously from the piquetero shantytown dweller, who is barely able to cover his or 
her basic needs. Historically, cases of full class consciousness are extremely rare (Foster, 
2010), so it would be folly to assume that the new urban poor (let alone the remainder of the 
existing Argentinean working class) would ever fully achieve a non-differentiated working-
class consciousness. Instead, what is sought here is a means by which their subjective 
economic and political consciousnesses can converge, whilst they may retain a distinct 
middle-class identity at the cultural and social levels. 
3.4.4 Cultural Framing and Cognitive Liberation for the New Poor
In Sections 3.3.1 and 3.3.2 the three elite social movement theories – RCT, RMT and PPT
were dissected and it was proposed that, as frameworks to explain the emergence and 
development of social movements, they are insufficient either because it is too simplistic to 
participation in movements to ‘rational choices’ or because they fail to see their target as the 
social totality, instead viewing the different movements under scrutiny as isolated and 
independent struggles. However there is some room to incorporate elements of one of the 
traditional social movement theories - that of ‘framing processes’ (Snow et al. 1986) into the 
Marxist model that I am trying to construct, because ultimately in the absence of mediating 
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‘frames’ which must be shared between participants in the movement, collective action cannot 
be fully accounted for. Despite the problems raised with this theory, Batstone et al. (1978) 
correctly identify that it is the shared meanings and definitions that people apply to their 
situations which are what actually mobilise those who are aggrieved about their circumstances 
to take action. In short, this is because they must also first realise that their grievance is shared 
by a significant number of other citizens, secondly understand that it is ‘wrong’ and that they 
are subject to an ‘injustice’ which is not of their own making (Mansbridge, 2001), and thirdly, 
feel optimistic enough about their ability to change their circumstances by acting collectively. 
McAdam (1982) describes this ‘cognitive liberation’ as a prerequisite for protest so that the 
socio-psychological dynamics of collective attribution and social construction – the framing 
process (Snow and Benford, 1988) – is satisfied. Lacking any of these factors, prospects for 
mobilisation will be stifled. The importance of ‘ideas’ and how they are understood (or 
‘framed’), therefore makes up an essential pillar of collective action. 
Clearly the kind of ‘cognitive liberation’ that is of interest in this research is that which 
liberates newly impoverished citizens from the hegemonic forces and processes that militate 
towards a passive acceptance of their social descent and which encourages them to solely play 
out their resistance through economic self-help strategies. In Gramscian terms, I am seeking 
ways from which the behavioural patterns that stem from their ‘good sense’ come to override 
those inherent in their ‘common sense.’
Ryan (2005:133) suggest that this justice frame is best presented as a counter-narrative which 
proposes a counter-hegemonic view, in which participants are invited to imagine a better world 
through the frame that is presented to them. By enabling citizens to confront the 
contradictions between their present existence and their imagined better situation, as proposed 
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in the frame, this brings these contradictions to the fore and exposes them. Applied to the 
objectives of this research, as a solution to help newly poor citizens understand and resist their 
pauperisation politically, what better, then, than to encourage participation in a working model 
of collective self-help that establishes a bridge between their present existence (whereby the 
capitalist system of accumulation has become naturalised and accepted as ‘the norm’) and this 
imagined better society, which seems so remote and impossible to achieve? 
Practical examples of how these actions work to educate participants by revealing the flawed 
‘logic’ of capitalism (even though they do not always directly challenge it as a system) are:
1) Barter: a system which discredits or circumvents money as a form of exchange, capital 
accumulation as the basis of a capitalist economy and the notion that one person has a 
set of skills that are more valuable and appreciated by others than their colleague’s. 
2) Workers’ self-managed cooperatives with horizontal workplace structures and direct 
democracy in decision-making. This refutes the idea that capitalist owner and worker 
cannot be one and the same, instead advocating the equal sharing of profits to all 
workers through the wage system. 22
3) Community kitchens: these illustrate that members of the community can enjoy 
looking after one another, rather than the conventional ethos that motors capitalism and 
dictates that humans are essentially greedy and selfish by nature. 
                                                            
22 It should be noted that ‘co-operatives’ take different forms and some reproduce existing hierarchies. 
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Collective self-help actions such as these can illustrate working examples of how an 
alternative wider system could function, especially if a justice frame were found that helped 
the new urban poor to recognise the injustice they have suffered themselves alongside other 
cohorts who have also undergone the same experience during the crisis (Mansbridge, 2001). 
In such cases, they would begin to feel a sense of solidarity with the injustices experienced by 
the indigent poor, who they would then recognise had been victims in the same way as them, 
but long before the crisis. The likelihood that newly poor citizens will come to realise that 
they have a common political cause to rally around together with fellow ‘newly poor citizens,’ 
as well as the long-term poor, unemployed, and those who made up the bulk of working class
– instead of each fighting disparate and lonely struggles – increases if the ‘sites’ of social 
integration, like those suggested above, are replicated and the need to ‘link up the struggles’ 
becomes more obvious. 
The frame can then be grounded in ‘rituals of solidarity’ (McAdam et al., 1996) through these 
initiatives in a way that pure imagining simply fails to do. Promoting involvement in small-
scale, practical collective actions thus makes the achievement of a utopian society more 
believable and attainable in the minds of the new urban poor who become involved in them. 
For the new urban poor, it also helps to raise awareness of the contrast between the lived 
experience of poorly remunerated, low-skilled, weakly autonomous and often barely 
appreciated effort that their individually performed work entails, in contrast to the positive 
experiences that collective self-help projects generate in terms of utilising skills, building self-
esteem, solidarity and more profound personal relationships with others. Consequently, the 
recipe for new urban poor political engagement is a combination of finding a practical channel 
through which they can explore and understand the contradictions in their own lives by 
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proposing an alternative to their current realities (framing), together with offering involvement 
in a practical experience to help them believe it is possible. 
In this chapter I have analysed various theoretical approaches to how and why citizens who 
are confronted with impoverishment may be moved to enact either self-improvement or 
protest responses and engage in these actions either privately or collectively. I discussed how 
the socio-political nature of particular regimes can influence whether protest movements form 
emerge in response to economic shocks in particular societies and I also critically reviewed 
the major existing social movement theories. Having identified some of their weaknesses, I 
have suggested how I anticipate that the research in this thesis may make contributions both 
to improving existing social movement theory and also to supporting the advancement of a 
Marxist theory of political mobilisation. Further, I have proposed how I intend to use the 
findings practically, in order to inform emancipatory movements that seek to invigorate new 
poor participation in protest movements. The Gramscian theoretical framework of this 
research has also been outlined, and the objective of seeking ways to overcome new urban 
poor false consciousness so as to and unite their seemingly disparate struggles with those of 
working class and structurally poor movements through the creation of alternative mobilising 
vehicles which are most suitable to the social and political context in Argentina has been 
highlighted. 
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CHAPTER 4 - UNDERSTANDING RESPONSES TO PAUPERISATION IN 
ARGENTINA: SITUATIONAL CONTEXT, IN-GROUP CONSIDERATIONS AND 
THE DIACHRONIC SHIFT TOWARDS POLITICAL RESISTANCE IN 2002
One dollar at a time I saved, during the twenty-five years I worked, so that I could live 
decently when I retired, not on a state pension. What do they want? A bomb? Well that’s not 
my style. That’s why I’m banging on my pan. I used to cook with it for my kids. Every 
time I look at it I’ll be reminded of those scoundrels [the bankers and government], but I’ll 
know that I fought for my rights. 
Female demonstrator, Memoria del Saqueo, 2004
In the following chapter, I begin to examine the reasons why those in Argentina’s new urban 
poor social strata developed a particularly potent sense of collective identity and were moved 
to undertake radical protest responses during the 2001-02 crisis. I compare their in-group 
behaviour to that of those who were pauperised in previous decades in the 1980s and 1990s
and explore a range of generative social, economic and political factors which may have 
accounted for the shift in their behavioural patterns. Based upon a critical review of the 
literature I dismiss the notion that the politicisation of responses was attributable to 
motivations formulate hypotheses to help explain the diachronic shift towards their political, 
rather than simply economic, resistance in 2002. 
The literature on Argentinean citizens’ responses to the crisis focuses on their motivation 
towards, and experience of, participating in particular types of actions, rather than being 
grouped together and discussed as either ‘collective vs. individual’, or ‘self-improvement vs. 
protest’ responses. These include barter clubs (Bombal & Luzzi 2006), neighbourhood 
assemblies (Svampa & Corral 2006), recovered factories (Paiva 2004), cacerolazo protests 
(Briones & Mendoza 2003), and savers’ escrache protests (Svampa 2006). 
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However, none of these publications scrutinised the involvement of newly impoverished 
participants in particular, nor sought to understand how hardship or a loss of status affected 
their subjectivities and how this sometimes induced politicised responses or collective forms 
of action. The particular responses of the ‘new urban poor’ as a group are seldom discussed 
and although some attempts have been made to isolate and examine the behaviour of ‘the 
middle class,’ few of these studies differentiate observable patterns of behaviour by the ‘new 
urban poor’ within this class. Yet it is precisely this stratum, having become pauperised, 
whose behaviour is most suited to intellectual analysis, first from a policy perspective (as 
among the most affected by the crisis) and secondly for research that seeks emancipatory 
goals. Having recently become proletarianised, its members join those in the working class 
and take centre stage in a process of capitalist development which, it is anticipated will 
eventually see the middle class disintegrate and will lead to a direct confrontation between the 
working class and the ruling class (Luxemburg in Laclau, 1985). The fate and political 
actions of new poor actors thus become central to Marxist analysis. 
Therefore, due to the absence of new urban poor literature on post-crisis responses, in 
Chapters 4 and 5 the hypotheses that are proposed are essentially derived from observations 
about the kinds of post-crisis responses that have been pursued by the country’s citizens in 
general, or by those of its middle class. The anticipated impact of the experience of 
impoverishment is subsequently factored in using a separate literature, so that hypotheses are 
formed that account for how it affects the way that those from the middle class see the world 
(which has implications for their actions in response). The limitations and opportunities 
provided by the middle-class habitus (Bourdieu, 1977) are also acknowledged when 
constructing propositions about behaviour in each case. 
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Meanwhile, sources that do examine ‘protests’ in general (Almeyra, 2004; Dinerstein, 2003; 
López-Levy, 2004; Schuster et al. 2005) do not tend to explore the relationship between the 
decision to engage in protest and opting for direct self-improvement actions. Hypotheses 
regarding how decisions were taken as to whether to participate in actions across each of the 
four categories outlined in Table 1 (in Section 3.1) will be articulated here, based on 
inferences made from aggregating the literature on these single actions into a combined 
literature on ‘collective and individual’ or ‘protest and self-improvement’ responses. 
The respective literatures on the diachronic fluctuations in middle-class political mobilisation 
since the 1990s and sources which discuss individual involvement in particular actions are 
analytically synthesised here to establish propositions about the generative influences on new 
urban poor collective action during the 2002 economic crisis. These are outlined in turn and 
are divided into in-group considerations (explanations for new urban poor behavioural 
patterns in 2002) in this chapter, and private ‘considerations’ (why certain individuals 
engaged in collective actions during the economic crisis while others didn’t) in Chapter 5. 
4.1 Experience of Impoverishment
One of the key assertions of this study is that the new urban poor do not simply respond to 
pauperisation by seeking economic self-improvement actions to try and reverse their fortunes, 
but also respond by engaging in protest actions under certain circumstances. However, the 
issue of whether impoverishment acts as a catalyst that motivates engagement in protest 
actions on its own or whether it only becomes a generative factor when other contextual 
events also interact with it must be explored. The background literature and available data 
generally supports the latter thesis and are outlined in this section. 
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It is important to point out that Argentina has suffered from historically high levels of income 
poverty since the 1970s. Whilst the poverty rate was well below 10% for most of the 1960s, 
it started to rise sharply after the military staged a coup d’etat in 1976, when it removed the 
democratically-elected government which was led by Juan Peron’s wife. Despite reaching 
35% by the end of the dictatorship in 1983 (INDEC), the military brutally repressed protest, 
the fear of which was one obvious reason why collective action was stifled in spite of 
growing economic grievances (Munck, 1987). Whilst poverty fell back gradually in the 
democratic era (with the exception of the hyperflationary year of 1989) Menem’s neoliberal 
reforms pushed it back up to 30% by the time he left office in 1999. 
Drawing upon Argentina’s national annual household survey data (EPH), together with data 
from the Grupo de Estudios sobre Protesta Social y Acción Colectiva (GEPSAC) at the Gino 
Germani Research Institute of the University of Buenos Aires, Figure 4.1 illustrates that there 
seems to be no association between the change in proportion of the population that fell below 
the poverty line and the number of recorded collective protest actions that took place around 
the country during between 2000 and 2003, including the most severe years of crisis. Instead, 
this relationship fluctuated wildly. 
If this period is broken down into three different years, then the first - May 2000-May 2001 
could be classified as a period of ‘protest in advance of impoverishment’, with rapidly 
increasing levels of protest (from 100 to 170 protests per quarter), yet relatively stable 
poverty levels (increasing only slightly from 29.7% to 32.7%). In contrast, the second period 
during the following twelve months (May 2001-May 2002) witnessed ‘synchronicity’ 
between sharply rising poverty levels (from 32.7% to 49.7%) and increasing protest (170 to 
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210 such actions per quarter). Finally, the third year under observation, May 2002-May 2003 
was a period of ‘demobilisation’ and saw protest levels slump back to below the levels that 
were prevalent at the start of the crisis (90 protests per quarter), even though the rate of 
poverty had barely changed and over half the population remained below the poverty line. 
Analysis of these three contrasting periods, and the absence of a clear-cut relationship 
between poverty levels and protest, indicate that pauperisation alone is unlikely to actively 
generate a politicisation in how citizens view their declining economic circumstances. 
Figure 4.1: Impoverishment and the Number of Collective Protest Actions in Argentina 
during the Economic Crisis 2000-2003
Source: Author, based on annual poverty figures from the Encuesta Permanente de Hogares 
and protest figures from GEPSAC (2006)
Further evidence against purely material motivations for protest is provided in numerous 
other sources. Collective protest had almost completely died away by 2004 (Vilas, 
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2005:254), even though real wage levels in that year were below half of what they had been 
in 2001 (OJF, 2010). Further, the number of protests grew strongly during 2000 and 2001, 
despite the fact that salaries were far higher then, in real terms, than at any point 
subsequently, until they recovered their pre-crisis levels in 2009. The fact that material living 
conditions were lower between 2002 and 2009 than they were in 2001, yet the protest 
movement was demobilised during that time, reinforces the argument that economic 
grievances were not, on their own, a generative factor in the decisions made about what 
actions to take in response to pauperisation. 
4.2 Severity of Economic Need, Changing Subjectivities, Loss of Confidence in Argentina’s 
Institutions and an Emerging ‘New Poor’ Collective Identity
During the 1990s, those citizens who became newly impoverished in the country’s ‘second 
new poverty wave’ (due to neo-liberal reforms) were more inclined to participate in collective 
forms of resistance following encouragement ‘from above’ by organisations such as small 
business associations and trade unions, at least compared to the early-2000s, when such 
resistance was more autonomous (Adamovsky, 2009). Interviews with newly impoverished 
people in the 1990s reveal that whilst these organisations were articulating their collective 
demands to the government, by contrast the newly poor citizens who remained outside of 
their membership structures felt especially powerless and detached from these mobilisations. 
They tended to instead resist their pauperisation through private means, almost exclusively 
relying on individual self-improvement strategies to do so (Svampa, 2005:143). 
Therefore, before deciding whether to carry out a protest action or restrict their response to 
the economic realm, instead of considering their own household’s material conditions alone, 
citizens may have also been influenced by: i) assessing the social, economic and political 
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context within which their impoverishment occurred, ii) evaluating what the chances were 
that participation in collective actions would be successful, iii) realising that they had a shared 
sense of grievance with others, iv) deciding whether the governing institutions of the day had 
legitimacy to rule, v) becoming aware of the spaces available to participate in collective self-
improvement and protest actions, rather than just individual coping mechanisms at that 
particular time. 
4.2.1 Macroeconomic, Social and Political Climate
Svampa (2005) observes that responses to pauperisation tended to move from a retreat into 
private spaces in the 1990s, to more collectivist forms of action after 2001. In explaining this 
trend, the earlier decade is described as a period during which Argentinean citizens were 
greatly exposed to and influenced by the Zeitgeist of neoliberal values of individualism and 
personal responsibility for one’s successes and failures. Therefore, they tended to internalise 
culpability for their problems and feel enormous shame in admitting social descent (Minujín 
& Anguita, 2004; Grimson & Kessler, 2005). Amidst the culture of risk and opportunity, it 
was little wonder that those from within the middle class who faced material adversity tended 
to respond privately in the 1990s, rather than to publicly expose their failings through a
collective presence on the streets. If they did join protest movements, these tended to be as 
part of the labour movement resistance or small business associations’ protests against 
structural adjustment, for example the teachers’ hunger strike and carpa blanca protest 
installation in 1997. 
Furthermore, one of the key objectives of the 1976-83 military Junta was to depoliticise 
society. Having murdered or ‘disappeared’ 30,000 citizens and tortured tens of thousands 
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more, they instilled a sense of fear in the population who were told ‘no te metas’ (don’t get 
involved in politics). Collective memory of the state terror endured during in the opening 
years of democracy in the 1980s and 1990s (Sitrin, 2010:140) and the fear would have surely 
also contributed to desisting from engagement in protest movements to a greater degree then 
than in 2002, by which time almost two decades had passed since the fall of the dictatorship. 
Returning to the 1990s, one of the mantras of President Menem’s administration was ‘save 
yourself,’ rather than relying on a corrupt political class and the wasteful state to help 
(Armony and Armony, 2005). The middle class was also encouraged to accrue a sufficient 
level of savings to act as an ‘insurance policy’ to cushion any potential fall or sudden 
impoverishment should their ‘risks’ (setting up businesses, speculating on the stock exchange 
or purchasing property) not pay off. As an added incentive to take risks, these savings were 
backed up against the US dollar under the government’s Convertibility 1991-2001 policy, 
which tied the value of the peso to the US currency, as a mechanism to control inflation 
(Pereyra, 2003:23), although it soon became clear during the Corralón where the real risk lay,
as these savings lost much of their value. 
Although due to a sense of embarrassment, new poverty tended to only manifest itself 
physically ‘behind closed doors’ in the 1990s (Minujín, 1995), by the start of the new 
millennium the political and macroeconomic climate had been transformed beyond 
recognition. After two years of deep recession, with unemployment reaching almost one in 
four by 2002 (INDEC), a systematic critique of neo-liberalism’s flaws had emerged. The 
idea that the structural adjustment of the 1990s had both damaged society and created poverty 
began to be countenanced by many intellectuals. Critical social commentaries also abounded 
in popular culture (Adamovsky, 2009), such as the popular TV series Los Simuladores and in 
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hit songs by artists such as La Renga and León Gieco. A wave of civil society organisations 
also sprang up in opposition to Argentina’s economic trajectory and their discourse was 
sprinkled with such rhetoric. Therefore, unlike the new urban poor of the 1990s who blamed 
themselves for making ‘bad choices’, those of the post-2001-02-era, influenced by 
sympathetic social narratives and influential political currents at the time, tended to shed this 
guilt and place their personal descent within a broader historical and economic context, 
emphasising the structural explanations for their ‘fall’ (Svampa, 2005:143). The result was a 
radical shift in the positioning of their subjectivity, away from one of autonomous rationality 
and towards one of having become the innocent victims of their country’s economic woes, for 
which the political establishment was deemed responsible. 
4.2.2 Increasing Belief that Collective Action Could be Successful
Symbolic mass acts of collective resistance to the neoliberal programme soon began to 
emerge, such as the apagones (the voluntary, mass switching off of lights at home). These
were supported by millions following appeals from the National Coalition Against Poverty 
(FRENAPO) to protest at soaring utility bills and personal impoverishment and were so 
widely followed that they even managed to halve electricity use during one such protest in 
December 2001 (Almeyra, 2004:165). After the voto bronco (the angry vote) in October 
2001 – when half of voters either spoilt their ballot papers, abstained completely (despite the 
legal obligation to vote) or voted for far-left parties during the legislative elections (Nohlen, 
2005) to vent their widespread anger and dissatisfaction with the political establishment
(Pérez, et al. 2005:389) – the new urban poor began to realise the impact of the collective 
strength of these acts of ‘private protest,’ that were made from the comfort of their own 
homes or in the voting booth. Unlike the new urban poor of a decade earlier, through 
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participation in these actions it became clear that they were not suffering alone and that 
millions of others shared their anger. 
4.2.3 Emerging Collective Identity and Shared Grievances
These citizens also came to realise that to participate in self-improvement actions alongside 
others no longer carried the stigma that it did a decade earlier. Individually, many reached 
the conclusion that only through collective action could they regain control of their fate and 
confront the structures in society that had caused their individual financial problems. The 
closed doors of new poverty had been ‘flung open’ (Grimson & Kessler, 2005:99). This 
sentiment was also supported by the recognition that during 2001-02, spaces for individual 
self-improvement (especially through work) were extremely limited (Bombal, 2002). The 
collective solutions that emerged ranged from the barter clubs that were used by up to three 
million largely impoverished Argentineans (Gomez & Helmsing, 2008:2496), to the 
neighbourhood assemblies that were deliberately held in public spaces to convey the message 
that it was acceptable to openly admit one’s descent (Svampa & Corral, 2006). 
Further, collective protests such as the cacerolazos and neighbourhood assemblies were 
construed as ‘new’ methods of manifesting dissent that were sufficiently distinct from the 
traditional forms used by the working class and structurally poor. This allowed them to be 
involved while still reasserting their middle-class identity and restoring the important role of 
the middle class on the national political scene (ibid. 2006). It therefore became much more 
acceptable to attend these forms of collective action, which had not existed in the 1990s. 
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An important caveat must be added here. It is worth pointing out that in the 1990s, surely not 
all of the new urban poor would have seen themselves as responsible for their fall (indeed 
whilst data is not available to prove this, many may have simultaneously blamed both 
themselves and the government). Equally, nor did they all attribute responsibility for their 
impoverishment to the government (or elsewhere) in 2001-02. The internalisation of blame, 
as Svampa, Adamovsky and others explain, was merely more of a “general tendency” among 
those in this stratum in the 1990s than in 2001-02. 
4.3 Crisis of Political Legitimacy, Economic Context and Reduced Tolerance of Hardship
Social scientists have drawn heavily upon structuralist critiques to suggest that in general the 
decision to become involved in collective forms of action was due to the spaces that opened 
for them to do so during the ‘crisis of legitimacy’ in the political and legislative institutions, 
which occurred during late 2001 and early 2002 (Palomino, 2005:19). The new urban poor, 
alongside other sectors throughout the country, began to organise collectively to improve 
their own economic circumstances because, in Weberian terms, the governing polity could no 
longer secure consent to rule from its people (Pérez, Armelino & Rossi, 2005:389). Indeed, 
the government was widely believed to be incompetent in both its economic management and 
political leadership - a view that fostered both economic and political self-organisation from 
below. 
Growing opposition to neo-liberalism in the late 1990s from those already mobilising on the 
streets against it, such as the CTA union confederation and CAME (Argentinean Federation 
of Medium-Sized Companies), was suddenly dealt a dramatic opportunity when the popular 
98
Vice-President ‘Chacho’ Álvarez resigned in late 2000, citing President De la Rúa’s inability 
to tackle corruption (Juri, Clarín, 07/10/2000). This led to an outbreak of infighting among 
the President’s cabinet and opened fissures in the ruling Alianza governing coalition, which 
Alvarez had, to a large extent, held together. Worse still, following the October 2001 
elections, De la Rúa was forced to form a minority government that relied on the support of 
the Peronist opposition to pass laws (Pérez, et al., 2005:389). With a weak and divided elite 
that was struggling to maintain consent to rule amidst a paralysis in the legislature, as well a 
series of high-profile corruption cases among the political elite (Perez, et al., 2005:389), the 
new urban poor sensed ‘political opportunities’ (Oberschall, 1973:128) to take advantage of 
these elite divisions and make their voices heard about their own plight. These opportunities 
had not existed to the same extent in the 1990s. 
Effectively, this internal division in the government lasted until May 2003, when Frente para 
la Victoria gained control of both Houses in parliament and newly appointed President 
Kirchner gave the Executive additional powers. He was soon to gain high approval ratings 
(Singer & Fara, 2008:756-760) and henceforth the opportunity for these internal divisions to 
be exploited closed. There was a notable decline in street mobilisations and collective 
resistance, both among the new urban poor and broader society after this time, which some 
attribute to the fact that after the election of Kirchner, people came to believe the crisis of 
legitimacy had ended (Mazzoni, 2008:222) and the new urban poor were persuaded that their 
‘political rights’ had been restored. Interestingly, Mazzoni also points out that their ongoing 
impoverishment was not accompanied by their prolonged political radicalisation because they 
had not developed a sophisticated enough understanding of their social (as opposed to 
political) citizenship. Instead, she argues, their radicalisation resulted from what was deemed 
to be a violation of their political rights, rather than an encroachment on their right to live free 
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from financial hardship (which, was not necessarily understood as a ‘right’ in itself). Further, 
once impoverished, their lack of comprehension of their social citizenship meant that the new 
urban poor expected little from the state in terms of welfare support and were driven by the 
value of financial self-sufficiency - a core component of their middle-class habitus. 
In short, whilst declining material conditions provided the fuel and oxygen for the fire of 
collective actions that the new urban poor participated in during the 2001-02 crisis, the spark 
was ignited by contingent political events which helped them to see their impoverishment in 
political terms. This made them increasingly likely to transfer blame for their problems away 
from themselves and onto the agents of capitalism such as politicians, government and 
International Financial Institutions. For the new poor, these events included firstly, the State 
of Siege declared by President De la Rúa on 19th December 2001 and secondly, the 
confiscation of savings by the banks under the Corralito because it provided a very clear 
example of how financial institutions, backed by government policy, had been complicit in 
the gross injustice that had resulted in financial insecurity for thousands in the middle. Both 
brought into focus the exploited nature of their relationship with capital, as well as the gaping 
deficit of legitimacy among liberal democracy’s ‘representative’ institutions. 
In his fascinating work When Men Revolt and Why (1971), James Davies attempted to explain 
political revolutions and why people overcome different barriers to engage in such protests in 
order to achieve social change. The J-Curve model that he developed apportions collective 
responses to a sudden reversal in fortunes after a long period of economic growth, or what he 
called ‘relative deprivation.’ The association between relative deprivation and the domestic 
incidence of collective protests was reaffirmed more recently in Richards and Gelleny’s 
cross-national empirical study of crises and domestic agitation in 125 countries between 1981 
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and 2000 (2006:795). When expectations grow but are left unfulfilled then a violent or 
politically radical response is likely. This helps to explain the general differences between
impoverished citizens’ responses to their situations in the 1990s and those in 2001-02. 
In the former period, whilst some middle class sectors benefited hugely during the Menem 
presidency (such as those linked to the finance sectors and because under the Convertibility 
Plan, foreign holidays and imported luxury goods became very cheap), those who suffered a
decline in quality of life (often due to unemployment), tended to experience impoverishment 
gradually and incrementally, as savings ran down or the value of wages eroded (Svampa, 
2005). Protests were also channelled through reformist organisations like trade unions, and 
impoverishment occurred amidst low expectations as a result of the deep economic recession 
of the Lost Decade of the 1980s and the hyperinflation of 1989-1991 (Adamovsky, 2009). 
In 2001-02, by contrast, millions fell below the poverty line in a far more sudden and violent 
fashion. It was also a personal descent that followed many years of raised expectations. As 
mentioned earlier, during the 1990s it became easy to believe that Argentina was finally 
nearing the greatness for which in the national imaginary, it had always been destined. This 
was due to, among other factors, the rapid modernisation of its infrastructure (shopping 
centres, airports and hotels), the expansion of services such as satellite TV and mobile 
phones, and its close relationship with the USA. Becoming accustomed to macroeconomic 
success for the first time in decades due to the country’s strong annual growth of 4-10% 
during the 1990s (except 1995), also substantiated this feeling (Armony & Armony, 2005:42). 
The policy of convertibility also helped ensure that those sectors of the middle class enjoyed 
unprecedented purchasing power Aside from being able to purchase to cheap luxury imported 
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goods, technology and consumer durables, a low cost of borrowing and sudden availability of 
credit in light of the artificially strong value of the peso. This added to their sense of material 
enrichment and helped convince many that the Menem Government of the 1990s was correct 
when it repeatedly assured them that all this meant that the country had reached the ‘First 
World’ at last. As Menem declared in 1992, “Our country is the leader of a new order. A 
new, home-grown Argentina will join the First World as a number-one country. The leader 
of new changes. The leader of a leap toward the future.”
However, following the country’s sovereign debt default in early 2002, the peg to the US 
dollar ended and the peso was subject to a devaluation of 75% (Corrales, 2002:32). The 
subsequent price hikes suddenly pushed imported consumer durables out of reach and it 
quickly became clear that the hopes and aspirations for a better material future that many had 
fostered during the 1990s had been built on false promises and ill-considered economic 
policies (Vilas, 2005:252). This brought an abrupt end to citizens’ perceived upward mobility 
and the high living standards that many in the middle class had become used to. It also 
exacerbated the perception and tangibility of social descent. This was not only difficult to 
cope with psychologically, but also provoked a ferocious response in the outburst of 
collective protests during 2001-02. Unlike the reformist demands of the 1990s, those of 
2001-02 were far more radical, articulating goals of direct democracy, neighbourhood-level 
self-management and – as encompassed in the QSVT slogan –questioning the whole system 
of representative democracy (Dinerstein, 2003:196-197). 
At this point and to make further sense of the collective protest responses that newly poor 
citizens adopted during the crisis of 2001-02, it is important to mention the relevance of
‘national identity’ construction and in particular, the myths associated with ‘national 
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greatness’ in the Argentinean imaginary (Armony & Armony, 2005). Most accounts of the 
political mobilisation of the middle class at this time can be categorised as either i) 
‘emotional/defensive’ –as an outpouring of collective anger at having incurred personal 
financial or material loss during the crisis, ii) ‘misguided/blame’ –as collective frustration 
with politicians for having made bad economic decisions and for failing to represent them 
effectively or iii) ‘institutional’ – due to public demands for accountability which was met 
with elected authorities unresponsiveness due to the weakness of Argentina’s institutions
under Menemismo. However, each of these explanations fails to recognise the cultural frames 
and cognitive patterns that underlay the connection between civil and political society which 
influenced the way that citizens behaved in the context of economic and political crisis. 
National identity construction in Argentina traces its origins to the influx of millions of 
European immigrants who settled in what they optimistically believed to be a rich, young, 
‘progressive ‘American country during the early to mid-1900s. Initially joining the ranks of 
the country’s industrial working class, they were soon aided by Peronist redistribution 
policies and acquired middle-class lifestyles, values and aspirations. At the same time, the 
country’s political leaders from President Alvear in the 1920s though to Peron in the 1940s
and 50s alongside the popular press were proclaiming that Argentina was to become ‘a 
leading nation in the world.’ A myth of past and future national grandeur definitively shaped 
public discourse, however, when the decadence of the second half of the twentieth century set 
in (due to the saturation of the ISI economic model), the notion of the ‘Argentinean Dream’ 
faded and was replaced by a narrative of victimisation in the minds of its people. The belief 
that ‘there is always some kind of ‘other’ which is liable for robbing its citizens of their
glorious destiny’ began to take root (ibid. 2005:44). 
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During the 2001-02 crisis, this neurosis played itself out with dramatic effect, especially 
among the new urban poor. They tended to direct blame for their personal pauperisation at 
the ‘political class’ that had, for them, long been responsible for the country’s unfulfilled 
potential. The tragedy of this period was that the culprits were perhaps ‘too obvious,’ in the 
sense that it was much easier to personify them in ‘politicians’ and ‘institutions’ such as the 
IMF, rather than in the unobservable processes and workings of capitalism. It is true that 
political corruption, poor policy decisions and the unrelenting pressure of international 
financial institutions all played a part in the proletarianisation of millions of Argentineans, but 
these merely obscured the true, underlying cause of their impoverishment. 
Another facet of Argentinean national identity – partly forged by the widely accessible 
education system that Peronism encouraged – was its association with the perception of 
upward social mobility, something that had been enjoyed by three generations of the middle 
class by the time Menem arrived in power in 1989. To be Argentinean, people believed, was 
to able to socially aspire. However, the 2001-02 crisis was so profound that it marked a 
watershed for the application of these national imaginaries to the reality of everyday life. 
During this period, the ideological glue that maintained society’s social fabric fell apart 
(Grimson & Kessler, 2005:88) as the new urban poor were forced to come to terms not just 
with their personal dislocation from society, but also three painful realisations. 
Firstly, they saw that President Menem’s so frequently repeated assertions in the 1990s that 
‘Argentina belongs to the First World’ and that he had managed to bring stability to the 
country were nothing but myths. Secondly, they realised that this crisis was so acute that 
neither they nor their children would probably be able to become upwardly mobile again. 
Thirdly, they understood that the conviction that they belonged to the middle class had 
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existed only in their minds. To quote Marx and Engels (1848), all that was solid truly seemed 
to ‘melt into air’. The collective sense of anger at this new social reality, the identification of 
a common (although misconstrued) enemy in the ‘political class,’ and the realisation that they 
could no longer trust their leaders who had falsely claimed to act in their economic interests, 
therefore became generative causes of the collective responses that many adopted. 
4.4 Growing Opportunities for Involvement in Collective Action and Undermined 
Opportunities for Self-Help
Finally, I suggest that among the new urban poor, both awareness of the existence of 
collective actions and geographical proximity to them increased significantly during 2001-
02, facilitating involvement to a much greater degree than in the 1990s. Of course, economic 
necessity was an underlying causal force, but a critical mass of people already involved in an 
action and its accessibility both played a significant role in prompting participation. 
A study of 5,268 collective protests in Argentina between 1989 and 2003 indicates that the 
average annual number of protest actions was actually higher among the general population
during the 1990s than in the crisis years of 2000-2003 (GEPSAC, 2006). The principal
movements involved during the 1990s were the trade unions (especially public sector unions, 
white-collar workers like teachers, civil servants, and those aligned with the CTA) and 
unemployed workers’ organisations, hence resistance tended to be led by the working class. 
Paradoxically, during the latter period, a plethora of qualitative research portrays snowballing 
levels of protest and collective self-help activity by the middle sectors, including the new 
urban poor, (Adamovsky 2009; Svampa & Corral 2006). 
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Although longitudinal quantitative data that breaks down involvement in collective actions 
by class or social strata does not exist, a general intensification of new urban poor collective 
and protest activity during the crisis can be inferred from the proliferation of specific actions 
that - according to the qualitative literature - contained a disproportionately high level of 
involvement from those in this stratum. For example, the number of barter clubs soared 
(largely due to contingent factors like the shortage of liquidity after the Corralito and 
sovereign debt default) from half a dozen in 1995 (totalling several hundred participants) to 
500 clubs (400,000 participants) in 2000, to 4,500 clubs (2. 6m participants) in 2002. 
Similarly, the number of cacerolazo protests exploded from a nominal pre-December 2001 
figure to 2,014 in the first three months of 2002 alone. Further, although barely any 
permanent popular or neighbourhood assemblies existed before 2001, 272 were established 
in 2002 (Nueva Mayoría, 2006). Middle-class savers’ protests also became widespread that 
year (Svampa, 2006). These figures suggest that “opportunities for” (or the “supply of”) 
collective actions available during 2002 were vastly greater than in the 1990s. A priori
evidence therefore seems to suggest that:
Hypothesis 1:
The decision to participate in collective actions – whether protest or self-improvement – is 
not simply motivated by impoverishment but also by other factors, namely increased 
opportunities to participate in such actions. 
4.5 Continuity in Resistance: 1980s-2002
However, the radicalism of the impoverished middle class and their participation in protest 
actions during the 2002 crisis must also be placed into historical context. Many authors 
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characterise the uprisings of 19th and 20th December 2001 as ‘spontaneous’ (Dinerstein, 
2003). However, whilst they were certainly an impromptu response to President de la Rúa’s
imposition of Martial Law following nationwide lootings to some extent, the strategies and 
tactics used in these protests did not emerge in a historical vacuum. As Tilly (2006) 
describes, they are both shaped by the nature of political regimes and also agents’ (either 
conscious or subconscious) recourse to a collective memory of social movements’ 
experiences and repertoires of protest, acquired through previous struggles. The ‘repertoires 
of territorialised protests’ that developed as a response to hyperinflation during the 1980s –
through to the vecinazo protests in Greater Buenos Aires and then the puebladas (popular 
uprisings) following mass unemployment in the 1990s – involved neighbourhood-based 
organisational methods such as assemblies and mass street protests, which were relatively 
new in 20th-century Argentina. 
Yet, by 2001, they had been incorporated into the collective action repertoires of broad 
sectors of the population and this included the middle class, when they too faced adverse 
economic conditions (Adamovsky, 2009). In any case, far from completely acquiescing to 
their descent in the 1990s, diverse elements of the struggling middle sectors had stood at the 
forefront of resistance to structural adjustment, including small and medium-sized agro-
industry producers that joined the Tractorazo protest23 in 1993, teachers and civil servants 
who were active in the CTA union confederation, and various business associations, which 
participated in the 1995 general strike. To some extent therefore, by the time of the economic 
crisis in 2001-02, engagement in protest had become a more naturalised response to economic 
crises by newly poor Argentineans than during earlier decades. In this sense, the 2001-02 
                                                            
23 Whereby thousands of protestors drove their tractors to the Plaza de Mayo square in Buenos Aires.
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scenario should not be considered as a historically distinct period of new urban poor 
collective resistance, but rather as an upsurge of the existing one. 
In seeking to understand new urban poor actions during 2001-02 crisis, in this first part of my 
critical review of the literature I pose the hypothesis that citizens’ response actions were not 
informed simply by their material hardship, nor the extent of their material need, but also by a 
range of contextual generative factors. I elaborated on the social, cultural, economic and 
political causes which help to explain why when responding to financial shocks, those in this 
social stratum were more likely to enact protest responses at that time, whereas in the 1990s 
and since 2003, those in the middle class who have become pauperised have been inclined to 
retreat into private actions. 
Among the factors that I have suggested increased the tendency to engage in collective 
actions and join protest movements during 2001-02 include the fact that impoverishment was 
experienced more tangibly and so one’s anger at their material loss was more potent (itself 
partly due to the hollowness of powerful national identity myths being exposed). Also, I 
made the case that there was a transformation in how one’s pauperisation was subjectively 
perceived because it occurred at the same time as a crisis of political legitimacy, thus the 
attribution for material losses were more likely to shift away from themselves and instead 
moved towards politicians and systemic causation. This shift in subjectivities bestowed the 
new poor with a target for their anger to whom they could remonstrate through street 
mobilisations. Further, due to the scale of the economic crisis, and sheer numbers of people 
who were suffering profound social descent at the time, it became easier for a collective 
identity to emerge, the self-belief that demanding change was possible to grow, and for action 
to be taken alongside others. As economic self-improvement channels such as employment 
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were undermined during the 2001-02 crisis, one’s political tolerance of their hardship 
declined at the same time as opportunities to become involved in collective self-help and 
protest actions mushroomed. These factors all combined and cultivated a diachronic shift 
which transformed patterns of in-group new poor behaviour. 
Now that these contextual factors have been highlighted, in the following chapter I will seek 
to establish hypotheses that explain the differentiated individual responses of the new urban 
poor within this social strata which are independent of the broader contextual influences that 
have been covered here. 
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CHAPTER 5 - UNDERSTANDING RESPONSES TO PAUPERISATION IN 
ARGENTINA: PRIVATE CONSIDERATIONS FOR TAKING ACTIONS IN 2002
In Chapter 4, we saw how individual citizens place their own impoverishment or downward 
social mobility into the context of macroeconomic and political events when deciding how to 
take decisions about how to respond. However, based on the literature it is suggested that this
is not the only factor that they assess. Instead, in this chapter and in the thesis more broadly, I 
establish a number of hypotheses about how individual biographies and financial, labour 
market and social influences on the household, as well as the localised opportunities to 
participate in different actions, also play a key role. 
In particular, I propose that it is the interaction between these individuals and their household 
dynamics, together with the broader social, economic and political context, that is crucial in 
trying to understand the generative processes and mechanisms which influenced new urban 
poor behaviour in 2002. These private considerations are discussed here. 
5.1 Tolerance and Tangibility of Hardship
Davies’ J-Curve Theory (1971), which was discussed in Section 4.3, explains that it is the 
suddenness of economic shocks that provides the basis for political revolutions. However, 
here it is postulated that this theory can also be reducible to the level of individual decision-
making and that as private agents, citizens in households which suffered particularly severe 
financial loss tended to resort to protest rather than simply self-improvement. The relative 
suddenness of the economic crisis in 2001-02 meant that Argentina’s new urban poor ‘did not 
have time to plan’ or adjust their individual economic self-improvement strategies by 
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leveraging their superior social and cultural capital. This would normally have provided them 
with employment opportunities and financial assistance, and would have enabled them to 
overcome their economic fall (Cortes & Kessler, 2004). Here again, I return to the intrinsic 
link between economic self-improvement strategies and political protest. For those to whom
adaptive strategies were denied and for whom financial loss would have been greater or more 
sudden (due to loss of employment, business earnings, savings, investment income etc), 
material deprivation could not be easily cushioned. In such cases, citizens tend to become 
angered that they have been denied the opportunity for individual economic self-
improvement, and vent their frustrations against the government (or other authorities), which 
are more likely to be seen as responsible rather than blaming themselves (Powers, 1999:532). 
Thus, they would have been less tolerant of their own financial hardship than those citizens 
for whom economic coping strategies were working at least to some extent (and some income 
being generated, despite remaining in poverty). 
Applying Davies’ ‘relative deprivation’ or J-Curve Theory to Argentina – that’s to say the 
decision to join collective protests was influenced by the suddenness or degree of households’ 
economic decline - has not, been tested empirically to date. However, isolated practical 
experiences of struggle suggest an association between the suddenness of impoverishment 
and the radicalism of response action. For example, the oil workers of the state-owned YPF 
Company in the Patagonian town of Cutral Co had traditionally represented the country’s
labour aristocracy, but in response to mass redundancy in the mid-1990s, they took drastic 
measures by blocking the public highroads in protests that soon turned violent, an event that 
marked the formation of the piqueteros movement (Almeyra, 2004:62). Using the ‘level of 
household income loss’ as an indicator of the extent of economic shock, the J-Curve Theory 
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will be tested here to account for differences among individual new urban poor behaviours in 
2002 (see the Hypothesis table in Chapter 6). Therefore, I suggest that:
Hypothesis 2:
New poor citizens in households that experience more sudden descent into poverty are more 
likely to participate in collective protests than those who suffer more gradual 
impoverishment. 
Our attention now turns away from the extent of ‘the fall’ (relative deprivation or changes in 
response that one can attribute to the amount of income that was lost) and towards the actual 
level of deprivation that new urban poor households experienced. In other words, how 
response was affected in terms of the income level households ended up at, regardless of the 
extent of their income loss. To give an example of the latter; two households A and B may 
have both fallen below the poverty line, but household A may have just fallen below it, with 
a per capita income of 230 pesos (US$ 66) per month, whereas household B may have had its 
income reduced to 150 pesos (US$ 43) per month (thus living in greater absolute poverty). 
Despite living in relatively better (objective) material conditions, household A may or may 
not have suffered greater income loss. The test that will be conducted under Hypothesis 2 
will thus measure how response was affected by the absolute level of poverty experienced. 
One study (Bombal, 2002:17) suggests that those who became poor during the crisis, but 
ended up surviving on lower per capita incomes, were more likely to choose actions that one 
could label as ‘self-improvement’ – rather than ‘protest’ – because they had greater financial 
necessity than those households living just slightly below the poverty line. Those who were 
in greater financial need had to fill their time engaging in self-help activities that sought 
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immediate economic benefit in order to ‘survive’ and so had less time for engaging in 
‘protest’ activities, even if these had specific financial demands such as the savers’ 
escraches.
Meanwhile, Kliksberg (2006) asserts that the poorest and most desperate were forced into the 
individual self-improvement strategy of becoming a cartonero, although such an option was 
quite rare among the new poor. Novick and Murias (2005:39) found that those who had 
become most profoundly impoverished during the crisis, especially through the loss of work 
and savings, saw the least reason to stay in the country and opted for the private ‘exit’ self-
improvement strategy of emigration, rather than expressing their ‘voice’ through protest. 
Thus, the literature suggests that those households that were situated furthest below the 
poverty line would have preferred to spend their limited time pursuing self-improvement, 
rather than engaging in protest (perhaps because the potential rewards were more immediate 
than the longer-term hope of heralding widespread change for the collective benefit). 
Finally, new urban poor theorists commonly write about the shame associated with sudden 
social descent (Minujín & Anguita, 2004; Grimson & Kessler, 2005) and the implications 
that this has for responses. Guided by this idea, at lower income levels, households are more 
desperate to pursue all channels possible in order to reverse their deprivation and therefore 
become increasingly willing to overcome the ‘taboos’ that act as impediments to self-
improvement. I will explore this idea further in this research. For instance, the previously 
inconceivable notion of accepting charity or asking friends for help suddenly becomes a 
realistic possibility, as the basic Maslowian need to provide for one’s family takes 
precedence over pride or custom. As Brecht (1928) put it: “food comes first, then morality.”
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In terms of how income level correlated here with the decision to protest, Fiszbein et al.
(2003) observe that, interestingly, among the general Argentinean population, participation in 
social protest actually increased with household income during the crisis, as Table 2
illustrates below (Group I being the lowest income quintile). 
Table 2: Argentina - Participation in Social Protests in 2002 (Percentage of households)
Quintile I II III IV V Average
% 11.4 12.6 17.5 17.5 22.0 16.7
Source: Fiszbein, Giovagnoli and Aduriz (2003)
This phenomenon may be because, during the crisis, those on higher incomes were more 
motivated to take remedial action to the more sudden and unacceptable changes to their way 
of life than the long-term poor (see discussion of J-Curve Theory above), or that those higher 
up the pre-crisis earnings scale had a greater sense of political citizenship (Mazzoni, 2008), 
so were more angered by and thus moved to protest during the crisis of political legitimacy of 
those days. This may also highlight the political alienation, powerlessness and isolation felt 
by the most impoverished members of society (Chambers, 2006). Whether the same trend 
occurs within the new urban poor stratum (as opposed to within the general population) will 
be examined here. As an a priori it is therefore anticipated that:
Hypothesis 3:
More deeply impoverished new urban poor households are more likely to participate in a 
higher number of self-improvement responses, rather than engage in protest actions, compared 
to those that are less profoundly impoverished. 
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5.2 Response Combinations
Recalling Powers (1999) finding that responses to economic shocks may become politicised 
when the spaces for engaging in self-improvement actions are restricted, it must be 
remembered that those who undertake a lower number of such strategies have not necessarily 
done so because these have been undermined. Instead, this may well be because the few 
coping strategies that they have engaged in were successful (with respect to achieving a 
satisfactory increase in their incomes). If taking on a new job provides a decent salary and 
increased standard of living, then this single self-improvement strategy may be enough on its 
own to convince someone to desist from joining a protest action (on the basis that they no 
longer have an economic grievance). On the other hand, households may deploy a wide range 
of coping strategies and yet find that none of them help to alleviate their hardship. 
In short, as the association between the number of economic coping strategies pursued and 
economic wellbeing is not valid, measuring the relationship between the numbers of self-
improvement actions performed and the likelihood of involvement in protest would also be 
spurious on this basis. Instead, willingness to participate in protest is more likely to be shaped 
by the degree to which coping strategies ‘have actually worked.’ Nevertheless, the contrary 
hypothesis – that among the new urban poor there was a positive association between those 
who undertook a greater number of self-improvement responses and the probability that they 
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participated in protest actions – can be supported on other grounds, based on the literature, as 
will be revealed. 
Here I refer back to three of the principal objectives of this study, which are to: i) Identify 
mechanisms by which the new urban poor can, through practical day-to-day experience, on the 
one hand develop a heightened consciousness about the reality of their subjugated social 
position in the world, as one which they share with the working class, unemployed and 
structurally poor and on the other, develop a desire to change it through the necessary political 
action. ii) Prolong the future involvement of the new urban poor in social movements so that 
they do not revert back to solely dealing with the atomising and disempowering situation of 
their impoverishment privately, limiting themselves to the economic opportunities that 
capitalism offers them. iii) Help them identify the social totality as the target of their protests 
and so recognise the underlying need to transform social structures that prevent their 
emancipation whilst joining other oppressed groups in doing so, rather than seeking reformist 
measures independently of other sectors and which only modify the existing system 
temporarily. 
Engagement in collective self-improvement actions seems to potentially achieve each of these 
three ends. First, in terms of heightening the discovery of shared class consciousness with 
other ‘sectors’ through practical experience: During the crisis, participation in barter clubs, 
recovered factories, communal soup kitchens and other collective self-improvement actions 
acted as a mechanism through which the new urban poor began to meet with the long-term 
poor and working class, often for the first time. Collective activities therefore acted as ‘sites of 
social integration’ (Almeyra, 2004:167) in which through practical, daily or regular 
interaction, the similarities that these citizens shared in terms of their increasingly common 
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experiences and ever more comparable social and economic conditions were exposed and 
often recognised for the first time by participants. Through interactions at these sites during 
2002, many started to feel a strong sense of solidarity with working-class and unemployed 
workers movements, whom they recognised were also the exploited ‘victims’ of capitalism 
(Palomino, 2005:19). Thus, the new poor began to develop a shared class consciousness, even 
if they continued to openly deny their proletarianisation at the ontological level of observable 
‘reality.’ Consequently, capitalism (and the crisis it produced in Argentina) therefore generated 
fertile grounds for longer-term solidarity in opposition to it, between the proletarianised former 
middle class, the working class and unemployed people’s movements. 
In Section 3.4.2 the methods that the dominant class used to successfully drive a wedge 
between the new urban poor and the long-term poor after 2002 were outlined, as well as how 
the dominant class was able to arrest the development of the new poor’s emerging working-
class consciousness. What is certain is that the million or so citizens who have remained 
‘newly’ pauperised since the crisis (Grupo CCR, 2009) continue to share a range of living 
conditions with the structural poor. These include: low incomes, underemployment, low-
skilled work, lack of workplace autonomy and social problems associated with deprivation, 
such as strained family relationships and deteriorating health as a result of the physical and 
mental stresses induced by an impoverished lifestyle (Kliksberg, 2006). 
Accepting one’s social descent is painful and psychologically distressing (Masseroni & 
Sauane, 2004), which is surely why the new urban poor went to great lengths to differentiate 
themselves from the structurally poor by stubbornly refusing to relinquish elements of 
symbolic capital that enabled them to preserve their superior status (Kessler & Di Virgilio, 
2008). Frequently, the most important of these was their home. Often at immense financial 
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and emotional cost, home ownership appears to have acted as a psychological barrier that 
prevented new poor citizens’ acceptance that they had suffered unthinkable descent into the 
ranks of ‘the poor,’ or that they had ‘joined the working class.’ Hence, the repeated 
observation of their refusal to sell their property during visits to such households (Ozarow, 
2008). This has at least allowed them a reference point from which to draw and say: "You see, 
we are not like them!" Although since 2003 this shared class consciousness has diminished, 
aside from their quality of housing and access to basic utilities the new poor still share 
virtually all other objective economic and social conditions with the structurally poor (who 
often resided in shantytowns). 
The question for Marxists is how to sensitively encourage the idea that the ‘new’ and 
‘structural’ poor share class interests once again by bringing them together at communal 
shared physical spaces, so that these shared hopes and interests can be recognised and 
stereotypes held about ‘the other’ broken down. At such sites, collective grievances can be 
recognised. In addition – as was seen from the crisis in 2002 – these spaces can act as a forum 
where the newly poor can console each other emotionally over the shared predicament they 
face (Svampa & Corral, 2006:148). 
During the crisis, details about other protest actions were also divulged at the popular 
assemblies, barter clubs and protests, through exchange of information and networking 
opportunities. Hence, a snowball effect was unleashed whereby those who were already 
engaged in a collective self-improvement action may have become involved in protest or other 
collective self-improvement actions because these meeting places acted as awareness-raising 
sites enabling the cross-fertilisation of resistance to take place.   For example, community 
kitchens (ollas populares) and other actions were organised by many of the neighbourhood 
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assemblies (Svampa & Corral, 2006), so there was an experiential flow of information about 
the existence of both activities. Meanwhile, the new poor who found work in the recovered 
companies and cooperative enterprises often became aware of their existence via their 
participation in barter clubs or neighbourhood assemblies (Paiva, 2004). 
First, these sites permitted the newly poor to establish acquaintances and mutual trust with 
those with whom they shared common interests. They met people with whom they could 
actually participate in collective protest actions and maintain relationships in the longer-run, so 
collective self-help initiatives promoted ongoing interaction. Further, engagement in these 
activities meant that members became more aware about the existence of such protests in the 
first place. Therefore, these sites acted not simply as educational arenas in the sense that the 
new urban poor ‘learned about own their position in the world’, but also as forums for the 
exchange of information about protest opportunities. They were places where the newly poor 
gained the confidence to take part in ‘political’ actions by befriending or coming into contact 
with others who were already attending protests. 
The same networking pattern is repeated in the opposite direction between those who initially 
participated in a protest, which then led them to take part in a collective self-improvement 
action. It is suggested in the literature (Mazzoni, 2007:291; Di Marco et al. 2003), that newly 
impoverished citizens with a background in having taken collective action (through trade 
unions, political parties and so on) tended to also be more predisposed to taking collective 
action in response to impoverishment because they possessed ‘collectivist outlooks’ and 
recognised from past experience that the only way to improve their prospects was by acting 
together. 
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Secondly, there is the wider issue of how engaging in collective self-help initiatives can help to 
provide continuity for newly individuals, so that they stay involved in ‘the movement’ in the 
longer term and maintain their progressive and emancipatory politics. This is especially 
important in Argentina, whose recent history shows that popular movements will not 
necessarily rally around progressive aims. Indeed as was demonstrated in Section 3.4.2, since 
the disintegration of the ¡Qué se vayan todos! and the assembly movement after 2003, there 
have been three episodes of mass political mobilisation (the Blumberg demonstrations in 2004 
and 2006, the anti-export tax protests in 2008 and most recently the anti-government 
cacerolazos in 2012). Yet, in each case, the struggling or recuperated middle class has in its 
majority taken a highly reactionary position, which has either scapegoated the structural poor 
or opposed government proposals to increase spending on social programmes and wealth 
redistribution. It therefore becomes important to understand that mobilising vehicles are, I 
argue, required to support the continuity of any movement’s political and social aims so as to 
prevent it from disappearing or its objectives from becoming more conservative in the post-
crisis years, despite originally being born of proposals to radically change society. 
It is starting to become clear that if the survey results suggest an association between 
participation in collective economic self-improvement strategies and collective protest actions, 
then it would suggest that the focus for movements wishing to mobilise and maintain the 
involvement of the new urban poor (and to grow and become more stable generally) should be 
to dedicate resources to establishing self-help projects as mobilising vehicles for protest. 
Promoting involvement in such initiatives can form a ‘base’ for practical, relevant and 
continuous activity from which people can make forays into political protest, even though 
encouraging such forms of action has often been neglected in the past by labour and other 
movements due to the fact that the public face of such mobilisations has focused so strongly on 
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protests and ‘campaigning’ (Croucher, 1987; 1995). For example, the ‘indoor relief’ and ‘poor 
houses’ which were used to punish sections of the unemployed and destitute by the British 
authorities became sites of widespread resistance and protest in the early twentieth century. 
Ultimately, protests are by their nature ‘sporadic’ and not permanent, yet collective self-help 
activities can be more continuous and transcend the fluctuating levels of class struggle which 
result in peaks and troughs of political dissent (and which partly themselves depend on the 
extent to which the dominant class is able to maintain hegemonic control at different 
moments). 
In relation to this, so far the evidence in Argentina has been anecdotal. For example, the 
popular assemblies often acted as organisational nerve centres through which protests were 
either agreed upon or publicised. However, whilst scores of such assemblies operated 
throughout the country during 2002 (although largely concentrated in the City of Buenos Aires 
– see Table 3 in Section 5.3.4), as the latter part of that year came around and 2003 began, 
many of them disbanded,24 with other collective actions soon dying away too as a 
consequence, because they had lost one of their main co-ordinating and awareness-raising 
platforms. There was also a positive correlation observable between the numbers of barter 
clubs (and participants in them) and the number of collective protests that took place, as 
illustrated in the figures that appeared at the end of Section 4.4. Whilst it would be spurious to 
conclude that the rise and fall in protest levels was because of the changing level of 
                                                            
24The reasons for this have been attributed to a wide-ranging set of factors in the literature.Almeyra (2004:175) 
discusses how participants became increasingly alienated by the growing influence and dogmatism of sectarian 
leftwing parties.Meanwhile, Svampa & Corral (2006:131) focus on how participants became disillusioned with 
the creeping devolution of decision-making power away from the local assemblies themselves towards first the 
‘Citywide Assemblies’ and then the Colombres (the ‘supreme decision-making body of all Citywide Assemblies), 
which were another rank further removed from their own participation.An alternative theory is offered by 
Pereyra(2003:169), who highlights how by June 2002, the cold Argentinean winter and the relocation of the 
assemblies away from streets, parks and public spaces to abandoned buildings or community centres created a 
loss of visibility and public display of solidarity.
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participation in barter networks, the idea that the clubs acted as a base from which protest 
actions grew needs to be explored further. 
Among the most concrete examples of how collective self-help activities can provide a 
springboard for involvement in protest actions are those means established by the piqueteros. 
One piquetero group – MTD de la Matanza – made the transition from a purely political 
movement to a self-managed cooperative in the longer term, whilst still maintaining its clear 
emancipatory aims. This has since crystallised their organisation so that its participants have 
remained ‘politicised’ whilst also overcoming labour market precariousness by providing jobs to 
those involved. Further, the project has reinforced the social bonds and solidarity needed to 
reactivate its members into taking protest action at appropriate moments. In addition, it has 
successfully contributed towards building a counter-hegemonic economic model whilst 
minimising their level of compromise with the capitalist state or risk of being co-opted by it. By 
pooling social welfare that the state provides to individual cooperative members (the Planes) and 
reallocating it for use in self-contained community projects, state assistance does not threaten 
their independence and self-management. On the contrary, it has actually given the group an 
initial income source from which to launch its own collective social enterprise (Forto & Cáceres, 
2006). The 205 successful examples of worker-managed recovered companies that have 
emerged since 2001 (UBA, 2010) are another example from which social movement leaders 
could learn if they wished to identify models for new urban poor engagement. 
Finally, I suggest that those who undertook more collective self-improvement actions were 
also more likely to be involved in protest actions (and vice-versa), because the psychological 
trauma associated with sudden and profound social descent and catastrophic economic turmoil 
can have two polarising effects on subjects. Namely, citizens either tend to become active in a 
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large number of actions or in none at all. For many, the anger and frustration caused by such 
loss are vented constructively, propelling and energising them to take action in order to reverse 
their declining fortunes. However, others deal with the situation either by denying their new 
reality or by falling victim to mental paralysis (Plotkin, 2003:224) and intransigence due to the 
feeling of being overwhelmed by events. This prevents any significant modification in their 
existing behaviour, which usually only consists of individual self-improvement actions. For 
many of those who experience this denial, their household’s financial circumstances worsen as 
they ‘spend money they no longer have’ and heavily in debt themselves in the process (Kessler 
& Di Virgilio, 2008:41). Those who are affected psychologically in this way will be much less 
likely to proactively take to the streets or join in collective actions. 
Further, dichotomous psychological and behavioural traits tend to self-perpetuate. On the one 
hand, engagement in collective self-improvement activity breeds involvement in protest; on 
the other, those who fail to accept their new reality and retreat into individual coping strategies 
tend to fall into a spiral of withdrawal and self-imposed exclusion. Nevertheless, it is 
important not to be deterministic. In spite of these trends, as the dialectical method proposes, 
modes of behaviour cannot be seen as static and the non-activist citizen may suddenly change 
in unexpected ways and engage in more proactive forms of resistance when external 
circumstances change. Consequently:
Hypothesis 4:
Those in households that participate in more collective self-improvement actions are also more 
likely to participate in protest actions (and vice-versa). 
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5.3 Biographical Characteristics
Both the statistical evidence and the literature review findings in Chapter 4 described how a 
number of factors in combination influenced the response choices that the new urban poor 
made in 2002, rather than just the experience of having ‘become impoverished’ in itself. 
These factors included: the spaces available to participate in different categories of action, the 
macro-political and economic contexts, and the changing apportioning of blame from ‘private-
to-system’. Impoverishment was judged to be an underlying but not immediate cause of 
politicisation. However, research also indicates that differences in response preferences
between households can be accounted for by referencing the particular life experiences and 
backgrounds of the individuals involved in several ways. 
5.3.1 Prior Experience of Collective Organisations
In terms of those biographical influences that were not examined in the ISCA Survey itself, 
work has been produced on the importance of previous political activism (Di Marco et al.
2003:123), which found that of those who participated in the neighbourhood assemblies (as a 
form of collective protest), 60% had prior experience of political involvement. Interestingly 
those with parents who were tortured or ‘disappeared’ during the military dictatorship of 1976 
to 1983 were also more likely to participate. The reasons for this are not explored but are most 
likely accounted for by the heightened exposure to political ideas and networking (referring 
back to the idea that sites of collective action acted as locations of information exchange). 
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Children of the last dictatorship’s victims may well have belonged to HIJOS25 or a related 
human rights campaign before the crisis and thus have been more likely to become involved in 
the assemblies (or other collective actions), having become politicised during the search for 
‘justice’ for their loved one. 
One can thus predict that prior involvement in ‘collective’ activities of any sort would make 
the possibility of engaging in collective protest actions following impoverishment more likely. 
This may be due to such prior affiliations engendering more collectivist outlooks, or providing 
greater confidence in becoming involved in collective actions, or may simply relate to greater 
networking opportunities being available through having belonged to collective organisations 
before. The ‘collective entities’ referred to here – and which act as a predictor variable tested 
in this research – cover a diverse range of fields including trade unions, religious groups, 
business associations and social affinity organisations (by age, gender, sporting activity, etc). 
Hypothesis 5:
Those with prior histories of affiliation to collective entities are more likely to engage in 
collective protests
5.3.2 Gender
Whilst little has been written about how personal characteristics played a part in the response 
decisions of Argentinean households, it should be noted that dialectical principles assert that 
these cannot (on their own) be a determinant of behaviour, because phenomena are treated as 
                                                            
25 The organisation run by children of the ‘Disappeared’ that campaigns for the perpetrators of the murders 
committed by Argentina’s Government during the Dirty War to be brought to justice. 
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being ‘in the process of development’ rather than as closed, static structures (Barker, 2008). 
This means that the gender, age or even skill-level of newly impoverished people do not have 
intrinsic behavioural values in themselves but instead can become either barriers or stimulants 
to mobilisation in particular ways when certain generative conditions exist, which trigger such 
behaviour. It is these generative conditions that ascribe importance to a particular 
characteristic. For instance, although between 70% (de Sanzo, 1998) and 85% (Gomez & 
Helmsig, 2008:2496) of barter club participants were women, this does not mean that females 
are biologically more predisposed to attend collective self-improvement actions. 
Instead, their propensity to engage in such actions was due to the fact that women’s assigned 
gender roles in Argentinean society were such that they tended to be seen as guardians of 
household welfare (Ford & Picasso, 2002. Therefore, during periods of pauperisation such as 
that which occurred during the crisis, it was they who were more likely to be made responsible 
for generating additional household income so that the wellbeing of its members could be 
restored. Bartering was also an action that many women felt particularly comfortable with, 
because it allowed those who did undertake traditional gendered household activities to 
combine them with hobbies like cooking foods or knitting garments for exchange as well as 
with wider opportunities for socialising (Parysow & Bogani, 2002). 
At this point it is prudent to mention that the ISCA Survey recorded the gender and age of 
respondents ‘as individuals’ whilst their responses were recorded at the level of ‘the 
household’. To this end, it is only possible to establish hypotheses about whether newly 
impoverished citizens of a particular gender or age category were more likely to belong to a 
household that enacted a certain type of action, rather than whether their backgrounds 
influenced their response preferences as an individual. For this reason, the question posed is 
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whether age or gender impacts on the response ‘of the household’ and not on that of ‘the 
individual’ (which was not possible to test within the available data). 
Among the households which suffered economically, although stable employment was 
particularly difficult to secure during the depths of the economic crisis in 2002, Argentina’s 
deeply ingrained machista culture meant that the male was expected to focus his attention on 
securing a return to formal, full-time employment as the main breadwinner – which often 
took much longer (Stobbe, 2005) - whilst women were given the duty of ensuring that the 
household’s short-term economic wellbeing was preserved by seeking temporary self-
improvement openings (whether individual or collective), such as informal or part-time work 
and self-employment (Leoni, 2003). 
Although figures do not exist to confirm whether there was a numerical gender bias in 
collective protest actions, some authors claim that women demonstrated ‘greater passion’ 
during these events because they felt more responsibility than their husbands for the impact 
that the crisis was having on their children (Briones & Mendoza, 2003:17). While men 
remained disorientated by the crisis, women often both became the household’s wage earners 
and also sought longer-term and larger scale changes that could only be brought about 
through collective protest. Using this information one can say that:
Hypothesis 6:
Women are more likely to belong to households that participate in a wider range of self-
improvement actions than men and are also more likely to participate in both collective self-
improvement and collective protest actions. 
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5.3.3 Age
As for the significance of age, spaces to gain employment were particularly closed to young 
adults during this crisis and consequently, a large proportion of this category remained 
unemployed or at best underemployed during 2001-03 (CEPAL, 2004 in Minujín, 2007:31). 
For this reason, younger people had more time on their hands, which may have meant that 
they were more likely to engage in collective protest. However, Novick & Murias (2005:46) 
argue that young adults were also more likely than older people to choose the individual self-
improvement strategy of emigration because they were more frustrated by the barriers to their 
professional or academic progress. Further, they also had fewer commitments to keep them 
in Argentina than those in older age groups, who were more likely to have dependent 
children - a factor that would complicate any potential emigration. 
Meanwhile, the idea that the elderly (or at least those among them who were healthy enough) 
were forced into collective coping strategies like barter because they were often too old to be 
employed, is also suggested in the literature. The onset of the crisis had pushed many deeper 
into poverty (most had no earned-income) and barter was one of the few remaining options 
for them (Toledo, 2005:21). Older people could rely less on support from relatives (many of 
whom had also become impoverished at the time), were more likely to have lost most of their 
savings in the Corralón and were less physically and mentally able to work. This category 
would have been the one most likely to engage in collective self-improvement actions, 
because resorting to individual coping strategies such as those mentioned above was simply 
less feasible. In addition, collective self-help may have proved especially popular with the 
middle-aged. For instance, 45% of barter club participants were aged between 46 and 65 
(Gomez & Helmsig, 2008:2495). The problems that those over 45 suffered with regards to 
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age discrimination (Ozarow, 2008) also undermined employment as a coping strategy and 
thus possibly helped to politicise responses among those in this age group. Therefore:
Hypothesis 7:
Young adults are more likely to belong to households that participate in collective protest 
actions, while the middle-aged and elderly are more likely to belong to those that engage in 
collective self-improvement strategies. 
5.3.4 Localised Opportunities for Collective Action26
Returning to Section 4.4 (the growing diachronic opportunities to participate in collective 
action), what is beyond dispute is that the spaces available for individuals to become involved 
in different collective activities in response to impoverishment largely also depended on the 
extent to which such actions were organised at the time. In this section, I extend this claim to 
propose that the new urban poor were also more likely to engage in collective actions if they 
existed within their local vicinity. Close residential proximity to such actions meant that i) 
they were easier to physically reach and ii) it was more likely that citizens would have heard 
about the actions taking place iii) it would have been more obvious if they did not get involved 
in such actions, thus the influence of peer pressure to join such activities will have been 
greater. For example, at the time of the ISCA Survey in October 2002, just 80 barter clubs 
remained in the City of Buenos Aires (Capital Federal) but 3,000 continued to exist in Greater 
Buenos Aires (Clarín 17/10/2002),making its residents much geographically closer to them 
(per km²). 
                                                            
26 Note that it was impossible to test for differences between responses in urban and rural areas due to the fact 
that the sample in the data collected for the latter was not nationally representative of the rural population.
Map 1 – The City of Buenos Aire
In terms of collective protest, many of the targets of these protests during 2002 included 
commercial banks’ headquarters, the Supreme Court, the Congress building and Presidential 
Palace - all of which are situated in 
centres like Cordoba, Rosario and Mendoza
attraction for protestors, it suggests that the new urban poor were more likely to protest 
capital city than anywhere else. 
s and Surrounding Greater Buenos Aires
The City of Buenos Aires or, to a lesser degree, 





Map 2 – Argentina and its Main Cities
Factoring the ‘supply of actions’ into an explanatory model of new urban poor responses to 
crisis contributes to a more sophisticated understanding of individual decision-making. It 
counterbalances the perhaps exaggerated emphasis on ‘agency’ and offers an enhanced role for 
the influence of structure. Nueva Mayoría data (2006) conveys a marked geographical 
variation in the number of permanent neighbourhood assemblies, cacerolazo protests and barter 
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clubs in Argentina’s provinces in 2002 (Table 3). Notwithstanding, reliability problems 
concerning the accurate recording of all possible actions and not accounting for regional 
differentials in transport, infrastructure, terrain or distance to population hubs, the figures 
provide a tentative indication of the ease with which it was possible to locate and thus join 
these different actions within one’s local proximity. 
The data unequivocally posits the City of Buenos Aires as the district with the greatest 
concentration of actions, boasting 41% of neighbourhood assemblies and 26% of cacerolazo
protests, despite only containing 7% of the national population. Its residents also had the 
shortest average distance to travel (calculated by dividing each region’s land mass by the 
number of collective actions that took place there at the time), in order to take part in collective 
actions (just 200 metres²). Greater Buenos Aires comprised a vastly disproportionate presence 
of barter clubs (60% of the total national figure) and offered relatively close physical proximity 
to collective actions, as did Santa Fe Province. 
Table 3 – Geographical Distribution of Collective Actions 2002
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Hypothesis 8:
Newly impoverished households are more likely to join collective actions if they lived in the 
City of Buenos Aires or Greater Buenos Aires and less inclined to do so in the remaining parts 
of the country. 
5.3.5 Relationship to the Labour Market
Labour market difficulties – whether they consist of a drop in income, redundancy or a change 
in employment – have been listed as the primary triggers for new impoverishment (Minujín, 
1995:164). In addition, one of the most striking features of new poverty internationally is that 
it leaves millions of well-educated, often highly experienced individuals either unemployed or 
working in a job for which they are tremendously over-qualified. In referring to the 
contemporary situation in the USA, where underemployment, unemployment and new poverty 
are also a prominent part of the social landscape, Nobel Prize-winner Paul Krugman (2006) 
summarised the climate perfectly when he declared that we had entered the “marvellous world 
of the graduate waiter, taxi driver and flight attendant”. In Argentina, between 1994 and 2002 
the unemployment rate among people with a university education doubled (Minujín, 2007:29). 
Here I will ask how the following factors affected households’ choice of response: the 
employment status of the head of the household, the average hours worked by household 
members, the sector of the economy they worked in and the type of income sources obtained. 
After the crisis, I propose that those who become newly poor through a loss of work were far 
more likely to elect collective self-improvement strategies than those who became 
impoverished while preserving their jobs. The primary reason for this is that those who were 
the victims of redundancy suffered the deepest loss of self-esteem, especially due to the fact 
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that in the middle-class psyche, self-identity and esteem are closely associated with the status 
gained from one’s employment (Masseroni & Sauane, 2004:244). Theoretical and 
psychoanalytical models suggest that loss of esteem can be recuperated and alienation 
overcome, however, by undergoing self-realisation (Elster, 1986:44), a two-stage process 
involving:
Self-actualisation (developing a potential ability into an actual one)
+
Self-externalisation (the transfer of the performance of these new skills into the public realm, 
where they are appreciated by others)
Searching for a path by which they could rediscover their sense of belonging and self-worth, 
several publications describe how the unemployed new urban poor were able to both develop 
their abilities and have them appreciated by others as outlined above, through their 
involvement in collective self-improvement actions like the barter clubs, recovered factories, 
cooperative businesses and public works, all of which incorporated the above process. For 
example, Parysow and Bogani (2002) researched a particular barter club in Bernal (a large 
town in Greater Buenos Aires) and found that having faced traumatic self-identity crises as a 
result of their loss of employment, belonging to the clubs had helped the new urban poor to 
establish a new, replacement identity, based on solidarity and trust. In this way, the workplace 
relationships that they had been deprived of were also replaced. The authors concluded that 
barter was a way of avoiding isolation and of achieving recognition of their profession, which 
they were able to practice at the clubs, and sometimes even impart knowledge of their own 
skills or in exchange for others’ goods or services. Thus, aside from being an economic 
survival strategy, the barter clubs became a ‘transitory refuge’ that the new urban poor could 
escape to so as to avoid being perceived – and perceiving themselves – as ‘unemployed’. 
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Similarly, the new urban poor who participated in the recovered companies tended to do so 
because these provided i) a cooperative project through which they could end their 
unemployment and therefore regain their lost sense of identity and ii) an ideal opportunity to 
undertake a new labour trajectory (Paiva, 2004). The unemployed or economically inactive 
also had more time on their hands to participate in these collective activities, rather than those 
who had simply become impoverished while maintaining their jobs. 
However, unemployed or inactive newly poor citizens also tend to be involved in a greater 
number of individual, as well as collective, self-improvement actions than those who maintain 
their jobs. In the Argentinean middle-class psyche of the early 2000s, to be unemployed was 
synonymous with being ‘outside the system’, even in the aftermath of the crisis and especially 
among the new urban poor, who had never experienced unemployment (Whitson, 2007:129). 
Furthermore, it was extremely difficult to reintegrate into the labour market during 2002/3, so 
rather than return to the formal labour market, many newly unemployed professionals opted 
for cuentapropismo (self-employment routes), such as starting small businesses, as an 
alternative way to recover the social mobility that was so important for them. In contrast, for 
the structural poor, work was less of a priority in terms of its significance for ‘achieving
status.’ Menni (2004) describes how many in the impoverished middle class were motivated to 
establish their own enterprise or take up informal jobs as a result of the fact that loss of their 
work or business during the crisis had left them with few alternative household survival 
options. 
It is doubtful whether employment status had any bearing on the decision to participate in 
protest actions (among the new urban poor at least). Certainly, at the height of the social 
crisis during late December 2001 and through to mid-2002, there was tremendous solidarity 
135
between many of those in the impoverished middle-class and the structural poor (Almeyra, 
2004:136). This is further illustrated by one of the most passionately voiced slogans of the 
Argentinazo: ‘¡piquetes y cacerolas, la lucha es una sola!’ (picketers and saucepan-bangers, 
we are facing the same struggle), with new urban poor office workers, still in their suits and 
ties, joining the protests alongside the long-term poor (Barbetta & Bidaseca, 2004:82). This 
principle was even enshrined in the Resolution of the First Inter-Neighbourhood Assembly 
on the 17th March 2002 (Pereyra, 2003:153). 
However, although there was a growing acceptance among a minority of the new urban poor 
that they had been recently ‘expelled’ from the middle class at the time (Grupo CCR, 2009) –
and whilst some had even reached the conclusion that they had become proletarianised and 
consequently now shared their class position with the structural poor (Ozarow, 2008) –
generally the new and structural poor maintained separate channels of protest. The new 
urban poor tended to favour the assemblies and cacerolazos (which they viewed as political 
manifestations of middle-class dissent), while the structural poor had their own, distinct 
protest forms, such as the road blocks performed by the piquetero unemployed workers’ 
movement (Svampa & Corral, 2006:119). Yet despite their solidarity, if, as many authors 
claim, the piqueteros were viewed by the impoverished former middle class as a movement 
‘for the real poor’ rather than a movement of the recent unemployed such as themselves, then 
there is little reason to think that the jobless new urban poor would have become involved in 
the protest movement specifically because of their lack of work. 
Hypothesis 9:
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The new poor in households with an unemployed or inactive head of household participate in 
more collective and individual self-improvement actions than those with an employed head. 
However, they do not necessarily get more involved in collective protest actions. 
A household’s relationship to the labour market may also be measured by examining the 
number of hours worked (in formally or informally-waged labour) by the individuals within 
it. 16. 1% of households that lost income during the crisis responded by sending additional 
members into the workforce and a fifth did so by its members working longer hours 
(Fiszbein et al. 2003:146). By dedicating increased time and energy into the act of labour 
during a period of political and economic turmoil, theoretically this would have left less time 
available for collective protest to be conducted among the household’s members. The
proposition of a negative association between average household hours that were devoted to 
performing work and participation in protest is also substantiated by the theoretical assertion 
that reinsertion into the labour market drives antagonisms into socially accepted channels that 
preserve order (namely dedication to work), harnessing individuals towards mechanisms that 
perpetuate the existing system (Park, 1967). 
For example, the act of increasing working hours may also have taken on significance as a 
‘disciplining device’ for the new urban poor, because of the risk of criminal arrest or of the 
employer-relationship problems associated with missing work in order to participate in 
protest actions. Indeed, some studies have demonstrated that the fear of losing one’s job 
(especially during times of high unemployment) leads workers to become more susceptible to 
forms of employer domination and control than they would be during non-crisis periods, 
whilst neutralising the threat of collective mobilisation to defend their interests (Castelhano, 
2005). Marx refers to this when discussing the ‘reserve army of labour’ in Das Kapital
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(1867). The free-rider dilemma and fear that their involvement in protest could imperil their 
new jobs and risk a return to unemployment may have persuaded those in households that 
were working more, not to manifest their anger this way. Meanwhile, those who worked 
fewer hours would have had ‘less to lose’ (in terms of potential wage loss) by attending 
protests. 
Hypothesis 10:
Those in newly impoverished households that work more hours are less likely to participate 
in collective protest actions. 
Forming hypotheses about whether the public or private sector employment status of newly 
impoverished people influenced the type of action that they adopted relies on the scant 
evidence that is currently available. One notable field study (Menni, 2004:66) suggests that it 
was artisans and those new urban poor who were highly skilled in a particular ‘trade’ for 
which there was a demand in the private sector of the economy, who were the most likely to 
select individual self-improvement routes such as establishing micro-enterprises and self-
employment, rather than engaging in collective responses. This form of individual self-
improvement action was particularly favoured by those who maintained their social and 
cultural capital (which they could draw on to run their new business) and those who were in 
trades with low start-up costs or had other household members available to assist them. 
People with a skilled trade or industry professionals among the newly impoverished may have 
been relatively less likely to follow collective self-improvement responses than those from the 
public sector, such as civil servants, because they had more transferrable private-sector skills 
that they could use to establish their own enterprises during the crisis in order to confront their 
declining material conditions. Further, if such opportunities were greater for those from the 
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private sector, the politicisation of their responses would have been less likely. Among those 
working for state or local government enterprises there may have been a more ‘collectivist’ 
spirit derived from the public sector ethos or simply because there was more of a culture of 
joining collective protest actions, due to the fact that their trade unions had headed national
strike statistics since the 1980s (Atzeni & Ghigliani, 2008). 
Hypothesis 11:
Newly impoverished people who work in the state sector are more likely to belong to 
households that take collective action than those in the private sector. 
It is unlikely that the sector of the economy that newly impoverished people worked in had 
any effect on their choice of action. Although historically, employees in the extractive and 
manufacturing sectors have been more likely to engage in labour militancy than those in 
services (Murillo, 2000), this would not necessarily have had a bearing on the new urban 
poor in 2002 – the data collection period – for various reasons. 
Firstly, workplace-based (trade union) mobilisations during the survey data collection period 
in 2002 period were (relatively) few and far between. In fact, under the Duhalde presidency 
between 2002 and 2003, for the first time since the transition to democracy in the early 
1980s, the proportion of protests that were staged by ‘civil society organisations’ exceeded 
those of the trade unions (GEPSAC, 2006). Organisation around workplace issues became 
relatively less frequent and less important, perhaps because unemployment was so high, 
which had a debilitating effect on union strength. Moreover, it should be remembered that 
the trade unions were the targets of the anti-institutional sentiment that fuelled the crisis-era 
protests due to allegations of corruption against prominent union leaders as well as the CGT 
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being viewed as having capitulated to Menem’s neoliberal restructuring in the 1990s 
(Campione & Rajland, 2006:300). Consequently, calls by trade union executives to ‘down 
tools’ may have received a less sympathetic response from members. 
Secondly, the impoverished former middle class tended to participate in the new forms of 
civil society protests that were emerging, such as the neighbourhood assemblies, escraches
and cacerolazos (Pereyra, 2003), which targeted the government, banks, IMF and so on, 
rather than ‘employers’ as such. The new urban poor therefore placed less attention on trade 
union or workplace-related protests. The influence of the sector of the economy that they 
worked in is thus rendered much less relevant in terms of being a generative factor affecting 
their decision to participate in collective protest. A third reason why sector difference was 
not a significant variable was the fact that that the new urban poor generally possessed 
superior educational qualifications or human capital (Minujín et al. 1993), so those in this 
stratum who worked in the extractive sector and manufacturing industry would have been 
more likely to be employed in managerial positions, where collective protests were much less 
likely than they were if they had been working at the coal face. 
Hypothesis 12: The sector of the economy that newly impoverished people belong to does
not affect the choice of action that their household takes part in. 
For most households other than those dependent upon pensions, the principal and most 
regular income source is that of salaried employment or other kinds of ‘work’ (INDEC, in 
RAM, 2001). Those that did not benefit from such income would therefore have been far 
more likely to have had to resort to a wider range of alternative self-improvement strategies 
in order to survive (Toledo, 2005:21). As mentioned in the discussion of Hypothesis 9, those 
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without work either due to unemployment, retirement or other reasons, would also have had 
more time on their hands to pursue self-improvement strategies. Therefore it is anticipated 
that:
Hypothesis 13:
Newly impoverished households without work as an income source (but who survive on 
pensions, welfare benefits, savings, remittances, support from family etc.) are more likely to 
participate in a wider range of self-improvement strategies. 
The association between class identity, national identity or other attitudes and response to 
impoverishment must also be investigated. The synergy between the new urban poor’s general 
tendency to insist on maintaining their middle-class identity and the individualist values that 
are accorded to such an identity (Ozarow, 2008) impacted upon the nature of how they 
prioritised their choice of action. Other research points to the fact that those who were more 
pessimistic about their futures were more likely to consider the individual self-improvement 
strategy of emigration, as they believed their prospects to be greater outside of Argentina 
(Novick & Murias, 2005:39). This option was also considered more by those who were the 
children or grandchildren of immigrants, both because of the more fluid concept of 
‘nationality’ that they had been brought up with (Feijóo, 2003:46), and in practical terms 
because such ancestry made it easier to obtain European Union citizenship (and the right to 
legally work and reside in any EU member state) for second or third generation immigrants 
(Melamed, 2002:25). These beliefs and attitudes, which underpinned the actual responses that 
were taken to pauperisation in 2002, will be investigated using LatinoBarómetro Survey data. 
141
5.4 Mapping New Poverty in Argentina
Aside from the responses themselves, it is useful to take a snapshot of the population in 2002 
(when the ISCA Survey was conducted) and profile which socio-economic groups were 
disproportionately pauperised as a result of the crisis. Such data has not been analysed in this 
way before but, whilst not integral to answering the research questions in this thesis, it does 
provide a useful appendage to the data on responses. First, it contextualises the actions that 
citizens took and second, it aids the new poverty literature through adding a quantitative 
element to the plethora of qualitative sources available. To begin with, the gender 
dimensions of impoverishment are discussed. Little research has been carried out that 
particularly addresses the question of gender differentials within the ‘new urban poor’ social 
stratum, either in Argentina or elsewhere. The rare exception is Koldorf’s (2008) study in the 
city of Rosario, which found that women had suffered especially harshly as a result of the 
neoliberal policies that generated new poverty since Menemismo in the 1990s. 
Whilst there is some evidence to show that women in newly impoverished households were 
more harshly affected in terms of their quality of life than men in the wake of the 2002 crisis, 
the limited data available in this research means that the results will only establish whether 
women were disproportionately affected in terms of new poverty incidence (that is to say, 
statistically ‘in income terms’) during this period. Detrimental qualitative effects of the crisis 
on newly impoverished women’s living standards that remain ‘hidden’ from the ISCA Survey 
results include the fact that they experienced increased levels of domestic violence 
(Kliksberg, 2006) and that they encountered significant ‘double burden’ effects. This was 
because they were expected to both generate additional sources of household income and
intensify their regular domestic duties, for example due to having an additional household 
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member look after at home due to husbands or dependents losing their jobs or their children’s 
additional emotional needs in a time of widespread anxiety and national turmoil (Bonder & 
Rosenfeld, 2003:35).
Nevertheless, several sources indicate that women were more likely to have fallen into 
poverty than men during the crisis. For example, in October 2002 only 35% of women were 
economically active compared to 52% of men (Encuesta Permanente de Hogares, 2002) and 
they earned 33% less income than men for performing an equivalent job, despite often being 
more qualified (SIEMPRO in Clarín, 13/03/2003). Historically, such wage inequalities are 
often increased during crises, when employers show discretion and give favourable treatment 
to male ‘breadwinners’ in terms of jobs and wages (Grytten & Brautaset, 2000). Indeed, the 
gender pay gap in the immediate pre-crisis years between 1998 and 2001 was never higher 
than 29% (Weisburd et al, 2011), so clearly became more acute as the crisis took hold. 
Further, the numbers of highly educated people in informal (usually lower-remunerated) work 
increased at more than twice the rate among women as it did for men during the crisis 
(SITEAL 2.7/2.8). Women may also have struggled to access financial credit in order to start 
their own microenterprises to a greater degree as their male counterparts (Jelin, 1998:99-100). 
A priori evidence therefore leads to the formulation of the following:
Hypothesis 14: 
Women were more likely to have become newly poor than men during the 2001-02 crisis. 
This study does not consider children’s responses to new impoverishment, because they are 
assumed to have only negligible autonomy when it comes to making economic or political 
decisions within the household. However, aside from children, new urban poor theorists have 
143
been particularly concerned about young adults’ susceptibility to pauperisation (Minujín, 
2007). Among 15-29 year olds, unemployment doubled between 1999 and 2002, reaching 
27.3% during the crisis. This was the highest proportion of all age groups (CEPAL in ibid. 
2007). During periods of high unemployment like this, young adults are particularly prone to 
joblessness because of their relative lack of labour market experience (Weller, 2003). 
Employment opportunities that do open up during such periods tend to be low-skilled and low 
paid, so these provide the only sources of work available to new entrants to the labour market, 
especially young adults (CEPAL, 2004). In addition, crisis periods like Argentina’s are often 
associated with inflation, so the fact that young people tend to have lower incomes means that 
as consumers they also tend to experience more severe deprivation than other groups (Shama, 
1981) whose members are cushioned by higher incomes, assets or savings. 
Although the elderly were particularly badly affected by new poverty under 1990s neo-liberal 
reforms, due to the attacks on state pensions (Palomino, 2005:21), during the 2002 crisis they 
were generally shielded from its most severe impacts (in terms of the extent of income loss) –
compared to other age groups – because they were relatively unaffected by its main economic 
consequences, such as sharply reduced salaries, redundancy and loss of businesses. For 
example, the 2000 Argentinean Census records show that the rate of economic activity among 
over 65s was just 22%, ,whereas it was between 72% and 79% for all other age groups. 
Therefore, elderly people’s independence from labour market forces and the fact that the 
retired middle class continued to receive their pensions helped to reinforce their immunity 
from the worst effects during the immediate aftermath of the crisis, even if public sector 
pensions were cut in the longer term. Exceptions existed of course, for example in cases 
where children or even grandchildren with whom they lived had lost their jobs, in which case 
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many become the main income-provider, relying on their often meagre pensions to support 
their families. 
Finally, middle-aged citizens (50-64 years) comprised the group most likely to have lost 
savings during the Corralito and to have suffered blatant and widespread age discrimination 
in the labour market (Gomez, 2003; Ozarow, 2008:24). Thus, the following hypothesis is 
presented:
Hypothesis 15:
Young adults (18-34) and the middle-aged (50-64) were more likely to have become newly 
impoverished than the elderly (over 65s) or 35-49 year-olds. 
Due to their more sophisticated levels of human capital, specialist skills, qualifications and 
managerial experience, the new urban poor largely consisted of professionals and ‘knowledge 
workers’ who worked in the services sector, as opposed to manufacturing or primary sectors. 
Evidence from the EPH national household survey suggests that the highly skilled and highly 
educated tended to maintain service sector employment during the crisis but experienced 
particularly large falls in their real incomes compared to those who were less educated 
(Beccaria et al. 2005:243-244). This was because, unlike less well-educated citizens, they 
suffered from downward occupational mobility at the time, which was thus associated with a 
loss of income, quality of work and impoverishment. 
Both public and private sectors suffered severe recession during 2001 and 2002, but after the 
public debt default and under pressure from the IMF, public spending was slashed from 
35.7% to 29.3% of GDP or from an average of 2,582 pesos (US$ 738) to 1,613 pesos (US$ 
461) per capita in 2002, according to the Ministry of the Economy. Public sector salaries fell 
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15% faster than they did in the (formal) private sector between May and October 2002 (the 
timeframe in which data was collected for this research). This leads us to the following 
proposition:
Hypothesis 16:
Those working in the public (compared to the private) sector and those working in services 
(compared to those in the extractive and manufacturing industries) 
were disproportionately affected by new poverty. 
In this chapter I have highlighted some of the private considerations that I anticipate will have 
affected the behaviours that Argentinean citizens exhibited when confronting their 
impoverishment in the months following the economic and political crisis. Based upon the 
critical review of the literature in Chapters 4 and 5, I have constructed a number of 
hypotheses which I will test using the quantitative data analysis and the methods described in 
Chapter 6. I outline these hypotheses in Table 4 as well as the themes that I have also 
identified which broadly group them together as predictor variables of new poor response 
actions. 
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Table 4: Summary of Hypotheses for Testing






Impoverishment or political, social and 
economic context
1 The decision to participate in collective actions – whether 
protest or self-improvement – is not simply motivated by 
impoverishment but also by other factors, namely increased 
opportunities to participate in such actions. 
Tolerance and Tangibility 
of Hardship
Suddenness of impoverishment 2 Those in households that experience more sudden descent 
into poverty are more likely to participate in collective 
protests than those who suffer more gradual pauperisation. 
Depth of impoverishment 3 More deeply impoverished new urban poor households are 
more likely to participate in a higher number of self-help
responses, rather than engage in protest actions, compared to 
those that are less profoundly impoverished. 
Response Combinations
Relationship between self-help 
strategies and protest actions
4 Those in households that participate in more collective self-
improvement actions are also more likely to participate in 
protest actions (and vice-versa). 
Biographical 
Characteristics
Prior experience of collective action 5 Those with prior histories of affiliation to collective entities 
are more likely to engage in collective protests
Gender 6 Women are more likely to belong to households that 
participate in a wider range of self-improvement actions than 
men and are also more likely to participate in both collective 
self-improvement and collective protest actions.
Age 7 Young adults are more likely to belong to households that 
participate in collective protest actions, while the middle-aged 
and elderly are more likely to belong to those that engage in 
collective self-improvement strategies. 
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Localised opportunities for action 8 Newly impoverished households are more likely to join 
collective actions if they lived in the City of Buenos Aires or 
Greater Buenos Aires and less inclined to do so in the 
remaining parts of the country. 
Relationship to Labour 
Market
Employment Situation 9 The new poor in households with an unemployed or inactive 
head of household participate in more collective and 
individual self-improvement actions than those with an 
employed head.  However, they do not necessarily get more 
involved in collective protest actions. 
Hours worked 10 Those in newly poor households that work more hours are 
less likely to participate in collective protest actions. 
Public or private sector employment 11 Newly impoverished people who work in the state sector are 
more likely to belong to households that take collective 
action than those in the private sector. 
Economic sector of employment 12 The sector of the economy that newly impoverished people 
belong to does not affect the choice of action that their 
household takes part in.
Type of household income source 13 Newly impoverished households without work as an income 
source (but who survive on pensions, welfare benefits, 
savings, remittances, support from family etc.) are more 
likely to participate in a wider range of self-help strategies. 
Mapping New Poverty
Gender 14 Women were more likely to become newly poor than men.
Age 15 Young adults (18-34) and the middle-aged (50-64) were 
more likely to have become newly impoverished than the 
elderly (over 65s) or 35-49 year-olds. 
Economic Sector 16 Those working in the public (compared to the private) sector 
and those working in services (compared to those in the 
extractive and manufacturing industries) were 
disproportionately affected by new poverty. 
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CHAPTER 6 - RESEARCH METHODOLOGY
In this chapter I provide a detailed description of the study’s methodological design, its 
epistemological and ontological positions, the data collection process and how the results are 
analysed and interpreted. In order to rigorously investigate the generative mechanisms that 
influenced the behaviour of the new urban poor in Argentina during the economic crisis in 
2002, I explain how I use survey data to enable phenomena to be placed in their social context 
so as to unmask the role of power relations and ideology. Quantitative methods will be used 
but, as I describe later, through a combination of analysing the results of two very different 
sets of survey data (one which allowed the observable actions of these citizens to be recorded 
and the other, an opinion-based survey that permitted the underlying motivations behind these 
actions to be interrogated), links are made between the micro and macro level of analysis, and 
between the behavioural tendencies of the new poor and the generative mechanisms that 
caused them. 
6.1 Research Philosophy
This research is guided by a critical realist philosophy of science and is informed by a 
Marxist body of thought. The precepts of critical realism are outlined in Bhaskar’s ‘A Realist 
Theory of Science’ (1975) and the compatibilities between it and Marxism originate in the 
fact that both differentiate between the existence of an external reality (as independent of 
human knowledge of it) on the one hand, and the socially produced nature of the scientific 
world and empirical knowledge, on the other. This dualist logic is clearly present in the 
Gramscian theory of ideology which is used as the explanatory framework of this thesis and 
according to which, social reality (for example the nature of one’s class position or class 
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interests) may be very different from its empirically observable surface appearance. In 
executing ideological hegemony, the dominant class is able to secure consent to rule from the 
working class and to create an apparent fusion of interests between their own and those of 
workers and the proletarianised middle class (the new urban poor). The latter, as outlined in 
Section 3.4.3, are subject to a false consciousness in which they come to support the 
reproduction of social relations that are antithetical to their own interests. Critical realism 
elucidates the ‘structures and generative mechanisms that underlie and produce observable 
phenomena and events’ and in Marxist terms, this enables an understanding of the 
relationship between ‘appearances’ of one’s class interests (which may be misleading, 
mystifying and so forth) and the ‘reality,’ as Marx describes in Capital (1867)27 as well as the 
implications of this to help explain their participation in collective action (when their class 
consciousness was sharper).
I also employ critical realism as an appropriate research philosophy because this thesis looks 
at how responses to pauperisation can be explained by newly impoverished citizens’ own 
interactions as agents, with the complex and unique combination of structures and processes 
to which they are exposed and with the forces in society that constrain and enable their 
responses at different points across time and space. Concurring with critical realism, whilst 
sensory experience is important, instead interpretation is also of epistemological significance. 
Of particular interest here is how the new urban poor construct meaning from the 
                                                            
27I also argue here that critical realism is a useful complement to Marxism, seeking to span each of the 
philosophical, theoretical and practical realms, yet is deficient in terms of being able to offer a ‘full-blown 
philosophy of science,’ that is to say one that covers ontology, epistemology, modes of inference, the nature of 
causality, nature of laws/tendencies, role of abstraction, distinction between essence and appearance, criterion for 
theory evaluation, and so on. Thus, only by borrowing from critical realism and adopting its insights as a research
philosophy can Marxist theory and political practices be placed on a secure footing (Brown et al, 2002).
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contradiction between seeing themselves as well-educated, hard-working citizens with high 
cultural standards and who come from several generations of upward mobility as well as
having enjoyed sophisticated consumption patterns in the recent past, yet who had become 
impoverished, or even proletarianised and with few prospects to gain the qualified jobs or 
upward mobility that they felt they merited in the present.
Further, I refute the positivist notions that human behaviour follows logical and consistent 
patterns (Halfpenny, 2001:372) and that ‘universal covering laws’ can be created to explain a 
causal relationship between a postulated independent variable (e.g. age or depth of poverty) 
and a dependent variable (e.g. how someone responds to impoverishment), because every 
individual is exposed to a complex interaction of unique and disparate structural influences. 
Explanatory content provides a criterion for evaluating theories, so, for example, simply 
looking at an individual’s ‘prior experience of involvement in collective organisations’ as an 
explanation for why they may prefer to adopt protest responses rather than simply private 
self-improvement activities is insufficient on its own.   Instead, therefore, I seek to examine 
multi-causal explanations and the interaction of numerous factors to build an explanatory 
model of new poor behaviour using quantitative data and surveys. 
Causation is something that I understand be seen as a ‘power of forces’ (Brown et al. 2002), so 
in this example, the relevance of such histories of participating in collective organisations 
during periods of strong economic growth may be nominal, because private paths to self-
improvement such as employment or business success may remain open. Yet, in a situation of 
macroeconomic collapse and political crisis, the value of such networks may acquire 
explanatory power if, for example through socialising with their peers at cultural associations, 
sporting clubs, religious groups or trade unions, such citizens come to realise that they possess 
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a shared experience of social descent. This is significant if, through the collective identity and 
sense of shared injustice that emerges, they form the necessary networks to engage in 
collective protest actions in order to confront their circumstances. Thus, the act of 
participating in collective protest actions becomes more likely not because of their history of 
involvement in communal organisations but because of how this characteristic of their 
biographies was granted generative power by the underlying external processes, social 
structures and contexts (economic and political crisis) that govern the phenomenon. 
6.2 Research Methods and Design
The implication of critical realism for the research method is that because a ‘one size fits all’ 
ontology is rejected, methods will be selected depending on the nature of the phenomena under 
investigation at a particular research stage (Fleetwood, 2007). I also select methods depending 
on whether the parts of the social world under observation are ‘closed’ – and so are subject to 
gathering data from ‘observable responses’ (e.g. the ISCA Survey) – or ‘open’, for example 
the underlying attitudes and opinions that are discursive and interpreted (for which 
LatinoBarómetro data is more appropriate). 
Given that the individual new urban poor agents interact with the real structures and processes 
that surround them and then respond in any of four ways, it will not be possible to solely draw 
upon ‘observable’ data to understand why they produce the events that they do. The four 
forms of response that are of interest to this research are: i) private self-improvement, ii) 
collective self-improvement, iii) private protest and iv) collective protest. The generative 
mechanisms that provoke such responses are unobservable, so need to be explained both by 
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using the literature and by analysing the underlying opinions that inform these actions. Such
methods will help to shed light for instance on how the new urban poor are socialised into 
reacting to their proletarianisation in certain ways. In this case, society’s capitalist-dominated 
structures stigmatise their loss of work and thus act as a force that promotes the return to work 
as a self-improvement priority. Quantitative methods, in the absence of the LatinoBarómetro 
data, would only be able to draw out such knowledge to a limited extent, if at all. 
In terms of the research design, this will follow a deductive logic because the categories that 
were chosen to formulate hypotheses about the generative factors that explain responses 
(‘suddenness of impoverishment,’ ‘relative deprivation’, ‘prior experience of collective 
organisation,’ etc) were already highlighted in existing theory.  Their application to the 
situation of newly impoverished urban citizens in Argentina in 2002 will be examined here. 
The visual model in Figure 6.2 illustrates the intended research process, following the 
Hypothetico-Deductive Research Method. 
Figure 6.2 Hypothetico
Source: Feurer &
Based on the phenomena that I observe and ideas
2 in the above figure), the objective will be to test existing theory about the responses to new 
poverty through the establishment of 
3). Data will then be systematically observed and 
below (stage 4) and subjected to 
with the results analysed using a series of Pearson’s chi
Whitney or Kruskal-Wallis) tests, depending on the type of independent variables being 
examined. My results will either ‘
(stages 7, 8 and 9) and so the existing theory will therefore be confirmed or revised 
accordingly (stage 10). 
-Deductive Research Method
Chaharbaghi (1995)
that I extract from the literature (stages 1 and 
sixteen hypotheses as outlined in Chapters
collected using the two Surveys mentioned 
analysis (stage 5) in which the hypotheses are tested (stage 6)
-squared or non-parametric (Mann
confirm’ or ‘refuse’ and then ‘revise/reject’ 
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In this research I draw upon data from two national household surveys. The first, entitled The 
Impact of the Social Crisis on Argentina (ISCA) was commissioned by the World Bank and 
conducted by the Argentinean market research consultancy, OPSM. This Survey was 
selected for the purposes of this research after an extensive trawl through suitable survey data 
from different authorities and in consultation with the Grupo de Estudios Sobre Protesta 
Social y Acción Colectiva at the University of Buenos Aires’ Faculty of Social Science. It 
became apparent that the ISCA was the only available source that simultaneously 
incorporated both self-improvement and protest responses to the 2002 crisis. 9,209 
individuals (of whom 6,531 were adults) participated in the ISCA Survey and were asked 
about their demographic characteristics, employment, income, migration status, education 
level, health coverage and social security contributions. I also gathered information about 
both official and unofficial income transfers, including cash and in-kind income sources. The 
second part of the questionnaire took ‘the household’ as its unit of analysis and was 
completed by 2,800 households. Participants completed the Survey twice: the first occasion 
was during May 2002, with follow-up questionnaires being completed during November 
2002. 
The background questions about individuals' incomes, genders, ages etc were answered 
personally by each member of the household. However, its ‘head’ or ‘best informed’ member
provided the answers about their household-level actions that were taken during the crisis. 
So, in the second survey in November 2002, they responded on behalf of their household with 
regards to their involvement in these actions ‘since May’ (the six-month period between the 
two surveys in which they had fallen below the poverty line). Thus, in the case of my new 
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poor sample, the survey examines how impoverishment affected responses. Participants were 
asked about their use of savings, changes in consumption patterns and participation in social 
programmes and community activities, including protests. Participants were also asked about 
their mental and emotional state and their expectations for the future (Fiszbein et al. 2003). 
Sampling Frame
For the purposes of this study, the stratified sample of cases that could be described as ‘new 
urban poor’ was initially extracted from the universal survey data. The sample was acquired 
by selecting all cases in which i) households had become income impoverished between the 
first and second data collection periods, and ii) households conformed to Minujín’s (1993)
definition of the ‘new urban poor’ social stratum. Therefore, I only included those cases that 
possessed the qualitative characteristics described by Minujín in his theorisation of the early 
1990s (see Section 6.2.3). Then, using the resultant sample of 314 cases (4.8% of the overall 
adult survey responses), households’ post-impoverishment economic coping strategies and 
political actions were recorded and classified in the ways outlined in Table 1 (see section 3.1). 
With this sample chosen, I therefore used its corresponding dataset in order to find out which 
actions were adopted by the new urban poor in response to impoverishment during late 2002. 
Two of the Survey’s main authors – Ariel Fiszbein, Lead Economist of the Development 
Department at the World Bank and Isidro Aduriz, Director of OPSM – were consulted for 
access to the original dataset and for tacit approval of the proposed methodology. 
Data collection was triangulated in the following way. Guided by the critical realist 
philosophy of this research, initially I obtained data concerning the ‘level of actual events’ 
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(the observable ways that these households dealt with impoverishment) using the 2002 ISCA 
Survey. 
The subsequent phase involved data collection from a separate public opinion survey in 2002 
(from a different population sample to the ISCA Survey), called LatinoBarómetro. This was 
utilised in order to try to understand participants’ social attitudes, political perspectives and 
the impact of other generative external processes. These were the processes that informed the 
decision to employ the ‘observable responses’ recorded in the ISCA Survey that same year. I
consciously adopted this process in the tradition of quantitative researchers who frequently 
attempt to understand meanings. Goldthorpe et al. (1968) is a classic example. In The 
Affluent Worker, these authors sought to discover the significance that industrial labourers 
attached to their work, but they did so by interrogating the answers that the workers provided 
to survey questions in a quantitative manner. In the same way, by analysing and running tests 
on aggregated answers from ISCA data in 2002 and LatinoBarómetro data from 1995, 2002 
and 2005, I made an attempt here to understand which factors influenced collective or 
individual behaviour among newly impoverished households and how their actions changed 
over time. 
Instrument - The ISCA Survey28
The World Bank’s ISCA Survey is nationally representative and covers 2,800 households in 
different regions of Argentina. In designing the Survey, the authors stress that its aims were:
                                                            
28 The full Survey background and Questionnaire is included (in Spanish) in Appendix III
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...to identify changes in income, consumption patterns, access to social and other services, 
saving and payment patterns, labour-market participation and reliance on formal and 
informal safety-net mechanisms... it sought to collect information on changes in the 
mental and emotional state of individuals... (Fiszbein et al. 2003:144)
In establishing these desired socioeconomic goals, the intent was to use the results in order to 
inform subsequent technical assistance and poverty reduction interventions in accordance 
with the World Bank (WB)’s objectives.29 However, only a small part of the Survey actually 
asked participants about their political and collective behaviour. I will invert these suggested 
original aims by paying particular attention to sections of the survey that focus on political, 
rather than socioeconomic, responses to the crisis. 
For urban areas, the original survey sample design was stratified by city size and region, so 
allowing comparisons to be made with INDEC’s EPH national household survey for urban 
areas only. Whilst the ISCA can be said to be nationally representative of the country’s urban 
population (and also its new poor population in 2002), it was not expansive enough to present 
a full picture of its heterogeneous rural sector (which is minimal anyway, accounting for only 
10% of the country’s population according to the 2001 Census), so the sample was 
unrepresentative of the rural population (Fiszbein et al. 2003). For this reason, urban and 
rural behavioural comparisons are not made in this research and the focus is on the new urban 
poor. 
This Survey was conducted by closed questionnaire (in Spanish, the participants’ mother 
tongue) after a ‘home visit’ to each household by a member of the OPSM research team. 
                                                            
29 Some commentators argue that the purpose of such surveys was to serve as a pretext for the WB’s ideological 
goal of designing interventions that would open up Argentina’s economy to further de-regulation and foreign 
trade and investment as a means of restoring growth (Green, 2003:56).
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This visit helped to ensure that household members clearly understood who should answer 
which questions in particular sections of the Survey, and that any misinterpretations could be 
resolved before completion. Participants were asked whether they had pursued each of the 
response indicators listed in Table 1 (see section 3.1) and provided a simple ‘yes’, ‘no’ or 
‘don’t know’ answer. 
Other than background information about their incomes and the number of hours worked, all 
answers provided about the response activity that they had participated in were recorded as 
nominal, categorical variables. Answers indicated whether a household member had pursued 
a particular single action such as ‘a communal soup kitchen’ or ‘sought self-employment’. In 
this study, however, I allocated each activity they participated in to the most relevant of the 
four pre-established Response Categories described in Table 1 (in section 3.1) – either 
individual self-improvement, individual protest, collective self-improvement or collective 
protest. For example, involvement in a community soup kitchen would be classified for this 
research as a ‘collective self-improvement action’. Once complete, each aggregated response 
category was reconstructed as a dichotomous, categorical variable such as ‘did you participate 
in a collective self-improvement action?’ with an answer ‘yes’ or ‘no’ and also as a discrete, 
numerical variable like ‘how many collective self-improvement actions did you participate 
in?’ The same process was repeated for ‘individual self-improvement actions’ and for 
‘collective protest actions.’
In the original Survey, to ensure that the sample was representative of the general population, 
a pre-questionnaire was completed by all households. This also helped to reduce sampling 
error and allowed the interviewers to verify the background details of the households they 
visited, ensuring that the same household was visited across the two survey periods. 
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Interviewers were requested to return to each home up to three times, in order to ensure that 
the head of each household was interviewed in each case. 
Instrument - The LatinoBarómetro Survey30
LatinoBarómetro is an annual public opinion survey conducted by national polling firms. It 
interviews some 19,000 people across 18 Latin American countries. Representative of the 
general population across gender, socioeconomic status and age, it chronicles Latin 
Americans’ opinions about politics, institutions and economics, perceptions about individual 
wellbeing and security and public attitudes toward free markets and democracy. The latter 
economic and political models are implicitly supported by LatinoBarómetro, based on the 
research interests of many on its advisory board and the explicit objectives of its sponsors, 
such as the Organisation of American States and the Inter-American Development Bank. 
In Argentina 1,200 people are randomly sampled each year and data from 1995, 2002 and 
2005 were selected for analysis in this study. 2002 was chosen so that some of the underlying 
attitudes among newly impoverished people could be used to help explain their observed 
responses in the ISCA Survey sample from the same year. I selected 1995 because it also 
represented a ‘crisis’ year in the 1990s (the only year of recession in Argentina during that 
decade and one which mainly resulted from the Tequila Effect of the Mexican crisis). This 
therefore builds on work by Svampa (2005) and others that compares how attitudes changed 
among the new urban poor stratum between the economic recession in the mid-1990s and that 
of the post-2001-02 crisis period. Comparing 1995 and 2002 allows more valid inferences to 
                                                            
30The full Survey background and Questionnaire is included (in Spanish) in Appendix IV
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be made about how attitudes changed, because both years represent poor macroeconomic 
contexts. I also chose to examine 2005 data because it represents a year of economic boom 
(9.2% growth according to INDEC) and it also followed two years of recovery. Therefore, it 
allowed for the opinions of newly impoverished people during periods of macroeconomic 
crisis (1995 and 2002) to be compared with those in a period of relative macroeconomic 
prosperity, when more self-improvement opportunities were available in society in general. 
By using the LatinoBarómetro data to observe how the new urban poor’s attitudes evolved 
over time (depending on whether the broader macroeconomic and political environments 
were positive or negative), I will be able to draw conclusions about the effect that the national 
context had on the choice of action taken by citizens. IPSOS-MORI conducted the Survey in 
all years (although the polling company was known simply as MORI before its merger in 
2005). Sampling error was +-2.8% in each year (with a confidence level of 95%) and 
answers were representative of 68%, 75% and 100% of Argentineans in respective years. 
Participants were asked to complete a closed questionnaire that required them to answer a 
series of statements reflecting the extent to which they agreed or disagreed with them, using 
(usually) three or five-level Likert items.31 The categorical dependent variables used in the 
analysis were therefore ordinal in most cases, but nominal in some. Further, where five-level 
scales were used, due to the small new urban poor sample sizes, sometimes I collapsed these 
variables into two or three levels (i.e. ‘agree’ or ‘disagree’ rather than ‘strongly agree’, ‘tend 
to agree’, ‘tend to disagree’ or ‘strongly disagree’) in crosstabs. This also prevented test 
                                                            
31A widely used psychometric scaling approach, commonly used in survey research to capture the intensity of 
feelings for a given item.
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assumptions (namely the minimum expected counts) being violated which would have 
invalidated the results. 
I should highlight at this point that whereas the ISCA Survey is used here to obtain a sample 
of newly impoverished people belonging to households that actually fell below the official 
poverty line, the situation of descent into poverty in LatinoBarómetro is based on 
participants’ subjective assessment of their own circumstances, because no income data were 
recorded in the Survey. Therefore, caution is urged when making definitive statements that 
cross-reference the observed responses from the ISCA Survey in 2002 with the underlying 
attitudes from LatinoBarómetro that help to explain them. Instead, because the samples from 
the two Surveys were stratified using different methodologies, I use the latter only as an 
indicative guide to the underlying opinions and attitudes of those in this stratum. 
6.2.2 Internal Reliability
In order to control for non-sampling error in the original data collection for the ISCA Survey, 
during visits to homes, a supervisor accompanied the interviewer to ensure that differences 
between interviewers (which pertain to human recording error) could be eliminated. The 
possibility that the shame of one’s social descent (Minujín and Anguita, 2004) could have 
impeded truthful answers from participants (or indeed the exaggeration of this so as to elicit 
sympathy) was reduced due to the fact that the Survey was not filled out in the presence of 
the interviewer and was also completed anonymously. The coding, editing and recording of 
material were conducted at the OPSM offices using CATI (Computer Assisted Telephone 
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Interview) Bellview software from a London-based company called Pulse Train. This 
maximised the quality of data entry and further reduced the possibility of human error. 
6.2.3 Validity and New Urban Poor Sample Selection
From the initial ISCA Survey sample of 2,800 households and 9,209 individuals (6,531 
adults), rigorous measures were taken in this study to maintain the face validity of the 
stratified new urban poor sample by selecting only cases which matched the profile of the 
socio-demographic group described as ‘new urban poor’ by Minujín et al. (1993) and 
outlined in Section 2.1. After this process was conducted, it left 314 cases (4.8% of the adult 
survey universe) in the stratified new urban poor sample. Table 5 below illustrates the 
variables used:
Table 5: New Urban Poor Sample as Identified in the ISCA Survey
New urban poor 
characteristic
ISCA Survey Variables
(New) Income poverty All those in households which were:
 not in poverty (nor indigent) at the time of May 2002 survey 
 but whose monthly per capita income fell below $232 Pesos 
or US$ 66 (the Basic Shopping Basket poverty line according 
to INDEC) in November 2002
Good standard of 
housing
All cases whereby individuals live in a ‘house’ or an ‘apartment’
(as opposed to a shantytown or temporary accommodation) 
before impoverishment
Access to utilities All cases who household possesses electricity and running water
High level of education All cases that at completed secondary school education or above
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Further, it should be noted that the new urban poor sample selected here was characterised as 
such on the basis that these people ‘became poor’ at sometime during the six-month period 
between the two ISCA Survey rounds in May and November 2002. These surveys did not 
provide information about whether these households had previously existed in conditions of 
income poverty or whether they had become “poor” for the first time. The ISCA survey 
merely provides a snapshot of the population at two distinct points in 2002 (May and 
November) and there is no existing data that both includes the variables that are of interest in 
this research and that are longitudinal in nature. In any case, conceptually, ‘newly poor’
citizens do not need to be studied over a prolonged period of time because by definition, 
being ‘new poor’ can only ever be a transitory state. After such time, these citizens either 
recover (if they manage to reintegrate into the labour force at a sufficiently high level), or if 
they are unable to do this, cease to be ‘newly’ poor and enter into another state of 
impoverishment (structural or otherwise), due to the fact that the value of the capital assets 
that they posses which make them distinct as ‘new urban poor’ quickly erode through non-use 
(Kessler & Di Virgilio, 2008; Ozarow, 2008). 
Recognising the prevalence informal work opportunities at the time (accounting for 45.1% of 
all jobs in 2002 according to INDEC)32 and the fact that the lack of official labour market 
opportunities and scarcity of available liquidity following the Corralito, the ISCA Survey 
measured ‘income’ that was derived not only from monetary practices that included formally 
and informally waged work, but also those earned from non-monetary arrangements such as 
barter credits, food vouchers or other income that was received in any of the conglomeration of 
                                                            
32Gaining informal self-employment income was a favoured response of the new urban poor due to their ability 
to utilise sophisticated human and social capital (stocks of social trust, norms and networks that can be drawn 
upon to solve common problems), relative to the structural poor, who tended towards ‘adaptive’ consumer-based 
responses (Feijóo 2003; Menni 2004; Kessler & Di Virgilio 2008; Ozarow, 2014).
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parallel currencies that were in circulation at the time. When referring to results that relate to 
the level of per capita ‘income’ later in this thesis, these caveats therefore not only ensure that 
the economic reality of households during 2002 was fairly reflected, but also that the credibility 
and validity of the numerous assertions that are made in Chapter 8 about the relationship 
between income and individual choice of action (e.g. relative poverty being more likely to 
stimulate protest) are subject to a multiplicity of safeguards. 
Meanwhile, in the LatinoBarómetro Survey, from the initial sample universe of 1,200 people, 
once the stratified sample of new urban poor was selected for this study (using the indicators 
outlined in Table 6), it left 124 cases in 1995 (10% of the survey universe), 202 cases (17%) 
in 2002 and 36 (3%) in 2005. 
Table 6: New Urban Poor Sample as Identified in the LatinoBarómetro Survey
New urban poor 
characteristic
LatinoBarómetro Survey Variables
(New) Income poverty All those respondents 
 whose current economic situation is ‘bad’ or ‘very bad’ 
 but whose situation had become ‘much worse’ during the 
last 12 months
Good standard of housing 
and access to utilities
All cases whose household possesses running water
High level of education All cases that completed secondary school education or above
6.2.4 Limitations, Precision and the Power of Tests
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A number of limitations should be mentioned here. First, the size of the stratified new urban 
poor sample in both Surveys was quite small, which reflects the rigorous selection criteria 
applied. This is because the one taken from the ISCA Survey only includes the proportion of 
the population who became impoverished during the six months between the time when the 
first and second surveys were conducted (in May and November 2002, respectively). 
According to INDEC, the actual numbers who fell below the poverty line increased by 4.6% 
(two million citizens) during that period, which almost exactly matches the 4.8% of the original 
Survey population of 9,209 (6,531 adults) who came to constitute the ‘new urban poor’ sample 
using the methods that were detailed in Table 5. Therefore, it is important to note that whilst 
the ‘new urban poor’ sample size is small, it is nevertheless nationally representative of the two 
million Argentineans who became poor between May and November 2002, because the 
original Survey used stratified samples according to national Census data. Similar reasons 
explain why the new urban poor samples from LatinoBarómetro are so small, though they also 
remain nationally representative. 
It was impossible to seek to increase the sample size (for example by including citizens who 
did not complete their secondary education) without violating the construct validity of the 
new urban poor sample (in this instance that they possessed high education levels), because 
the sample was attained by adhering to the conceptualisation of new poverty as described by 
its original and most prominent theorists in Section 2.1. 
Further, the World Bank’s ISCA was the only household survey that existed at the time which 
on the one hand allowed a new urban poor sample to be abstracted (due to its two data 
collection rounds) and which on the other, also measured both household economic and
political responses. For this reason, no alternative relevant data sources exist and these are 
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the best results that can be obtained given the data available. Related to this, alternative time-
series data that would have permitted the responses of newly poor Argentineans to be traced 
over a number of years in order to find out which actions proved to be most successful in 
aiding impoverished households to climb out of poverty was not available either. 
Regarding the ISCA results, the Survey data does not establish exactly which day or even 
which month (within the six-month timeframe mentioned above) the household’s income 
level fell below the poverty line. Therefore, it may be the case that at the time of the 
November 2002 survey, some households had been officially living below the poverty line 
for the entire six months whilst others had only been doing so for a few days. This works 
against the precision of data validity, although it is not an uncommon problem when using 
large datasets. The issues of small sample size and lack of precision raise the possibility of 
the methodological problem of Type-II errors having occurred (by which a null hypothesis is 
falsely accepted). In this case, some Survey respondents may not have taken certain actions 
in the days or weeks that immediately followed their ‘official’ impoverishment (the point at 
which their income fell below the poverty line), but which they otherwise might have done if 
they had actually been ‘new urban poor’ for the whole duration of the six-month timeframe. 
This under-reporting of significant results occurs because, in effect, the ‘cases’ in the Survey 
were actually ‘non-poor’ for at least some of the period under analysis. For these reasons and 
due to the small size of the sample, before the hypotheses were tested, I took the decision to 
determine the outcome of test results at the 90% confidence level rather than 95%, thereby 
mitigating against the increased likelihood that a null hypothesis would be falsely accepted 
(Verrill & Durst, 2005). 
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Another point to highlight is that in obtaining results using comparisons of the different 
frequencies of nominal categorical variables, only dichotomous explanations of new urban poor 
behaviour can be produced. To illustrate this point, in the results, (section 8.2.1), the impact of 
‘relative poverty’ on choice of action is discussed. While 28% of the new urban poor who lost 
a large amount of income joined a protest, this compares to only 16% of those who did not 
suffer any (non-inflationary) income loss. In such cases, although the difference was 
statistically significant (Appendix I, H2, V4) (p=0.06), the ‘gradation’ in the difference 
between the frequencies means that one cannot generalise the result to the entire new urban 
poor population or say that ‘all those who lost a lot of income protested’ and ‘all those who just 
slipped below the poverty line did not protest’.   The results should therefore not be interpreted 
as a definitive finding or generalised explanation of new urban poor actions, but they do still 
have some explanatory power. They thus represent behavioural ‘tendencies’ that made 
observable patterns of private, collective, self-help or protest action ‘more likely’ or ‘less 
likely’ under the specific conditions that existed in 2002. The changing nature of the political 
and economic context (which also impacted on new urban poor actions) negates the possibility 
that these behavioural patterns can be generalisable beyond the historical specificity of the 
particular circumstances that existed in Argentina in 2002. 
Further, the surveys used for this thesis used closed categories and unfortunately these do not 
allow the new urban poor actors themselves to rate their motivations for engaging in different 
kinds of response by using descriptions of their own choosing. However, whilst this latter 
method might have proved interesting, an enormous literature already exists on what motivates 
citizens to engage in collective action or in social movements per se (Tilly, 1978; McAdam, 
1982; Tarrow, 1988 and 1998) so were used in this research.
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In addition, in the ISCA Survey, although all individuals within each household answered 
background questions about their gender, age, relationship to the head of household, 
employment, income, migration status, education level, medical coverage and social security 
as individuals, at the level of the response itself, questions were answered either by the head 
of household or ‘its most informed member.’ Aside from the reliability problems that this 
raises (did the head of household know if their child had been on a protest for example), the 
additional problem is that the unit of analysis for all types of response action was ‘the 
household’ rather than ‘the individual’. For each action, the head of household was asked ‘if 
you or anyone else in the household participated in...’ (my emphasis). The implication is that 
when analysing data on individual biographical characteristics (such as age, gender or 
employment status) and their effect on response, inferences cannot be made in these terms. 
The results can only reveal whether newly impoverished people of a certain biographical 
background belonged to households that responded in a certain way. Where possible in the 
ISCA data, biographical characteristics of the head of the household are not used to represent 
associations with a household’s response choices. Instead, associations are measured 
depending on these characteristics as individual household members. 
Finally a few words are required to explain why qualitative methods, and in particular in-
depth interviews were not conducted with citizens who became ‘newly poor’ at the time. 
Whilst such research may have helped to further understanding about individual motivations 
for participation in collective protest and self-improvement actions in 2002, I took the 
decision not to do this for three reasons. 
Firstly, whilst it would have been hypothetically possible to gain access to the contact details 
of the same participants from the ISCA survey in order to seek to interview them, the 
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numerous internal validity and internal reliability threats of conducting ex-post facto research 
and retrospective interviewing were too significant. The passing of a decade of history since 
the crisis would have altered respondents’ perceptions of history as well as their memories of 
the events to such an extent that it would have been possible to precisely extrapolate their 
feelings and motivations for their actions back in 2001-02 by discussing these with them 
during the course of this research between 2009 and 2013 (Aaker et al 2008; Baddley, 1979; 
Hindley, 1979; Gittens, 1979). 
The effect of ‘maturation’ (Hindley, 1979; Gittens, 1979) - how people evolve over time and 
especially how they may become more cynical about participation in the protest movement of 
2001-02 was also particularly poignant in this case. It must be remembered that the main 
demand of the protestors at the time was ‘Get rid of all of them (politicians)!’ and that at the 
time, an atmosphere of hope of creating a new way of participatory politics resonated across 
society (Dinerstein, 2003; Lopez-Levy; 2004). Yet by 2003 many of the old politicians had 
returned and so did the representative democracy that the popular assemblies movement had 
sought to replace. In that sense the aims of the movement had been categorically defeated, 
even though the incoming Kirchner government did incorporate some of its demands in the 
politics of the new administration (Schaumberg, 2014). Given this scenario and the highly 
politically polarised situation at the time of writing in Argentina, this would surely have 
meant that respondents would have reflected on events ten years ago now in a very different 
way to how they would have done at the time. An additional ‘mortality’ problem (Baddley, 
1979) would have complicated returning to ISCA Survey households to interview their 
members again because many would have moved home or passed away.
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The second reason why interviews were not conducted was because I felt that the existing 
literature with regards to how struggling Argentinean middle-class actors describe their own 
motives for participation in different actions already provided the data that was needed. The 
interviews that these sources were based on were generally conducted during the crisis itself 
and include labour market reinsertion and consumer strategies (Feijoó, 2003), self-
employment opportunities (Bayón, 2003), savers’ escraches (Svampa, 2006), barter clubs 
(Bombal & Luzzi, 2006), recovered factories (Paiva, 2004), neighbourhood assemblies 
(Svampa & Corral, 2006) and cacerolazos (Briones & Mendoza, 2003). For the purposes of 
answering my research questions, I felt that it would be more valuable to aggregate the 
existing literature and available qualitative data rather than conducting primary research by 
interviewing participants in these actions from scratch many years after the events had 
occurred.
Thirdly and in some ways most importantly, as stated from the outset, one of the main 
objectives of this research is to provide a quantitative study of new urban poor responses to 
economic crisis because such an analysis has on the one hand not been conducted previously 
and on the other, will serve to frame and contextualise the qualitative research that has 
already been conducted on the matter. This is what makes this research particularly original 
although I am planning to conduct retrospective interviews with Argentina’s 2002 new urban 
poor33 once my doctorate is completed, precisely to examine their life trajectories and also 
explore their reflections on the 2001-02 protests over a decade later.
                                                            
33 I have already been granted access to the original ISCA Survey datasets and household contact 
details by the Survey designers at OPSM for this purpose.
171
6.3 Quantitative Data Analysis
All results will be obtained deductively by testing the sixteen hypotheses that were 
established, and which take the form of ‘differential’ research questions. The results will be 
analysed using SPSS Software, with those that include nominal response variables being 
subjected to chi-square tests while those that involve ordinal response variables will be 
analysed using non-parametric (Mann-Whitney) tests to compare their ranks, because the 
data sought to compare independent samples of new urban poor actions or opinions (as 
discussed in Section 6.2.4). Non-parametric (Kruskal-Wallis) tests will be taken where more 
than two independent samples are being investigated. In the handful of cases where discrete, 
numerical variables are tested (namely when comparing the ‘number of actions taken’), 
initially Kolmogorov–Smirnov tests will be used to assess the normality of distribution. In 
each case, the distributions were found to be non-normal (breaking one of the assumptions of 
the independent samples T-test), so in these circumstances, non-parametric tests were 
conducted. 
6.4 Ethical Issues and Reflexivity
The research process contained few ethical issues, due to the fact that no primary research 
was conducted. Some of the ethical issues pertaining to the specific surveys are outlined in 
the sections where the survey instruments are described (6. 2. 1). Primarily, these concern the 
anonymity of interviewers’ answers being guaranteed because of the sensitive nature of the 
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issues that appear in the Questionnaires (participation in ‘protests’ and one’s declining 
personal financial and social circumstances). The research was conducted in compliance with 
Middlesex University Business School’s ‘SRCEP Guidelines on Research Ethics.’
Although the axiological assumptions of critical realism accept that research can be value-
laden because the researcher is embedded within the socio-political context of their study 
(Robson, 2002:33), it is worth mentioning the ‘personal’ motivations for my own interest in 
new poverty, as it is important to be aware of any unintended bias. Having volunteered in 
Argentina (for an NGO working on new urban poor aid programmes in 2003-04) and 
researched in the country for many years, I had doubtless already unconsciously established a 
set of assumptions about the group of people under study here. Furthermore, many 
Argentinean friends – including my wife and her family members – have been seriously 
affected by the experience of new poverty, which has elicited a certain sympathy in me. 
Whilst these influences and the prospect of potentially having ‘gone native’ do exist (Bryman 
& Bell, 2007:457), they are perhaps less relevant in a piece of research that is predominantly 
based on quantitative methods, due to the increased distance between the researcher and 
participants. In addition, although attempts can be made to shed such sentiments from one’s 
conscience during research so as not to depict the participants in the study in an overly 
sympathetic light, it must be recognised that is impossible to prevent such feelings from 
influencing judgement altogether and this may have had some consequences when the results 
were discussed and interpreted in Chapters 7, 8 and 9. 
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CHAPTER 7 - DISCUSSION OF THE RESULTS: SITUATIONAL CONTEXT AND 
IN-GROUP CONSIDERATIONS
In Chapters 7, 8 and 9, the sixteen hypotheses that were formulated in Chapters 4 and 5 are 
tested, with the results statistically analysed and presented using the SPSS statistical analysis 
package. I begin with some general descriptive statistics about the forms of resistance used in 
2002 in Section 7.0. These contextualise the analysis of the inferential statistics that follow, 
in which the findings of the research questions about ‘in-group’ and ‘private’ considerations 
are conveyed in this Chapter 7 (where the results that test Hypothesis 1 are analysed) and 
Chapter 8 (Hypotheses 2 to 13) respectively. In Chapter 9 (Hypotheses 14 to 16), the results 
of three additional areas of research are presented which, despite being more peripheral to the 
immediate interests of this study, nevertheless fill important gaps in the new urban poor 
literature and help to contextualise their decision about whether to engage in collective or 
private responses to pauperisation. These include a statistical mapping of new poverty in 
Argentina in 2002, a comparison of new and structurally poor responses to the crisis, and in 
addition, findings which may be of particular interest to policy-makers - namely, how state 
benefits (in particular Plan Jefes y Jefas de Hogar) was received and understood by newly 
impoverished citizens. The test results on response actions from ISCA Survey data appear in 
Appendix I and those from LatinoBarómetro – that measure the opinions and attitudes which 
informed these responses – are shown in Appendix II. 
7.0 Form of Resistance
Before examining the findings from Hypothesis 1 (whether it was impoverishment alone or if 
social, political and macroeconomic contextual factors also influenced the new urban poor 
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stratum’s in-group responses to pauperisation in 2002), here I briefly outline some 
background findings about the forms of resistance that such citizens undertook according to 
the results of the ISCA Survey.
In accordance with the organising principle of subsidiarity, which counsels that matters ought 
to be handled by the smallest, lowest or least centralised competent authority (Powers, 
1999:532), individual (rather than collective) actions were generally the most freely used 
strategies and were employed by all newly impoverished citizens, whilst collective action was 
taken by 28% during the six-month period under scrutiny (see Table 7 below). Another way 
that the data manifests this ‘subsidiarity principle’ is by suggesting that in terms of where 
these activities were physically conducted, whilst creative individual solutions at the 
household level were most commonly used, the next most common form of collective 
participation was at the level of the locality, through involvement in community job centres, 
barter clubs or neighbourhood assemblies. However, actions that adopted a more national 
focus (demonstrations against the central government, commercial banks’ national 
headquarters, etc) were least commonly used. 
It was also found that as the focal point of the action becomes increasingly geographically 
distant from the household, it is undertaken by ever fewer numbers of participants.  Figure 7.0 
illustrates how the new urban poor organised their resistance in 2002 and that they were 
significantly more likely to engage in household or local, private and self-improvement 
actions than national, collective and protest actions.   
Figure 7.0: How Resistance was Organised among the New Urban Poor in 2002
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Among the new urban poor stratified sample, 28.3% resorted to some kind of collective 
action. 12.4% joined some form of collective economic self-improvement action, whilst 
20.1% engaged in collective political protest. Unfortunately 2002 ‘individual protest’ data 
was not obtainable through the ISCA data.
Table 7: Action Category Pursued by New Urban Poor Households, Argentina (Jun-Nov 
2002) as % of households
Type of Action Individual Collective All Actions
Self-improvement 100 12.4 100
Political protest N/A 20.1 20.1
All Actions 100 28.3 100
*Columns and rows may not ‘add up’ because some households took part in multiple actions
7.1 Situational Context and In-Group Considerations: Attitudes, Opportunities and 
Influences that Informed ‘New Urban Poor’ Responses in 2002
First, the group behaviours of the new poor are analysed, that is to say, their response 
tendencies as a social stratum in 2002,with underlying generative attitudes compared to those 
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held by those in the same situation in 1995 and 2005. The results analyse different four 
diachronic and situational factors which serve as alternatives to the Hypothesis that new 
urban poor responses were shaped purely by their financial impoverishment and economic 
‘need.’ The sections in this chapter correspond to the discussion and hypothesis formulation 
in respective sections from Chapter 4; The in-group experience of impoverishment (7.1.1) is 
analysed in answer to section 4.1 and tests Hypothesis 1 directly, severity of economic need 
and changing subjectivities (7.1.2) follows the critique of the literature in 4.2, the impact of 
the crisis of political legitimacy on tolerance of hardship (7.1.3) responds to the earlier 
discussion from 4.3 and the fluctuation in opportunities to join collective and private actions 
is evaluated in 7.1.4 by following up from the debate in section 4.4. Finally the change in 
underlying social attitudes and political opinions is analysed in 7.1.5.
7.1.1 Experience of Impoverishment - Becoming Poor Did Not Generate a Protest Response 
on its Own. 
In order to test whether the experience of impoverishment acted as a sufficient stimulus on its 
own to provoke new urban poor participation in collective action (Hypothesis 1), differences 
between the responses recorded for those in the new urban poor sample group were compared 
between the period immediately before the household became impoverished (October 2001-
May 2002) and the period immediately following it (June 2002-November 2002). As 
anticipated, the results confirmed that there was no evidence to suggest that there was any 
significant change in either the level of participation in collective protest, which remained 
constant at around 20% (a non-significant change at the 5% level, given the p-value of 0.98, 
see Appendix I, H1, V1) or in collective self-improvement responses (which grew from 9.9% 
to 12.4%, but the rise was not significant at the 5% level, with a p-value of 0.37, see 
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Appendix I, H1, V2), after their per capita income had dropped below the poverty line. These 
results provide clear evidence to confirm one of the premises of this research: that economic 
grievances alone are not enough to stimulate involvement in collective protest. Furthermore, 
although the proportion involved in ‘all’ collective actions increased from 23.6% to 28.3%, 
this change was not significant either, returning a p-value of 0.17 (Appendix I, H1, V3). So, 
given that Hypothesis 1 has been confirmed and economic grievances alone were not 
sufficient to politicise action among the new urban poor, what does the Survey data suggest 
were the alternative explanations for the political protests during the crisis in 2002?
7.1.2 Severity of Economic Need, Changing Subjectivities, Loss of Confidence in 
Argentina’s Institutions and an Emerging ‘New Poor’ Collective Identity - From Self-
Blame under ‘Menemismo’ to System Attribution in 2002
In particular, the data instead indicates support for the literature that suggests that before 
deciding how to respond to their own declining economic circumstances, those in new urban 
poor households first underwent a cognitive process of identifying how their own 
pauperisation related to the general economic and political climate in which it had occurred. 
Svampa (2005) suggests that one way they did this was by assessing whether they were to 
blame for their own plight themselves or whether, instead, their impoverishment had been 
induced by a third party authority. She notes that the new urban poor of the 1990s tended to 
blame themselves and internalise the reasons for their downward mobility, due to the 
prevailing neoliberal values of personal responsibility with which they were imbued. Indeed, 
it is clear from LatinoBarómetro data (Appendix II, C4, V63) that by 2002, the overwhelming 
majority of the new urban poor had arrived at the conclusion that their government was the 
prime culprit for their personal economic descent (see Table 8). They were also highly 
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critical of several other political institutions and processes, whilst only a small minority (18%) 
attributed responsibility to themselves ‘as individuals’ in any way. 
Table 8: Who the New Urban Poor Blamed for the Economic Crisis in 2002




Lack of domestic production 20%
Lack of individual enterprise 18%
Lack of investment 15%
WTO 7%
Source: Based upon data from LatinoBarómetro
Thus, the translation of their material grievances into collective protest must be understood to 
emanate from how the blame for their personal financial problems shifted away from 
themselves and became attributed to other processes and international institutions of financial 
capital - in particular, the Government. The result must also be seen in light of the crisis of 
legitimacy during 2001 and 2002, during which time the Government lost the consent of its 
citizens to rule and their confidence in many of the other liberal-democratic state institutions. 
Some of the reasons for this were described in Section 4.2, but the data also indicates that the 
new urban poor of ‘the class of 2002’ considered that their government was comparatively far 
less capable of resolving their economic woes than their new urban poor cohorts did in 1995. 
It is this colossal loss of faith that appears to have been a key factor in new poor households’ 
decision to resort to collective protest or to engage in their own autonomous collective self-
improvement solutions after the 2001-02 crisis. 
This proposal is substantiated by analysing other results. Whereas 49% of new urban poor 
had ‘no’ confidence in their government in 1995 this soared to 82% by 2002 and almost every 
single person (97.5%) surveyed that year stated that they had ‘little or no confidence’ in the 
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government. A non-parametric test revealed this collapse in confidence among the new urban 
poor between 1995 and 2002 to be significant at the 0.1% level with a p-value of 0.00 
(Appendix II, C3, V49). It should be noted however, that confidence in government remained 
appallingly low throughout the ten-year period under study (1995-2005), despite a slight 
improvement during the macroeconomic boom in 2005. 
Survey results (illustrated in Figure 7.1.2 below) also revealed that newly poor citizens’ 
confidence in every single one of Argentina’s institutions plunged between 1995 and 2002 (as 
measured by the proportion who had ‘a lot’ or ‘some’ confidence in them) and only recovered 
among some of these institutions by 2005. First, for validity purposes, the interpretation of 
what is meant by possessing ‘confidence’ in the eyes of survey participants must be discussed. 
LatinoBarómetro explains that it refers to how much trust is held in the institution to fulfil
their function under the liberal democratic system within which they operate 
(LatinoBarómetro Annual Reports 1995-2005). For example, ‘confidence in the judiciary’ 
would imply faith in that institution to deliver justice and ‘confidence in Congress’ is 
understood as faith in the lower house of parliament to reflect the interests of the country’s 
citizens through approving and delivering legislation. So, LatinoBarómetro interprets ‘low 
confidence’ ratings in democratic institutions across the continent in 2002 as a general ‘lack 
of trust’ in political structures, which they described as having suffered a ‘loss of legitimacy’ 
at that time (LatinoBarómetro Annual Report, 2002:8). 
Loss of legitimacy in Argentina’s institutions
This loss of legitimacy in Argentina’s institutions in 2002 must be seen in the context of the 
radical demand of the protest movement to dismiss the entire political and legislative class, as 
well as through their widespread efforts to construct and participate in counter-hegemonic 
180
economic, social and political movements. I will outline how this confidence changed 
between 1995 and the crisis in 2002 and discuss the significance of each institution in turn. 
Representative and explicitly ‘political’ institutions
Aside from the government, any confidence in the remaining politically ‘representative’ 
institutions was almost completely wiped out during 2002. 
Parliament
The functioning of parliament (especially Congress) was virtually paralysed at that time due 
to the minority government that resulted from the October 2001 legislative elections and the 
fragmented distribution of seats. Coupled with the general disdain with which most 
politicians were viewed among the new urban poor (and society at large) for being self-
serving and incompetent (Armony & Armony, 2005), it is unsurprising that the proportion of 
those who had ‘a lot’ or ‘some’ confidence in Parliament fell statistically significantly from 
26% to 9% (p=0.00) (Appendix II, C3, V58). 
Political parties
The new urban poor had also lost faith in the old political parties to represent them by 2002 
(although confidence was already low in 1995), as their support dropped from 21% to 7% 
(p=0.00) over the period (Appendix II, C3, V50). The implosion of the Radical Party and the 
failure of the traditional Left to present an electoral alternative contributed to political parties 
being understood as vehicles for building up personal power bases rather than for listening to 
and representing citizens’ voices. In particular, after a decade of unfettered neo-liberalism, 
many arrived at the conclusion that the political parties were defenders of big business 
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interests rather than their own. In other words, there was a loss of legitimacy of the whole 
political elite. 
Trade unions
Figures are not available for confidence in the trade unions in 2002 but remarkably, of all the 
institutions, the unions were held in the lowest regard of all by the new urban poor in 1995 
(with just 15% having confidence in them). This did not change significantly by 2005 
(Appendix II, C3, V55), suggesting that there was an embedded pessimism felt by newly 
impoverished Argentineans about the ability of trade unions to represent them. Instead, they 
were seen as fundamental to the state apparatus, which was so categorically rejected in 2002. 
This negative reputation also originates from the corporatist structures of Argentinean 
capitalism and the association of the main union confederation (CGT) with one political party 
- Justicialismo (Peronism), as discussed in Section 3.4.1. In addition, it was also because the 
CGT was widely criticised for having capitulated to neoliberalism during the 1990s due to its 
pact-making with President Menem (Duhalde, 2009). Furthermore, the unions were always 
more heavily associated with supporting industrial workers (a distant experience from the 
workplace realities of the new poor, who were largely ‘professional’ and services-sector 
based). As there was no New Unionism project which sought to reach out to those in the 
‘modern workplace’ in the same way as there was in Western Europe and North America –
outside of certain sectors such as teaching – affiliation to trade unions remained low among 
those in this sector. The Argentinazo therefore marked the end of what Touraine would call 
the ‘grand politics’ (1992:55) and opened up a new era of political self-organisation, that 
filled the hole that was left when the reformist organs of representative democracy – including 
the political parties and trade unions – were no longer seen to be acting on the people’s behalf. 
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Non-‘representative’ and non-political institutions
Then there were the state’s institutions that had less explicitly ‘political’ aims. 
The Church
Among these, the Church enjoyed the highest approval rating, although this fell dramatically 
(and statistically significantly) from 65% to 46%, during that time (p=0.01) (Appendix II, C3, 
V53). This is surprising, because of all the organisations listed the Church played a relatively 
‘neutral’ role during the protests of 2001-02, neither directly helping nor hindering the 
insurrectionary mood. The Catholic Church’s main function when the Government lost 
legitimacy to rule during the crisis was to help maintain social order by supporting the 
functioning of failing state institutions, for example by providing welfare aid to those in most 
desperate need and by acting as a mediator during stand-offs between protesters and the 
police (Benclowicz, 2006). However, the fact that support for the Church declined so sharply 
demonstrates on the one hand just how profound the crisis of legitimacy was (stretching 
beyond the overtly ‘political’ state structures), and on the other, how politically astute many 
of the new urban poor and those involved in the protest movement were, seeing through the 
Church’s mediating agenda and critiquing the social conservatism that lay at its heart. 
Armed forces and Police
Support for the armed forces also collapsed. Having earned the confidence of 40% of the new 
urban poor in 1995 (presumably largely due to the fact that the army had pledged to ‘defend 
democracy’ after beating back the Carapintada mutinies34 in the late 1980s and early 1990s), 
                                                            
34 The Carapintadas was a faction of the military that staged a series of attempted mutinies between 1987 and 
1990 after democracy had been restored. Reasons ranged from grievances about pay and conditions, to 
demanding impunity against prosecution for human rights violations committed during the Dirty War of 1976-
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faith in the military slipped to just 25% in 2002 (Appendix II, C3, V54). Whilst the armed 
forces may have returned to the barracks after the dictatorship fell in 1983, it was no secret 
that there were some 10,000 soldiers on standby to crush the revolt of December 20th 2001 
(Katz, 2001). Ultimately they were not needed, as the riot police finally suppressed the 
uprisings after killing dozens of protestors and injuring many more (Delich, 2002:9). 
Awareness that the armed forces were in reality a wholly undemocratic and repressive power 
was reignited during 2002 in light of these events. Confidence in the police also fell from 
36% to 19% (p=0.01) for similar reasons (Appendix II, C3, V52). 
Judiciary
However, aside from the government, the most acute disintegration of confidence was 
reserved for the judiciary, whose support rating was obliterated, falling from 31% to 6% 
between 1995 and 2002 (p=0.00) (Appendix II, C3, V51). Not a single Survey participant 
mentioned that they had ‘a lot’ of faith in the judicial system in 2002. A series of high profile 
corruption cases, in which many wealthy businessmen and politicians were seemingly granted 
impunity during that period, made the legal system appear to be protecting the ruling class to 
the detriment of normal Argentineans. A few examples of such cases were: 1) The 1994 
terrorist attack on the AMIA Jewish community centre in Buenos Aires, which left 85 people 
dead but for which no one was ever found guilty, and 2) The ongoing bitter taste left by the 
Ley del Punto Final (1986), in which prosecutions against many of the Generals responsible 
for the 30,000 disappearances under the dictatorship were lifted during the late-1990s. It was 
little wonder that newly pauperised citizens became increasingly conscious of this during the 
crisis. Their underlying exasperation with the justice system exploded when thousands of the 
                                                                                                                                                                                             
1983, to demanding a full-scale restoration of military rule. The Armed Forces were widely praised for having 
accepted submission to the popular will after 1983.
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new urban poor had their savings confiscated by the banks during the Corralito and the 
judicial process that they pursued to claim their deposits back (which was just beginning in 
2002) seemed to be wrought with complexities that must have made claimants doubt the 
fairness of the judicial system even further. 
Recovery of confidence by 2005, but only in the non-politically representative institutions
In light of the collapse in confidence in institutions across the board, the categorical rejection 
of the entire political establishment and the attempts to reconstruct society’s political and 
economic institutions by establishing potentially counter-hegemonic, parallel35 organising 
structures in society (such as the inter-neighbourhood assembly, barter clubs and companies 
without bosses), I ask what clues the survey results provide in terms of how the dominant 
class was able to recover its post-2002 hegemonic consent to rule through these institutions. 
Interestingly, the less overtly ‘political’ institutions mostly managed to obtain a significant 
recovery in their support by 2005. For example, confidence in the police was restored to 
1995 levels, returning to 36% (p=0.02), confidence in public administration and the civil 
service grew strongly (Appendix II, C3, V57) as did trust in private companies (V59) and the 
Church also recovered most of the confidence lost since 2002. However, the increases in 
confidence in the armed forces and the judiciary between 2002 and 2005 were not statistically 
significant and remained far lower than they were back in 1995. 
                                                            
35 Whilst these were not organs of dual-power (thus there was no counter-hegemonic challenge to capitalism per 
se), the Assembly movement in particular had the potential to become an alternative mechanism for governance, 
but died away before its potential could be fulfilled. Hence, for a few months at least, the hegemonic order came 
to be profoundly questioned by a significant part of the Argentinean population, even though no alternative 
project was able to replace it.
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Here lies the crucial point. Between 2002 and 2005 not one of the country’s overtly 
democratic organs experienced a significant restoration of confidence among the new urban 
poor. As illustrated in Figure 7.1.2, faith in Parliament remained abysmally low, at just 8%. 
There was no significant change in the support for political parties (just 11%), trade union 
support remained low (20%) and whilst faith in the ‘Government’ increased from a pitifully 
low base of 3% to 17% (p=0.00), this is tantamount to saying that 83% of the new urban poor 
remained deeply disappointed with their Government in 2005. 
Nestor Kirchner as the ‘Cesarist’ saviour but persistence of crisis of legitimacy
Crucially, it was ‘confidence in the President’ (V61) that exceeded every other political 
institution – parliament, parties, trade unions and the Government – with a support rating of 
39% among the new urban poor according to the Survey. Moreover, 49% of the new urban 
poor ‘approved’ of President Kirchner in 2005 compared to just 9% who did so for President 
Duhalde in 2002 (p=0.00) (Appendix II, C3, V61). Further, as mentioned earlier, President 
Kirchner’s broader popularity among society in general (in separate polls) was huge, ranging 
from 74% to 79% in that year (Clarín, 30/12/2005). He was credited by many with 
establishing Argentina’s macroeconomic ‘miracle’ and positioning himself on the side of the 
people in his rhetoric and policies (Armony & Armony, 2005). 
These results signal firstly that an underlying ‘crisis of representation’ in the political 
structures persisted in 2005 (even though faith was restored in most of the non-political 
institutions). Secondly, as Gramsci (1992) wrote, in moments of organic crisis, social classes 
separate themselves from the old political parties and the gap is filled by one of two 
possibilities; 1) Either revolutionary fervour or 2) a ‘Cesarist’ figure is expected to appear in 
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whom the masses instil their trust.  In Argentina’s case, after a brief spell of the former during 
late-2001 and 2002, Gramsci’s prediction materialised and this ‘Cesarist’ character soon 
appeared to help pacify the challenge from below in the form of charismatic and populist 
Presidential candidate, Néstor Kirchner.  Largely due to his personal popularity and authority, 
Néstor Kirchner was able to restore ‘consent to rule’ by the old hegemonic order. This also 
confirms Mazzoni’s findings (2007) about how the political radicalism of newly poor people 
in was pacified by Kirchner’s election. 
An alternative understanding of the situation, once this figurehead had taken the reins in 2003, 
is offered by Leon Trotsky (1939).  Trotsky described how when underdeveloped countries 
are exposed to an opening up of the economy to foreign competition for prolonged periods, 
foreign capital becomes the predominant social force.  The domestic bourgeoisie becomes 
very weak and the working class could still be relatively strong.  In Argentina this was the 
scenario following two decades of unfettered neo-liberalism.  In such situations, Trotsky 
explains, the political elites are faced with the option of either siding with foreign capitalism 
and suppressing the working class (which is what they did during the military dictatorship of 
1976-83, so as to force through the neoliberal agenda) or instead of getting the working class 
onside, in order to gain the political and social space within which to establish a project of 
national capitalism.  Trotsky described both these forms of rule as Bonapartism - the second 
of which is the project that Kirchner moved towards (within the limitations of the global 
economy).  His national-popular policies included expanding the possibilities for state 
intervention, founding a new state-owned energy company, ENARSA in 2004, reducing trade 
with the United States and favouring closer ties with MERCOSUR - the regional trading 
block in Latin America (Wylde, 2011). 
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Figure 7.1.2: Confidence in Argentina’s Institutions among the New Urban Poor, 1995-2005
Source: Adapted from data in LatinoBarómetro Surveys, 1995, 2002 and 2005
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Faltering support for ‘democracy’
Perhaps the most concerning finding of this research was that rather than citizens simply 
losing confidence in the government and entire political system in 2002, the long-term
political ramifications have been far more profound. Although support for democracy 
survived the economic and social crisis, the scale of the crisis of legitimacy became so 
acute that among the new urban poor it even led to a statistically significant fall in support 
for democracy as a political system. 
In its historical context, democracy had been the exception as opposed to the rule and 
periods of military dictatorships had littered 20th century (Rock, 1991). Given that the 
country had only re-established its democracy in 1983 after a century of intermittent 
periods of military dictatorship, this faltering support for Argentina’s democracy is 
something which must surely confound leading theorists of political transition such as Linz 
and Stepan (1996). With reference to South America, these authors claimed that in the 
new democratic era, citizens no longer judge a particular political system by the policy 
successes or failures of its governments, because democracy has become ‘the only game in 
town’.   Yet between 1995 and 2002 the proportion of new urban poor who 
‘wholeheartedly supported democracy at any cost’ fell from 81% to 72%, with those who 
believed either that there ‘was a place for authoritarianism in certain circumstances’ or 
‘had no strong feelings in favour of democracy’ increasing from 19% to 28% (p=0.1) 
(Appendix II, C2, V48). 
What is also of concern is that despite 1) ‘confidence in the Government’ having ploughed 
its way back to 1995 levels by 2002-05 (Appendix II, C3, V49), 2) the high popularity of 
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President Néstor Kirchner and most significantly, 3) the thriving macroeconomic situation 
in 2005, the proportion of new urban poor who ‘wholeheartedly supported democracy’ did 
not recover in the same way (C48). Faith in the democratic process as a whole failed to 
recover, and remained significantly lower than it was during the previous decade. 
In summary, it appears that the political crisis of legitimacy that has been identified in 
2002 helps to explain why the new urban poor were more likely to take collective protest 
action, rather than their participation simply being due to their economic impoverishment. 
This offers one explanation for the confirmation of Hypothesis 1.
7.1.3 Crisis of Political Legitimacy, Economic Context and Reduced Tolerance of 
Hardship -Fluctuations in hegemonic control 1995-2005
Another crucial insight that this research revealed as an explanation for the confirmation of 
Hypothesis 1 is that engagement in collective and protest actions also occurred because 
the scale of the macroeconomic crisis in 2001-02 reduced the extent to which they were 
prepared to politically tolerate their own hardship. Unlike the new urban poor of 2001-02, 
their cohorts in the mid-1990s were prepared to tolerate high personal economic costs 
without the inclination towards manifesting political discontent because it was felt that 
generally the Government had the macroeconomic situation under control. For instance, 
the Menem administration had brought inflation down from 4,900% in 1989 to single 
digits by the mid-1990s, which seemed highly impressive (Powers, 1999:533). However, 
as Argentineans later found out, it was a feat that was largely built on the fixed exchange 
rate and Convertibility which were ultimately major catalysts of the economic crisis which 
followed, in 2001-02. In fact, in his statistical analysis of Latin American elections, 
Fabian Echegary (1995) found that rather than one’s own household economic 
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circumstances, the most significant economic issue to influence individuals’ voting choices 
and political opinions is actually inflation. Unlike 1995, in 2002 the spectre of 
hyperinflation returned as prices for imported goods soared after currency devaluation and 
food costs rocketed by 34.6% (CEPAL, 2003). This may help to explain citizens’ relative 
political radicalism in 2002 compared to 1995, despite their personal impoverishment in 
both cases. 
Further, in the mid-1990s, the mindset of newly impoverished people was that 
pauperisation was believed to be something that was only happening to them and not to 
others (during the economic boom of that decade and when Convertibility generated the 
sense of societal prosperity), hence the focus was on individual strategies to overcome it 
(Svampa, 2005). By 2002, however, it had become clear that impoverishment was a much 
more obviously ‘shared’ experience in the midst of a social and economic crisis and mass 
unemployment. Consequently, the proportion of respondents who stated that poverty was 
the main ‘general problem for society’ more than doubled from 4% to 8.9% at this time. 
This adds credence to the view that poverty was seen as endemic during the 2002 
economic crisis. Thus, in 2002 the stigma attached to ‘becoming poor’ appears to have 
melted away and raised the possibility that taking action alongside others could be 
considered as an option, rather than simply confronting impoverishment alone. 
Figure 7.1.3 (below) shows which issue the (subjectively defined) new urban poor (from 
LatinoBarómetro results Appendix II, C5, V64) thought was the ‘main problem facing the 
country’ and how this changed between 1995, 2002 and 2005. It is interesting to note that 
in 2002 there was a strong, relative reduction in the naming of issues that the new urban 
poor could have imagined were attributable to their own inadequacies or those which could 
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have been perceived as the ‘individual’s responsibility’ (certainly by neoliberal advocates 
such as Murray, 1984) as opposed to being attributed to the Government or other external 
processes and institutions. For instance, unemployment was cited by 43.6% in 1995 but 
this fell to 31.7% in 2002, yet there was an accompanying sharp rise in the citing of issues 
that could only objectively be seen as the responsibility of Government policy and 
ineptitude, such as corruption (including Government corruption), which almost doubled 
as the headline issue of concern from 11.3% to 19.3% between those years. The politically 
sensitive issue of inflation, seen by citizens as an indicator of government competence over 
the economy was cited by six times as many new urban poor in 2002 as was the case in 
1995. Therefore, if there was a shift away from issues for which blame could be 
internalised, towards those that were seen as the result of Government failure between 
1995 and 2002, then it adds impetus to the evidence suggested earlier that in 2002 one’s 
own impoverishment was much less likely to be tolerated and it was much more likely that 
anger would be unleashed in the political arena through protest, rather than just self-
improvement, in 2002 compared to 1995. 
A further factor which helps to explain the difference in new poor responses between 1995 
and 2002 is that it takes ‘society’ time to implement the social policy responses and aid 
programmes necessary to help individuals cope with economic shocks (Powers, 1999:534).  
Citizens’ responses are likely to be more radical when crises occur more abruptly, as was 
the case in late 2001 and 2002.  Whilst the ranks of the poor swelled gradually during the 
1990s with each neo-liberal policy reform that removed another welfare safety net, 
privatised another industry (shedding jobs), or placed further downward pressure on 
wages, charities, local authorities and other organisations intensified their interventions 
accordingly and were relatively successful because they had time to plan a systematic 
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response to the subsequent social problems that these policies spawned.  During this time, 
the incremental nature of rising poverty meant that these organisations maintained the 
capacity to function, aided by the fact that strong upward structural mobility among those 
in middle-income jobs also meant that thousands of new urban poor more moved in the 
opposite direction and towards economic self-sufficiency once again.  The proportion of 
the population in income poverty in Greater Buenos Aires, for example, climbed steadily 
every year between 1991 and 1999 from 21% to 28% (INDEC).  
However, as Figure 4.1 showed, the violent nature of the economic explosion that rocked 
the country between October 2000 and the end of 2002 caused the impoverishment of 
some 7. 3 million Argentineans, with the rate of poverty incidence rising from 29% to 54% 
(INDEC).  The agencies that were charged with the responsibility of looking after such 
large numbers of impoverished people found themselves unable to provide the degree of 
support needed.  The impotence of the welfare institutions that are necessary to offer aid to 
deprived citizens and essentially ‘buy-off’ the risk of social revolt under liberal-democratic 
capitalist regimes was exposed (Gough, 1979).  This meant only one thing: that the social 
responses from the new urban poor in 2002 were likely to be far more violent than 
anything seen a decade earlier, substantiating Davies’ J-Curve Theory.
The evidence presented in this section suggests a second alternative to help explain the fact 
that Hypothesis 1 was confirmed; that the scale of the economic crisis and loss of 
neoliberal hegemony by the dominant class led to a dramatic loss of tolerance of financial 
hardship among Argentinean citizens which was responded to by an increased level of 
participation in protest action.
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7.1.4 Growing Opportunities for Involvement in Collective Action and Undermined 
Opportunities for Self-Help - Declining Belief in Individual Self-Improvement 
Prospects or Private Protest Routes
Aside from examining the general political and economic context within which their own 
impoverishment had arisen, Survey data suggests that a third alternative to the ‘financial 
need’ thesis as an explanation for new poor action which helps explain the confirmation of  
Hypothesis 1 was that the decision about whether or not to engage in forms of protest action 
was also influenced by the extent to which opportunities for individual economic coping 
strategies were undermined and those for collective action engagement increased, thus 
confirming such propositions by Powers (1999) and others in the literature. 
In such instances, tolerance of impoverishment was likely to be lower and responses switch 
from self-improvement to protest. Notably, the proportion of new urban poor who agreed 
with the statement ‘success in life depends on hard work’ dwindled from 60% in 1995 to 45% 
in 2002 (p=0.01) (Appendix II, C8, V68). A belief in individual hard work, self-sufficiency 
and education in order to achieve upward mobility are common to the middle class across 
cultures, but the Argentinean middle class has been especially inculcated in these values 
because of its predominantly immigrant ancestry and unusually open access to the education 
system (Mafud, 1985:24-26). A discourse analysis of national identity perceptions by 
predominantly middle-class citizens on internet forums reveals that they overwhelmingly 
attach ‘hard work, honesty and generosity’ to notions of what it means to be an ordinary 
citizen (Armony & Armony, 2005:38). 
Yet, during the social and economic crisis in 2001-02 these deeply ingrained beliefs that had 
been integral to the middle-class psyche for three generations became the minority view 
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among its impoverished wing. Because fewer and fewer believed that it was possible to 
recoup their lost socio-economic status through ‘hard work’ (and thus the individual self-
improvement route) between 1995 and 2002, it is unsurprising that an increasing proportion 
opted for the protest alternative during the 2001-02 crisis. Meanwhile, those who refrained 
from protest in 2002 came to realise that with the limited dividends that hard work could 
yield, self-improvement would more likely be achieved by pursuing economic coping 
strategies alongside other members of the community through collective projects, rather than 
as isolated individuals. 
Aside from a belief in hard work, the second resource upon which the Argentinean middle 
class had traditionally relied in order to achieve upward mobility and withstand economic 
strife was its accumulated social and cultural capital. Unlike the traditional poor, who obtain 
the informal provision of goods and services through political clientelist networks (Auyero, 
2001), the new urban poor are neither concentrated geographically (something that clientelism 
requires to function effectively), nor has it traditionally been possible to direct social policy at 
them specifically, because income targeting cannot distinguish the new urban poor from the 
structural poor (as they are likely to share similar income levels). Furthermore, they are far 
less inclined to accept such clientelist or assistentialist forms of self-improvement than the 
structural poor (Aguirre, 2008). It is for these reasons that in the absence of these alternatives, 
stocks of social capital and in particular, social networks are exploited by the new urban poor 
during such times. 
Yet, the value of their social capital depreciated during the 2002 crisis, because networks of 
well-connected and affluent professional acquaintances that the new urban poor had previously 
benefited from (to leverage employment, promotions and business recommendations) had dried 
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up (Ozarow, 2014). On the ‘supply-side’ this was because these networks were often bereft of 
resources themselves, for example because of the sheer scale of pauperisation or because very 
few small and medium-sized businesses were financially able to recruit new staff. Meanwhile, 
on the “demand-side,” some newly poor felt too embarrassed to admit their dramatic descent 
and ask for assistance anyway (Minujín & Anguita, 2004). In any case, the kinds of favours 
that the new poor now needed were food, money and favours of a far more rudimentary nature 
than those that they used their networks to acquire prior to pauperisation. 
The embarrassment of having to ask well-off peers for such things meant that the value of 
their social capital eroded on the one hand and on the other, unlike under their pre-
impoverishment climate when approaches to social contacts for skilled employment 
opportunities, promotions or new businesses would often pay off, in the post-impoverishment 
context when their needs changed, it was by no means certain that an old business 
acquaintance would be prepared to provide a loan to them (to cover more basic needs), for 
example. Therefore, the kinds of social networks that traditionally leveraged the new urban 
poor advantages in pre-impoverishment scenarios became a redundant resource once 
pauperised. The value of these assets as a means to aid the recovery of livelihoods was 
therefore both time and context sensitive (Kessler & Di Virgilio, 2008:41). 
Social networks also diminished in the years that followed impoverishment, as the new urban 
poor could not afford to socialise among professional acquaintances as often as they had done 
in the past (Ozarow, 2008), hastening the process of social exclusion and the feeling that they 
had become ‘disconnected’ from society. Given the scarcity of material resources available 
once impoverished and without being able to reciprocate the kinds of favours they were used 
to exchanging now that they had lost their skilled jobs and financial capital, social capital 
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quickly deteriorated. Thus during 2002 a) the value of their social capital eroded in many 
respects36, and b) their human capital declined because of the shortage of skilled jobs 
available (Porcú, 2003), which their employment experience and superior education would 
otherwise have given them an advantage in securing. Survey data confirms this ‘erosion of 
social capital’ proposition. The numbers of newly impoverished people agreeing with the 
statement ‘success in life depends on who you know’ fell from 75% in 1995 to just 60% in 
2002 (p=0.01) (Appendix II, C9, V69). With the options of skilled employment and support 
from personal acquaintances seriously undermined in 2002, taking to the streets to protest 
their condition seems to have become a more attractive option, because the new urban poor 
were forced to adopt ‘unacceptable’ choices such as consuming less, working (if at all) in 
unskilled jobs and sacrificing leisure time. 
Finally, there is some evidence to support the hypothesis that when the spaces for individual
protest are curtailed, the new urban poor are more likely to engage in collective protest. In 
this study, ‘the vote’ is adopted as a principal channel of individual protest and in 1995 the 
figures suggest that the option to vote for an opposition party as an expression of discontent 
was commonly taken up among the new urban poor. For example, survey data indicates that 
at that time, 73% believed that ‘voting can change the way things will be in the future.’ This 
belief in the vote as a viable protest option is supported by the fact that 80.5% of the new 
urban poor intended to vote for an opposition party in 1995 compared to just 19.5% who were 
going to vote for a governing party (Appendix II, C12, V74) in the same year. In that year, 
the Radical Party (UCR) was the main opposition party to Menem’s governing Peronist 
faction in Congress and between them, the Peronists and Radicals shared 199 out of the 257 
                                                            
36 Social capital is a particularly important asset in terms of improving one’s prospects for gaining quality 
employment in Argentina (Toledo & Bastourre, 2006).
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seats available in the Chamber of Deputies (Nohlen, 2005). Given that the UCR was viewed 
as the historic party of the urban middle class37 (Powers, 1999:538; Lupu & Stokes, 2009) and 
it already had strong support in parliament, it is no wonder that many of the new urban poor 
viewed them as a viable political option in 1995. 64% of the new urban poor who intended to 
vote for an opposition party backed the UCR as an outlet to express their discontent about 
their economic hardship that year. 
Although LatinoBarómetro data about new urban poor voting patterns is unavailable for 2002, 
what is certain is that after the events of December 2001, the Radical Party became 
completely discredited, having been blamed (along with its leader, then President De la Rúa) 
for implementing the reforms that sparked the debt default and social crisis at the end of 2001. 
FREPASO (Coalition for National Solidarity) - the other main electoral front which had 
enjoyed growing support throughout the late 1990s and was part of the Alianza government -
also disbanded in 2001. For example, in late 2000 a political scandal broke in which 
Argentina’s secret service (SIDE) was found to have paid huge bribes to a number of senators 
so as to pass the controversial Labour Reform Act. SIDE’s Director, Fernando de Santibañes 
was a personal friend of De la Rúa (Bazza, 2000) and so the mud stuck to both him and the 
UCR. With the Radicals entering a period of profound internal crisis and fragmentation 
between its left and right-leaning factions, the party haemorrhaged members and two of its 
former protagonists left to form their own parties. Elisa Carrió quit the party to form ARI in 
2001, followed by Ricardo López Murphy who helped establish Recrear in 2002. 
                                                            
37 Whilst the Peronist Partido Justicialista (Justicialist Party) officially embraces all classes, it has always 
reserved its strongest supportive rhetoric for the working class, channelled through its historic alignment with 
the country’s main union confederation - the CGT.
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At the ballot box, the Radicals’ percentage of the vote virtually halved between 2001 and 
2003 and its 2003 Presidential candidate Leopoldo Moreau received just 2.3% of the votes 
(Argentinean Interior Ministry figures). The former middle class that had been pauperised 
was left without a political party that they could trust to represent them (or to vote for) by 
2002, although in any case with no elections held that year, venting their grievances and 
having their political energies channelled through the ballot box was not an option. 
Furthermore as is well known, the unprecedented proportion of citizens who refused to vote 
or spoiled their ballot papers during the voto bronca in October 2001 (Basset, 2003) 
demonstrates the complete disintegration of trust in the political establishment and its parties, 
which contributed towards the crisis of legitimacy. This also made manifesting discontent 
through protest more likely in the wake of the Argentinazo. 
Although political scientists understand the mass abstention during the voto bronca to have 
been an act of protest in itself in a country where voting is a legal obligation (Basset, 2003), it 
spoke more about what Argentineans were against that what they were for. Many of the new 
urban poor participated in the direct democracy experiments that were embodied in the 
popular assemblies and other acts of collective protest, precisely because of a collapse of faith 
in the political organs of representation. These assemblies, worker-recovered companies and 
so on did offer a positive alternative re-conceptualisation of political decision-making, only 
this time it involved the principles of horizontalism and local grassroots participation in 
deciding how resources should be allocated. In 2001 and 2002, the vote (as an individual 
protest form) was therefore not a mechanism that was perceived to be able to actually bring 
about desired change on its own. Hence, alternative ways of ‘doing politics’ were conceived. 
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As Section 7.1.2 suggested, the ‘crisis of representation’ continued to exist for years after the 
2001-02 uprisings, so the legacy of the use of abstention as a protest tool against the political 
establishment among the new urban poor had far from disappeared by 2005. In that year, 
only 40% of them were willing to use a vote for an opposition party to protest at their 
declining personal circumstances, compared to 80% in 1995, p=0.01 (Appendix II, C12, 
V73), demonstrating that political parties were generally unable to capitalise on new urban 
poor discontent because the whole political class had been tarnished. As a response choice, 
‘the vote’ was used significantly less in 2005 than in 1995. Furthermore, just 28.6% of the 
new urban poor voted for a governing party in 2005 (albeit an increase on 1995 levels), 
suggesting that they were far from enamoured with Kirchner’s Frente para La Victoria 
Peronist faction, which had become the largest force in parliament by 2003. Indeed, despite 
often being lifelong Radical supporters, those from the middle class who became poor still 
tend to remain largely disillusioned with the Radicals today. According to Eduardo Fidanza, 
Director of Argentinean consultancy Poliarquía, a large part of this stratum (which makes up 
approximately 15% of the electorate) has begun voting for ex-Radical leaders like Carrió and 
her Acuerdo Cívico y Social electoral front, or for López Murphy in recent years (La Nación 
09/06/2009). 
Thus we see how as both the opportunities available to pursue and the belief in private self-
improvement or protest routes declined in 2001-02, simultaneously spaces emerged to engage 
in collective solutions to overcome one’s pauperisation and also protest their condition 
alongside others. This acts as the third explanation for Hypothesis 1 having been 
substantiated.
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7.1.5 Underlying Social Attitudes and Political Opinions – Stoic and Centrist Identities 
(1995, 2002, 2005), Kirchner Election Pacifies Discontent (2002-2005) and 
Disintegration of ‘Cross-class’ Solidarity (2002-2005)
In this section I examine the fourth and final reason that attests to the confirmation of 
Hypothesis 1 - a series of test results that suggest how the underlying social and political 
attitudes of the new urban poor help to explain their behaviours in terms of the period of 
collective action mobilisation (until 2002) and then de-mobilisation (2002-2005).
Firstly, the overriding evidence from LatinoBarómetro data shows that newly impoverished 
Argentineans’ political identities (in terms of their self-defined position on the political 
spectrum) remained constant and ‘centrist’ between 1995, 2002 and 2005. This was in spite 
of the general political discord of 2002 and the significant decline in their own financial 
circumstances. The data also suggests that both the organised political Left and the country’s
traditionally weak, ‘institutionalised’ conservative Right-wing failed (in the short term at 
least) to capitalise on the financial impoverishment of the middle sectors. Having been asked 
to assign a Likert item rank to their ideological position from 0 to 10 on the political spectrum 
(Left =0 and Right =10), their overall political position did not experience a statistically 
significant change (p=0.66), either as a mean rank or as a categorical variable (in percentages) 
(Appendix II, C1, V46). Despite generally maintaining centrist positions (a mean rank of 
approximately 5 out of 10 in each year), some evidence suggests that the crisis in 2002 did 
provoke some respondents to move further away from the centre and towards the extremes of 
the political spectrum. In 1995, the data on the ranking of political position elicited an Inter-
Quartile Range (IQR) of 2 (as it did in 2005), but in 2002 the IQR had increased to 3. 
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The decline in support for the Left among the general population between 2002 and 2005 has 
been researched elsewhere. Explanations offered include the fact that there was a loss of faith 
not so much in its principles but rather its political parties, which were becoming ever more 
sectarian and disunited (Almeyra, 2004:175). Left-wing commentators like Petras (2004) 
have also criticised the ‘impoverished middle class’ for abandoning their radical ideals and 
becoming submerged in ‘conservative’, security-related preoccupations following 
macroeconomic recovery after 2003. When this happened, their concerns switched to those 
of i) their private property, ii) their own and their family’s personal safety and iii) the security 
of their (often recently acquired and precarious) employment. At this point, their perspectives 
became more individualistic and inward-looking, values upon which the political Right have 
traditionally thrived. Thus, the collectivist ideals that were so popular during 2001-02 were 
abandoned. Solidarity consequently broke down and the popular slogan ‘¡piquetes 
y cacerolas, la lucha es una sola!’ that once resounded through the streets of Buenos Aires 
disappeared. 
Figure 4.1 illustrated how the collective mobilisations quickly faded away, especially 
between late 2002 and mid-2003; however it was also the case that particular social and 
political attitudes of many of the new urban poor became increasingly reactionary during that 
period (even if they did not define themselves as having moved to the political ‘right’). As 
Table 8 illustrated, in 2002 70% blamed the Government for the crisis that caused their 
economic hardship, but whilst capitalism’s processes (such as ‘globalisation’) or its principle 
financial institutions (such as the IMF and WTO) were also accused, this was not nearly to 
the same extent. This statistic largely confirms the fascinating case study conducted by 
Mazzoni (2008:222) on the political sentiments of the new urban poor. This identified that, 
despite appealing to active citizenship in their own discourse, most of those interviewed in 
203
2004 instead maintained a rather minimalist understanding of political citizenship. Because 
few held expectations that their political rights also needed to be underscored with social 
rights, the Government itself was harshly condemned for violating political freedoms due to 
its involvement in corruption, having declared the state of siege and so on. Yet the capitalist 
system and its support structures like the IMF were held less to account because the economic 
and social guarantees that they could either provide (or remove) were not seen as ‘rights’ in 
the same sense but rather something that as individuals they were responsible for securing. 
Furthermore, the participants in her study attached great significance to the act of voting 
compared to other methods of political participation, such as the need for ongoing dialogue 
with their elected representatives. To this extent, by believing that their interests would be 
protected simply by a change in Government (which they had deemed to be the main 
perpetrator of their hardship in 2002), instead of developing a deeper critique of capitalism 
and the processes and institutions that nourished it, the new urban poor generally had their 
political concerns appeased by settling for ‘capitalism with a human face’ (Katz, 2005) and 
electing Néstor Kirchner as President. His election was thus a watershed moment for new 
urban poor mobilisation and at least partly contributed to their political demobilisation as a 
social stratum. 
However, market conditions and above all, the competition for jobs, soon re-establishes 
disunity among the ranks of the exploited (Barker, 2008). This process was played out in
textbook fashion in Argentina as the new urban poor joined the popular resistance in 2001 
and 2002, yet from 2003 began to turn against the structural poor with whom they had once 
seen as allies, as they fought to compete for the same kinds of jobs in the years that followed. 
Thus, they mistakenly came to see the structural poor as class enemies rather than allies. The 
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LatinoBarómetro survey results support the theory that increased competition for jobs led to 
expressions of racism and anti-immigration feeling among the new urban poor. By late 2002, 
42% of those surveyed felt that ‘immigrants38 were to blame for taking away their jobs’ 
(Appendix II, C7, V67).   
By 2003, the new urban poor had not only begun to distance themselves from the structural 
poor, but a significant part of this stratum also came to believe that those in the shantytowns 
had become a threat to their own insecure jobs and safety, dividing them further. Fed by a 
media frenzy that depicted the shantytown poor as ‘dangerous and foreign’, the new urban 
poor became defensive about law and order and increasingly concerned about the 
encroachment of these structurally poor communities upon the ‘respectable’ middle-class 
districts and the exaggerated threat that they could occupy their homes (Guano, 2004:69). 
Meanwhile, protest leaders like Juan Carlos Blumberg were promoting the criminalisation of 
the indigent poor (La Nación, 01/09/2006), which the new urban poor largely swallowed.39
By supporting this discourse themselves, they often symbolically differentiated themselves 
from the structural poor in terms of their race (their ‘whiteness’ as opposed to the negro40 of 
the shantytown), nationality (their Argentinean backgrounds and European ancestry as 
opposed to the recent immigrant background of many of the structural poor), and level of 
education. Highlighting these differences acted as a psychological coping strategy that many 
                                                            
38 White, urban middle-class Argentineans often confuse Argentineans who migrate to the urban centres from 
the north of the country (and who tend to be racially ‘mestizo’) with being ‘immigrants.’
39 This trend should be understood in its historical context. Fear of the ‘Black’ indigent poor by the middle class 
of white, European origin dates back to the October 1945 events which helped launch Juan Peron into the 
Presidency to the disdain of the middle class which understood as the moment to be one where they became 
politically subservient to the ‘cabecitas negras’ (Adamovsky, 2009).
40 Translates into English as ‘of Black racial origin’ in but is used by Argentineans to refer to those of Andean or 
indigenous descent.
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used in a scenario where – in terms of their income and job status – they were almost 
indistinguishable (Guano, 2004; Ozarow, 2008). The reactionary politics of many of the new 
urban poor after 2003 was driven by fear, self-interest and perceived self-defence. 
LatinoBarómetro data about how the main issues of concern for the new urban poor changed 
between 2002 and 2005 (Appendix II, C5, V64) confirms many of these propositions. For 
example, during that time, the proportion of new urban poor citizens who cited ‘crime’ as 
their main concern doubled from 4% to 8%. Furthermore, the number who had either ‘been 
the victim of a crime, assault or attack or knew someone who had in the last twelve months’ 
rose from 53% in 2002 to 64% in 2005 (Appendix II, C6, V66). Shockingly, the statistic had 
stood at just 30% in 1995 with the increase between then and 2002 and 2005 being 
statistically significant (p=0.01). This suggests that the growing fear of crime not only 
induced merely an imagined ‘moral panic,’ but was also the result of actual increased 
incidence, itself the product of the growing vulnerability and social inequality that has 
bedevilled Argentina since the crisis (Rohter, 2006). 
The data shows that other issues which are traditional rallying points for the political Right 
had also appeared by 2005, such as the concern that ‘immigrants are the main problem in our 
society’ (3%), which was previously not judged to have been of importance by any of the new 
urban poor in either 1995 or 2002. By 2007, millionaire businessman Mauricio Macri had 
formed a right-wing electoral coalition – Propuesta Republicana (PRO) – and won a 
landslide victory as Governor of The City of Buenos Aires on a platform of reversing 
insecurity (Clarín, 2007). Since the 2002 crisis, not only has crime risen, but job insecurity 
has also grown, as low wages and unprotected work have been actively encouraged through 
labour reforms that ‘formalise’ such practices (Olmedo & Murray, 2002). It is little wonder, 
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then, that among those who became ‘newly’ impoverished in 2001-02 but remain poor during 
the years of economic boom since 2004, social solidarity has diminished in comparison to 
earlier years and the associated feelings of fear that this instability invokes have been 
manipulated by populists on the Right such as Macri and Blumberg. It is also no coincidence 
that among a climate of ‘anti-politics’, these two figures enjoyed success precisely because 
they have distanced themselves from the political establishment and have played on their non-
political ‘business’ backgrounds. Consequently, the impoverished middle class feel 
increasingly under attack, less trusting of others and more disposed to seek individualist self-
improvement solutions rather than those that call upon the cooperation of other members of 
the community. 
In this chapter I have analysed data from the two surveys which confirm Hypothesis 1 - that 
the impoverishment of Argentina’s citizens during the 2001-02 economic crisis was not 
sufficient to stimulate their involvement in collective action as a response on its own. Four 
alternative contextual processes and explanations have been suggested here which account for
the increased tendency towards participation in collective protests or self-improvement rather 
than simply private responses in 2002. They are 1) The severity of the economic crisis led to a 
transformation in their subjectivities, such that the culpability for their material losses shifted 
away from themselves towards the government and institutions of political representation. 
The resulting emergence of a collective identity among the new urban poor and loss of 
confidence in their politicians to run the economy spurred them to take to the streets to protest 
their condition collectively and also to seek self-improvement measures alongside others in 
society. 2) The crisis of political legitimacy and the acute tangibility of their hardship reduced 
their political tolerance of their condition. As material losses escalated beyond the realms of 
‘acceptability’ and anger at their politicians boiled over, it prompted many to engage in 
207
protest and demand the removal of the entire political establishment. 3) Opportunities for 
individual self-improvement were undermined and belief in these survival strategies declined 
just at the time that the spaces to engage in social movements and collective self-help 
experiments increased. Thus, it became easier and more desirable to become involved in 
solidarity actions and more likely that these activities would assist their emergence from 
impoverishment than private actions. 4) Changing ways of thinking and trends in underlying 
social and political attitudes also militated in favour of partaking in actions that brought the 
new urban poor together in solidarity in joint actions both with other social sectors and against 
the government. It is now to the private considerations that individual citizens took in 
assessing how to respond to their pauperisation that our attention turns.
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CHAPTER 8 – DISCUSSION OF THE RESULTS: PRIVATE CONSIDERATIONS
8.1 Tolerance and Tangibility of Hardship: ‘Relative’ poverty generates protest but 
‘absolute’ poverty generates self-improvement actions
With reference to Hypothesis 2, test results that measured the impact of the ‘suddenness of 
descent’ upon response offer evidence to support the proposition that those newly poor 
households that experienced more substantial income drops were more likely to take to the 
streets in protest. 16% of households that lost no income between June and November 2002 
(but merely slipped slowly below the poverty line due to the rising prices) responded by 
participating in collective protest actions, yet this figure was significantly higher (28%) 
among those households that lost between half and all of their income (p=0.06) (Appendix I, 
H2, V4). Similarly, income losses were also more pronounced amongst those new urban poor 
households that did opt for collective protest. They experienced an average loss of income of 
31% compared to those who stayed at home, whose average loss was only 23% (p=0.09) 
(Appendix I, H2, V4). 
Returning to the idea of ‘linking’ between self-improvement and protest responses, what I
infer from this result is that the new urban poor who experienced more abrupt descent had less 
time to develop the economic coping strategies that would have cushioned their fall and 
moderated their response. Instead, because these strategies were undermined or there was 
insufficient time to implement them, they tended to respond more radically, having been 
politicised by the realisation that they would not be able to recover their material losses if 
their responses were reduced solely to economic activities. I add one caveat here. The data 
also conveyed that those households which lost almost all (that’s to say 90-100%) of their 
income had quite low collective protest participation rates. Evidence from tests conducted on 
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Hypothesis 3 indicate that this is because at this level of income loss, such households are too 
busy conducting a wider range of individual economic self-improvement actions, because 
survival strategies become more pressing and are a more rational use of time than 
demonstrating. 
The ISCA data also confirmed Hypothesis 3 - that the greater the depth of household 
impoverishment, the higher the number of both individual self-improvement strategies 
employed (Appendix I, H3, V5) and aggregated (individual and collective) self-improvement 
strategies (Appendix I, H3, V7) undertaken to counter it in response. A non-parametric test 
returned a p-value of 0.01, demonstrating strong evidence to support this assertion in both 
cases. The literature also suggests that those who had the lowest incomes pursued the most 
coping strategies due to the fact that at greater depths of impoverishment, many of the taboos 
that act as impediments to new urban poor self-improvement actions (like hostility towards 
the idea of accepting charity, asking friends for help or publicly admitting one’s 
impoverishment by seeking collective responses to alleviate problems) are overcome. The 
basic need to provide for one’s family supersedes the shame associated with acting in such 
ways. Results found that those in greater depths of poverty also tended to pursue more 
collective self-improvement actions. In the context of a macroeconomic crisis where few 
skilled jobs were available, for those on the lowest incomes (usually the unemployed or 
underemployed), joining collective actions like barter clubs – especially when understood as a 
substitute form of ‘work’ (Bombal & Luzzi 2006), or recovered companies and workers’ 
cooperatives – was an attractive option, because these provided a means of subsistence, a 
sense of self-worth and permitted a recovery of professional identities (Paiva, 2004). 
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However, no evidence was found to suggest that members of more deeply impoverished 
households were more likely to participate in collective protest (p=0.7) (Appendix I, H3, V8). 
The new urban poor households that were situated slightly below the poverty line were just as 
likely to take to the streets as those who were more profoundly impoverished. This suggests 
that it is the degree of fall in income (see earlier result), rather than the degree of material 
deprivation per se, that is what politicises responses. 
8.2 Response Combinations: The Activist or Non-Activist Dichotomy
Strong evidence was found to support Hypothesis 4 that in 2002 newly impoverished 
households which pursued a wider range of economic self-improvement strategies were also 
more likely to participate in political collective protest actions. The actual result 
demonstrated that whereas among those that pursued a low-range (0-2) of self-improvement 
strategies, only 13% engaged in collective protest actions. This proportion more than doubled 
to 31.4% among those who pursued a wider number (3-11) of self-improvement strategies 
(p=0.00) (Appendix I, H4, V9). This indicates that pauperisation may have provoked two 
polarised sets of responses among the new urban poor in 2002. For the first group, whom I 
have labelled the ‘non-activists’41, the experience seems to have had a demoralising and de-
motivating impact. They participated in fewer coping strategies and tended to avoid protests 
entirely. Yet, for the second group, whom I call ‘the activists42,’ impoverishment had a 
mobilising effect, stimulating active participation in both political protest and economic self-
                                                            
41 To suggest a sense of a continuum in terms of the level of civic engagement that citizens possess, I use the 
term ‘non-activist’ because they still have taken part in some collective actions. This is opposed to using 
alternative terminology like being a ‘passive participant’, which would suggest more absolute docility.
42 ‘Activists’ is used not in the sense that they belonged to a political party or interest group, or necessarily 
possessed greater collective action experience, but to describe someone who took part in a lot of actions at this 
particular time even if they were an ‘ordinary’ citizen.
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improvement responses. As I will convey later on (Figure 8.3.5), this latter group were not 
only more likely to engage in protests and participate in a wider variety of different coping 
strategies, but also tended to dedicate the longest hours to paid employment, reinforcing the 
activist/non-activist dichotomy. 
Because evidence also alludes to a positive association between the range of individual self-
improvement strategies and likelihood of engaging in collective self-improvement strategies 
(p=0.03) (Appendix I, H4, V10), this suggests that those households that pursued collective 
self-improvement actions did so because they did not enjoy success in generating income 
through the initial individual self-improvement actions that they had followed and hence 
collective self-improvement activities were taken up as a fallback option. 
The evidence from earlier results that supported Hypothesis 1 (that impoverishment is not 
sufficient to stimulate collective protest on its own) and Hypothesis 3 (that the more deeply 
impoverished are not necessarily more likely to engage in collective protest) are recalled here. 
With these findings in mind, even if those pursuing a wider range of economic self-
improvement strategies did so because the initial strategies they attempted had proven 
unfruitful in reversing their fortunes, it was not this lack of success (and consequent ongoing 
impoverishment) that was the reason why they also pursued protest actions. As I have shown, 
there is no relationship between economic grievances and the propensity to protest. Instead, 
this positive association between the number of self-improvement actions and the likelihood 
of protest must be explained by other means. 
Evidence points to the fact that the decision to engage in collective protest actions was at least 
to some extent made more likely by the practical experience of having taken part in collective 
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self-improvement actions. The second result identified here was that those involved in 
collective self-improvement actions were twice as likely to join protests than those who were 
not involved in them. Of those who participated in collective protests, 21% had also 
participated in a collective self-improvement action whereas among those who did not engage 
in collective protest only 10% had taken part in collective self-improvement of some kind 
(p=0.05) (Appendix I, H4, V11). 
One possible explanation for the association between joining collective self-improvement and 
pursuing collective protest actions is that collective self-improvement activities acted as ‘sites 
of information’ about protest actions that were taking place, through the exchange of 
knowledge and awareness between participants. Therefore, aside from helping to alleviate 
their hardship, collective activities like barter clubs, soup kitchens and cooperative businesses 
may have played a secondary function by acting as recruitment grounds for protest actions. 
Secondly, these were loci at which the interaction with others who had also experienced 
pauperisation would have promoted a heightened sensitivity to the fact that social descent had 
burdened many of their peers and so would have prompted a realisation that they were not 
alone. By coming into contact with others who had been through a similar experience to 
them, they became more confident about attending protests, either against their hardship or 
the general political situation. They also met people they could identify with - in their same 
situation - with whom they could attend these protests. Thirdly, as suggested earlier, as ‘sites 
of social integration’ (Almeyra, 2004:167) many of the new urban poor mixed with the long-
term poor for the first time, while engaging in collective self-improvement activities like 
barter clubs. Thus, the new urban poor often became more conscious of the general injustices 
in society and the injustice of their own experience too, prompting them to join collective 
protest actions. 
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Finally, because there was no association found between the depth of household 
impoverishment (level of absolute poverty) and involvement in protest, the fact that those 
who enacted lower ranges of self-improvement actions were also less likely to join protests 
was not necessarily because their material need was less acute. Instead, for some new urban 
poor households at least, low participation rates in both self-improvement and protest were 
apparently due to one of two confounding factors. First, it may have been owed to a denial of 
their newfound impoverishment, which meant that the new urban poor remained intransigent 
in the face of their pauperisation and so failed to change their behaviour. Alternatively, it 
may have resulted from the mental paralysis that they experienced as fall-out from the 
psychological effects of their ‘fall’ (Plotkin, 2003:224). The absence of mental clarity would 
have led to economic or political inaction, instead of taking rational measures to readjust to 
their new circumstances. 
So, Hypothesis 4 was confirmed by the test results. It seems clear that whilst for some of the 
seven million new urban poor, the lack of self-realisation that they endured due to loss of their 
work, businesses and social lives provoked anger and stimulated action, others were subjected 
to an increasing sense of alienation during the economic crisis which sapped their motivation 
to even strive towards achieve self-improvement, let alone engage in protest (Ozarow, 2014). 
For this part of this stratum, it was better to resign themselves to defeat than to join the social 
revolt or seek more self-improvement strategies and face potential disappointment if they 
were not able to achieve upward social mobility again. It must be remembered that in 2002, 
just 18% of the new urban poor thought that their prospects would improve in the following 
twelve months, whereas 47% were convinced things would get worse (Appendix II, C10, 
V70). 
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Furthermore, over half (55%) no longer believed that ‘success in life depends on hard work’ 
(Appendix II, C8, V68). In an atmosphere of such pessimism and with the question of 
whether society would even reward hard work anymore fresh in their minds, these ‘non-
activists’ may well have become more risk averse and lowered their expectations of a brighter 
future. This risk aversion would have reduced their participation in all types of action and 
was an especially potent demobilising force, given the psychological damage that had been 
caused by having had their expectations raised so extensively during the 1990s but left 
unfulfilled and crushed during the 2001-02 crisis. Understandably then, having their hopes 
lifted and then denied again wasn’t something that any of the new urban poor would have 
wanted to go through again after 2002. The answer for many was disillusionment and 
passivity rather than investing their energies in protesting for social change. 
8.3 Biographical Characteristics
8.3.1 Prior Experience of Collective Organisations Generates Collective Action
As anticipated in Hypothesis 5, prior involvement in or affiliation with some kind of 
collective activity (whether political, social, religious or other) strongly increased the 
likelihood of involvement on collective protests among the new urban poor. Among those in 
households which had previously belonged to a collective organisation of some kind before 
2002, over half (54%) ended up participating in some kind of protest during the time period, 
yet this fell dramatically to just (19%) among those who had no such histories. There was 
very strong evidence against the null hypothesis with a p-value of 0.00 (Appendix I, H7, 
V18). Unfortunately due to data limitations, it was not possible to conduct separate tests on 
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involvement in particular kinds of organisation (such as trade unions or political parties) and 
response. This builds upon previous empirical research, which has demonstrated the link 
between civic and political engagement in Latin America. For example, Klesner (2007) 
showed how the social capital acquired and reciprocated through involvement in non-political 
organisations encourages participation in explicitly political activities. 
8.3.2 Gender - No Generative Impact on Response
No evidence was found in support of Hypothesis 6 - that gender influenced whether the 
household response that was adopted took a self-improvement or protest form. Despite the 
fact that more newly poor women (25.5%) than men (20.6%) belonged to households that 
took part in protest actions, it yielded an insignificant result at (p=0.4) (Appendix I, H5, V12). 
Although the results did show that women belonged to households with significantly lower 
average per capita incomes than men, this had no effect on the decision about whether to 
pursue protest actions or a higher number of self-improvement strategies. The non-
significance of income-level on responses has already been determined from Hypotheses 4 
and 6. 13.8% of females belonged to households that participated in collective self-
improvement actions compared to 10.3% of men, a difference that was also insignificant, 
(p=0.6) (Appendix I, H5, V13). Both these results contradict the expected outcomes as 
outlined in the hypothesis. However, some words of caution here. Firstly, these hypotheses 
were based on theory about the actions that newly poor men and women in post-crisis 
Argentina tended to take as individuals, rather than the actions of the households to which 
they belonged (which was the closest dependent variable that could actually be tested with the 
available data). Therefore, due to data limitations, conclusions cannot be drawn about gender 
differences upon individual responses per se. 
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8.3.3 Age - The Elderly Favour Private Self-Help Activities, not Collective Action, whilst 
the Young Take Flight
For similar reasons, it was also difficult to either prove or disprove Hypothesis 7, which 
predicted that i) young adults were more likely to participate in collective protest and ii) that 
those in both the 50-64 years and over 65 years age categories were more likely to engage in 
collective self-improvement actions. Table 9 suggests that there was no association between 
age and household response category. The exception was the elderly (65 and over), who 
tended to belong to households that took part in a significantly wider range of individual self-
improvement strategies, with 66% doing so compared to 33% or less among other age groups 
(Appendix I, H6, V17). 
This result can probably be explained by the fact that first of all, the data indicated that the 
elderly (as an age group) were much less likely to be ‘working’ or ‘studying’ because most 
were retired. In practice, this would have meant that they had more time available to dedicate 
to the pursuit of different economic coping strategies. Secondly, a breakdown of their coping 
strategies indicated that they were more likely to rent out their homes and ‘cash in’ dividends 
or other kinds of investments than any other age group. Thirdly, the results indicate that they 
were more likely to draw upon favours from acquaintances so as to buy goods and services on 
trust than other age groups. 
Critically, as the result in Appendix I, H6, V17a shows, they were far more likely to obtain 
help from friends and acquaintances (pursued by 33% of those 65 and over, but just 15% of 
young adults, 8% of those aged 35-49 and only 4% of those aged 50-64 (p=0.04)). This 
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suggests that their networks of social capital did not diminish in the same way that it did for 
members of other age groups, which meant they could still exploit it to pursue individual 
coping strategies to a greater extent than other groups. Furthermore, the results showed that 
of all age groups, the elderly were also most likely to withdraw savings, sell or pawn their 
possessions and access government aid. Consequently, they were also much less likely to 
belong to households that engaged in collective self-improvement activities because they were 
not in as much financial need, given their ability to obtain alternative income sources for the 
household through exploiting their own personal networks. Returning to the observations in 
Section 5.4, the particular susceptibility to impoverishment among the elderly in the 1990s 
(due to the reductions in state pensions) was contrasted with the fact that during the 2001-02
crisis they were generally shielded from its most severe impacts (in terms of the extent of 
income loss). While the elderly suffered an especially low standard of living both before and 
during 2002, they did not encounter a particularly harsh deterioration in their circumstances 
compared to other age groups. The results identified in the ISCA survey above apparently 
now help to explain this. 
The lower level of household participation in collective protest among older people might also 
be explained by referring back to the tests on Hypothesis 2, which indicated that more sudden 
losses of income are more likely to generate a protest response. However, the relative income 
stability that households with older people benefited from – due to income from the option of 
withdrawing their pension still being available, on the one hand, and the multiple use of social 
capital to pursue a wider range of individual coping strategies, on the other – meant that such 
external shocks to the household were cushioned and impoverishment was relatively easier to 
adapt to compared to other age categories. Secondly, generally speaking, the elderly were 
usually physically less able to take to the streets in revolt, which surely also explains their 
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preference for self-improvement actions ahead of protest. Separate studies (Jennings & 
Markus, 1988; Schubert, 1988) indicate that political activity in the lifecycle tends to peak 
during the mid-fifties, then declines into the sixties and seventies, when protest activity takes 
more individual forms such as letter-writing. Age differences relating to protest behaviour 
were not statistically significant for younger age groups, so this trend could not be confirmed. 
Table 9 - Proportion of Newly Impoverished Argentineans Belonging to Households that 
Participated in Different Actions in May-November 2002 (by age)







18-34 33 16 18
35-49 27 9 21
50-64 33 10 25
65 and over 66 0 11
In terms of attitudes and outlooks, it is interesting to note that while it should come as no 
surprise that there was generally a great deal of gloom among the newly poor with respect to 
their futures in 2002, the data shows that there was an association between age and level of 
optimism. Young adults were more optimistic about their futures compared to those in the 
middle-aged category, who were statistically significantly more pessimistic than anyone else 
(p=0.09) (Table 10 and results Appendix II, C11, V72). The reasons for this are numerous, 
but the literature suggests that they are principally due to concern among the middle-aged for 
their future employment prospects, given age discrimination in the labour market (Gómez, 
2003), the erosion of their human capital, and an ‘it’s too late for me’ mentality (Ozarow, 
2008). On the other hand, emigration was seen as an exit strategy that gave particular cause 
for hope to younger age groups, partly explaining their (relative) optimism overall. 52% of 
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18-34 year olds and their families ‘seriously considered’ emigrating in 2002, while this fell to 
44% among those aged 35-49, 39% of 50-64 year olds and just 17% of those aged 65 and over 
(p=0.1) (Appendix II, C13, V76). 
Table 10 - Impact of Age upon Optimism for Future Prospects among the New Poor in 2002 
Age Category Better % Same % Worse %
18-34 20 39 41
35-49 19 33 48
50-64 13 27 60
The reasons why emigration was a particularly attractive option for young adults are due to a 
combination of ‘push’ and ‘pull’ factors. For example, on the ‘push side’ (those which 
encouraged them to leave the country), the ISCA data illustrates that the unemployment rate 
among young adult new urban poor was an astonishing 42%, far higher than any other age 
group, meaning that they had more reason to seek job opportunities overseas. The rate was 
just 15% among 35-49 year-olds and 27% among 50-64 year-olds (p=0.00). Further, not only 
did young people (18-34) have fewer job opportunities, but the data suggests that they had 
fewer family commitments (dependents) to keep them from leaving Argentina. They would 
also generally have been in better health to start a new life overseas than their older cohorts. 
Whether younger people were particularly attracted to emigrate by ‘pull factors’ such as 
supportive family networks abroad could not be determined from the survey data alone, 
although it has been demonstrated that many Western countries which operated Highly 
Skilled Migrants Programmes at the time, facilitated immigration prospects particularly for 
young professionals (Blitz, 2010). Younger Argentineans also tended to be more likely to 
apply for EU passports (Melamed, 2002) which granted them the right to live and work in 
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European countries. No statistically significant difference was identified in the level of 
optimism among men and women (Appendix II, C10, V71). 
8.3.4 Localised Opportunities for Collective Action – The City of Buenos Aires as the Hub 
of Protest Activity but not for the New Urban Poor
As for the results of the influence of one’s residential location upon behaviour Hypothesis 8
was rejected. Amongst the new urban poor in particular, no significant localised difference 
were identified (Appendix I, H8, V23) in terms of the number of self-improvement actions or 
total collective actions they participated in. In contrast to expectations and the hypothesis 
formulation, the decisions that citizens took about whether to resist their impoverishment 
individually or collectively were therefore not influenced by whether such opportunities 
physically existed within their province. However, among the general survey universe, 
interestingly, citizens were significantly more likely to take part in collective protests if they 
lived in the City of Buenos Aires (31%) compared to Greater Buenos Aires (21%) or 
Argentina’s remaining provinces (21%) (p=0.00).
At first glance this statistically non-significant result for the new urban poor seems surprising, 
because as described earlier, many of the major institutions that became targets of new urban 
poor anger (or at least those protests that made the news) were situated in city centres, 
especially in The City of Buenos Aires. These included the commercial Banks’ Headquarters, 
the Supreme Court, Congress and the Presidential Palace. However, a closer inspection of the 
figures which emerged from the data helps to explain why the test did not induce the expected 
outcome. Firstly, it must be acknowledged that much of the literature upon which the 
hypothesis was predicated focused purely on collective protest actions during the height of 
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social unrest at the end of 2001 and in early 2002, rather than on the actions that occurred 
later on in 2002 (the period of data collection) and beyond, for which the literature is more 
scarce. However, the data suggests that during the timeframe in which the sample group 
became ‘impoverished’ (June 2002 to November 2002), there was a relative shift in the ‘sites’ 
of new urban poor protest, away from the major urban centres such as The City of Buenos 
Aires and towards the provinces. 
So why did new urban poor protests in the provinces (that is to say, outside of The City of 
Buenos Aires) increase through the course of 2002, yet remain unchanged in Argentina’s 
capital city? Notably, the number of cacerolazo, escrache or other protest marches that were 
most likely to target strategic urban locations such as the courts, banks or Parliament had 
fallen sharply by the time of the second survey, at the end of 2002.  This can be ascribed 
firstly to the fact that at the tail end of that year, savings had been partially returned to many 
victims of the Corralón, secondly because the banks which had been the target for many of 
the new urban poor-led protests had become subject to a Government-instigated judicial 
process (Vilas, 2005:258), and thirdly because many of the individual politicians who were 
seen as being responsible for the Crisis, such as President De la Rúa and Economy Minister 
Domingo Cavallo (La Nación, 20/12/2001), had either resigned or been removed from office. 
For these reasons, many citizens were pacified during 2002 to some degree and this reduced 
the magnetism that the national governing institutions based in The City of Buenos Aires held 
as protest loci. The fourth reason that may explain the provincialisation of protest and why 
Hypothesis 8 could not be supported is that many of the escraches that occurred later in 2002 
targeted the private country estates of politicians, bankers, or judges who were identified as 
being corrupt and who it was felt had to be removed from office due to their perceived role in 
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the crisis. It appears that, as that year unfolded, protest increasingly focused on local rather 
than national issues, which would confirm ethnographic research at the time (Rossi, 2014). 
8.3.5 Relationship to the Labour Market - Politicisation Through Work
The final specific area of analysis examines how newly impoverished households’ responses 
were influenced by the relationship its members had to the labour market. I begin by looking 
at whether the employment status of the head of household impacted upon the response 
choices. As expected, test results imply that there was no association between employment 
status and the decision to participate in collective protest, thus confirming Hypothesis 9. 
Whilst 20.4% of those new urban poor in households with employed heads joined a collective 
protest, the figure was almost identical (19.4%) for those with unemployed or inactive heads 
(p=0.96) (Appendix I, H9, V26). Assuming that in such cases, the head of household’s lack 
of work entailed greater impoverishment for its members – as was discovered from the result 
of Hypothesis 1 – this would not have been a determining factor in itself with regards to 
whether or not household members protested. Instead, this was influenced by the economic 
and political context within which their impoverishment had occurred. 
However, the results produce interesting findings in terms of the economic coping strategies 
sought. New urban poor households with an employed head were significantly more likely to 
pursue collective coping strategies than those with unemployed or inactive heads. 16% of the 
new urban poor with employed heads belonged to households that chose a collective self-help 
strategy, while just 7% of those with unemployed or inactive heads did so (p=0.03) 
(Appendix I, H9, V25). In contrast, those with unemployed or inactive heads were 
significantly more likely to seek a wider range of individual coping strategies. 29% of the 
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new urban poor from households with an employed head opted for wider ranges of these 
actions, but this rose to 40% among those with unemployed or inactive heads (p=0.06) 
(Appendix I, H9, V27). 
One way of understanding this result is with reference to the a priori proposition that the 
workplace acted as a site through which information about the occurrence of collective self-
improvement activities was disseminated. Although the data itself does not provide such 
explanations, one can insinuate that, through interaction with work colleagues during their 
employment, the head of the household may not only have been more likely to join protests 
due to the discovery of shared grievances with fellow workers, but may also have persuaded 
other household members to also join them. Such behavioural patterns were less likely 
among those who did not go to work. Unemployed heads of households would have been 
less exposed to such environments where they could discover the possibility of engaging in 
collective action, hence they and their families resorted more to individualist solutions. These 
proposals are reinforced by the result of Hypothesis 10 (that the greater the number of hours 
spent in the workplace, the more likely respondents were to engage in collective protest 
actions). No evidence was found to support the hypothesis that those households with 
unemployed heads were more likely to partake in all types of collective action than those with 
employed ones (Appendix I, H9, V24). 
In Hypothesis 10 I anticipated that the fewer the average hours worked by the household, the 
greater the likelihood that its members would engage in protests. This was based firstly upon 
the rational-choice assumption that the disciplining nature of work would mean that those 
who worked more had less ‘free time’ available and would therefore have had fewer 
opportunities to attend protest actions. Protest would also have carried a greater ‘opportunity 
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cost’ for households with less leisure time available. Further, it was assumed that the fear of 
the implications of arrest (especially for one’s existing employment) would act as a deterrent 
to participation for those who worked more. However, the results imply that in fact, the 
opposite proved to be true: the likelihood of participation in protest actually increased as 
working hours became longer. Hypothesis 10 was therefore rejected and revised in the 
following way.
Among those households where no-one worked at all (that is to say, they had 0 average 
working hours), 15% of newly poor Argentineans participated in collective protest. This 
increased to 19% among those in households working between 1 and 20 hours, rising further 
to 24% among those who worked 21 to 40 hours. The proportion engaging in protest 
increased again to 37% among those with the longest average working week of between 41-
60 hours (Appendix I, H10, V29). Initially, this result looks puzzling and somewhat 
‘irrational’. Why were those who were working longer hours more likely to engage in protest 
actions if they had less time available? It is with reference to a combination of other survey 
results, together with a return to the literature, that the result can be explained. 
First of all, in trying to understand which sectors within the new urban poor population were 
more likely to be mobilised by the call to protest, it is crucial to analyse the success of the 
‘frame-alignment processes’ that were used by social movement leaders. These helped new 
urban poor citizens to understand the causes of their impoverishment as being attributable to 
systemic factors, rather than their own responsibility as individuals. This process of 
attributing blame establishes the link between individual grievances and action, by framing 
the injustice in a way that resonates with the personal concerns of a disadvantaged group (in 
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this case, the new urban poor) in a congruent and complementary manner (Snow et al., 
1986:464). 
One should remember that – as mentioned on numerous occasions throughout this thesis – the 
ethos of hard work and self-reliance has always been fundamental to the Argentinean middle-
class habitus, particularly given their predominantly immigrant ancestry (Mafud, 1985:24-
26). It is therefore unsurprising that when referring to the personal injustices afflicting the 
hard-working, impoverished members of the middle class who had been the victims of the 
crisis, movement leaders (for example, of assemblies, cacerolazos and escraches)apportioned 
blame to the politicians, bankers, IMF and virtually all of neo-liberalism’s institutions in an 
attempt at ‘motivational framing’ that would convey the message that, as new urban poor, 
they ‘deserved better’ leaders and representative institutions. Yet, impoverishment and 
dramatic declines in living standards had been suffered by these people in spite of their hard 
work, which contravened the meritocratic values they held. In examining who was moved to 
join the protest movement at this time, what is important is that the ‘frame’ had to seem 
relevant to the participants’ experience and fit within their cultural narrations (Snow & 
Benford, 1988). The results of this study suggest, therefore, that those of the new urban poor 
who worked hardest were most enraged by the violation of their meritocratic principles: the 
unfairness of exerting so much effort in their jobs, yet still being unable to recoup their old 
quality of life was most salient to them. This helps explain why those who worked the 
longest average hours per week were most likely to be politically mobilised by the framing of 
demands in this way and so take to the streets in protest. 
Secondly, those who worked longer hours by definition spent more time in the presence of 
their work colleagues, who were almost certainly also affected by the crisis. As discussed, as 
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‘a site for the exchange of information, ideas and social networking opportunities’, the 
workplace may have been a source through which the new urban poor became aware that 
their personal grievances were shared by their colleagues. As a result, a collective identity 
may have emerged, with workers becoming more aware of the injustices taking place in 
Argentina generally. In addition, they could learn about the existence of collective actions 
they could take part in to confront their ‘fall’. Assuming that spending more time in the 
presence of work colleagues further stimulated the opportunities available for protest in these 
ways, the link between number of hours worked and politicisation becomes clearer. 
Thirdly, the assumptions upon which the hypothesis was constructed in the first place is 
actually spurious and in some cases, those working more hours may not necessarily have ‘less 
free time’ available (to join protests or otherwise). The ISCA Survey upon which the data 
was based, only measures ‘working hours’ in terms of paid work. However, the data also 
reveals that many of those who worked fewer hours did so because they were at home 
performing unpaid domestic labour - a time constraint that would have intensified during the 
crisis. This is because, for example, they would have had to shop around for the cheapest 
prices (Fay, 2005), prepare more homemade food to save money, dedicate greater energy to 
looking after loved ones who had been made redundant or suffered anxiety-related illness due 
to the crisis, etc (Plotkin, 2003). Others who worked few hours in paid employment were 
studying at university, conducting voluntary work or were ill/disabled. In essence, the 
number of average hours ‘worked’ in a household was not a particularly valid indicator of 
‘spare time’ in all cases, so whilst the result should be accepted, it should be treated with 
some caution. 
In a separate result, it was discovered that those households that worked longer hours 
generally had higher per capita incomes (a one-way ANOVA test certified this, giving a p-
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value of 0.02). Yet, because it was determined earlier on that the absolute depth of 
impoverishment (level of income) they end up in does not influence the decision about 
whether to engage in protest (Appendix I, H3, V8), this latest result provides another reason 
to refute the proposition that fewer working hours (thus lower income and worse material 
conditions) equals a greater likelihood of protest. Instead, I draw the tentative conclusion that 
a main generative factor in the decision to protest for the new urban poor was whether they 
could place their own social descent within the macroeconomic and political context and 
attribute blame towards ‘the system’ as opposed to themselves. Aside from this, however, I
can now add that they were more likely to undergo a politicisation of their action if i) the 
degree to which their sense of injustice about the conditions of their own household was more 
potent and ii) this feeling more deeply contravened previously held beliefs in meritocracy and 
the associated ‘middle-class’ values inherent in their habitus. 
Working hours and protest
At this juncture I return to one of the key themes of the research - that as spaces to participate 
in economic self-improvement activities were restricted or undermined, the probability that 
responses to pauperisation became politicised and manifest as protest actions increased (see 
Sections 3.3.1, 5.1 and 7.1.4). Figure 8.3.5 is based upon the test results that were obtained 
during this research and illustrates that as the number of working hours increased, so did the 
propensity for the corresponding reaction to take a protest form, relative to the probability 
that the reaction would involve a wider range of self-improvement activities and so take an 
‘economic’ rather than a ‘political’ form. This trend is illustrated by the reducing gap on the 
line graph between the two forms of action, as the number of working hours increases. 
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By comparing the proportions of newly poor who participated in a wider ranges of coping 
strategies (Appendix I, H10, V30) with those who opted for political protest (V29), this 
tendency becomes clear. In households where no-one worked, economic strategies were 
significantly more popular than political ones, with the number of new urban poor who 
enacted a wider variety of economic coping strategies outnumbering those who participated 
in protest by a ratio of 3:1 (46% opted for a wide range of coping strategies and 15% protest 
actions). This ratio fell to 2:1 among those working between 1 and 20 hours, (34% pursued a 
wider range of coping strategies, while 18% protested), dipped further to 1.5:1 among those 
working 21-40 hours (35% and 24% respectively) and fell once more among those working 
the longest hours (41-60 hours). The latter were almost just as likely to protest as they were 
to engage in a wider variety of coping strategies, with a ratio close to 1:1. 
Figure 8.3.5: Working Hours and Responses to Impoverishment in Argentina, 2002
Source: Adapted from World Bank ISCA Survey data (2002)
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There are various possible explanations for this relationship. First, the Survey results indicate 
that those households that worked more hours had higher incomes (so were less profoundly 
impoverished). Although it should be remembered that as the earlier result found, this had no 
statistically significant effect on whether the protest option was chosen (Appendix I, H3, V8), 
working more hours did act as a downward pressure on the number of economic coping 
strategies that were followed, because their consequent higher income meant that there was 
less need to seek a wider range of non-work income sources for the households’ survival. 
Secondly, those who worked more hours yet remained impoverished may have been more 
likely to have become conscious of the nature of their exploitation at the hands of their bosses 
and in relation to capital than those who were also newly pauperised but worked fewer (or 
zero) hours. Therefore, this raised level of consciousness (or ‘working-class consciousnesses 
as Marxists would argue) would have radicalised the solutions that they sought to improve 
their own circumstances. Indeed, the notion that ‘economic’ issues, such as falling incomes 
and increased working hours, can become the catalyst for ‘political’ demands, like democratic 
rights, was analysed over a century ago, when Rosa Luxemburg (1906) discussed the idea 
with reference to the 1905 Revolution in Russia. This is entirely relevant to Argentina, where 
the new urban poor (who had to work longer hours yet remained in poverty), initially took a 
lead role in demanding a replacement of the country’s existing representative political 
structures with the notion of direct democracy. 
Thirdly, as I observed earlier, Powers’ research found that the actions of impoverished people 
increasingly tend to move from the economic to the political arena as tolerance of privation 
withers away and when they are forced into making ‘unacceptable choices’ (1999:525). 
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Assuming that the numbers of new urban poor who were engaged in unpaid work remained 
constant among households at each category of working hours, those who were forced to 
carry out more labour hours will have had to sacrifice their social lives, time with their 
families and other life projects to a greater extent than those who worked fewer hours. 
Having to be forced into making these ‘unacceptable choices’ may have invoked the urge to 
take political action in response. Some may argue that this conclusion is invalid because the 
statistics for those on zero working hours is skewed by the presence of the elderly (who 
tended to be retired) and who I inferred earlier, were more inclined to i) stay away from 
protests but ii) engage in wider numbers of individual self-improvement strategies (Appendix 
I, H6, V15-17a). However, given that the elderly made up just 3% of the new urban poor 
sample (Appendix I, H15, V39), their influence on this result would have been negligible. 
Private or public sector employment and response
In Hypothesis 11, I anticipated that newly impoverished people who worked in the state 
sector were more likely to have belonged to households that took collective action than those 
in the private sector. No evidence was found to support this and in fact there was no 
statistically significant difference between the sector of employment that the newly poor 
worked in during late 2002 and whether their household participated in collective protests 
p=0.4) (Appendix I, H11, V33). Hypothesis 11 was thus rejected. This non-significant result 
is probably attributable to the fact that the incidence of trade union protest (strikes, 
demonstrations, etc) as a proportion of all societal protests actually fell sharply from almost 
40% to 25% between 2001 and 2002, while the level of mobilisation among civil society and 
piquetero organisations actually intensified in relative terms (GEPSAC, 2006). This therefore 
reduced the relevance that the strength of the unions in the public sector had in terms of 
whether those working for the state were more likely to join protests. In doing so, this 
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reduced the prospective sectorally-based differences in industrial action patterns. Further, 
due to the situation of mass unemployment, there would have been fewer opportunities to join 
industrial or workplace-based collective action than would have been the case in earlier years. 
However, two intriguing results lay behind this finding. Firstly, what did make some 
difference to the propensity towards protest choices was the background sector of their 
employment history before the economic crisis deepened in October 2001 (as opposed to the 
sector they were actually working in at the time of the ISCA Survey). Taking this variable 
into account, among those with public sector backgrounds from before the crisis, 30% 
engaged in a protest of some kind after their impoverishment, but this figure was 
considerably (and statistically significantly) lower, at 18%, among those who had a previous 
employment history in the private sector (p=0.07) (Appendix I, H11, V33). Whether or not 
the collective repertoires of protest (Tilly, 1986:390) that were learned through the public 
sector industrial struggles against the cuts of the 1990s actually empowered the new urban 
poor with such labour histories to take collective protest action compared to their colleagues 
with private sector backgrounds, needs to be explored in greater depth. 
Secondly, the results point to the fact that there was not necessarily a ‘collectivist’ ethos 
among those with public sector backgrounds; at least not to the extent that it influenced 
action. Working in the public sector had no bearing on whether all types of collective actions 
(protests and self-improvement combined) were pursued (Appendix I, H11, V32). 
Economic sector of employment and response
As expected from Hypothesis 12, no statistically significant difference in protest participation 
rates was identified between those who were employed in different productive sectors of the 
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economy (primary, secondary and tertiary). Whilst 23.5% of those in the construction, 
agricultural and mining or manufacturing industries were involved in a collective protest, the 
percentage was exactly the same for those in services (Appendix I, H12, V35). Although 
41% of new urban poor employees in the primary and secondary sectors43 were engaged in 
collective action of some sort, compared to 33% of those in the tertiary sector, the difference 
was not statistically significant (p=0.7) (V34). Hypothesis 12 was thus confirmed.
Type of household income source
With reference to Hypothesis 13, chi-square tests returned statistically significant results to 
confirm that more new urban poor households without a waged income source tended to take 
part in a wider range of economic coping strategies than those that did possess such an 
income source. 57% of the unemployed or inactive new urban poor belonged to households 
that resorted to wider ranges of coping strategies, but this figure fell to just 35% among those 
with a waged income source (p=0.00) (Appendix I, H13, V37). Hypothesis 13 was thus 
confirmed.  This result may be explained by the fact that as waged work is the self-
improvement strategy from which the vast majority of household income is derived, those in 
households that did not benefit from such an income source were generally forced to be more 
creative when exploring alternative income sources. Those households with someone 
working had an average monthly household income of $164 pesos (US$ 47), a significantly 
higher salary than those without waged-work ($140 or US$ 40) (p=0.01). In any case, those 
without paid work often had more time available to undertake alternative strategies, which 
also explains why their households undertook wider ranges of self-improvement activities. 
                                                            
43 I should point out that they were ‘urban’ by nature of their residence although many who worked in 
construction, agriculture or mining may have commuted to rural and countryside areas to conduct their work. 
Those who worked in these sectors tended to be ‘owners’ or self-employed rather than manual workers. 
233
CHAPTER 9 – MAPPING THE NEW URBAN POOR AND CONTEXTUALISING 
THEIR RESPONSES
In this chapter, I examine survey results from three further areas in order to contextualise the 
findings about how citizens responded to pauperisation during the crisis. I begin in Section 
9.1 by seeking to gain an overall picture of Argentina’s ‘new urban poverty map’ at the time
of the ISCA Survey (late 2002). Then, in 9.2 I compare new urban poor responses with those 
of the structural poor and consider how the impoverished middle class leveraged their 
superior capital assets as a survival strategy in ways that were not possible for those who had 
lived in conditions of abstract poverty in the shantytowns. I then analyse some of the data 
concerning new urban poor uptake of state benefits at the time and offer some insights into 
their underlying values, attitudes and opinions about welfare aid, with a view to contributing 
towards new poor social policy debates.
9.1 Mapping New Poverty in Argentina: A Young, Female and Public Sector Face
Gender
As anticipated from the literature that contributed to formulating Hypothesis 14, women were 
significantly more likely to be affected by new poverty than men (Appendix I, H14, V38). 
Among the new urban poor sample, 59.9% were women compared to just 40.1% of men 
(p=0.01). The primary reason for this seems to be that women had fewer opportunities to 
generate income for the household. The Survey data suggests that they worked fewer paid 
hours (an average working week of 34 hours against men’s 42 hours) and earned much lower 
incomes (an average of $109 pesos (US$ 31) per month against men’s $198 pesos (US$ 57)). 
However, evidence also suggests that this was not because women were less skilled or less 
hard-working, but rather that they were being actively discriminated against in the labour 
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market. For example, whilst there was no significant gender difference in terms of their 
qualifications, men earned $4.71 pesos per hour whilst women’s hourly wage was just $3.20 
pesos, some 32% lower. This disparity is almost identical to the gendered salary difference 
that was calculated by SIEMPRO at the time and was referred to in the Literature Review. 
LatinoBarómetro data (Appendix II, C16, V80) suggests that women were also 
disproportionately affected by new poverty in 1995, although the (marginally) non-significant 
result in 2005 is due to the small sample size in that year (women still made up 64% of the 
new urban poor). Hypothesis 14 was therefore accepted.
Age
The results for age differences from Hypothesis 15 produced some intriguing results 
(Appendix I, H15, V39). As expected, young people (aged 18-34) were significantly over-
represented among the new urban poor, making up 55% of the stratum (p=0.00). The 
prediction that the elderly would be under-represented was also confirmed, as they made up 
just 3% of the sample. This result is explained by the fact that their pensions and/or savings 
acted as a cushion to pauperisation.44 Unlike pensions, alternative sources of income such as 
employment had to be negotiated rather than being guaranteed, so the elderly were less likely 
to have fallen into poverty than other age groups whose income sources were more vulnerable 
to the effects of the crisis.45 Surprisingly, middle-aged citizens (50-64 years) were not 
                                                            
44 Indeed, whilst approximately 77.5% of Argentineans over the age of 65 were drawing a pension in 2001 
(Rofman, 2002:3), this was almost certainly higher among the new urban poor, who would have fitted the 
middle-class profile of having worked in formal employment and contributed to private as well as state pensions.  
45 However, although I found that older people were less likely to have become pauperised in 2002, the statistic 
does not signify that their material conditions /m,.were necessarily superior to those of other age groups.  On the 
contrary, state pensions had generally fallen below the minimum subsistence income since the 1990s, when older 
people became one of the socioeconomic groups that was most exposed to economic hardship (Palomino, 
2005:21).  The point here is that while the elderly suffered an especially low standard of living both before and 
during 2002, they did not encounter a particularly harsh deterioration in their circumstances compared to other 
age groups, because of the reasons mentioned. 
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particularly negatively affected by new poverty in 2002. There are two points to make about 
this which may help to explain the result, or rather some of the real life experiences that it 
obscures. First, the Survey data largely only reveals information about economic wellbeing 
and does not examine other variables, such as the particularly acute emotional anguish that 
those in this age group experienced due to the psychological burdens of poverty, seeing their 
children’s hopes for a bright future extinguished (Briones & Mendoza, 2003:17), or being 
unable to sufficiently care for their children and parents (Ozarow, 2008). 
Secondly, as mentioned earlier, survey data in this investigation only refers to the impact of 
new poverty ‘within the first few months’ of pauperisation and does not trace responses over 
time. Interviews with middle-aged Argentineans conveyed how, as an age group, they tended 
not to suffer particularly badly during the early stages of the crisis, however, when job 
opportunities were created and the economy grew again, they found it relatively harder to 
escape impoverishment in the longer term compared to their younger cohorts, because of age 
discrimination in the labour market and an erosion of the value of their human capital. In 
addition, the practical impossibility of other exit routes such as emigration prevented upward 
mobility from being redeemed to the same degree as it did for their younger cohorts who were 
able to leave (Ozarow, 2008). Hypothesis 15 was therefore only partially accepted and partly 
revised.
Economic sector of employment
Hypothesis 16 about the sector of the economy in which newly poor people were employed 
and their incidence of pauperisation were only partially confirmed. The 2002 ISCA Survey 
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(Appendix I, H16, V41) demonstrates that, as anticipated, those working in the public sector 
were particularly vulnerable to becoming newly pauperised (they made up 39% of the new 
urban poor but just 28% of the general population, p=0.01). However, whilst the Survey 
revealed that 14% of the new urban poor worked in the agricultural, mining, construction or 
manufacturing industries and 86% in the services sector (V40), this was not significantly 
different from the general population. In contrast to the anticipated results, Argentineans 
were thus equally likely to become poor regardless of the economic sector in which they 
worked. 
New urban poor poverty map
During the period of data collection, the official per capita monthly income poverty line was 
$232 pesos, which at the exchange rate of 1 dollar to $3.5 pesos (at the time) equates to 
approximately US$2 per day (US$ 66 per month).  The income distribution among the new 
urban poor is illustrated in the box plot (Figure 9.1), which reveals a negatively skewed 
distribution with an average monthly per capita income of $158 pesos, a median of $176 
pesos and a mode of $205 pesos.  The box plot indicates a mixed picture in terms of the 
severity of deprivation that was experienced by the new urban poor.  From a humanitarian 
perspective it was reassuring to see that generally, this stratum avoided extreme income 
poverty (less than US$1 per day46).  A quarter of them fell only fractionally below the poverty 
line (with a per capita household income of $208 pesos or above) and half had a monthly 
income of $176 pesos or more.  Nevertheless, the predicament of extreme income poverty did
afflict 28% of the new urban poor, a worrying proportion in any case.  
                                                            
46The internationally recognised income representing ‘absolute poverty’ was US$1 per day at the time of the 
crisis, but the Wold Bank has since revised it to US$1.25
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Figure 9.1 - Box Plot Illustrating the Spread of Distribution of Newly Impoverished 
Households in Argentina (by income) in November 2002
9.2 Comparing New and Structurally Poor Responses: Superior Capital Assets as a Mode 
of New Urban Poor Survival
Here I take a brief comparative look at how newly urban poor citizens engaged in coping 
strategies compared to the structural poor in 2002. Of those who were already income 
impoverished among the general population in May 2002 (living on per capita incomes below 
US$ 2 per day but above US$ 1), the ISCA Survey results suggest that some 55% fell into 
extreme poverty (below US$ 1 per day) by November 2002, however, this is twice the rate of 
those among the new urban poor. This indicates that the new poor tended to be more able to 
gain alternative income sources by accessing possibilities which simply did not exist to the 
same extent for the structural poor. Furthermore, the latter were often unable to take 
advantage of their social, human and physical capital as effectively and sought recourse to 
different ‘resources of poverty’ (de la Rocha, 1994) to the new poor.
The results also point towards the fact that the reason why extreme income poverty was 
generally avoided by the new poor was because they tended to gain some kind of work source 
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during late 2002 (albeit precarious, part-time or underemployment). As Table 11 indicates, 
83% of new urban poor households possessed an employment or informal work source within 
the first six months of impoverishment. Despite this, clearly the wages received (or hours 
worked) were not enough to keep them from falling into poverty, which confirms the 
suggestion made earlier that the impoverished middle class was able to replace the structural 
poor in the low-skilled and low-paid services jobs that remained available, due to their 
superior levels of human capital (Porcú, 2003). 
Table 11: New and Structurally Poor Households’ Self-Help Strategies, (Jun-Nov 2002)







Work or employment 83 77
Pensions 29** 19
Social capital (gifts or loans from non-household family or friends) 17 32*
Financial capital (credit card/bank loan/savings/sell assets/investments 16** 8
Advance payment (on trust) 10 6
State aid (benefits and non-pension welfare) 5 22*
Barter 3 4
Shop/Business reserves 2 6
Cartonero 0 4
Chi-square statistic identifies a significant difference between new and structural poor at *0.01 
and **0.1 levels. 
The table also illustrates that new urban poor households also benefited statistically 
significantly more from pensionable income than their structurally poor counterparts. Clearly, 
the possession of physical capital (especially housing) explains the relatively high proportions 
that were able to gain access to financial capital such as credit, bank loans, income from rent 
of a property and also savings and income from the sale of assets, compared to the structural 
poor. The latter was simply a less realistic option for the structural poor, because they were 
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not socially connected to those with businesses and jobs and did not own the deeds to their 
homes. Nor would their homes have had much monetary value to provide collateral to gain 
credit or investment income to the same extent. Interestingly, the structurally impoverished 
were much more likely to obtain aid from contacts outside the household, indicating that 
‘embarrassment’ may have been a factor that prevented the new urban poor from asking those 
close to them for help (Minujín et al, 1993; Kessler & Di Virgilio, 2008). Further, the 
conditions for exchanging favours and seeking recourse to social networks are rather more 
favourable in areas where extreme poverty is concentrated, such as the shantytowns, where 
many of the structural poor reside (de la Rocha, 1994). 
Unsurprisingly, the long-term poor were also much more likely to be enrolled on state welfare 
programmes, due to state targeting of the extreme poor as well as new urban poor reluctance 
to seek ‘handouts.’ This idea is explored further in the discussion of state benefits in Section 
9.3. Informal work sources were more common among the structural poor and the income 
received from employment or work was 17% higher among the new urban poor, suggesting 
that the work they did obtain was better paid. 
Despite this income analysis of the depth of the new urban poor problem, it must be 
remembered that purely looking at income is not necessarily an appropriate indicator of 
‘wellbeing’. Although the new urban poor were significantly less likely to experience 
extreme poverty than the structurally poor, such families are accustomed to a higher standard 
of living, so the psychological effects and problems associated with adapting to this new way 
of life are enormous and are not necessarily ‘measurable’ in income terms. The fact that their 
consumption patterns and lifestyles had to be completely re-invented meant that their 
subjective reality was often transformed beyond recognition (Golovanevsky, 2004:157). 
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9.3 State Benefits as a Survival Strategy - Rejection of Plan Jefes y Jefas de Hogar
Qualitative research that was conducted in Argentina during the crisis, independently of this 
study, produced several insights into how the new urban poor tended to reject state aid such 
as Plan Jefes,47 or other forms of charity as a coping strategy (Aguirre, 2008). Svampa 
(2005:142) found this ambivalence to be a result of the desire to maintain their middle-class 
identity, which entailed the new urban poor giving preference to strategies that were believed 
to symbolise the ‘middle-class values’ of self-sufficiency and individual enterprise. 
Therefore, options such as self-employment and negotiating access to public goods or 
benefits (excluding the taboos of financial or food aid) through their own efforts and utilising 
their sophisticated accumulated social and cultural capitals, were strongly favoured over 
‘assistentialist’ means (those that resorted to welfare aid). Assistentialism or becoming an 
ambulante (street vendor) were understood to incur an unacceptable loss of dignity and were 
therefore only reserved for ‘the real poor’ (Aguirre, 2008). 
As Kessler & Di Virgilio emphasise (2008:41), drawing upon Bourdieu’s notion of ‘the 
embodied state’ (1986), the new urban poor thus enjoyed advantages of access that were 
closed to the structural poor, because (for example) they possess greater knowledge about 
how to ‘play the system’ or are skilled at framing their demands for public goods in ways that 
are more likely to obtain results. When trying to access state or municipal institutions in the 
                                                            
47 In response to soaring unemployment and in order to try to stifle the hundreds of thousands of dissenters who 
had taken to the streets, in May 2002 the Argentinean Government launched Plan Jefes y Jefas de Hogar 
Desocupados (Programme for Unemployed Heads of Households). This state benefit granted a monthly 
monetary transfer of $150 pesos to unemployed Heads of Households, conditional upon the recipient carrying 
out up to 20 hours a week of communitarian activities, such as the maintenance and construction of social 
infrastructure, cleaning of public spaces, sanitary and health-supporting activities or childcare (Roca et al., 
2003).
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resolution of disputes to (non-aid) entitlements, attempting to gain access to hospital 
treatments or a place for their child at the best school, they enjoyed considerable success by 
utilising their more sophisticated cultural capital, littering their claims with references to 
‘rights’, or emphasising their social position or qualifications to resource gatekeepers. Such 
coping mechanisms were further aided by them often having friends ‘in the right places’ 
within organisations and therefore greater social capital available to exploit. 
Data from the 2002 ISCA Survey appears to confirm the new urban poor tendency to shun the 
possibility of accepting state aid programmes. This allows us to quantify the extent to which 
they bypassed Plan Jefes, for instance. Whilst the actual take-up rate of this programme was 
extraordinarily low, at just 1.3% among the new urban poor (V43), this is certainly an under-
representation of the real situation because it covers all households, not just those that were 
eligible. Secondly, the new urban poor sample upon which the results are based, by 
definition of them having ‘completed secondary school education’ would have excluded all 
those below 17 years of age, the very age category that the household had to include in order 
to be eligible for the benefit.48 Aside from the 1.3% of households receiving the Plan, an 
additional 9% of households applied for the benefit, (of whom 81% were actually eligible) 
but were not actually able to receive it (V43). 
The data reveals two interesting trends about the extent to which the Plan Jefes failed the new 
urban poor as a social policy. First, in practical terms they found it extremely difficult to 
obtain. Of those who were eligible but not receiving it, 32% were told that they must wait 
more time to qualify. Another 27% were told by local offices that as there were limited 
                                                            
48 Having school-aged children was a key eligibility criteria for the Plan Jefes.
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places available, their office had ‘exceeded their local quota’ and so could not provide the 
benefit to them. A further 41% had been told that they would receive the benefits but had not 
done so yet due to ‘delays’ (V44). This suggests that the problems of delivering aid to the 
new urban poor are more complicated than assisting the structural poor and represent both a 
lack of cultural sensitivity towards such applicants on the one hand, as well as eligibility 
difficulties on the other. Aguirre (2008) describes how the new urban poor tend to find it 
hard to access ‘focalised’ government assistance programmes in the first place, because in 
recent years Argentinean welfare aid has generally been aimed at those with ‘basic needs 
requirements,’ rather than being means tested by income. These stipulations act as a 
particular deterrent to the new urban poor (who by definition are ‘income deprived’ but ‘basic 
needs satisfied’), so they tend not to be eligible.49
Secondly, the data confirms the idea that – despite being seen as their ‘right as taxpayers’ –
the new urban poor largely tend to avoid aid programmes because they do not want to be seen 
as ‘good-for-nothings’. The structural poor, on the other hand, see such aid as coming from 
‘some distant place as a gift’ that is to be accepted (ibid. 2008). This rejection of state aid 
programmes by the new poor is also represented by figures showing that of those in the 
sample who did not register for Plan Jefes, intriguingly 23% simply ‘did not want the Plan’ 
despite being entitled to it. A further 6.4% were either unaware of the programme or unsure 
how to apply for it and 71% had work or did not qualify for some other reason (V45). 
                                                            
49 Aguirre also finds that the new urban poor experience a ‘wellbeing trap’ and are at fault themselves, to some 
degree.  This is because they tend to join social assistance programmes late and give them up early – as soon as 
minimal improvements are experienced (even if they become worse off without them) – due to the fact that they 
want to abandon their self-perceived status as ‘welfare beneficiaries’, owing to the loss in self-esteem this 
causes.  This ‘early exit’ is often followed by a slip back into very serious poverty, but the new urban poor then 
find it almost impossible to re-register onto the programmes again, as the managers who run them see them as 
‘boycotters of the state’s promotional work’ (ibid.  2008). 
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In this chapter I have discussed some of the peripheral findings from the results of the two 
surveys which nevertheless provide some useful gaps in the new poverty literature. I 
statistically mapped the phenomenon for the first time (finding that women, young adults and 
public sector workers were disproportionately affected in income terms) and also provided a 
quantitative analysis of how Argentinean citizens utilised their human, social, financial, 
physical and cultural capital assets to cope with pauperisation. I highlighted both the relative 
importance of ‘work’ and also of utilising financial and physical capital as new urban poor 
survival strategies. I also found that recourse to state aid and social capital were significantly 
more commonly used strategies among the structural poor.50
Further, I explored new urban poor citizens’ engagement with state employment programmes 
at the time of the crisis and noted some of the problems associated with both registering and 
qualifying for such schemes as well as a general reluctance to accept state welfare. These may 
also help to inform the design of future social and labour market policies that support 
impoverished middle-class citizens in a way that is both sensitive to their values and habitus, 
whilst also taking advantage of the particular superior capitals that they possess.
                                                            
50 For a more detailed explanation of how the value of social capital eroded for the new urban poor during the 
economic crisis see Kessler and Di Virgilio (2008).
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CHAPTER 10 – CONCLUSIONS
Using Argentina as a case study, this research has sought to ascertain what processes and 
conditions prompt professionals and other middle-class citizens to choose to enact private and 
collective self-improvement strategies and also carry out individual protests or take to the 
streets to resist severe financial hardship. Specific national contexts in which protest 
movements emerge were also compared and the conditions under which these movements are 
able to attract recently pauperised citizens were explored, as were the environmental factors 
that might explain when and why those in this stratum retreat into individualistic responses 
and self-improvement activities. I have found that whilst economic coping strategies were 
universally adopted to varying degrees in response to pauperisation during the economic and 
political crisis in 2002, a fifth of newly poor citizens were involved in some kind of collective 
political protest movement and over a quarter participated in all collective actions (including 
self-help initiatives) within the first six months of their impoverishment. The significant 
degree of involvement in collective protest clearly illustrates that resistance to declining 
economic circumstances manifested itself in both economic and political forms. 
10.1 Contribution to Theory
So what were the motivating factors that increased the likelihood of new urban poor 
participation in protests? First, I ruled out economic grievances as having a significant
mobilising effect on their own; neither the descent into poverty itself nor the level of income 
deprivation experienced influenced this choice of action. Those who became poor but 
survived just below the poverty line were just as likely to join protests as those who had the 
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lowest household incomes. However, the interaction of several other generative processes 
and features did mould the form of the response taken. These are discussed here. 
The New Urban Poor’s Fluctuating Consent to be Ruled by the Dominant Class
In explaining the collective group behaviour of the Argentinean new poor, a notable 
distinction was made between three phases during the last twenty years. Their tendency 
towards political passivity during the 1990s was replaced by a greater willingness to engage 
in radical collective protest actions during 2001-02, before their general withdrawal from the 
streets since 2003 (until 2012) once the macroeconomy picked up again. The oscillating 
sense of collective identity and transfer between progressive and reactionary attitudes (which 
were documented in the LatinoBarómetro survey data) have informed these fluctuating 
patterns of action. I also conclude that a principal factor that transformed economic 
grievances into political ones was the loss of the consent to rule by both elected officials and 
the institutions of power during the crisis of legitimacy in 2001-02. However, this consent 
was held intact during the two periods either side of it. 
Evidence was analysed that suggests that the main reasons for the change during this 
intermediate period were due to a systematic reassessment of who was to blame for citizens’ 
personal descent, reversing culpability away from themselves and casting it onto their 
government, the banks, globalisation and international financial institutions in 2002. In other 
words, the dominant class maintained its consent to rule from the masses in the 1990s, 
including over the new urban poor, who tended to restrict their responses to private economic 
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coping strategies rather than collective protest actions at that time. The institutions and 
structures of power, the government, the mainstream media, the education system51 and so on,
successfully propagated the neoliberal idea that one had to take personal responsibility for 
one’s own failures in the ‘risk society,’ and strongly encouraged entrepreneurship and self-
sufficiency. Despite personal impoverishment, newly poor citizens were therefore much 
more likely to commit what Ross (1977) would describe as a ‘fundamental attribution error,’ 
whereby they felt that their pauperisation and downward social mobility could be explained 
as a consequence of their own deficiencies as individuals, as opposed to having resulted from 
the workings of capitalism. Thus, they adopted a submissive approach to the government and 
the institutions of capitalist domination, to which (in view of the general macroeconomic 
prosperity of the 1990s) they granted consent to rule. One facet of this ‘attribution error’ was 
the belief that the implementation of neo-liberalism in Latin America was ‘the way things 
have to be.’ This sentiment resonated with the citizenry in the 1990s because it was 
understood to be the only solution to the hyperinflation and debt crisis of the preceding years. 
The new urban poor were also less likely to understand their proletarianisation to be ‘system-
attributable’ during the 1990s because of the conditions of social isolation in which they lived 
at the time, meant that they lacked the information and perspective on their own 
circumstances that an interaction with other citizens who were also experiencing the same 
thing could have provided. The new urban poor in the 1990s tried to hide their 
impoverishment (Minujín, 2004), because under relatively strong macroeconomic conditions 
and the impact of Convertibility, it appeared as if everyone around them was enjoying 
prosperity. Whilst it is certainly true that many of their middle-class peers were able to 
                                                            
51 For example it wasn’t until 2002 that Argentinean universities began to offer Economics Degrees which 
challenged the neoliberal paradigm (Blejmar, 2013)
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pamper themselves with affordable, luxury consumer imports (due to the pegging of the peso 
to the US dollar), a sizable proportion were also enduring economic hardship ‘behind closed 
doors’ (Minujín, 1995). 
Meanwhile, during the mid to late 1990s, the dominant class was able to offer electoral
alternatives (the Radical Party and FREPASO) as outlet to channel passive political 
opposition to Menem’s broadly despised Peronist government through the ballot box and so 
temper radical spaces for political dissidence. Ultimately this ‘false choice’ offered the new 
urban poor a wholly ineffective political alternative in government from 1999 and when the 
country’s economic system collapsed and corruption scandals engulfed the country, faith in 
the government, mainstream parties or candidates to resolve citizens’ personal economic 
woes deteriorated and confidence in the neoliberal hegemonic institutions also disintegrated 
according to the survey results. A crisis of legitimacy’ across Argentina’s institutions ensued
in 2001-02 and (as the LatinoBarómetro results indicated), voting lost credibility as an 
individual protest route, simultaneously opening spaces for collective protest.  Many began to 
fundamentally question the roots of their own impoverishment and withdraw their consent to
a neoliberal hegemony, re-attributing blame to those institutions and processes which they 
believed were promoting the interests of international capital whilst sacrificing their own. 
Impoverished middle class quickly realised that only by inventing new, potentially counter-
hegemonic structures independently and collectively ‘from below,’ could they rebuild society 
and create a better future for themselves, which was why they were often at the heart of the 
protest movement at the time (Adamovsky 2009). 
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By the time of the third LatinoBarómetro survey in 2005, in the face of opposition from these 
challenges to the dominant class, the results indicate that the elites had managed to restore 
their hegemonic control through a series of defensive strategies, which fused measures of 
appeasement with repression. Examples of these defensive actions included the following: 
Firstly, co-opting certain unemployed workers’ movement and labour leaders into 
government to isolate more radical elements of the opposition and break down the solidarity 
that had been created with the new urban poor. Secondly, Néstor Kirchner was presented as a 
reformist Presidential candidate who drew on anti-establishment rhetoric to win over many of 
‘the system’s’ detractors (including those new poor citizens who had been radicalised by the 
events of 2001-02). Thirdly, the government made overtures to the impoverished middle 
class’ sense of civic participation by establishing citizen’s observatories, participatory 
budgeting in The City of Buenos Aires and other urban centres, and by financially supporting 
some of the neighbourhood (rather than the ‘popular’) assemblies (Rossi, 2014). Thus, the 
government co-opted many back into support for the political establishment. 
By this time, new electoral players had also entered the political arena, such as Coalición 
Cívica, which helped encourage a restoration of faith in electoral spaces of contention and the 
abandonment of extra-parliamentary protests. Moreover, welfare was broadened and NGOs
expanded their programmes to pacify many who had been pauperised, while the omnipresent 
capitalist media ensured that the solidarity between previously insurgent sectors disintegrated 
further by demonising the piqueteros and the structural poor (Svampa, 2005). Through these 
strategies, the domestic capitalist class successfully reasserted control, replacing financial 
capital as the hegemonic political force, and the resistance was over. 
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Therefore, one of the key findings of this research was that rather than the new urban poor 
automatically seeing their economic grievances in political terms, in this case they first 
underwent the cognitive process of assessing the broader macro-political and economic 
conditions in which their impoverishment had occurred. It was only at this stage that they 
decided upon the nature of their response. In 2002, they tended to attribute responsibility to 
their leaders (and ‘the system’) and thus articulate their resistance through protest, whereas 
they were more likely to internalise responsibility for their own financial hardship in both 
1995 and 2005 and confine themselves to private, self-help activities. 
The Survey results showed that in 2002 the new urban poor who were involved in collective 
self-improvement activities were also more likely to join collective protests. They tended to 
attribute their impoverishment to ‘the system’ rather than to themselves because these 
collective self-improvement activities may have acted as ‘sites of social integration’ and 
‘injustice recognition.’ Interestingly, the results suggests that the workplace also served this 
function with those who spent more time there being more likely to engage in collective 
protests, as it was perhaps a site at which the new urban poor became aware of the existence 
of such actions. 
Marx emphasises the proximity of members of the working class to one another in their daily 
social environment as being important in terms of the development of a class consciousness 
and thus as an antecedent to collective action of all kinds (Elster, 1986:132).  These sites (at 
least temporarily), became incubators for the development of a shared class consciousness 
with the long-term poor.  Whilst here I am critical of Resource Mobilisation Theory, some 
elements of it are suggested by the data and are useful towards contributing to a Marxist 
social movement theory.  For example, RMT speculates that the recognition of an injustice is 
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a vital precondition to participation in protest action (Mansbridge, 2001).  Thus, when protest 
movement leaders tried to frame the hardship that the new urban poor were enduring as an 
‘injustice,’ those who had engaged in communal self-improvement actions were more likely 
to identify with this message (as they could see that such a large number of other both 
structurally and recently impoverished citizens, had also been affected as well as themselves).  
Again, the process of observing and comparing their own fate with that of other Argentineans 
is observed and how it helped to ‘open the closed doors of new poverty’ (Grimson & Kessler, 
2005:99) and politicise their responses. 
Yet, the literature describes how at that time, awareness about the injustices to which they 
were subject and the drive to pour onto the streets in protest were not stimulated from above, 
or ‘formally’ by some kind of official, resource-rich organisation like a trade union or a 
political party (Dinerstein, 2003 Lopez Levy 2004; Svampa & Corral, 2006; Adamovsky, 
2009), as RMT theorists would assume. Instead, what I propose here is that these ways of 
thinking were developed through the informal conversations and ‘learned experiences’ that 
were derived through their engagement in these ‘sites of awareness’ during 2001 and 2002. 
That is to say, their collective self-help activities and the workplace became alternative 
mobilising vehicles. Nor were the protest movements they joined (popular assemblies, 
escraches, cacerolazos, etc) mobilised by formal reformist organisations like unions or left-
wing parties, the official presence of which was almost entirely absent from these 
‘autonomous’ movements, even though individual party or union activists often participated 
in them (Rodgers, 2007; Svampa & Corral, 2006). 
In fact, the regard in which the new urban poor held both these types of formal organisation 
was extremely low. For instance, although survey figures were not available for 2002, an 
251
astounding 81% of the new urban poor in 2005 had ‘little’ or ‘no’ confidence in the trade 
unions (Appendix II, C3, V55), only slightly down from the 85% figure in 1995. The reasons 
for this disdain towards the unions were not specified but were quite possibly to do with the 
fact that the main trade union confederation, the CGT, is closely aligned to the Peronist Party 
and embedded in Argentina’s corporatist governing structure. It is thus considered by many 
to be more of an enemy than an ally during times of economic adversity, when the 
government is seen to be acting against the popular will. Meanwhile, although the rival 
confederation – the CTA52– was more independent from the state and more politically radical 
(consisting mainly of smaller left-wing parties, unions and independent activists), and had 
helped to mobilise some newly impoverished sectors like teachers, amidst the spirit of 
autonomism and horizontal decision-making of that time, it was unable to renew itself or free 
itself from traditional forms of industrial engagement (Svampa, 2006) and was arguably 
viewed as not being relevant to ex-professionals, highly-skilled workers or managers, such as 
those among the new urban poor. Equally, as the earlier result showed, political parties were 
rejected during the crisis, with 93% of the new poor having ‘little or no confidence’ in them 
(of which 79% had ‘no confidence at all’) in 2002 and remaining abysmally low even by
2005 (Appendix II, C3, V50). 
With such negative opinions about liberal democracy’s traditional and representative outlets 
of contestation, it is little wonder that instead, these protests and new urban poor forms of 
mobilisation like the cacerolazos and neighbourhood assemblies were organised more 
informally, for example though word of mouth, the placing of posters in public areas by 
concerned citizens (Rossi, 2014) or through the calling of further collective actions at existing 
                                                            
52http://www.cta.org.ar
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sites of protest rather than following calls from the executives of traditional trade unions or 
the representatives of other civil society bureaucracies. Whilst it is proposed here that such 
protests - especially those of December 19th and 20th but also subsequently - emanated from
informal methods of interaction and communication, the scale of participation was even more 
extraordinary given that this was before the age of Facebook and Twitter, which provided key 
information channels for more recent mass protest movements such as the Arab Spring 
(Mason, 2012). 
However, a refutation of the notion that these were purely ‘spontaneous acts’ is provided in 
section 4.5 because citizens can be better understood as having joined the protests whilst 
either consciously or unconsciously pursuing learned collective repertoires of action (Tilly, 
1986), especially those that had been practiced in earlier struggles against neoliberal 
restructuring in the 1980s and 1990s. Further, extemporaneous collective actions like those 
of December 19th and 20th require at least minimum organisation if they are to be maintained 
in the longer term (Atzeni, 2010:6) and some kind of leadership soon becomes necessary 
(Hyman, 1989). Yet whilst the reduced role of formal modes of organisation did limit the 
movement in some ways, it proved to be a considerable strength too. This challenges some of 
the suppositions of Resource Mobilisation Theory, as this seems to refute the links between 
organisational infrastructure, its political institutionalisation and the propensity for protest 
that it creates. These results also challenge the idea of mapping professional social 
movements by theorists such as McCarthy and Zald (1973, 1977). 
In ‘Winning Hearts and Minds’ (1977:34), Ferree and Miller argue that people are more 
likely to correctly attribute their circumstances to ‘systems’ rather than internalise their 
situation if they enjoy intense, regular contact with other similar people. In other words, 
253
evidence points to the fact that grassroots settings like the workplace and neighbourhood 
(Tilly, 1978), and informal social networks can facilitate and structure collective action and 
hold the potential for the ‘destruction of top-down sovereignty in favour of popular 
democracy’ (Hardt & Negri, 2004:353). This is why later, I seek to identify ways in which 
informal social interactions such as friendships and acquaintance networks – upon which the 
results suggested much of the participation in collective protest by newly poor citizens was 
built can help foster the development of collective (class) identities. 
The research also supports J-Curve Theory , because those who became newly poor during 
the economic crisis of 2001-02 tended to experience more sudden descent, on the back of 
growing expectations and perceived prosperity throughout the 1990s (due to a combination of 
macroeconomic growth and Convertibility), which was suddenly brought to an end during the 
events of December 2001. Because poverty was experienced more abruptly and intensely and 
was more tangible compared to the 1990s, it prompted more intense outrage than the gradual 
social descent and incremental pauperisation of a decade earlier. In the 1990s, material 
expectations were also lower due to the economic depression, volatility and hyperinflation of 
the period that directly preceded it (during the 1980s), so the new urban poor of that era were 
less likely to become conscious of their pauperisation or indeed their proletarianisation. 
Similarly, during the 2002 crisis, state welfare apparatus, the charity sector and other 
reformist mediating institutions that help to pacify social unrest in capitalist societies were 
less able to deal with the sheer scale and relatively sudden increase in impoverishment than 
they were in the 1990s. With the capacity of these mediating forces severely reduced in 
2002, protest as a response to impoverishment was more likely to occur. Furthermore, the 
macroeconomic crisis of 2002 was so severe that the value of the kinds of superior social and 
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human capital that the middle class usually leveraged to their advantage under times of 
prosperity (especially with regards to employment opportunities through business 
connections, promotions and so on) eroded quite significantly (Ozarow, 2012). This 
depreciation of their human assets undermined many of the alternative self-improvement 
strategies that were more commonly pursued by the new urban poor in the 1990s and 
spawned the search for alternatives in the political sphere. Impoverishment also took place 
on an immense scale during the 2002 crisis, making those who had suffered palpable 
economic loss feel more confident and less ashamed to take part in protest movements 
compared to the 1990s. 
Just as it was the abrupt termination of rapidly growing economic and national expectations 
among the Argentinean middle class that contributed to their political mobilisation during 
2002, it was as they became accustomed to their reduced quality of life by 2003 that their 
expectations of a brighter future rapidly diminished. This was a major factor in the 
subsequent decline in collective protest actions. The election of President Néstor Kirchner in 
May 2003 also played an important role in the reconstitution of citizen’ subjective positioning 
of their own place in society, as well as Argentina’s role in the world, by breaking with the 
longstanding tradition of promulgating the country’s mythical ‘greatness’ and of predicting a 
prosperous future for the individual (Armony & Armony, 2005:48). Instead, he talked about 
a ‘dream’ of an ‘ordinary’ country: “I want a normal Argentina. I want a serious country”
(Kirchner 2003). By managing expectation in this way and initiating economic stability, he 
was able to construct a more realistic vision for society. In turn, for this reason and following 
the defeat of the uprisings, citizens adopted more conciliatory outlooks: the radical demands 
of 2001-02 were placed into perspective and the ambition to achieve them dissipated. 
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Changing Macroeconomic and Political Contexts and Diachronic Spaces for Collective, 
Individual, Protest and Self-Improvement Action by the New Urban Poor
The second factor to analyse when looking at how individual newly poor people chose to 
respond to impoverishment using i) economic self-improvement and political protest actions 
and ii) whether they conducted these individually or collectively, was the fluctuating 
diachronic spaces that opened and closed to these four different types of action. The 
changing macropolitical and macroeconomic contexts in Argentina over time consequently 
created or restricted opportunities to engage in each kind of action, as the dominant class’ 
ability to enforce its consent to rule expanded and contracted during the neoliberal era. 
These ‘spaces’ are construed in each of four ways. First they refer to the actual ideological
opportunities that the changing contexts provided for a certain category of action. For 
example, in the early 1990s when there was strong macroeconomic growth, there were ample 
spaces for ‘individual self-improvement action’ because employment was relatively high 
(official unemployment was only 7%), but when the economy went into freefall during the 
crisis in 2001-02, jobs (especially skilled ones) became enormously scarce and 
unemployment officially hit 21.5% (INDEC), reducing individual self-help possibilities. 
Similarly, whilst individual protest options existed in the 1990s, with a credible and 
apparently sympathetic main opposition party available to vote for (and therefore a space to 
channel anger against downward mobility or impoverishment through the ballot box),by late 
2001 the mainstream opposition had become discredited. The Peronists were tarnished by 
Menemismo and the governing Radicals - and by association in the ruling Alianza coalition 
FRENAPO - were blamed for the crisis, so such spaces closed and instead new urban poor 
citizens either had to abstain from voting, cast a null vote or vote for a small, anti-capitalist 
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opposition party. At these moments, when individual protest routes were restricted like in 
late 2001, the new urban poor became more likely to engage in collective protests or 
demonstrations to voice their dissent. 
I have discussed at length how the 1990s’ macropolitical context generated a thriving 
individualist spirit and way of thinking at the time, which reduced social interaction, hindered 
the development of a consciousness of individual exploitation, limited confidence to protest 
and heightened the stigma of impoverishment, thus closing spaces for collective forms of 
action. However, spaces soon opened up due to short-term contingent factors, such as the
Corralito, and especially the ‘state of siege’ Declaration in late December 2001 which, in 
enabling dictatorial emergency powers to be used by the government to suppress dissent, 
provoked hundreds of thousands of newly poor people to take to the streets and caused them 
to question the legitimacy of the governing regime as well as the structural reasons for their 
descent. The election of Néstor Kirchner in May 2003, by contrast, closed many of these 
spaces, because as Mazzoni found (2007), faith in the Government was significantly restored. 
This reformist leader was able to largely reinforce the consent of the masses to their own 
subjugation by the dominant class. 
A second kind of space is the ‘physical’ space, or ‘opportunities’ available for certain actions
within one’s geographical proximity. For instance, the number of barter clubs in Argentina 
soared from 400 to 8,000 between the year 2000 and August 2002 (Almeyra, 2004:130). So, 
during this time it became much easier to join collective self-improvement actions like this, 
because they were within physically closer proximity. However, 40% of the clubs had closed 
between August and October 2002 (Grimson & Kessler 2005:159) often due to the 
falsification of credits and inflation in the barter system, thus limiting the opportunities to 
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becoming involved in this action once again. Yet the results found that this kind of space was 
not a generative factor in terms of explanations for new poor citizens’ participation in social 
movements. 
Thirdly, these spaces refer to those that opened and closed to individual agents as the 
outcome of opposing pressures that created and constrained opportunities for them to act in 
alternative ways. In essence, I refer here to the fact that individuals are never completely 
‘free’ to adopt any one type of action (Elster, 1986:25). Instead, spaces for political and 
economic forms are interdependent, as are the spaces to act in individualistic or collectivist 
ways, all of which are in constant flux and endlessly shape and reshape spaces for the 
alternative. How the material interests of the new urban poor were more likely to become 
‘political’ when they were unable to find sufficient economic mechanisms to be able to cope 
(Powers, 1999) was demonstrated as was how tolerance of economic hardship declined when 
coping strategies were undermined. This explains, for example, why when spaces to pursue 
commonly used individual coping strategies of the 1990s like the use of savings, finding work 
or utilising social capital became restricted during 2001-02 (when the corralito meant that 
savings were confiscated, there was mass unemployment which reduced opportunities for 
work and the value of social capital eroded sharply), spaces for collective protest action 
opened up as an alternative. 
I also found that at the time of the survey during 2002, the take-up of state aid among the new 
urban poor was extremely low and I identified some of the teething problems that the state 
experienced in offering welfare to the new poor. However, the ineffectiveness of Plan Jefes
as a cushion to support the new urban poor and the lack of sensitivity that state welfare
programmes demonstrated towards the particularities of the new urban poor experience 
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contributed to the inclination to avoid this as a self-improvement measure and instead resort 
to collective protests that year. Yet by 2003 (a year after the height of the rebellion and the 
survey being conducted), up to a quarter of the new urban poor did begin to receive state aid 
(Aguirre, 2008:49-54), demonstrating the state’s capacity to reduce spaces for protest by 
appeasing discontented citizens with welfare - increasing spaces for individual self-
improvement and enticing them away from the streets. 
Fourthly and finally, the ‘spaces’ I discuss here refer to how the new urban poor as 
individuals were able to utilise their different biographical characteristics to achieve access to 
a particular type of action or, conversely, how their personal characteristics constrained 
spaces for involvement in other categories of action at different points in time. For example, 
44% of Argentineans are of European descent (Heguy, 2005), which meant that a significant 
proportion of the country’s new urban poor had the option of securing citizenship of a 
European Union member state in order to take advantage of the individual self-improvement 
strategy of emigrating there during the crisis. However, when a further nine countries joined 
the EU in 2004, such possibilities suddenly opened for tens of thousands more Argentineans 
whom possessed respective national origins. The precise connotations of this example must 
be explored more rigorously, but the implication is that those in this category may have been 
less likely to protest as they had an additional ‘self-improvement strategy’ to choose from, 
compared to a newly poor Argentinean without European citizenship. 
Similarly, the survey results identified that the value of social networks in terms of ‘bringing 
success’ fell for the new urban poor between 1995 and 2002, so those with higher levels of 
social capital would have discovered that this capital became more of a redundant asset in 
terms of achieving self-improvement over these seven years (Ozarow 2014). Closing 
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‘spaces’ to use such resources would have encouraged these citizens to take protest action to a 
greater degree. Since 2003 up until the time of writing, the vast majority of the new urban 
poor have once again retreated back into individualist, private spaces, although a minority 
have continued to engage in collective self-help initiatives. Several neighbourhood 
assemblies metamorphosised into small-scale community projects like community kitchens 
(Grimson & Kessler, 2005:175; Rossi, 2014) and are enthusiastically supported by some 
newly impoverished Argentineans today. Meanwhile, a section of the new poor who are 
particularly concerned at the lack of democratic participation and accountability caused by 
neo-liberalism, have become involved in civil society organisations that seek to collectively 
monitor political institutions and lobby for improved mechanisms for citizen involvement in 
the democratic process (Minujín, 2007). The barter clubs have also enjoyed a small but not 
insignificant rebirth since the economic recovery started to run out of steam in 2009 (Cerioli, 
2009). 
The actions of the new urban poor under neo-liberalism can therefore be described as 
constituting ‘cycles of protest and of collective behaviour’ (Tarrow, 1998), which fluctuate 
depending on the spaces available for these actions. I have also looked at some of the 
underlying opinions and attitudes among newly poor Argentineans, which influenced their 
oscillating behaviour. The Survey results attest that whilst confidence in the Government and 
institutions fell dramatically between 1995 and 2002, by 2005 it was restored to its mid-1990s 
levels (though nonetheless remaining abysmally poor). Issues  deemed to be the 
responsibility of Government (such as inflation, poverty and corruption) became more 
pressing concerns between 1995 and 2002 and hence fuelled the politicisation of 
impoverishment between those years. Worryingly, the data also revealed that faith in the 
current system of democracy has not recovered at all since the crisis of legitimacy in 2002. 
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Between 2002 and 2005 the issues considered most important among the new urban poor 
moved away from those that had previously united them with working class and unemployed 
movements (government corruption, poverty, etc), towards those that divided them, such as 
security and crime. In other words, from a Gramscian perspective, the new urban poor’s 
concerns have tended to become more aligned with those of the dominant class, which has led 
them to move towards more reactionary perspectives, turning them against the shantytown 
poor and diluting opportunities for political resistance from below to materialise. 
Interestingly, whilst unemployment became relatively less of a concern (probably because as 
the survey confirmed, the new poor tended to regain employment after the crisis, but in low-
skilled work), they remained concerned about the general ‘political situation.’ Given the 
reduced participation in protest movements by 2005, this concern suggests that many of the 
country’s newly poor may have become demoralised, disempowered and politically alienated,
rather than being enthusiastically supportive of the political institutions at that time. 
Curiously, the self-defined position of the new urban poor on the political spectrum did not 
change significantly between 1995, 2002 or 2005. Disappointment with left-wing political 
parties was evident in the survey results, as they failed to capitalise on the anti-government 
and even anti-capitalist sentiment that followed the Argentinazo. These left-wing parties 
were not helped by parties of all political persuasions being tarnished with the same brush, on 
the one hand, and a move towards more reactionary attitudes, on the other. 
The Value of Personal Biographical Characteristics when Interacting with Specific 
Generative Conditions
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The results suggested that possessing certain biographical characteristics influenced the 
responses of new urban poor citizens. For example, older people were less likely to protest, 
young adults were more likely to emigrate and those who had been members of communal 
organisations were more likely to participate in collective actions during the crisis. However, 
it is important to note that such characteristics cannot determine behaviour because, they are 
inert and do not possess intrinsic properties which induce action in themselves in the absence 
of context. Instead, the principle was established that only under certain generative 
conditions such as macroeconomic or political changes do these characteristics gain any 
behavioural value in order to become either stimulants or barriers to collective response. 
Similarly, any one of their biographical characteristics can gain behavioural value through 
their complex interaction – not just with a range of mechanisms and processes that surround 
them as individuals – but also with other personal characteristics that they possess. 
Relative Deprivation
In terms of specific biographical characteristics that proved to contribute a generative impact 
upon responses in 2002, firstly the results confirmed Davies’ theory of ‘relative deprivation’ 
because they indicated that individuals in households which suffered a more sudden material 
descent (more like an economic ‘shock’) were more likely to adopt collective protest actions 
than those who slipped into poverty more steadily. Those in this latter group were more 
likely to restrict their responses to economic self-improvement activities. Given that as I 
concluded earlier, neither the event of becoming ‘income poor’ nor the general level of 
material conditions in which they lived affected the propensity to protest, but the ‘degree of 
their fall’ did, the evidence therefore points to the irrelevance of absolute definitions of 
poverty in determining action. 
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In terms of which factors helped to politicise responses, crossing over an arbitrary ‘poverty 
line’ made no difference . Instead, politicisation seemed to have occurred when poverty 
actually resulted in additional and perceivable privations being experienced in daily life. This 
is when impoverishment becomes ‘real’ in terms of how it is experienced and understood as 
such by the subject. To some extent, awareness of their subjugation to the dominant capitalist 
class was revealed more strongly amongst those who suffered comparatively sudden 
proletarianisation. In Gramsci’s terms (1998), the new urban poor who suffered more acute 
losses developed a more intense awareness of the injustice to which they were subject. Their 
‘good sense’ was realised and objections to the contradictions between it and their ‘common 
sense’ were raised more resolutely within their consciousness. 
Prior Experience of Collective Action
Newly poor citizens’ previous experience of collective action or participation also proved to 
play an important role in influencing their responses. I found that those who had previously 
been involved in broadly defined collective actions were much more likely to have engaged 
in collective protest following their pauperisation during 2002. The reasons for this could not 
be fully explained and need to be investigated further, but the result opens up new questions 
for investigation. In particular, about whether or not prior collective involvement aided the 
tendency to join protests due to this entailing a more open attitude to collectivist solutions in 
general; bestowing an increased degree of confidence and belief that collective action can 
work; or simply endowing the individual with increased networking opportunities through 
which to became aware that such protest actions were taking place. 
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Age and Gender
To some extent, drawing conclusions about the effects of age or gender on response 
behaviour is invalid within the context of this thesis, because the limitations of the available 
data meant that it was impossible to measure individual responses as distinguished by those 
variables. However, it was possible to comment on action taken at the household level and I 
showed how, although gender made no significant difference to response outcome, some 
differences were identified in terms of age category. Elderly new urban poor citizens (over 
the age of 65) were much more likely to belong to households where responses were 
restricted to individual self-improvement strategies and they also experienced the least degree 
of involvement in either collective action or collective protest. This appears to have been 
owed to the fact that relative to other age groups, the spaces they had available to pursue 
individual coping strategies (e.g. withdrawing pensions, renting property, cashing-in 
investments, pawning or selling possessions, asking for favours, etc) remained open 
compared to those of other age groups. 
Those aged 50-64 were the most pessimistic about their futures but there was no statistically 
significant association between age and tendency to protest. Responses to impoverishment 
for all age groups were determined by a complex interaction of forces and spaces for action. 
For example, while young Argentineans contended with the fewest employment opportunities 
during the 2002 crisis, they enjoyed superior emigration prospects. Residential location 
(region of the country in which they lived) was not found to be a generative factor in how 
newly poor citizens responded during the 2002 crisis, at least at the time the data was
collected for this study. 
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Relationship to the Labour Market
There were noticeable differences between the responses of new urban poor households 
depending on their relationship to the labour market. Those with inactive or unemployed 
heads of household, or those with no employment income source, tended to participate in 
wider ranges of individual self-improvement strategies because their lower household income 
levels meant that they needed to undertake a broader range of income-generating activities in 
order to make ends meet. However, they were less likely to be involved in collective self-
improvement initiatives, perhaps because they were absent from the workplace, which acted 
as a site where information about the ‘existence of’ and ‘benefits gained from’ collective self-
help actions was disseminated. No differences were found in the tendency to join collective 
protests, which is unsurprising given that as I concluded earlier, income differentials among 
the new urban poor did not have any effects on the decision to engage in protest. 
A key finding was that the more paid hours worked on average by a household, the more 
likely it was that its members would react to their pauperisation through protest actions rather 
than simply by increasing the range of coping strategies that they undertook. I inferred from 
this that the new urban poor experienced politicisation and so responded through collective 
protest when they worked longer hours due to three factors. 
Firstly, because they may have developed a greater sense of ‘injustice’ than those who 
dedicated less time to work. Working harder yet still remaining impoverished meant that they 
were less likely to blame themselves for their plight and more likely to hold the government 
responsible because in their own minds they were doing everything they could to generate an 
income. Having become ‘working poor’ would also have revealed the often obscured nature 
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of their exploitation to them.  In turn, this would have helped to develop a working-class 
conscience, facilitating the harsh realisation of their downward social mobility and even the 
horror of having to accept their social descent into the working class.  Meanwhile, those who 
worked fewer paid hours may have tended to feel that they shared greater responsibility for 
their own pauperisation. 
Secondly, those who worked more hours would have had to make greater sacrifices in terms 
of family and social life in order to reach subsistence income levels. This would have made 
them ‘feel’ more impoverished because the losses in their quality of life would have been 
more tangible and on the other, have invoked a greater sense of anger in them (Powers, 1999). 
Thirdly, the workplace may have acted as a site through which awareness was raised about 
the existence of collective protest opportunities that newly poor citizens could join. Spending 
more time there will have increased their exposure to trade union attempts to mobilise protest 
actions and to conversations with work colleagues whom they would realise faced similar 
grievances to their own (thus reducing their sense of isolation), and with whom they could 
confront their situations through collective action. 
The idea that the workplace can act as a site through which collective action is encouraged 
and which social movements (with broader social ideals outside of traditional labour-based 
grievances) can benefit from, has been advanced by Scully and Segal (2002:131). In Passion 
with an Umbrella: Grassroots Activists in the Workplace, they point to the fact that the it is a 
place where people experience injustices first-hand in a non-abstract way and where 
inequalities based on social identity become salient and contestable. This setting, they argue, 
therefore provides the desire to seek some kind of radical response and makes subjects more 
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cognitively ‘tuned in’ to collective opportunities for contentious action. Secondly, they 
propose that through the workplace, citizens develop an enhanced understanding of how 
potential resources can be mobilised opportunistically (booking rooms for meetings, 
accessing computers and photocopiers to publicise activities and so on), which makes them 
more confident about promoting collective actions to their colleagues. Thirdly, recruits to 
‘the movement’ can be easily located and mobilised, given that so many people work within 
the same building or geographical space. Therefore, those new urban poor who spent more 
time in the workplace would have been more exposed to mobilising possibilities in these
ways. 
Finally, whilst neither the sector of the economy that the new urban poor worked in nor 
whether their job was in the public or private sphere made any difference to responses, their 
employment histories did have an impact. Specifically, in that those who had previously 
worked in the public sector were more likely to become involved in collective protest action 
during the crisis. Whilst the reasons for this can (for now), only be speculated upon given the 
limitations of the data, this may be because the public sector bore the brunt of Menemismo’s 
austerity measures in the 1990s and its employees therefore had more experience of taking 
protest action or being part of collective organisations, such as trade unions. 
The Polarising Impact of Impoverishment on Action
Impoverishment had a polarising effecting and that one can broadly categorise the new urban 
poor as either ‘activists’ or ‘non-activists.’ Those in the first group were mobilised into 
different actions following their personal descent on the one hand and by the general climate 
of economic and political chaos on the other. The ‘activists’ tended to be involved in both a 
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greater number of economic self-help activities (both individual and collective) and collective 
protest actions. Those in this group also tended to work more hours in their paid 
employment. The psychological impact of their own impoverishment therefore provoked 
them to take remedial action. Meanwhile, the second group (non-activists) seem to have been 
demobilised and demoralised by their experience and consequently neither participated in the 
protest movement, nor went out of their way to seek additional means of achieving self-help. 
The Survey results indicate that the new urban poor were more likely to be motivated into 
action depending on whether a combination of factors applied. These included: i) the 
‘suddenness’ of their descent into poverty and loss of household income, ii) their knowledge 
or awareness about events (itself partly accumulated through engagement in existing types of 
collective action), iii) their individual biographical histories, such as their previous 
employment experience and prior involvement in collective activity and iv) their personal 
psychological reactions to impoverishment and whether it had a paralysing or motivating 
affect upon them. 
Towards a Theoretical Framework
The conglomeration of results from this empirical research has shed new light on the scant 
existing literature about how citizens who suffer personal impoverishment and 
proletarianisation take decisions about their response actions in confronting hardship. Figure 
10.1 has been designed as a theoretical framework to illustrate the inter-relationship between 
the various different concepts that influence such responses. The ultimate ‘response’ 
preference is depicted as the inner circle, which is the result of how their biographical features 
(the second circle that surrounds the response) interact with (shown by the arrows) spaces to 
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engage in any one of the four classifications of action (the four orbiting circles). These 
‘spaces’ for action themselves change with time depending on the spaces that open and close 
for alternative actions (illustrated by the linking ‘arches’), and with the existing economic and 
political contexts, which constitute the level of hegemonic control possessed by the dominant 
class and the fluctuating consent to rule that it manages to secure. All the while, responses 
(and biographical features) are also influenced by capitalism’s structures and the middle-class 
habitus (the third ‘outer’ circle) that tend the new urban poor towards individual actions as a 
default response. 
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Figure 10.1 Theoretical Framework to Explain New Urban Poor Responses to Impoverishment
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10.2 Implications for Practice
We of the sinking middle class may sink without further struggles into the working class where 
we belong, and probably when we get there it will not be as dreadful as we feared for after all, 
we have nothing to lose. 
George Orwell 
The argument advanced in this thesis is that during the organic crisis that occurred in 
Argentina in 2001-02, the dominant class lost its legitimacy and neoliberal institutions began to 
lose their consent to rule. It is this, above all other factors, which prompted those who 
descended into poverty to transform their responses from economic activities to political 
actions. However, the consent given to the ruling class to govern does not simply disintegrate 
on its own during hegemonic crises. Instead, whilst such circumstances certainly precipitate 
objective transformations in power relations, they also set framing processes in motion which 
can be used by the social movement to further de-legitimise and expose the dominant class’ 
authority to rule (Snow et al. 1986), whilst building counter-hegemonic alternatives to replace 
it. 
It is the movement’s ability to capitalise on the correct frames effectively which will ultimately 
determine the size of participation in mobilisation and the success it has. The potential of a 
framing process also depends upon the populations’ access to mobilising vehicles that are 
available for them to act through. So, framing has far greater possibilities for success where 
permanent rather than temporary mobilising vehicles exist. Where system-critical framing 
(McAdam et al. 1996) emerges – whereby blame is shifted from the individual to the system –
it is unlikely that collective mobilisation will last long if the campaign is limited to a protest 
movement, which can quickly disintegrate once the dominant class enacts defensive strategies 
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to both accommodate and repress it. In order to overcome this internal weakness, the 
movement’s mobilising vehicle must have a significant degree of permanence, which then 
counteracts such attempts to break up the movement. 
In order to foster new poor collective action, the theoretical findings of this research have 
identified the need to create mobilising mechanisms which frame collective demands in a way 
that: a) prompts the new urban poor to question the legitimacy of the capitalist system and the 
dominant class’ authority to rule, b) provides permanent mobilising vehicles through which the 
new urban poor can organise, c) may also help stimulate solidarity with those from the working 
class and structurally poor sectors and d) is sensitive to the new urban poor habitus and 
resonates with their cultural understandings, so as to optimise its politicising impact and 
maximise mobilisation. I shall attempt to propose such solutions in this section.
It is important to reiterate here that economic grievances do not induce political reactions on 
their own but require the shared meanings and definitions among new urban poor citizens to 
also apply to their own situations. This is what mobilises those who are aggrieved about their 
circumstances to take action, because they must feel optimistic enough about their ability to 
change their circumstances by acting collectively (McAdam et al., 1996:5). Therefore, the 
mobilising mechanisms that are devised here must provide real and regular forums through 
which newly poor citizens can identify and be reminded of the injustice to which they are 
subject, whilst becoming aware that these grievances are also shared by a large number of 
others. Writing during the height of the uprisings in Argentina, De Lucía (2002) argues that the 
movement against the consolidation of the hegemonic order must also seek to highlight the 
weakness of reformist projects that are offered to citizens within capitalism and should expose 
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the false neutrality of the state whilst revealing its bourgeois character. Mechanisms will also 
be proposed here that foster this consciousness. 
A Heuristic Approach to Mobilising the New Urban Poor
If we are to propose a set of initiatives that can help to engage and politicise newly poor 
citizens in transformative grassroots social movements, then the starting point must be to 
acknowledge that exploited groups experience deprivation and oppression within a concrete 
setting, not as the end result of large and abstract processes. Therefore, any actions that social 
movements can use that are geared towards facilitating the process of politicisation must 
attempt to either replicate these exploitative conditions or better still, draw attention to them. A 
means must be found of encouraging participation in an alternative form of labour that 
enlightens the participant as to the exploitative nature of the underlying capitalist structures and 
relationships that reproduce these conditions, but that are not observable other than through the 
particular phenomena or events they produce (Wainwright, 1994:7). 
As Piven and Cloward express (1977:20), it is after all, the daily experience of people that 
shapes their grievances, establishes the measure of their demands and draws out the targets of 
their anger. Yet, for the new urban poor these experiences do not merely constitute isolated 
incidences of deprivation and oppression but can provide opportunities to i) discover their true 
class position alongside the long-term poor and thus establish the foundations of a mass 
movement that poses a radical challenge from below (and so uncover the ‘good sense’ that is 
buried within their local rationality that will enable them to understand and confront 
capitalism’s hegemonic structures that enslave them) and ii) integrate socially with the rest of 
the dominated classes in society so that solidarity is fostered and the social totality becomes the 
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target of political opposition. Experience-based learning like this can only result from bringing 
together newly poor citizens with the unemployed and structurally impoverished in regular 
forums so that they can interact closely with each other and develop relationships and mutual 
trust. In this environment, fertile ground is created for shared grievances to be identified and 
exploited groups are able to combine their fragmented knowledge so that the hidden structures 
of their oppression are brought within participants’ ‘cognitive reach’ (Barker & Cox, 2002). 
Crucially, in the process of helping to develop their shared class consciousness, the character of 
their grievances, their demands and the target of their ire can change in transformative ways 
from the types of ‘oppositional’ collective actions and protests that are usually bound to a 
specific, apparently isolated and ‘local’ experience to ones that target the social totality. 
‘Local’ protests included the savers’ escraches, which demanded the return of dollars that were 
confiscated by the banks and the piqueteros’ road blockages, which are performed so as to 
demand improvements in social assistance programmes for the unemployed). However, 
instead, seemingly disparate struggles can be brought together into more widely encompassing 
and radical counter-hegemonic projects. 
Part of the explanation for the dissolution of the protest movement in Argentina post-2003 was 
that whilst the target of their class-based interests should have been the capitalist system as a 
whole, the new urban poor lost sight of this emancipatory goal and instead became distracted 
by scapegoating other sectors and blaming political institutions (mainly the government alone) 
for their plight.  The increasing post-crisis precariousness and the frustration and tension 
generated by the state of subordination in which they found themselves, led the struggling 
middle class to attempt to preserve its threatened social status by drawing a dividing line in 
society ‘below’ rather than ‘above’ themselves.  Indeed, the contradictory nature of capitalism 
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means that in times of crisis it should unify opposition to it across classes, as the working class 
loses jobs and livelihoods and the middle class is ‘squeezed’ through fiscal tightening, loss of 
businesses and the confiscation of savings.  
If the history of ‘identity politics’ and organising around specific individual and collective 
identities is one that has emerged as a result of the working class’ history of defeats and retreats 
– rather than the postmodernist assertion that it is a natural consequence of changing industrial 
conditions and a ‘learned correction’ from the totalitarianism of earlier movements (Callinicos, 
1990; Barker & Dale, 1998) – then it is unsurprising that the new urban poor learned the wrong 
lessons from their own movement’s defeat.  This was true even for those who had once 
participated in the assemblies, cacerolazos and street protests alongside movements of the 
unemployed, workers and shantytown poor, when the carnival of insurgency had died down 
after 2003 and the focus of daily life had returned to the mundane struggle to make ends meet.   
They began to search for who was to blame for their political defeat and in doing so, turned 
against their former allies, especially the piqueteros, whom Svampa describes as being held in 
disdain today by many of those who self-define as middle class (in Jasovich, 2009).  
Class struggle is therefore not merely fought between classes but also within them, because of 
the practical and theoretical sense that they make out of the concrete situations they find 
themselves in.  It is for this reason that here, solutions are sought that could help to unite the 
structural and new urban poor, whilst at the same time removing the tensions that are created 
between them during periods when a surplus army of labour exists in the capitalist economy 
whilst also aiding the attribution of systemic (capitalist) causes of their pauperisation.
Creating and expanding sites of collective action can help to reverse the fear and distrust that 
exists between the new and structural poor.  Currently, the main ‘site of interaction’ between 
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them is the piquetero roadblock – where the lives of the impoverished middle class are severely 
disrupted and which provides a recipe for tension and atomisation, rather than solidarity, 
because piquetes are understood to infringe on the fundamental value of ‘freedom of 
movement’ in the eyes of the new poor (Mazzoni, 2007:205).  Positive social interactions, such 
as those that occurred during the 2001-02 protests or through the barter clubs, have been 
replaced by negative ones.  Only the rebuilding of trust, solidarity, shared visions for self-
improvement and promotion of positive ‘site of interaction’ can help to restore some of the 
foundations upon which the insurrectionary movement of 2001 and 2002 was constructed. 
However, there is no inevitability about exploited groups like the new urban poor being prone 
to revolting against their social conditions.  On the contrary, these groups are subject to the 
daily routines and practices that are inherent in capitalism and that reproduce the subordination 
of the very ideas that support the dominant class (Barker, 2008), whilst the nature and injustice 
of their own exploitation is disguised.  In this sense, it is unsurprising that as Argentina’s 
economic growth was restored after 2003, the concerns of the new urban poor shifted away 
from the goals of direct democracy, political accountability and social transformation towards 
those that preoccupy the dominant class itself, such as crime, job security and the protection of 
private property.  
What I am advocating here is that social movements therefore re-focus their energies towards 
promoting regular involvement in collective self-help projects like barter clubs, workers 
cooperatives and community kitchens, which present practical and positive alternatives to the 
existing economic system, which is at the very root of their difficulties. Indeed, multi-sectoral 
approaches like these are already promoted by autonomist-inspired social movements such as 
the Darío Santillán Popular Front (FPDS). Such strategies will broaden the scope of collective 
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action and provide alternatives which demonstrate to participants through their own practical 
experience that another system is both workable and possible. Autonomous grassroots social 
movements are also uniquely placed to stimulate interest in these activities among newly poor 
Argentineans, because as we saw in the survey results, this stratum’s faith in other collective 
organisations which bourgeois liberal democracy permits spaces for (such as the traditional 
trade unions or political parties), has remained extremely low for years after the crisis. 
In addition, the advantage for social movements of promoting more low intensity, day-to-day 
activities, rather than constant protest, is that it encourages an ongoing form of contact with and 
among its participants (in this case the new urban poor). This occurs without continually
having to take to the streets, when the movement itself could risk disintegrating due to ‘protest 
fatigue,’ which happens when protests are held too often on issues that are too familiar 
(Wilson, 2001:35). Thus, collective self-help activities can help to overcome protest 
movements’ tendency to be short-lived (Croucher, 1987). 
Having said that, protests must not, under any circumstances, be sidelined or replaced by 
collective self-improvement actions. On the contrary, self-help activities should be seen as a 
complement to them, acting as an incubator in which the ‘good sense’ that Gramsci describes is 
cultivated and where the new urban poor can develop a proletarian consciousness from which 
protest actions emerge at a later time. Those coordinating these collective self-help spaces 
should subtly promote the need for participation to extend to a counter-movement on the streets 
and in public spaces, as well as simply behind the closed doors of factories and private 
residences. However, this encouragement to engage in protests should not be forced 
prematurely but arise as a natural consequence of participants asking, ‘where do we go from 
here in order to change society?’ having started to construct potentially counter-hegemonic 
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collective self-improvement structures. Self-help actions act as a base upon which to build and 
engage participants in the kind of debates that engender longer-term politicisation, so that 
protest objectives become more radical, the numbers of participants increases and the 
movement has a greater chance of securing lasting, transformative change, especially when a 
crisis of hegemony presents the opportunity to do so. 
This heuristic approach is based upon the survey results, which suggest that collective self-
improvement activities can act as a base from which protest actions grow. As we saw, the 
workplace can also provide such an incubator under certain conditions, therefore for this reason 
and the reasons mentioned earlier, both collective self-improvement activities and the 
workplace must form the basis of any social mobilisation of the new urban poor. Furthermore, 
in a society where life projects are increasingly built around consumer choice rather than work, 
professional skills or jobs (Bauman, 1998), and in which the new urban poor construct their 
own subjective middle-class identities around their capacity for consumption rather than
production, mechanisms must be found to help reformulate the idea that one’s class position 
should be a product of one’s place within the realm of the latter (production), not the former 
(consumption). In all likelihood, this process would help encourage an acceptance of the new 
urban poor’s proletarianised, working-class reality and in doing so, break down the barriers that 
prevent them from building alliances with working class and unemployed movements. 
Encouraging engagement in self-improvement and ‘work’ responses becomes central to 
achieving this goal. 
Lasting social transformation also depends upon the movement’s ability to develop new kinds 
of social institutions, which can install the foundations of a remodelling of social relations and 
forms of social, economic and political power (Barker, 2008). This makes it doubly important 
278
for social movements to dedicate more resources to the establishment and fortification of 
collective self-help initiatives, rather than to seek short-term mass mobilisations on the streets. 
Building sufficient support for and involvement in counter-hegemonic social, economic or 
political institutions will ultimately represent the crux of revolutionary social change. 
Mobilising the Non-Activists: Politicising the Anti-Politics
We are supporting the cacerolazos, which were started by the middle class... It’s not 
political, we don’t do politics, it’s just a social movement. We want equality for 
all...political, economic and social equality and decent health services. 
Male protestor, Argentina in Revolt, 2002
Whilst there is no doubt that the scale of collective action during 2002 was widespread and 
unprecedented among Argentina’s new poor, it is important to put this into perspective. It 
must be acknowledged that 71.7% of those surveyed did not take part in any collective actions 
whatsoever (during the six months between June and November 2002) and four in five 
refrained from taking to the streets in protest. In some ways therefore, the question that is most 
important of all in seeking the participation of greater numbers of newly poor in emancipatory 
social movements, is how to reinvigorate the unengaged silent majority of ‘non-activists.’
Stimulating the involvement of the alienated new urban poor in collective action and civil 
society projects is no easy task, given that through their alienation they will have lost either 
their belief or willingness even to try and improve their own lives. 
In seeking to achieve their civic engagement, Minujín (2007) calls for cooperation between the 
state, civil society and the business sector. He argues that the involvement of the new poor in 
public space should be encouraged by taking advantage of their high cultural values, social 
‘connectedness’ and desire for civic participation. He cites placing education at the heart of 
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initiatives to achieve their reintegration into society, as well as implementing public policies 
that encourage:
 The expansion of public space
 Increasing citizenship participation in democratic decision-making by promoting citizen 
observatories and participatory budgeting
 Improving cultural spaces and access to technology, especially for young people
 Providing high quality public services 
 Broadening social protection
 Tackling discrimination of all kinds
 Assisting microfinance initiatives
However, such policies will ultimately do little to reverse some of the problems identified in 
the survey, such as the need to reduce the tension and growing sense of fear that exists between 
the new urban poor and structural poor. Nor would these measures necessarily create a greater 
sense of solidarity in society and, most importantly, they would do nothing at all to create 
counter-hegemonic institutions that tackle the root causes of Argentina’s social and economic 
problems in the first place. 
If the objective is to encourage those in this stratum to join the social movement, it is useful to 
ask what actions constitute ‘belonging to’ the movement itself. The problem is that the 
boundaries between movements and the society and culture from which they emerge are 
indefinite and ‘fuzzy’ (Marwell & Oliver, 1984). Participation in them can range from more 
tangible actions, like marching in demonstrations or signing petitions, to less concrete forms of 
protest. For example, one may instigate a subtle ‘collective protest’ merely through a 
conversation with a group of friends or work colleagues, yet these are the kinds of actions that 
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do not appear in the survey data, nor are they formalised in any way. Nor, indeed, would the 
participants in them even necessarily understand them to be ‘political acts.’
Research by Zurawicki & Braidot (2005:1107) has for instance found that the most common 
form of resistance among ‘middle-class Argentineans’ during the crisis was actually ‘virtual’ 
rather than ‘visible’ protest. 36.5% of their sample engaged in some kind of protest 
communication over the internet, greatly exceeding the proportion that participated in street 
demonstrations or neighbourhood assemblies at that particular time. The survey authors cited 
the ‘anonymity and convenience’ provided by social and electronic media, as well as their 
‘trust in its power’ to explain why participation rates in virtual protests were particularly high. 
If the internet was a primary mode of protest in the county in 2001, the potential it holds as a 
protest forum today is innumerably greater, given that internet access in the country has 
multiplied fivefold since then (World Bank, 2011). Indeed, social media has played a vital role 
in protest mobilisation and as an initial forum for engagement in the protest movement for 
‘non-activists.’ It opened a gateway to more confrontational forms of street protest during the 
Arab Spring revolts and the Indignados uprisings in Spain (Mason, 2012), as well as during 
Argentina’s own anti-government 8-N (8th November) protest movement in 2012 (La Nación,
08/11/2012). With this in mind, grassroots social movements should look to further 
incorporate the Internet and social media into their mobilising strategies, for example by 
establishing interactive forums where middle-class citizens can become radicalised and 
convinced to attend events, acting as sort of virtual 'spaces' inlieu of the factory floor. 
‘Politics’ continues to maintain an awful reputation in Argentina. Not only was this confirmed 
by the survey data, which consistently conveyed that ‘little’ or ‘no confidence’ was held in the 
government and respective political institutions in the years before, during and after the 2002 
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crisis, but the data also showed that half of new urban poor Argentineans have either ‘little’ or 
‘no’ interest in politics as a whole (Appendix II, C3, V62). These figures demonstrate that the 
‘no te metas’ (don’t get involved) mentality endures, having been instilled in much of the 
population as a legacy of the 1976-83 military dictatorship and its attempts to discourage 
people from ‘taking part in politics’. This mantra was even promulgated during the opening 
years of democracy that followed it (Sitrin, 2010:140). 
However, Argentineans have a long history of disguising political acts as ‘apolitical,’ a 
technique borne of the necessity of having lived under repressive military dictatorships for the 
vast majority of the twentieth century, until democracy was restored in 1983. In this way, 
different protest groups (including the Mothers of the Plaza de Mayo under the military junta 
Junta in the late 1970s) have managed to secure broader public support whilst avoiding the 
repressive excesses of the state apparatus by framing their movement as non-threatening and 
apolitical. 
With reference to the Argentinean new urban poor, Mazzoni (2007:187) found that ‘politics’ 
remained synonymous with ‘corruption’ in their minds. They remained highly cynical of 
politicians and participation in ‘politics’, a view that was universal, irrespective of socio-
occupational background or age. The only exceptions were those who had prior engagement as 
political activists, who were not put off by overtly ‘political’ activity. It is for these reasons 
that a way must be found of stimulating new urban poor ‘non-activist’ participation in political 
acts, therefore, without these initially being construed as ‘political.’ Harnessing their 
involvement in what are understood to be ‘apolitical acts’, while gently introducing them to 
more overt and ostentatious expressions of dissidence, must be the way forward. Building their 
confidence to join collective protests and raising their awareness of their own exploitation will 
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occur simultaneously. In the words of the philosopher Slavoj Žižek (2000), in an age where 
there has been a ‘radical de-politicisation of the economy,’ the question is how to foster a 
politicising politics. This has to start by taking the particularity of the demands of a certain 
struggle (those of the new urban poor, in this instance), but aiming it at something that 
transcends these particular demands so that universalism can emerge. 
Mazzoni’s research (using interviews conducted in 2004) was confirmed by the 
LatinoBarómetro survey results from 2005, which suggest that new urban poor citizens’ 
cynicism regarding the state’s political structures endured after the crisis. However, as the 
early attempts to construct counter-hegemonic political structures like the assemblies died 
away and their participation in grassroots resistance dwindled, so did movement participants’
belief that it was possible to construct a more participatory democracy where the old politicians 
would genuinely be got rid of. Instead, for many a dual consciousness whereby they still 
wished to challenge the system from below, yet at the same time they realised that they were 
ideologically bound to it. This was especially the case towards the end of 2002 and early 2003, 
in the absence of regular engagement in counter-hegemonic forums that confronted the 
political and economic status quo. 
Maintaining a radical political stance, yet losing their excitement and the belief they held in 
December 2001 that their own actions could induce transformative change, led many new 
urban poor to capitulate. So instead, they placed their faith in achieving the greatest degree of 
change they deemed feasible within the existing hegemonic structures. In practice, this meant 
supporting Néstor Kirchner as Presidential candidate in the 2003 election, especially due to the 
anti-establishment rhetoric that he espoused. The new urban poor returned to their pre-
Argentinazo understanding of politics as ‘the practice of the government but the business of the 
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people’ (Mazzoni, 2007:189), as they fell into the trap of assuming that they could still achieve 
their desired ends of real social change by delegating the responsibility for it into the hands of 
reformist representatives (albeit with ‘new faces’) who would instead serve the interests of the 
ruling class. This is another reason why maintaining the ‘doing’ side of things through 
collective self-improvement projects in the ‘now’ is so crucial to the restoration of a political 
challenge from below (Holloway, 2002). 
Therefore, in terms of looking for ways to reinvigorate new urban poor interest in collective 
action – in light of this loss of confidence in their capacity to generate radical improvements in 
their quality of life and wellbeing – it would be fruitless to plead for their direct political 
involvement in protest movements in the first instance. However, one value that has persisted 
among new urban poor Argentineans is a strongly held belief in economic ‘self-reliance.’ This 
is because they tend to possess minimalist perceptions of their citizenship, expecting the state 
to provide little for them in the way of social and economic benefits but in contrast demanding 
that as an entity it should guarantee their political rights, come what may. In other words, they 
can be described as ‘low-impact citizens’ (Mazzoni, 2008:219). For this reason, encouraging 
involvement in collective self-help activities (rather than protest actions) also fits more closely 
with the new urban poor’s cultural narratives of self-reliance in terms of securing their own 
economic wellbeing, without the intervention of the state. Methods of fostering citizen 
empowerment in the economic sphere must be found so that the link to political action can be 
reinvigorated and capitulation to Argentina’s traditional ‘delegative democracy’ model 
(O’Donnell, 1994) can be overcome. 
Lukács (1920) describes how three conditions are necessary to create a heightened class 
consciousness and to dilute the false consciousness that prevents workers (in this instance the 
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‘proletarianised new poor’) from becoming revolutionary subjects and dooms them to repeating 
the same mistakes. The first condition is that there must be an economic crisis, because during 
such times class awareness sharpens and class struggle intensifies. In this sense, the mobilising 
vehicles that I identify to radicalise the new poor must also be active during ‘non-crisis’
periods so as to both prepare them for a revolutionary challenge in future crisis periods and 
also promote the continuity of potentially revolutionary movements between periods of crisis. 
The second requirement is that Marxist theory is used as a guide to develop this revolutionary 
consciousness, which is what I attempt to do here. The third condition he speaks of is the 
existence of a revolutionary party. This stipulation represents a point of departure between 
theory and the practical realities of Argentina’s recent history, which suggest that reliance on a 
Marxist-Leninist political party to play such a role in the development of class consciousness 
may at best prove unfruitful or impossible to achieve, and at worse may even have a 
detrimental effect on the ultimate goal. It is for this reason that alternative mobilising vehicles 
are sought here. 
The autonomist forms of organisation that the new urban poor were involved in during the 
crisis of 2001-02 and their initial explicit rejection of collaboration with either state or civil 
society organisations emanated from a deep suspicion of Argentina’s reformist institutions that 
have been tainted by the state’s corporatist apparatus, in particular the trade unions and 
political parties of any colour, not least those on the Left. It is for this reason and the generally 
abysmal reputation that ‘politics’ has, that social movements should seriously consider finding 
ways of using economic forms of collective organisation as their mobilising vehicles for 
political engagement, not the traditional political party structure as such. These aspects of 
social economy may include co-operative, non-profit making businesses in which the 
participate in alongside their regular jobs (at least solely during their leisure time at first) but 
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which also incorporate a social component so that these enterprises are not perceived as an 
activity that will detract from their social life, but rather complement it. 
Furthermore, so omnipresent is the dominance of Peronist ideology across the trade unions, 
several unemployed workers movements and even many leftist political parties, that virtually 
every single political movement in Argentina has a Peronist or anti-Peronist agenda, either 
explicitly or more discretely. The electoral popularity of Kirchnerismo shows Peronism’s 
ability to reinvent itself from Menem’s neoliberal ‘right-wing’ incarnation, into new centre-left 
political fronts. Clearly, as an ideology, it is not likely to die away any time soon, so the reality 
of its hegemonic position must be acknowledged for now. 
If political forms of organising have become so easy for Peronism to penetrate and co-opt, then 
it is proposed here that more impermeable organisational forms, that are embedded in 
economic as opposed to political activity, will have a better chance of withstanding such 
attempts. It would, after all, be much more difficult for a puntero53 to hold sway over the 
political decisions made by group of participants in a project that has economic goals, because 
it would involve them having to also become part of their everyday productive practices 
(unlike those of a political grouping, which meets on a more ad hoc basis). 
It is for these reasons that the Hegelian principle of starting with an understanding of the ideas 
in people’s heads at a particular time as a means of creating change (Wallace, 2005) must be 
ascribed to. As both the results of this study and the practical experience of Argentinean 
politics in recent years have illustrated, to revert back to orthodox and dogmatic mechanisms of 
                                                            
53Political brokers, traditionally used by Argentinean political parties to mediate between their party masters and 
potential ‘voters’ in a way that transforms them into ‘clients’ (see Auyero, 2001).
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trying to politicise the new urban poor through top-down political parties will more likely than 
not end in failure. An alternative means of doing so must be enacted and I propose that the 
collective self-improvement form adopt a double economic and political function in order to 
achieve this. 
In terms of fostering the politicisation of newly poor citizens, the challenge of doing this with 
‘non-activists’ is to nurture the growth of these informal and unconscious political acts, so as to
set off a series of events and activities that will lead to a ‘process of engagement’ involving 
more direct and confrontational acts of collective protest. It is about turning subtle yet 
seemingly apolitical acts, such as dissenting conversations or internet exchanges which 
complain about their own personal hardship, into involvement in some kind of collective self-
improvement action, with the aim of establishing counter-hegemonic social, economic and 
political projects that are both popular and widely used. 54 Indeed the internet can act as key 
tool in this process, for example, through using online forums where people can suggest ways 
to make extra money or make ends meet and also publicise events like barterclubs and soup 
kitchens. An alternative electronic currency system like Bitcoin55 could be utilised and 
promoted as the form of exchange, so that these strategies neither support the existing capitalist 
financial institutions nor reproduce international financial capitalism. 
Therefore, social movement leaders should encourage engagement in collective initiatives by 
framing them in the following ways, fit with newly poor people’s cultural narrations (Snow & 
Benford, 1988) and the values that are precious to them. First of all given that, as I found in 
                                                            
54In this way I seek to utilise the Widerstand concept - a criterion used by investigators who were keen to promote 
opposition to the Nazis in Germany - which allows for more or less any expression of a different view from the 
official position (including those in the cultural realm) to be labelled ‘opposition’.
55www.bitcoin.org
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the survey, such citizens will vehemently reject anything they perceive as ‘social assistance,’ 
they must convey that such projects involve a high degree of ‘self-reliance.’ Participants will 
be asked to commit something themselves, be it time, money, or goods and services in which 
they have a particular skill like teaching a class, in exchange for some other kind of monetary 
or non-monetary remuneration. 
Secondly, social movement leaders should play on the former Argentinean middle class’ 
proven ability to establish and reproduce social capital by encouraging them to involve their 
friends, family and networks of acquaintances in these collective solutions. Thirdly and 
finally, whilst these efforts should appeal to their entrepreneurial and aspirational values 
(Mafud, 1985:24-26), by incentivising them to reap economic and financial rewards 
themselves, they should find some way to simultaneously project an altruistic vision - a tenet 
which is also central to newly poor citizens’ mindset (Mazzoni, 2007). In this way, it can be 
argued that their own contributions and hard work will benefit both themselves and the 
collective, whose destiny accordingly becomes entwined. ‘Helping oneself by helping the 
collective’ could become a fitting mantra for the new urban poor. 
Capitalising on New Urban Poor Human Assets
These actions should also take advantage of the extensive human capital that the new urban 
poor possess, but which lie dormant or under-utilised in their unemployment or low-skilled 
jobs for which they are over-qualified. Therefore, movements should look to establish ‘social 
enterprise hubs,’ through which newly poor citizens engage in teaching their professional skills 
(languages, Information Technology, Business Management, etc) to the structurally poor who 
can utilise these skills themselves to establish or improve their own autonomist cooperative 
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enterprises through their involvement in unemployed workers’ movements like MTD de la 
Matanza. In this way, this would provide the ‘altruistic vision’ that appeals to the new urban 
poor mindset by supporting the most deprived in society whilst at the same securing 
employment themselves, valuable work experience for the young, and restoring self-esteem. 
Their salaries could be either taken from the piqueteros’ pooled Plan Jefes income, or 
alternatively the training they deliver could be remunerated through the barter system, in 
exchange for services that cooperative members would provide to their newly poor colleague
(babysitting, manual labour, etc) as a form of timebank scheme. This would therefore be 
funded in ways that avoid co-optation by the capitalist state and would help to strengthen those 
piquetero-run autonomist cooperatives, by endowing its members with new capabilities and 
skills. 
The creation of micro-discursive spaces as a method that can aid cooperation across social 
movements (Croucher & Cotton, 2009) entails personal exchanges that will help dissolve fear 
and distrust between new and structurally poor citizens. The mutual respect that is garnered 
through these exchanges would aid social integration, heighten a shared sense of injustice and 
act as a basis for future solidarity between new and long-term poor Argentineans. Indeed, 
central to the success of the movement from below, and of the new urban poor’s own 
liberation, is that they should no longer see the long-term poor as their enemies or competitors, 
but as their comrades with whom they can work together to construct a brighter future and 
fairer society. Breaking down the widely held perception among the impoverished middle 
class that the poor are ‘dangerous, polluting and foreign’ (Guano, 2004) is essential to the 
emancipation of the new urban poor themselves. In Marx’s words, “a people that subjugates 
another people is forging its own chains” (Elster, 1986:131). If the appropriate justice frames 
can be implemented alongside these actions, initially ‘selfish’ reasons for engagement in 
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collective self-improvement actions by newly poor citizens will be transformed into actions 
that they also participate in for the benefit of the community whilst cultivating solidarity 
between the new and structural poor. 
In terms of fostering prospects for longer-term transformational change, the additional benefit 
that encouraging increased trust and interaction between the new and structural poor would 
bring is that it would encourage a pooling of experiences in terms of the strategies and tactics 
used by their respective social movements. The resulting synergy would promote both the 
demands and actions which were most likely to bring about the kinds of change that would 
truly emancipate both strata from their exploitative relationship with capital. 
Palomino (2005:24) astutely observed that, ultimately, the prospects for the impoverished 
Argentinean middle class to successfully achieve their desired outcomes through their 
collective protests were inherently weak because of the incongruence between tactics and 
demands among different sections of the movement. On the one hand the new urban poor 
possessed maximalist demands (the replacement of an exhausted political system with direct 
democracy), but pursued them only through minimalist actions (such as creating the assemblies 
to set an example ‘from the bottom up’ and establishing micro-projects like soup kitchens and 
unemployment centres at community level). Meanwhile, the structural poor had only 
minimalist demands, like food and jobs, but employed maximalist actions through the 
piqueteros’ mass street protests, which were sometimes violent and targeted institutions of 
power. Had the two movements firstly cooperated and secondly coordinated their maximalist 
aims and actions, the potential they had to achieve transformative change during 2001-02 
would have been significantly greater. 
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In many ways, the rebellion of the new urban poor was socialised into submission. If the only 
power they have ever known has been one that is submissive to bankers and ruling elites 
(Briones & Mendoza 2003:13), then it is not surprising that they strived to only gradually
achieve the initially revolutionary aim of ¡qué se vayan todos! through the creation of counter-
hegemonic and bottom-up organisations like the assemblies that, it was hoped, would bring 
about a change in political culture. The problem was that the assemblies became an end unto 
themselves, rather than a means to actually replace the establishment. To this extent, it 
becomes doubtful whether the aims of all but the most militant new urban poor citizens were 
revolutionary at all. 
The additional advantage of promoting collective self-improvement activities and encouraging 
new urban poor involvement in them (as opposed to directly trying to mobilise them in 
protests) is that this is a mechanism that cultivates solidarity and collectivism in a way that 
overcomes the ‘free rider’ dilemma (Marwell & Oliver, 1984). Potential participants may 
choose not to join a protest because they decide they will not necessarily gain personally from 
it, even if the protest wins its objective, yet they may lose out if they do join and the protest is 
defeated. However, with collective self-improvement actions, the point is that citizens would 
be much more likely to gain material and social benefits through involvement themselves. 
Plus, a self-help action does not necessarily suffer ‘defeat’ as easily as a protest. All those 
involved will directly benefit in some way and there is more to gain and less to lose from direct 
involvement in self-improvement actions. 
This is not to say that the ‘free rider’ problem is sufficient to explain patterns of collective 
action involvement on its own. On the contrary, it neither takes account of notions of solidarity 
or other ‘non-rational’ reasons. Nor can one argue, however, that rational choice decisions do 
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not contribute to collective action involvement to some degree. Therefore, if a sense of 
collective solidarity can be fostered initially through collective self-help initiatives, then
building these up to large-scale self-help actions in the longer run, this will mean that ‘rational 
choice’ impediments to mass participation in protests among the new urban poor will diminish. 
These barriers will be displaced by i) an accumulated network of solidarity bonds, ii) the 
increased belief that collective action can change things, iii) establishing the kinds of social 
relationships that will lead to self-realisation and gain collective class consciousness. 
Simultaneously, these actions will help to raise awareness of broader social issues, which will 
generate significantly greater new urban poor involvement in protest actions that target the 
social totality, instead of focusing on their specific struggle for justice in isolation. 
Reinvigorating New Urban Poor Self-Belief as Agents of Radical Change
Just as politics cannot be separated from life, life cannot be separated from
politics. People who consider themselves to be non-political are no different; 
they've already been assimilated by the dominant political culture-. They just 
don't feel it any more. 
Pramoedya Ananta Toer
Perhaps the most alarming figure that the survey results provided was the new urban poor’s 
growing post-crisis disenchantment with democracy, in spite of strong macroeconomic growth. 
Almost a third of respondents accepted that authoritarian government was acceptable in some 
circumstances in 2005, for example (Appendix II, C2, V47). Helping to reinvigorate civil 
society by enacting some of the measures suggested here will hopefully help to restore faith in 
democracy by promoting an alternative (direct) democratic model in which citizens make 
political and economic decisions themselves, whilst at the same time critiquing democracy’s 
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existing ‘representative’ and ‘capitalist’ variant, which relies on bosses or politicians (with
conflicting class interests to their own) to take decisions on their behalf. 
The survey results also suggest that old political parties of all creeds continue to be rejected 
and dogmatic language and debating styles, as well as sectarianism, were also suggested to be 
among the reasons why the ‘impoverished middle class’ abandoned the assemblies and other 
protest movements (Almeyra, 2004:175). As an electoral outlet, the new poor increasingly turn 
to abstention, rather than voting for opposition political parties, to protest their condition so in 
that sense, the legacy of the voto bronca endured. Paradoxically, the survey results also show 
that a significantly higher percentage would have voted for the governing party in 2005 (e.g. 
Néstor Kirchner and his Frente para la Victoria) than that which would have voted for Menem 
and the Justicialist (Peronist) Party in the mid-1990s (Appendix II, C12, V73). Again, this 
indicates that in 2005, new urban poor responses diverged from those of a decade earlier, 
because they either tended to put their faith in Kirchnerismo or abstain completely. However, 
future attempts to mobilise the new urban poor should avoid using the traditional language of 
the Left, given that most maintain very centrist political outlooks. Further, despite having sunk
into the ranks of the ‘working class,’ social descent has generally been denied by the new urban 
poor, and attempts at preserving middle-class identities persist. Thus, a more tactful approach 
must be adopted than overtly calling for ‘proletarian revolution.’
Demand Framing: ‘Political’ Citizenship and the Injustice of Social Inequality
One of the methods I have identified to reinvigorate newly urban poor Argentineans to both 
engage more with radical and progressive contentious political movements and at the same 
time confront the contradictions that exist between their present living standards and their 
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imagined better situation is to design appropriate justice frames. I have ascertained several 
perceived injustices, which if exploited prudently through the framing of appropriate demands, 
will attract greater new urban poor involvement.
These including their meritocratic ideals that are inherent in their middle-class habitus and 
which, when violated, is likely to induce anger and their potential engagement with social 
movements that aim to reverse such infringements. The belief that hard work will bring 
success remains fairly high, despite having fallen significantly in the years following the crisis. 
The new poor also maintain a firm belief in educational achievement, even if it no longer acts 
as a guarantee of social mobility. Indeed, education has always been central to both 
Argentinean national and middle-class identity (Mafud, 1985). However, in the post-crisis 
milieu, educational qualifications have assumed more importance as an alternative status 
symbol and as a safety net against indigence, rather than as a guarantee of actually landing a 
professional career now that skilled work is in much shorter supply. In the words of former 
Education Minister Daniel Filmus, “education has become more of a parachute than a 
trampoline” (Minujín, 2004:129). Thus frames which appeal to the injustice of possessing 
superior education and of working hard, yet not being able to enjoy a socially and materially 
corresponding quality of life would be important starting points for movement organisers to 
use to promote mobilisation from those in this social stratum.
Secondly, as mentioned earlier, the new urban poor understand their citizenship in ‘political’ 
not ‘social’ or ‘economic’ terms, so social movement leaders who frame movement demands in 
terms of their ‘democratic rights’ and attribute their impoverishment to the failures of the 
‘political system’ are more likely to succeed in mobilising the new poor to political action than 
by making demands for state welfare or a more redistributive tax system. 
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Research suggests that despite the 2001-02 economic crisis, the idea that Argentina is destined 
to one day become ‘a great country’ has not disappeared in the national imaginary, including 
that of the impoverished middle class (Armony & Armony, 2005:39). One of the primary 
motivations that social scientists have cited for middle-class political mobilisation during 2001-
02 was as an emotional response to the chasm between what they demanded from politics and 
what their political representatives actually delivered (Portantiero, 2002). Importantly, the new 
urban poor continue to remain proud of their country and hold faith in its potential, but have 
positioned themselves as victims of their incompetent, greedy and narcissistic politicians. In 
this sense, not very much has changed since 2002. Anti-political discourse has been repeatedly 
used in Argentina by populists, revolutionaries and nationalists, all of whom have strongly 
criticised representative democracy ever since the 1920s. This includes President Menem in 
the 1990s and Néstor Kirchner post-2003, both whom attempted to promote themselves as 
distant from the political establishment and presented politicians as an obstacle to the country’s 
destined greatness (Armony & Armony, 2005:41). The myth of the Argentinean Dream was 
shaken at the end of 2001, but has recovered since then. Especially in light of its neighbour 
Brazil’s remarkable recent rise as a global economic and political power, the difference now is 
that Argentina’s greatness is something that has become a longer-term hope (and belief) for the 
future, rather than is either attainable nor believable in the ‘now.’
For all these reasons, in order to mobilise the political engagement of the new urban poor, 
social movement coordinators would also be wise to move beyond purely focusing on 
economic grievances and instead utilise justice frames that exploit the low regard they hold for 
their political leaders. At the same time, they should highlight the ‘unfairness’ of their 
unemployment or underemployment and ensure that the mobilising frames they use pertain to 
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the lack of democratic accountability, given that ‘political corruption’ and ‘unemployment’ 
have been the two most important issues of concern cited since 2002. References should be 
made to the fact that the new poor possess a very high level of education and employment 
experience but, in spite of these qualifications and the long hours they put in, their politicians 
have ‘let them down.’ In short, in view of this potential ‘national greatness’ it must be 
pragmatically emphasised that they ‘deserve better’. Aside from rational judgments that are 
based solely on their own interests, new urban poor Argentineans are also open to emotional 
appeals and cultural images. These must be recognised in the attempt to re-capture their 
political engagement. 
‘Equality before the law’ is a further value that the new urban poor hold dear (Mazzoni, 2008). 
Consequently, proposed frames must challenge the enormous gender disadvantages that newly 
impoverished women face (in terms of salaries, opportunities for promotion, etc) and which 
need to be reversed through stricter legislation. As the initial survey results indicated, new 
poverty continues to be a feminised phenomenon and age discrimination also continues to be 
prevalent in the Argentinean labour market, despite nominal attempts by federal government 
administrations to legislate against it (Ozarow, 2008). In order to enfranchise the middle-aged 
in the protest movement, appeals should be made to the difficulty of finding work over the age 
of 40 and the governments’ feeble response to such discrimination. These appeals should be 
littered with references to the prosperous pasts of those in this age group, so as to attempt to 
make them question why things cannot be how they used to be. 
Young adults are significantly over-represented among the new urban poor, yet they did not 
appear to be at the forefront of the protest movement during the 2001-02 crisis. As the main 
‘victims’ of new poverty, unemployment, and downward intergenerational mobility, they need 
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to be ‘brought back in’ to the movement, perhaps by prioritising the mobilisation of the young 
by targeting university campuses. Indeed, Argentina maintains relatively high levels of access 
to higher education among the poorest sectors of society, so there is no more appropriate 
‘incubator’ or site of social integration from which to unite the children of the new and 
structural poor than at university. 
All of these appeals for participation in the movement must be made without compromising 
strongly anti-capitalist principles, but appropriate, non-aggressive semantics should be found to 
do so. If the social movement is successful in engaging the newly poor in some of the 
collective actions mentioned, then it increases the likelihood that they will end up concluding 
that capitalism must be replaced for all the reasons mentioned. However, caution must be 
urged against repeating the same old sloganeering and dogmatic language or approaches of the 
past, which research (Almeyra, 2004) has shown are likely to repel such citizens. 
10.3 Suggestions for Future Research
This study has provided an in-depth examination of new urban poor responses to pauperisation 
and downward social mobility in Argentina. However, an important caveat must be added to 
these results. Some of the limitations of using closed secondary data and quantitative sources as 
the basis for explanations of new urban poor behaviour have been noted. For example, the ISCA 
Survey’s emphasis on ‘income’ (albeit in both monetary and non-monetary forms) as a central 
indicator of household wellbeing and behavioural motivation, rather than feelings of ‘love,’ 
‘hope’, ‘solidarity’ or other categories which newly poor citizens may have expressed 
themselves, limit the explanatory power of this research. The results are therefore tentative and 
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this thesis may prove most useful as a much-needed quantitative framework for additional 
qualitative research. This could build on previous studies, so that a more comprehensive 
understanding can be reached about political responses to new impoverishment and the current 
new urban poor can be given a voice to describe their own motivations. 
Other emerging themes from this research that require further investigation include the question 
of why two-thirds of the country’s new urban poor did not engage in any collective actions, 
despite the climate of economic chaos and social unrest in 2002. Understanding political docility 
(why citizens refrain from involvement in protest) during times of economic crises is an under-
researched issue, despite being equally as important for social movement theorists as explaining 
political mobilisation itself (a far more common approach). Conducting interviews or focus 
groups with non-participants in the 2001-02 protests would help to achieve this end. 
Further work is also needed that compares how impoverishment has translated into political 
resistance cross-nationally. A brief and provisional attempt was made here, which identified 
that politicisation is more likely to occur in countries where, on the one hand, the dominant 
class has lost hegemonic control and the ‘consent to rule’ from its citizens and, on the other, 
sufficient political spaces exist for citizens to engage in collective action. 
Interestingly, the radicalisation of a significant part of the new urban poor has been witnessed
not just in countries where there is a strong political culture of middle-class engagement in 
collective action, like Greece or Spain, but also in those like Iceland and Cyprus, where the 
middle class has a history of expressing their political dissatisfaction more passively under 
neo-liberalism, and without acting collectively or taking their protests to the streets. In these 
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instances, political radicalisation was unexpected and accompanied by crises of political 
legitimacy. It adopted horizontal organising and leadership structures and was agitated for 
outside of political party structures, trade unions or formal organisations. These outbreaks of 
new urban poor militancy can be ascribed to situations where a crisis of legitimacy in the 
state’s institutions has occurred and political spaces for resistance have opened. The results
found that the new urban poor are much more likely to understand their pauperisation as a 
political problem that requires a political response under these circumstances. However, in 
national contexts where wide-scale new impoverishment has occurred but where the dominant 
class has successfully enacted ‘defensive strategies’ of control, resistance has tended to confine 
itself to the economic realm. Russia and South Africa are examples of this scenario. 
Cross-national comparative work is also required because the social, political and economic 
contexts under which the new urban poor have both emerged and exist today are vastly distinct 
in different societies. If the goal is to assist new urban poor radicalisation, then a more 
profound understanding of these citizens’ conditions, especially in non-Western contexts, must 
be obtained. Further, it must be remembered that new urban poor mobilisation is not inevitably 
politically ‘progressive’ and may indeed also take a fascist turn, as it has seems to have done in 
current-day Greece.  Such cross-national comparisons will help to shed light on the political 
trajectories and manifestations that different new urban poor movements might adopt.
Certain universal values that the pauperised middle class possess – such as aspiration, 
education and hard work – cut across national boundaries and should be borne in mind by 
social movement coordinators in the mobilising frames they use to engage them in collective 
action. However, there are also differences in these values which must be explored further. 
For example, I concluded that in Argentina, justice frames should focus on the infringement of 
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democratic citizenship rather than on social and economic rights; however in Russia, due to the 
legacy of state socialism and welfare protection, the opposite is the case. References to loss of 
social protection and the ‘right’ to a certain standard of living are likely to induce more of a 
mobilising impact there than frames that appeal to their ‘democratic rights’ or demand 
immediate political participation. A tradition of top-down government and weak democracy in 
Russia necessitate a different approach in that country. 
10.4 New Urban Poor Radicalism – Past, Present and Future
The lower strata of the middle class - the small tradespeople, shopkeepers, and retired tradesmen 
generally…all these sink gradually into the proletariat, partly because they are swamped by 
competition with the large capitalists and partly because their specialised skill is rendered worthless 
by new methods of production. 
Karl Marx, Communist Manifesto, 1848 
Neo-liberalism’s hegemonic crisis in Argentina during 2001-02 swept through the entire range 
of capitalism’s institutions, even those that possess reformist objectives (like the left-wing 
parties and trade unions). Instead, the mobilising structures that the new urban poor were 
involved in were more organic and amorphous, originating in unplanned and informally 
organised gatherings, which turned into politically independent popular assemblies or civil 
society associations. This illustrates newly impoverished citizens’ ability to establish or 
participate in innovative and exciting counter-hegemonic projects, such as the popular 
assemblies, workers cooperatives, the barter system and mass protest through the cacerolazos. 
The informal nature, independent organisation and scale of newly poor citizens’ involvement in 
these actions indicate their revolutionary potential, especially when they collaborate with those 
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in other deprived sectors of society and when they come to develop a shared class 
consciousness. 
However, whilst the refusal of many neighbourhood assemblies to negotiate with the state or 
become institutionalised (Svampa & Corral, 2006) was wise in the sense that it helped them to 
avoid compromising their counter-hegemonic project, they were trapped in a double bind. 
Without some kind of permanent alternative, non-institutionalised mobilising vehicle, it was 
impossible to maintain the momentum of collective action beyond 2002. This shortcoming of 
the movement caused it to eventually die away and led to a return of the status quo -
representative democracy (albeit with slightly increased channels for democratic participation) 
and capitalism (in a neo-developmentalist, rather than an entirely neoliberal form) after 2003. 
Seven years after the crisis in Argentina, average salaries had still not returned to the levels that 
they were in October 2001 (Neffa et al., 2009) and a third of its population could still be 
described as ‘impoverished middle class’ (Grupo CCR, 2009). In many ways, the movement 
which formed in December 2001 and that demanded ‘¡Qué se vayan todos!’ has been defeated.  
This led those who became pauperised but politically radicalised at the time to retreat back into 
private responses by 2003, whilst they have become demoralised, alienated and even more 
politically cynical since then. This is why this research has proposed a variety of collective 
self-improvement strategies that could act as alternative mobilising vehicles with a better 
chance of securing the movements’ continuity next time. 
The importance of searching for such strategies is all the more pronounced at the time of
writing (early 2013), for several reasons. Firstly, due to significant disagreements in how both 
price inflation and the Basic Shopping Basket of goods are measured, there is an enormous 
disparity between the government’s official estimated poverty rate of 6.5% and those of 
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‘independent’ consultancies like EcoLatina (32%), the Catholic University of Argentina (22%) 
and the ATE trade union (37%) (Kanenguiser, 2012). However, what is clear is that since 2007 
both inflation and the cost of living have risen sharply as the economy has slowed. This has 
swelled the ranks of the new urban poor again and in particular, has plunged millions of 
‘middle-class’ Argentineans below the poverty line once more. 
At the same time, a mass protest movement (8-N or 8th November) has emerged since late 2012
which, led by the struggling middle class and fuelled by anti-government media and 
personalities such as journalist Jorge Lanata, has marked the return of the cacerolazo as a form 
of protest and has witnessed hundreds of thousands of citizens on the streets of Argentina’s 
urban centres (Svampa, 2012). Yet, carrying with them a range of demands from the 
‘economic’ (freedom to withdraw dollars, halting inflation), the ‘social’ (opposing rising 
crime) and ‘political’ (against the re-election of Cristina Kirchner), these demonstrations and 
their demands have been interpreted as reactionary - in sharp contrast to the spirit of 2001 –
despite citizens’ understandings of Argentina’s failing representative democracy being one of 
the root causes, this marking continuity between the movements of a decade ago and today 
(Svampa, 2012). Despite further continuities in terms of the autonomous strategies and tactics 
of the movement, this time, the poor and working class are no longer seen as common allies 
against capitalism or the ruling class, but as enemies in the eyes of the impoverished middle 
class. This illustrates how easily participants in progressive and potentially revolutionary 
movements during times of hegemonic crisis can also search for scapegoats and adopt 
reactionary demands during periods when the political hegemony is restored. 
In this sense, this thesis utilises the case of Argentina to argue for autonomist Marxism and 
emphasises citizens’ ability to become the primary motor of change. This may come about 
302
through the organisation of autonomous networks that use horizontal decision-making 
structures rather than hierarchical forms (like those offered by the traditional trade unions and 
political parties). Echoing the writings of theorists such as Negri and Hardt (2004), this thesis 
makes the case for self-organised collective action by the new urban poor, who should 
coordinate their responses with other elements of the working class. 
The role of social movements should be restricted to assistance in establishing and supporting 
collective self-help activities, rather than playing an ‘educational’ role themselves in which 
they impart their knowledge to their subjects. Thus, it is through these practical experiences 
and regular participation in such initiatives that participants can ‘discover’ their class 
consciousness organically, without this sort of intervention or that of political parties, the 
unions or the state, all of whom were entirely absent in the formation of the resistance 
movements that emerged during 2001-02. Indeed, it was arguably the very interventions of 
left-wing party militants and their sectarianism during 2002 that inadvertently led to the 
breakdown of the popular assemblies (Almeyra, 2004) and the other social movements. This 
has led to the specific rejection of the involvement of organised party, union or state structures 
in future movements (as currently evidenced by the dynamics of the bourgeoning 8-N 
movement). 
Here I therefore appeal for a return to the original writings of Marx and Engels who, in  The 
German Ideology (1845) rejected non-materialist, abstract idealism and argued that the 
working class is capable of gaining rational insight into its plight as the downtrodden product 
of capitalism by following its own instincts. In the spirit of these writings, I reject the notion 
that the working class (including the proletarianised ‘new urban poor’) need to be ‘taught the 
gift of Marxism’ by a vanguard of Marxist theoreticians and sees this view as condescending, 
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elitist and alien from Marxist thought. Clearly, in the absence of a vanguard party to mobilise 
and then remobilise citizens, some kind of alternative organisation is still required to help 
maintain the continuity of the movement and guide the flourishing of the ‘good sense.’ It is 
argued here that collective self-help forums constructed from below can provide this role, as 
part of a broader movement which should include street mobilisations, popular assemblies, 
public forums to debate strategy and tactics and attempts to construct counter-hegemonic 
economic models through worker-recovered companies and the gradual replacement of the 
money system with barter or parallel alternatives. At the same time, workers must be allowed
to develop their revolutionary potential and direction endogenously. The feasibility of such a 
proposal must also be researched further, but it surely provides the best opportunity for the 
masses both in Argentina and beyond to achieve true emancipation. 
Detailed analysis of new urban poor action in Argentina and references that were made to other 
national contexts illustrate that the radicalisation of newly poor citizens could potentially occur 
anywhere where political legitimacy breaks down, although such mobilisation is more likely to 
arise during major financial crises. The leaders of many Western nations have certainly 
become increasingly worried about the possibility of an outbreak of radical, struggling middle-
class protest during the current financial crisis (Campbell, 2008). This would become even 
more plausible if a significant proportion of the population were to fall victim to the spectre of 
pauperisation or proletarianisation, especially in light of the events in Iceland. According to a 
recent Eurostat report (2012), 24% of the EU’s non-poor population (or 120 million citizens) 
are currently at risk of poverty or social exclusion, in addition to the 9% who are already 
materially deprived. 
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The principal difference in Western Europe, compared to Argentina, is that civil society and 
reformist institutions are much more deeply embedded into the political superstructure. 
Therefore, the hegemony of the dominant class would surely not disintegrate as easily or as 
quickly. In Europe, a crisis of political legitimacy resulting from a financial catastrophe would 
probably be tempered by the reformist institutions of civil society, which remain in a much 
stronger condition than their Argentinean equivalent. However, as the European Union’s 
sovereign debt crisis persists and deepens, there are already signs of a loss of faith in the 
political system among significant proportions of the population in many member states and 
the prospect of systemic economic collapse has far from disappeared. How new poor citizens 
respond to financial shocks and their personal social descent looks set to become one of the 
defining issues of the early 21st century. 
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V1 - The decision to 
participate in collective 
protest was sparked by 
their own impoverishment 
rather than other factors.
0.98* ---
Participated in collective protest actions: prior 
to impoverishment (20.4%); after 
impoverishment (20.1%).
V2 - The decision to 
participate in collective 
self-improvement was 




Participated in collective self-improvement 
actions: prior to impoverishment (9.9%); after 
impoverishment (12.4%).
V3 - The decision to 
participate in all collective 
actions was sparked by 
their own impoverishment 
rather than other factors.
0.17* ---
Participated in any collective actions: prior to 
impoverishment (23.6%); after 
impoverishment (28.3%).
APPENDICES
Appendix I: Analysis of dependent variables contributing to differences in response category among the new urban poor in 2002 (ISCA Survey data)







V4 - Households that lost 
between half and all of 
their income were more 
likely to collectively protest 
than those that just slipped 
below the poverty line 
without losing income.
0.06* 0.09
Participated in collective protest: Households 
that lost no income (16%). Households that 
lost 50-100% of their income (28%). Of those 
households that had members who protested, 
mean income loss was 31%, whereas for 
those that didn’t protest, it was only 23%.
H3 - Depth of 
Impoverishment
V5 - More deeply 
impoverished households 
pursued a greater number 
of individual self-
improvement actions than 
those that were less 
deeply impoverished.
--- 0.01
Mean ‘rank’ number of individual self-
improvement responses pursued by the most 
impoverished = 2.8; and by the least 
impoverished = 2.4.
V6 - More deeply 
impoverished households 
were more likely to pursue 
collective self-
improvement responses 
than those that were less 
impoverished.
0.5* ---
(17%) of the most impoverished pursued a 
collective self-improvement action compared 
to (13%) of the least impoverished.
V7 - More deeply 
impoverished households 
were more likely to pursue 
greater numbers of all self-
improvement responses 
than those that were less 
impoverished.
--- 0.01
Mean ‘rank’ number of any self-improvement 
responses pursued by the most impoverished 
= 3.2 and by the least impoverished = 2.5.
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V8 - More deeply 
impoverished households 
were more likely to pursue 
collective protests than 
those that were less 
impoverished.
0.7* ---
(21%) of the most impoverished pursued a 
collective protest action compared to (17%) of 









V9 - Those households 
that pursued a wider range 
of self-improvement 
strategies were more likely 
to have also participated in 
collective protest than 
those pursuing fewer self-
improvement strategies.
0.00* ---
Of those who pursued a low-range (0-2) of 
self-improvement strategies, (13%) engaged 
in collective protest actions compared to 
(31.4%) of those who pursued a wider range 
(3-11) of such strategies. 
V10- Those households 
that pursued a wider range 
of individual self-
improvement strategies 
were more likely to have 




Of those who pursued a low-range (0-2) of 
individual self-improvement strategies, (9%) 
also engaged in collective self-improvement 
actions compared to (18%) of those who 
pursued a wider range (3-11) of such actions.
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V11 - Among newly 
impoverished households 
there was there a positive 
association between 
involvement in collective 




Of those who participated in collective protest 
actions, (21%) also participated in a collective 
self-improvement action compared to (10%) 





V12 - Women were more 
likely to belong to 
households that participated 
in collective protest
0.4* ---
(25.5%) of new urban poor women belonged 
to households that participated in collective 
protests compared to (20.6%) of new urban 
poor men.
V13 - Women were more 
likely to belong to 




(13.8%) of new urban poor women belonged 
to households that participated in collective 
self-improvement actions compared to 
(10.3%) of those with men.
V14 - Women were more 
likely to belong to 
households that participated 
in a greater no. of self-
improvement actions.
--- 0.97
Women belonged to households that 
participated in an average of 2.7 self-
improvement strategies compared to an 
average of 2.6 for men. 
H6 - Age
V15 - Young adults were 
more likely to belong to 
households that participated 
in collective protests than 
other age groups.
0.7 ---
Household participation in collective protest: 
Over 65-year olds (11%), 50-64 year olds 
(25%), 35-49 year olds (21%) and 18-34 year 
olds (18%).
V16- The middle-aged were 
more likely to belong to hhs 
participating in collective 
self-improvement actions.
0.2 ---
Household participation rates in collective 
self-improvement: Over 65-year olds (0%), 
50-64 year olds (10%), 35-49 year olds 





V17 - The middle-aged 
were more likely to belong 
to hhs that participated in a 
wider range of individual 
self-improvement actions.
V17a –Older people were 
more likely to benefit from 
financial help from outside 
the household (friends and 
acquaintances) than 
younger people.
V18 - Those with history of 
affiliation to a collective 
organisation were more 








Households that participated in a wide-range 
of individual self-improvement strategies: 
Over 65-year olds (66%), 50-64 year-olds 
(33%), 35-49 year olds (27%) 18-34 year-olds 
(33%),
Households that received financial aid from 
outside their household including: Over 65-
year olds (33%), 50-64 year olds (4%), 35-49 
year olds (8%) and 18-34 year olds (15%).
Collective protest participation rates among 
those in households that had belonged to a 
collective organisation (54%); had not (19%).
Location H8 - Location
V19 - Households located 
in urban areas were more 
likely to pursue collective 
protest actions than those 
in rural areas.
0.4* ---
INVALID RESULT – Rural sample was 
unrepresentative of the national rural 
population. Households that participated in 
collective protest: Rurally located (27.3%); 
Urban located (19.2%).
V20 - Households located 
in rural areas were more 
likely to pursue collective 
self-improvement actions 
than those in urban areas.
0.82* ---
INVALID RESULT – Rural sample was 
unrepresentative of the national rural 
population. Households that participated in a 
collective self-improvement action: Rurally 
located (15.2%); Urban located (12.1%)
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V21 - Households located 
in urban areas were more 
likely to pursue any 
collective actions than 
those in rural areas.
0.09* ---
INVALID RESULT – Rural sample was 
unrepresentative of the national rural 
population. Households that participated in a 
collective action of any kind: Rurally located 
(42.4%); Urban located (26.7%)
V22 - Households located 
in urban areas pursued 
more self-improvement 
actions (of both types) 
than those in rural areas.
--- 0.2
INVALID RESULT – Rural sample was 
unrepresentative of the national rural 
population. Average number of self-
improvement actions performed by 
households in: Urban settings (2.6); Rural 
settings (3.0)
V23 – Households in The 
City of Buenos Aires were 
more likely to participate in 
collective actions than
those in the Interior 





New urban poor households that participated 
in a collective action: City of Buenos Aires (33 
%); Greater Buenos Aires (25%); The
Provinces (29%).
New urban poor households that participated 
in a collective protest: City of Buenos Aires 
(17%); Greater Buenos Aires (17%); The
Provinces (25%).
New urban poor households that participated 
in a collective action: City of Buenos Aires
(17%); Greater Buenos Aires (8%); The








V24 - Those households 
with an 
unemployed/inactive head 
were more likely to have 
participated in all collective 
actions than those with 
employed ones.
0.11* ---
Participation in all collective actions: among 
the employed (32.6%); among the 
unemployed or economically inactive (22.2%). 
V25 - Those households 
with an 
unemployed/inactive head 




Participation in collective self-improvement: 
among those with employed heads of 
households (15.5%); among those with 
unemployed or economically inactive heads 
(6.5%).
V26 - Those households 
with an unemployed or 
inactive head were more 
likely to have participated 
in collective protest than
those with employed ones.
0.96* ---
Participation in collective protest: among the 
employed (20.4%); among the unemployed or 
economically inactive (19.4%).
V27 - Those households 
with an unemployed/
inactive head were more 
likely to participate in a 
wider range of individual
self-improvement actions 
than those with employed 
heads.
0.06* ---
Among households with an inactive or 
unemployed head (39.8%) of the new urban 
poor participated in a wide range of individual 
self-improvement actions, compared to 
(28.6%) for those with an employed head of 
household.
V28 - Those households 
with unemployed or 
inactive heads were more 
likely to participate in wider
range of all self-
improvement actions than 
0.23* ---
In households with an inactive/unemployed 
head, (44%) participated in a wide range of all 
self-improvement actions, compared to (36%) 
of those with an employed head of household. 
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H10 - Hours 
worked
V29 - Those households 
that worked fewer average 
paid hours were more 
likely to participate in 
collective protest than 
those working more hours.
0.11 ---
The proportion of those new urban poor who 
in households that participated in collective 
protests (among those that worked the 
following average hours)were: Didn’t dedicate 
time to a paid employment (0 average hours)
(15%); 1-20 average hours (19%); 21-40 
average hours (24%); 41-60 average hours 
(37%).
V30 - Those households 
that worked fewer average 
paid hours were more 
likely to participate in a 
wider range of all self-
improvement actions than 
those working more hours.
0.26 ---
The proportion of those new urban poor who 
in households that participated in a wider 
range of all self improvement strategies 
(among those that worked the following 
average hours)were:
Didn’t dedicate time to a paid employment (0 
average hours) (46%); 1-20 average hours 
(33%); 21-40 average hours (35%); 41-60 
average hours (42%).
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V31 - Those households 
that worked fewer average 
paid hours were more 
likely to participate in a 
wider range of individual 
self-improvement actions 
than those working more 
hours.
0.03 ---
The proportion of those new urban poor who 
in households that participated in a wider 
range of individual self improvement 
strategies that worked the following average 
hours were:
Didn’t dedicate time to a paid employment (0 
average hours) (44%); 1-20 average hours 
(28%); 21-40 average hours (26%); 41-60 
average hours (32%).
H11 - Public or 
private sector 
employment
V32 - Public sector 
workers were more likely 
to belong to households 
that participated in all
collective actions than 
those in the private sector.
0.9* ---
(36%) of new urban poor public sector 
workers and (33%) of private sector workers 
belonged to households that participated in all 
types of collective action.
V33 - Public sector 
workers were more likely 
to belong to households 
that participated in 
collective protests than 




(28%) of public sector workers were in 
households that participated in collective 
protest, compared to (20%) in the private 
sector^. Test assumptions violated.
(29.6%) of those with public sector job 
histories joined collective protests compared 






sector of the 
economy
V34 - Primary and 
secondary sector workers 
were more likely to belong 
to hhs that participated in 
collective actions than 
tertiary sector workers.
0.7* ---
(41%) of primary and secondary sector 
workers and (33%) of tertiary sector workers 
belonged to households that participated in 
any collective action.
V35 - Primary and 
secondary sector workers 
were more likely to belong 
to hhs that participated in 
collective protests than 
tertiary sector workers.
1* ---
(23.5%) of primary and secondary sector 
workers and (23.5%) of tertiary sector workers 
belonged to households that participated in a 
collective protest.
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H13 - Type of 
household 
income source
V36 - Those households 
without a work income 
source were more likely to 




Of those households with at least one salary 
earner, (28%) pursued a ‘wide-range’ of 
individual self-improvement strategies,
compared to (57%) of those without such an 
income source. 
V37 - Those households 
without a work income 
source were more likely to 
engage in a wider range of 
all self-help strategies.
0.00* ---
In households with at least one salary earner,
(35%) pursued a ‘wide-range’ of all self-
improvement strategies. In those with no such 




V38 - Females were more 
likely to become newly 
poor than males.
0.01* ---
(60%) of the new urban poor was female and 
(40%) was male. In the general population, 
(53%) was female and (47%) was male. 
H15- Age
V39 - Young adults (18-
34) and the middle-aged 
(50-64) were more likely to 
become newly poor than 
the elderly (over 65s) or 
35-49 year-olds.
0.00 ---
(55%) of the new urban poor was aged 18-34, 
compared to (41%) of the general population. 
(3%) of the new urban poor sample was made 
up of the elderly (65+), though these 
represented (14%) of the general population. 
Among 35-49 and 50-64 year-olds, 
differences in their proportions of the general 
and new urban poor populations were within 
5% of each other.
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H16- Sector
V40 - Those working in the 
‘services sector’ were
disproportionately affected 
by new poverty (compared 
to extraction/
manufacturing)
V41 - Those working in the 
public sector were 
disproportionately affected 
by new poverty compared 





Out of the new urban poor, (14%) worked in 
the extractive or manufacturing sectors while 
(86%) worked in services. In the general 
population, (20%) worked in the extractive or 
manufacturing sectors while (80%) worked in 
services.
(61%) of the new urban poor worked in the 
private sector. (39%) worked in the state or 
local government sector. Within the general 
population, (72%) worked in the private sector 
and (28%) worked for the state or local 
government.
H17 - Location
V42 - New poverty 
affected urban inhabitants 
more than those living in 
rural areas.
0.002* ---
INVALID RESULT – Rural sample was 
unrepresentative of the national rural 
population. (10.5%) of the new urban poor are 
rural inhabitants, compared to (17.3%) of the 
general population. (89.5%) of the new urban 
poor live in urban areas, but among the 





Plan Jefes y 
Jefas de Hogar
(unemployment 




V43 - What percentage of 
the new urban poor were 
in receipt of Plan Jefes y 
Jefas de Hogar?
--- ---
1.3% of the new urban poor belonged to 
households in receipt of Plan Jefes y Jefas de 
Hogar. A further 9% actually applied (of which 
81% were eligible), but were not in receipt of 
the Plan.
V44 - Of the new urban 
poor households that were 
eligible but not in receipt of 
the Plan, what were the 
reasons?
--- ---
(32%) were told they must wait more time to 
qualify fully; (27%) were told that as there 
were limited places, the local area had 
exceeded its quota and so they could not 
receive the benefit; (41%) were told that they 
would receive the benefits but hadn’t yet done 
so.
V45 - Why did those new 
urban poor households 
that were not registered 
not do so?
--- ---
(71%) were in households that had work or 
did not qualify for some other reason. (23%) 
did not want the Plan. (6.4%) were either 

























Percentages/Mean ranks of each 
variable
Political C1 Ideology
V46 - Did the political 
ideology of the new urban 
poor change in terms of 
their position on the political 
spectrum? 
0 = Very left-wing








1995:Left (23%) Centre (60%) Right (17%) 
2002:Left (26%) Centre (52%) Right (22%)
2005:Left (17%) Centre (61%) Right (22%)
Mean ranks: 
1995:4.75 (slightly to the Left) 
2002:4.85 (slightly to the Left) 
2005:5.21 (slightly to the Right).
1995 
2002
0.60 0.20 1995:Left (23%) Centre (60%) Right (17%) 
2002:Left (26%) Centre (52%) Right (22%)
1995 
2005
0.30 -0.90 1995:Left (23%) Centre (60%) Right (17%) 
2005:Left (17%) Centre (61%) Right (22%)
2002 
2005
0.85 0.40 2002:Left (26%) Centre (52%) Right (22%) 
2005:Left (17%) Centre (61%) Right (22%) 
Appendix II Analysis of dependent variables contributing to differences in social and political attitudes among the new urban poorin 1995, 2002 





V47 - Do you 
wholeheartedly support 
democracy at all costs or is 
there a place for 







1995:Wholly support democracy (81%) 
Room for authoritarianism/no pref. (19%) 
2002:Wholly support democracy (72%) 
Room for authoritarianism/no pref. (28%) 
2005:Wholly support democracy (69%) 
Room for authoritarianism/no pref. (31%) 
Political
V48 - Do you 
wholeheartedly support 
democracy at all costs or is 
there a place for 





1995:Wholly support democracy (81%) 
Room for authoritarianism/no pref. (19%) 
2002:Wholly support democracy (72%) 




2002:Wholly support democracy (72%) 
Room for authoritarianism/no pref. (28%) 
2005:Wholly support democracy (69%) 




1995:Wholly support democracy (81%) 
Room for authoritarianism/no pref. (19%) 
2005:Wholly support democracy (69%) 






1 = A lot
2 = some
3 = a little
4 = none
V49 - How much 
confidence do you have in 
the Government? 
1995:A lot (2%) some 
(24%) A little (25%), None 
(49%)
2002:A lot (1%) Some (2%) 
A little (15%) None (82%)
2005:Alot (3%) Some(14%) 












Mean ranks: 1995 = 3.21 2005 = 3.19
V50 - How much 
confidence do you have in 
Political Parties? 
1995:A lot (1%) some 
(20%) A little (44%), None 
(35%)
2002:A lot (0%) Some (7%) 
A little (14%) None (79%)
2005:A lot(0%) Some (11%) 













Mean ranks: 1995 = 3.14, 2002 = 3.72
Mean ranks: 2002 = 3.72,2005 = 3.42
Mean ranks: 1995 = 3.14,2005 = 3.42
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V51 - How much 
confidence do you have in 
the Judiciary? 
1995:A lot (6%) some 
(25%) A little (44%), None 
(25%)
2002:A lot (0%) Some (6%) 
A little (24%) None (70%)
2005:A lot (3%) Some 














Mean ranks: 1995 = 2.89, 2002 = 3.63
Mean ranks: 2002 = 3.63,2005 = 3.5
Mean ranks: 1995 = 2.89,2005 = 3.5
V52 - How much confidence 
do you have in the Police? 
1995: A lot (5%) Some 
(31%) A little (33%), None 
(31%)
2002: A lot (5%) Some 
(14%) A little (27%) None 
(54%)
2005: A lot (11%) Some 














Mean ranks: 1995 = 2.90, 2002 = 3.28
Mean ranks: 2002 = 3.28,  2005 = 2.86
Mean ranks: 1995 = 2.90,  2005 = 2.86
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V53 - How much confidence 
do you have in the Church? 
1995:A lot (23%) some 
(43%)A little (19%), None 
(15%)
2002:A lot (21%) Some (25%) 
A little (24%) None (30%)
2005:A lot (31%) Some(28%) 












Mean ranks: 1995 = 2.27 2005 = 2.31
V54 - How much confidence 
do you have in the Armed 
Forces? 
1995:A lot (11%)Some (29%) 
A little (31%), None (29%)
2002:A lot (6%) Some (19%) A 
little (25%) None (50%)
2005:A lot(3%) Some(26%) A 













Mean ranks: 1995 = 2.77, 2002 = 3.20
Mean ranks: 2002 = 3.20,2005 = 3.03
Mean ranks: 1995 = 2.77,2005 = 3.03
344
V55 - How much confidence 
do you have in the Trade 
Unions? 
1995:A lot(4%)Some (11%)A 
little (37%), None (48%)
2002:N/A
2005:A lot(5%) Some(14%) A 





Mean ranks: 1995 = 3.292005 = 3.39
V56 - How much confidence 
do you have in the Press? 
1995:A lot(9%)Some (41%) A 
little (41%), None (9%)
2002:N/A
2005:Alot(0%)Some(49%)A 
little (17%) None (34%)
1995
2005
--- 0.08 Mean ranks: 1995 = 2.50,2005 = 2.86
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V57 - How much confidence 
do you have in the Public 
Administration? 
1995:A lot (2%)Some (19%)A 
little (43%), None (36%)
2002:A lot (2%) Some (14%) A 
little (32%) None (52%)
2005:A lot(8%) Some(28%) A 












Mean ranks: 1995 = 3.13 2005 = 2.94
V58 - How much confidence 
do you have in the National 
Congress?
1995:A lot (4%)Some (22%)A 
little (39%), None (35%)
2002:A lot (1%) Some (8%) A 
little (21%) None (70%)
2005:A lot(0%) Some (8%)A 













Mean ranks: 1995 = 3.05, 2002 = 3.61
Mean ranks: 2002 = 3.61,2005 = 3.36
Mean ranks: 1995 = 3.05,2005 = 3.36
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V59 - How much confidence in 
Private Companies? 
1995:A lot(3%)Some (25%) A 
little (35%), None (37%)
2002:A lot (1%) Some (16%) A 
little (25%) None (58%)
2005:A lot(3%) Some(36%) A 













Mean ranks: 1995 = 3.04, 2002 = 3.39
Mean ranks: 2002 = 3.39,2005 = 2.92
Mean ranks: 1995 = 3.04,2005 = 2.92
V60 - How much confidence 
do you have in Television? 
1995:A lot (5%); Some (36%);
A little (44%), None (15%)
2002:A lot (3%); Some (32%);  
A little (27%) None (38%)
2005:A lot (3%); Some (22%);  
A little (53%) None (22%)
V61 - How much confidence 
do you have in the President? 
2005:A lot (6%), Some (33%), 
A little (28%), None (33%)






















Mean ranks: 1995 = 2.69, 2002 = 2.99
Mean ranks: 2002 = 2.99,2005 = 2.94
Mean ranks: 1995 = 2.69,2005 = 2.94
2002:Approve of President (9%); Disapprove 
of President (91%)
2005:Approve of President (49%); 
Disapprove of President (51%)
1995:Very (14%), Fairly (29%), A little (38%), 
Not at all (18%)
2005:Very (19%), Fairly (31%), A little (22%), 






V63 - Who do you blame for 
the economic crisis?
2002 --- ---
Government’s economic policy (70%)IMF 
(38%)
Globalisation (26%)
The banks (21%) 
Lack of domestic production (20%)
Lack of individual enterprise (18%)









V64 - What is the most 
important problem facing 
the country?
1995 --- ---
Unemployment (44%), Low salaries (13%), 
Health (12%), Corruption (11%), Education 
(11%), Poverty (4%), Crime (2%), Youth 
Opportunities (1%), Inflation (1%).
2002 --- ---
Unemployment (38%), Corruption (20%), 
Poverty (9%), Low salaries (6%), 
Education (6%), Inflation (5%), Crime 
(4%), Human Rights (3%), Health (3%), 
Youth Opportunities (3%), Drugs (2%).
2005 --- ---
Unemployment (17%), Corruption (17%), 
Political situation (17%), Education (14%), 
Other (14%), Crime (8%), Poverty (6%), 
Immigration (3%), Health (3%), Low 
salaries (3%).
C6 Crime
V65 - How has crime 





2002:Increased (99%), Decreased/ stayed
same (1%).
2005:Increased (92%), Decreased/stayed 
the same (8%).
V66 - Have you or a 
member of your family been 







1995 (30%), 2002 (53%), 2005 (64%).
C7 
Immigration
V67 - Do you agree with the 
statement ‘immigrants take 
away our jobs?’
2002 --- ---
Strongly agree (15%), Agree (28%), 
Neither agree nor disagree (14%), 
Disagree (33%); Strongly disagree (9%). 
In total: (44%) Agreed (42%); Disagreed 





V68 - Do you agree with the 
statement ‘success in life 





1995:Agree (60%); Disagree 






V69 - Do you agree with the 
statement ‘success in life 






1995:Agree (75%); Disagree (25%). 
2002:Agree (60%); Disagree (40%).
C10 
Prospects
V70 - What are the 
prospects for you and your 
family in the next 12 
months? 1 = Better 2 = 






1995: Better (18%); Worse (44%). 
2002: Better (18%); Worse (47%). 
2005: Better (24%); Worse (38%).
V71 - Does gender make a 
difference to the degree of 
optimism about future 
prospects? 1 = Better 2 = 
Same 3 = Worse
1995 0.41 0.39
Men: Better (12%); Worse (46%). 
Women: Better (23%); Worse (42%). 
Mean rank Men: 2.3 Women 2.2
2002 0.38 0.29
Men: Better (14%); Worse (49%). 
Women: Better (22%); Worse (44%). 
Mean rank Men: 2.4 Women 2.2
2005 0.97 0.87
Men: Better (27%); Worse (36%). 
Women: Better (24%); Worse (38%). 
Mean rank Men: 2.1 Women 2.1
350
Personal
V72 - Does age make a 
difference to the degree of 
optimism about future 
prospects? 
1 = Better 2 = Same 3 = 
Worse
1995 0.65+ 0.61
Age 18-34: Better (20%); Worse (43%). 
Age 35-49: Better (16%); Worse (39%). 
Age 50-64: Better (13%); Worse (60%). 
Age 65 and over N/A (Violated test 
assumptions) 
Mean ranks: Age 18-34 = 2.2 Age 35-49 = 






Age 18-34: Better (20%); Worse (41%). 
Age 50-64: Better (13%); Worse (60%).
Age 18-34: Better (20%); Worse (41%). 
Age 35-49: Better (19%); Worse (48%). 
Age 50-64: Better (13%); Worse (60%). 
Age 65 and over N/A (Violated test 
assumptions) 
Mean ranks: Age 18-34 = 2.2; Age 35-49 = 
2.3; Age 50-64 = 2.5 Age over 65 = 2.3
2005 ---+ 0.63
(Crosstabs violated test assumptions) 
Mean ranks: Age 18-34 = 1.9; Age 35-49 = 





V73 - Would you vote for 
the government or an 
opposition party (in protest) 
if there was an election 
tomorrow?
V74 - Would you vote for 
the government or an 
opposition party/not vote (in 
protest) if there was an 
election tomorrow?
V75 - Have you or has 














1995:80% would vote for an opposition 
(not governing) party as a form of protest.
2005: 40% would vote for an opposition 
(not governing) party as a form of protest.
In 1995:81% either wouldn’t vote or would 
vote for the opposition as a form of protest. 
In 2005:71% either wouldn’t vote or would 
vote for the opposition as a form of protest.
2002:Yes (44%) No (56%) 






V76 - Does age make a 
difference to whether 
emigration is considered as 
an individual self-
improvement strategy?
V77 - Does level of 
optimism about prospects 
associate with decision to 
emigrate?
V78 - Are more nationalistic 
Argentineans historically 



















Considered emigration: Age 18-34 (52%); 
35-49 (44%); 49-64 (39%); 65 & over 
(17%).
Considered emigration: Age 18-34 (50%); 
35-49 (50%); 49-64 (40%); 65 & over (0%)
Considered emigration: 
Under-40 (54%); Over-40 (33%).
Considered emigration: 
Under-40 (53%); Over-40 (21%).
Those who thought things would get better 
(42%); Would get worse (43%).
Participated in collective protest: Proud of 







V79 - Did unemployment 
change as a relative 





They or a household member were 
out of work in the last 12 months 
2002:(63%) 2005:(50%)
C16 Gender
V80 - Were women 
disproportionately 
affected by new poverty?
1995 0.02* ---
Population: Men (49%) Women 




Population: Men (48%) Women 
(52%). New urban poor: Men (48%) 
Women (52%).
2005 0.14* ---
Population: Men (50%) Women 
(50%). New urban poor: Men (36%) 
Women (64%).
C17 Age 
V81 - Was there an 
association between age 
and new poverty?
1995 0.00 ---
Population: Age 18-34 (36%); 35-49 
(27%); 50-64 (24%); over 65 (13%). 
New urban poor: Age 18-34 (53%); 




Population: Age 18-34 (40%); 35-49 
(22%); 50-64 (21%); over 65 (17%). 
New urban poor: Age 18-34 (48%); 
35-49 (30%); 50-64 (16%); over 65 
(6%).
2005 0.50 ---
Population: Age 18-34 (32%); 35-49 
(25%); 50-64 (23%); over 65 (20%). 
New urban poor: Age 18-34 (33%); 
35-49 (28%); 50-64 (14%); over 65 
(25%).
Appendix III – Impact of the Social Crisis on Argentina (ISCA) Survey: Background 
Information and Survey Questionnaire (in Spanish)
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1. INTRODUCCIÓN
A partir del 1998 la Agentina comineza una ininterrumpida recesión. A finales del año 2001, la 
crisis económica y financiera se profundiza. En el transcurso de dicho año, se tomaron varias 
medidadas para reactivar el crecimiento y proteger al sistema bancario frente al amplio retiro de los 
depósitos (por ejemplo, el "corralito") que tuvieron como resultado restringuir la liquidez y la 
actividad económica y generaron descontento popular. El proceso culmina con la renuncia del 
Presidente en curso en diciembre de 2001, una rápida sucesión de presidentes designados, el 
anuncio formal de la cesación de pagos sobre la deuda del sector público, y a incios de 2002, el 
abandono del Plan de Convertibilidad.
Con una marcada depreciación del peso desde su flotación y una política monetaria indefinida, 
Argentina experimentó durante el 2002 una significativa inflación por primera vez desde 1991.
Con el objetivo de poder contar con un conocimienoto rápido de los efectos que ha tenido esta crisis 
económica sobre el bienestar de los hogares, se realizó la encuesta de Impacto Social de la Crisis en 
Argentina (ISCA). A partir de ella pueden identificarse los mecanismos y estrategias de 
supervivencia adoptados por las familias argentinas durante estos tiempos difíciles.
Adicionalmente, la encuesta cubre variables tales como: cambios en los ingresos, patrones de 
consumo, acceso a servicios sociales y servicios públicos, patrones de ahorro y de pago, 
participación en el mercado laboral, y cambios en el estado mental y emocional experimentados a 
nivel personal del jefe de hogar encuestado.
Es una encuesta representativa a nivel nacional, que cubrió 2.800 hogares de diferentes regiones 
(incluyendo a pequeñas localidades con menos de 2000 habitantes). No obstante, en la encuesta no 
se incluyeron las áreas dispersas y por lo tanto, no presenta un cuadro completo del heterogéneo 
sector rural argentino. En el caso de las áreas urbanas, el diseño de la muestra se basó en una 
estratificación por tamaño de ciudad y por región. Para las zonas rurales no dispersas se 
seleccionaron las localidades en forma aleatoria. Si bien se hizo el esfuerzo de incluir localidades de 
diferentes regiones, la muestra no es lo suficientemente grande como para ser representativa a nivel 
regional.
Este documento tiene por objeto describir en detalle los objetivos de la encuesta, la metodología 
aplicada en el diseño y los pasos para su realización.
2. OBJETIVOS DE LA ENCUESTA
2.1. Objetivo general
El objetivo general de esta encuesta es brindar un instrumento rápido que permita conocer el 
impacto de la crisis sufrida durante el 2001-02 en el bienestar de los hogares argentinos.
2.2. Objetivos específicos 
1. Identificar los mecanismos que éstos hogares utilizaron para sobrevivir y asegurarse contra 
el riesgo de la perdida de ingresos o hacer frente a las perdidas cuando estas ocurren. En 
este sentido se dispone de información sobre: 
Mercado de trabajo 
Mercados financieros formales e informales - ahorros, préstamos y ayudas, venta de activos 
Cambios de hábitos y modalidades de consumo de bienes y servicios 
Redes sociales 
2. Evaluar el impacto de la crisis en las posibilidades y condiciones de acceso a los servicios 
sociales- salud, educación, jubilación, asistencia social. 
3. Evaluar el impacto de la crisis en las posibilidades y condiciones de acceso a los servicios 
servicios públicos –electricidad, gas, agua potable, telecomunicaciones, transportes – y 
cambios en el uso de estos servicios como consecuencia de la crisis, en aspectos tales como: 
Modalidades de 
utilización Modalidades 
de pago Morosidad 
4. Evaluar el impacto sobre algunas componentes del Capital Social –valores, normas, 
instituciones, procedimientos y confianza en las instituciones. 
5. Evaluar las percepciones de los jefes de hogar sobre: 
El estados de ánimo y salud mental antes y después de la crisis. 
Las expectativas en términos de seguridad ciudadana 
3. CARACTERÍSITICAS GENERALES
3.1. Unidad de análisis
Las unidades de análisis quedan conformadas por los individuos y los hogares, definidos estos 
últimos, operacionalmente, como 'grupo de personas, emparentadas o no, que habitan bajo el mismo 
techo y se asocian para proveer a sus necesidades alimentarias u otras esenciales para vivir'
2
.
Queda excluida la población residente en hogares colectivos, es decir, quienes habitan una misma 
vivienda bajo régimen no familiar, por razones militares, de salud, religión, castigo, etc.
3.2 Periodo de referencia
Se establecen distintos períodos según las variables relevadas:
Semana de referencia: es una semana calendario completa, de domingo a sábado, precedente al 
relevamiento de datos. Se refiere a esa semana la mayoría de las características socio-
demográficas.
Mes de referencia: es un mes calendario completo precedente al relevamiento de datos. Se 
refiere a este mes de referencia las preguntas sobre ingresos.
Perido de referencia previo a diciembre 2001: corresponde al momento previo a la devaluación. 
Se refieren a este período los indicadores específicos incluidos para para medir el impacto de la 
crisis.
4. MEDICIÓN DE LAS VARIABLES Y MÉTODO DE RECOLECCIÓN
A partir de los objetivos ya explicitados se diseñó un instrumento de captación que consta de tres 
módulos:
Modulo A - cuestionario que permite la recolección de datos para el conocimiento de los 
atributosde la vivienda donde habita el hogar (zona de residencia, variables referidas a 
caracteristicas especificicas de la construccion de la vivienda, acceso a servicios publicos, entre 
otras). La mayoría de estas variables se recogen por observación.
Modulo B - un cuestionario individual que releva los atributos individuales solicitando 
informacióna cada uno de los miembros del hogar e incluye preguntas sobre características 
demográficas (sexo, edad, relación con el jefe, cantidad de miembros), empleo, ingresos, estado 
migratorio, nivel de educación, cobertura médica y aportes a la seguridad social. Varias de estas 
preguntas son retrospectivas usando el mes de octubre de 2001 como punto de referencia. Se 
preguntó a los encuestados sobre sus ingresos individuales laborales y no laborales (en efectivo y en 
especies) así como las transferencias de ingresos oficiales y no oficiales.
Modulo C - un cuestionario específico que se concentró en el hogar como unidad de análisis y 
elrespondente fue el Jefe de Hogar (o la persona mejor informada del hogar). Se incluyeron 
preguntas sobre el uso de ahorros, cambios en los patrones de consumo, y participación en 
programas sociales y actividades comunitarias. También se preguntó sobre el estado mental y 
emocional y las expectativas para el futuro del respondente.
Estos módulos diferían levemente en el caso de las áreas rurales y urbanas a fin de capturar las 
especificidades correspondientes a las mismas
4.1. Tipo de estudio:
Entrevistas directas a través de la utilización de un cuestionario semi-estructurado sobre 
comportamientos, actitudes y opiniones sobre temas vinculados a los impactos de la crisis desatada 
en diciembre del 2001.
4.2. Diseño Muestral:
El ISCA es una encuesta por muestreo en aglomerados urbanos y rurales agrupados. Por lo tanto, 
para estimar una determinada característica de alguna zona se encuesta una muestra de dicha zona 
poblacional de cada una de las localidades que integran la muestra. El criterio de pertenencia a 
estrato debe ser tenido en cuenta por dos razones: a) en primer lugar existe una razón de cobertura, 
porque cuanto más población del universo quede representada más confiable es que la información 
sea representativa del total del universo. Es por esto que de los primeros 2 estratos se han 
seleccionado la totalidad de ciudades. B) La segunda razón por la cual es tenido en cuenta este 
criterio es la posible heterogeneidad de resultados de acuerdo al tamaño de las ciudades. Por este 
motivo, entre los estrato menores a 100 mil habitantes se ha hecho una selección aleatoria de 
ciudades que atiendan a la representación de cada uno de ellos. Dentro del estrato 3 se concentrará 
la mayor cantidad de localidades muestreadas porque allí se concentra mayor cantidad de población 
que en los estratos IV y V. Para esta selección aleatoria de ciudades se atendió a la representación 
regional, de forma tal de garantizar un número de casos necesarios para una posterior desagregación 
de la información.
4.2.2. Selección de las localidades rurales agrupadas que integran la muestra:
Las localidades en área rural no dispersa se seleccionaron en forma totalmente aleatoria intentando 
garantizar un mínimo de representatividad regional. Dada la cantidad de casos prevista por región 
(50 por región) resulta imposible su desagregación. Por este motivo los resultados obtenidos en el
área rural sólo serán ofrecidos como exploratorios
3
.
4.2.3. Cobertura de la muestra en área urbana y tural no dispersa
ÁREAS URBANAS
Localidad Provincia Población cubierta % Cobierto
Capital Federal Capital Federal 2,768,772 100.0%
Conurbano Bonaerense Buenos Aires 9,277,149 100.0%
Localidad Provincia Población cubierta % Cobierto
REGION PAMPEANA 5,119,309 48.3%
Mar del Plata Buenos Aires 541,857
37.2%Bahía Blanca Buenos Aires 272,176
Gran La Plata Buenos Aires 681,832
Gran Córdoba Córdoba 1,368,109
55.8%
Gran Río Cuarto Córdoba 149,437
Gran Paraná Entre Ríos 247,587
41.0%Concordia Entre Ríos 137,046
Larroque Entre Ríos 5,376
Santa Rosa-Toay La Pampa 101,987
43.4%
Rancul La Pampa 3,327
Gran Rosario Santa Fe 1,159,004
60.3%
Gran Santa Fe Santa Fe 451,571
REGION NORESTE 1,251,053 48.7%






Formosa Formosa 198,146 52.8%
Gran Posadas Misiones 280,454
42.8%
San Javier Misiones 7,861
REGION DE CUYO 1,453,485 69.5%
Gran Mendoza Mendoza 846,904
69.0%
Tupungato Mendoza 11,879
Localidad Provincia Población cubierta % Cobierto
REGION NOROESTE 2,140,097 61.2%
Gran S F del Valle de Catamarca Catamarca 171,447
71.0%
Chumbicha Catamarca 4,005
Gran San Salvador de Jujuy Jujuy 277,985 53.3%
La Rioja La Rioja 143,921
63.7%
Chepes La Rioja 9,793
Gran Salta Salta 469,192 52.2%
Santiago del Estero - La Banda Sgo. del Estero 327,736 61.8%




Comodoro Rivadavia Chubut 135,813
60.6%
Trelew Chubut 88,397
Neuquén – Plottier Neuquén 224,685
54.4%
Piedra del Aguila Neuquén 3,358
San Carlos de Bariloche Río Negro 89,475
20.3%
Luis Beltrán Río Negro 5,143
COBERTURA OPSM 22,556,736 69.7%
TOTAL AREAS URBANAS 32,352,909
ÁREAS RURALES AGRUPADAS
REGION PAMPEANA 19,844 3.5%
Las Toninas Buenos Aires 1,614
Stroeder Buenos Aires 1,968
3.8%
Pasteur Buenos Aires 1,914
O'Higgins Buenos Aires 1,379
San Francisco del Chañar Córdoba 1,712
2.1%
Villa Reducción Córdoba 1,442
Miguel Riglos La Pampa 1,952
9.0%
6  
Los valores de las poblaciones rurales agrupadas son extraídos del Censo 91’
Piedras Blancas Entre Ríos 1,045 2.1%
REGION NORESTE 7,492 6.0%
San Lorenzo Corrientes 1,586
10.3%
San Carlos Corrientes 1,664
General Lucio Victorio Mansilla Formosa 1,590 8.6%
Azara Misiones 1,190 2.7%
La Tigra Chaco 1,462 4.6%
REGION DE CUYO 5,359 6.6%
La Dormida Mendoza 1,953
8.3%
25 de Mayo Mendoza 1,440
Calingasta San Juan 1,966 11.1%




Sañogasta La Rioja 1,453 4.2%
El Tala  (Est. Ruíz de los Llanos) Salta 1,889
7.3%
Coronel Cornejo Salta 1,494
Pozo Hondo Sgo. del Estero 1,601
4.5%
Los Núñez Sgo. del Estero 1,112
Alto Verde Tucumán 1,775
8.7%
Santa Rosa de Leales Tucumán 1,448
PATAGONIA 5,441 10.5%
San Patricio del Chañar Neuquén 1,907
22.7%
Mariano Moreno Neuquén 1,715
Cervantes Río Negro 1,819 5.0%
COBERTURA OPSM 51,271 4.7%
TOTAL AREAS RURALES AGRUPADOS 1,093,846
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Santa Cruz y Tierra del Fuego no fueron relevadas
4.2.4  Selección de las fracciones, radios,  puntos muestra y viviendas:
El diseño de base combina muestras de tipo polietápico, muestras sistemáticas y aleatorias simples 
de manera de conservar las características poblacionales permitiendo así mejor confiabilidad y 
mayor precisión de los resultados obtenidos.
Considerando las definiciones utilizadas a nivel del INDEC, estas zonas se muestraron en base a los 
criterios que a continuación se detallan:
A.1. EN CAPITAL FEDERAL
En la Capital Federal se siguieron las siguientes etapas para seleccionar los puntos muestras:
Unidades primarias, los distritos escolares: Se evalúa el peso de cada distrito escolar sobre la basede 
la cantidad de viviendas que contiene cada uno de ellos. La cantidad de viviendas a visitar 
efectivamente en cada distrito será proporcional a dicho peso.
Unidades de 2da etapa, las fracciones censales: Una vez determinada la cantidad de viviendas 
avisitar en cada distrito, la identificación de las fracciones dentro de cada distrito se basa 
proporcionalmente a la cantidad de viviendas en cada fracción o sea siguiendo el mismo 
procedimiento para la selección de los distritos.
Unidades de 3ra etapa, los radios censales: De acuerdo al mismo procedimiento se seleccionan 
losradios a visitar. El número final de viviendas por radio habiendo sido calculado, las manzanas a 
visitar se basan en un muestreo sistemático.
Unidades de 4ta etapa, muestreo sistemático de manzanas: Se seleccionan las manzanas mediane 
unmuestreo sistemático.
Unidades últimas, Muestreo aleatorio simple de viviendas: Para cada elemento de la muestra 
demanzanas, se identifica una esquina de inicio al azar y se procede a la numeración de las 
viviendas dentro de dicha manzana. Y se realiza un muestreo aleatorio de las viviendas.
A.2. EN EL CONURBANO
Unidades primarias, los partidos: Según el peso de viviendas de cada partido, se determinan 
lacantidad de puntos muestra a relevar.
Unidades de 4ta etapa, muestreo sistemático de manzanas: Se seleccionan luego las manzanas 
encada radio siguiendo un muestreo sistemático.
Unidades últimas, Muestreo aleatorio simple de viviendas: Finalmente, se identifican las 
viviendassiguiendo el mismo procedimiento que el empleado para Capital Federal.
A.3. EN LAS REGIONES PAMPEANA – CUYO – NORDESTE – NOROESTE Y SUR
Unidades primarias, las fracciones: La cantidad de casos por localidad habiendo sido determinadaen 
forma no proporcional, se determinan las asignaciones a fracciones dependiendo del peso de cada 
fracción de cada una dentro de cada localidad.
Unidades de 2da etapa, los radios censales: Luego, se seleccionan los radios de manera aleatoria.
Unidades de 3ra etapa, muestreo sistemático de manzanas:Y finalmente, se procede a un 
muestreosistemático para elegir las manzanas dentro de cada radio.
Unidades últimas, Muestreo aleatorio simple de viviendas: En una selección aleatoria de unaesquina 
inicial de cada manzana seleccionada se enumeran las viviendas de cada manzana para realizar un 
muestreo aleatorio para elegir las viviendas.
4.2.5 .Selección de la vivienda, del hogar del entrevistado
Una vez seleccionada la manzana, es el personal de campo el que continúa el proceso polietápico de 
selección de viviendas. Básicamente los encuestadores proceden a numerar, comenzando a partir de 
una esquina elegida al azar, el total de las viviendas de la manzana en una planilla. Multiplican el 
número obtenido por un número al azar ente 0 y 1 que aparece en cada planilla. El entero más 
próximo al resultado de ese producto representa la vivienda seleccionada. Se establece a su vez un 
procedimento aleatorio similar para las viviendas en las que coexista más de un hogar. De igual 
forma se procede para seleccionar el miembro del hogar a entrevistar.
La cantidad prefijada de revisitas para lograr el total de las encuestas en los hogares seleccionados 
es de 3, pudiendo ser mayor en los casos que el coordinador de campo lo considere necesario. En 
los casos de no lograr contacto, o el total de las entrevistas en tiempo y forma satisfactoria, se 
procede a la selección de una vivienda de reemplazo mediante un segundo número aleatorio que 
figura en la planilla de ruteo.
5. RELEVAMIENTO DE LA INFORMACION
Las tareas llevadas a cabo pueden desagregarse en tres bloques: tareas previas al relevamiento, las 
propias del relevamiento y las posteriores a él.
5.1 Tareas previas al relevamiento
El conjunto de tareas que incluye esta etapa abarca desde aspectos que van desde la instrucción y 
preparación del personal que interviene durante el relevamiento, hasta la preparación de los 
materiales que se utilizarán en él.
La totalidad del encuestadores destinados al proyecto pertenecen al plantel permanente de 
encuestadores de la empresa y cuentan con una vasta experiencias en estudios sociales, 
particularmente a estudios sobre victimizacion y areas de estudios vinculadas.
La instrucción a los encuestadores se realiza en dos etapas. Una primera instancia se lleva a cabo en 
las oficinas de la empresa, donde participan el director general de proyecto y el director de campo, 
quien dicta un curso de capacitación para los coordinadores y supervisores del campo. Se entrega 
material por escrito en forma de breve manual de instrucciones y el instructor amplía la información 
despejando las dudas que pudieran surgir en el proceso de capacitación. En una segunda etapa se 
reproduce la primera instrucción con los diferentes grupos de encuestadores asignados al proyecto, 
incluyendo ejercitación de casos simulados con el fin de entrenar a los entrevistadores en la correcta 
aplicación de los cuestionarios.
Una vez finalizado el período de capacitación se realiza una prueba piloto para ajustar los últimos 
detalles a los formularios de entrevista, mejorar los procedimientos de capacitación y calidad de la 
información, puesta a punto de tecnología y recursos humanos designados para el control, 
codificación y grabación de los datos y obtención de información preliminar para evaluar y corregir 
el marco muestral. Para finalizar, previo a la salida al campo, se procede a preparar las hojas de 
ruteo de los encuestadores, con los hogares que debe visitar, además de la cartografía detallada de la 
zona de trabajo que le permitirá ubicar con precisión las unidades seleccionadas.
Se elaboran credenciales, con fotografía, cargo en la empresa e institución responsable de la 
coordinación general del proyecto.
5.2 Tareas propias del relevamiento
encuestador procede a registrar la vivienda seleccionada como una "no respuesta", especificando 
sus causas.
Al realizar las entrevistas el encuestador deber tener en cuenta los siguientes aspectos básicos:
Las preguntas que incluye el cuestionario hogar deben ser respondidas preferentemente por el 
jefe de hogar, o en caso contrario, por otro miembro del hogar cuya edad no sea inferior a los 18 
años.
Las preguntas correspondientes al cuestionario individual deben ser respondidas por cada uno 
de los entrevistados del hogar.
5.2.2 Procedimientos de aseguramiento de la calidad de la información
Una vez completada la entrevista a un hogar dado, el encuestador procede a entregar el material a 
los supervisores de campo, quien lleva a cabo un primer análisis de consistencia y coherencia de la 
información, registrando el material recibido y determinando que material debe volver a campo para 
ser aclarado o completado.
Por otra parte, con el fin de controlar los errores no muestrales se lleva a cabo la supervisión de los 
encuestadores mediante revisitas a los hogares entrevistados. Esta tarea realizada por los 
supervisores de campo se efectúa dentro del lapso más próximo posible de la visita del encuestador 
a la vivienda con el fin de eliminar las diferencias debidas al efecto de recordación.
Las tareas de supervisión se realizan sobre el 30% del material de cada hoja de recorrido entregada 
por los encuestadores. Las revisitas de supervisión garantizan la calidad absoluta de la información 
que ingresa a las oficinas. El material, debidamente controlado, se envía luego en su totalidad a las 
oficinas de la empresa donde se realizan las tareas de preparación de la información para su 
procesamiento.
La cantidad de supervisores es de uno por cada 10 encuestadores coordinados directamente desde 
las oficinas de OPSM por un responsable general.
Sobre la base del trabajo realizado en esta etapa, los coordinadores de campo confeccionan un 
informe de campo exhaustivo que permite tener una visión global del proceso de realización de las 
encuestas que queda a disposición de la Dirección cada quince días. El detalle registra por área 
geográfica: la cantidad de casos efectivos, cantidad de revisitas, cantidad de rechazos y 
Para la codificación, edición y grabación del volumen estimado de información con mínimo error, 
se contó con el sistema CATI Bellview (Computer Assisted Telephone Interview) de la empresa 
Pulse Train C.O. de Londres, adaptable a tareas de data entry que asegura la maxima calidad en el 
ingreso de datos. Dicho sistema permite la programación de cuestionarios para su carga siguiendo 
todos los controles de validación y “filtros” que el estudio requiera, imposibilitando la carga de 
datos fuera del rango. Incluye la posibilidad de listar las respuestas abiertas que existan en cada 
cuestionario, y una vez generadas las guías de codificación, posibilita la codificación de los datos 
sobre el sistema.
6. PONDERACION - EXPANSION DE RESULTADOS
La ponderación se realizó tomando en cuenta los siguientes factores: Cantidad de población real, 
cantidad de miembros del hogar y el nivel de instrucción.
En el caso de las regiones Pampeana, Cuyo, Nordeste, Noroeste y Patagonia y para las localidades 
urbanas, se realizaron agrupaciones de localidades bajo el supuesto de que para cada región las 
localidades no muestradas se comportan de manera similar a las localidades de la muestra. La 
ponderación toma como unidad dichas agrupaciones. Además, para calcular los ponderadores 
finales se distribuyó la población no muestrada sumándola a la población muestrada de las 
agrupaciones de acuerdo al peso de estas últimas.
El mismo procedimiento se repitió para las localidades rurales agrupadas. La diferencia reside en 
que las agregaciones de las poblaciones fuera de la muestra se fueron realizando al nivel de región 
(Pampeana, Cuyo, Nordeste, Noroeste y Patagonia) de acuerdo al peso de cada región rural 
muestrada.
Cabe mencionar que para las regiones rurales sólo se consideraron las que tienen menos de 2000 
habitantes y se excluyeron las que se encuentran en campo abierto
El siguiente cuadro muestra la distribución de las unidades de ponderaciones, las poblaciones y las 
poblaciones ajustadas. Estas últimas se obtienen agregando a la población original de la unidad de 
ponderación la parte de la población de las localidades no muestradas de la región que corresponde 
a esta unidad de acuerdo al peso de la unidad muestrada en dicha región.
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Tipo Unidad De Ponderación Sexo Población
Población
Ajustada
Capital 1. Capital Federal
Varón 1,257,286 1,257,286
Mujer 1,511,486 1,511,486




3. Conurbano 2do Y 3er Cordón
Varón 2,690,865 2,690,865
Mujer 2,794,824 2,794,824
4. Gran Córdoba / Río Iv
Varón 726,333 1,591,508
Mujer 791,213 1,733,671
Región Pamp 5. Gran Rosario / Santa Fé / Paraná / Concordia
Varón 954,644 2,091,773
Mujer 1,040,564 2,280,038
6. Mar Del Plata / La Plata / B. Blanca / Santa Rosa Toay
Varón 767,037 1,680,697
Mujer 830,815 1,820,445
7. Resistencia / Charata
Varón 185,056 379,629
Mujer 196,588 403,287
Nordeste 8. Corrientes / Formosa / Goya
Varón 279,582 573,543
Mujer 301,512 618,531











12. Santiago Del Estero / La Banda
Varón 156,876 256,509
Mujer 170,860 279,374
13. S. S. Jujuy / Catamarca / La Rioja / Chumbica / Chepes
Varón 295,725 483,542
Mujer 311,426 509,214
14. Mendoza / Tupungato
Varón 410,614 592,876
Mujer 446,566 644,786





























7.  DISPONIBLIDAD DE BASE DE DATOS, DESCRIPCION DE VARIALBES Y REPORTES RURALES
En http://www.bancomundial.org.ar/inf_esp.htmse encuentran disponible:
1. Bases de datos (hogares y personas) en formato spss y stata 
2. Descripción de variables que componen la base de datos. 
3. Descripción cualitativa de las areas rurales no dispersas encuestadas. 
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ANEXO I.ERRORES DE MUESTREO Y COEFICIENTES DE VARIACIÓN PARA LAS PRINCIPALES VARIABLES
Se presenta a continuación la metodología utilizada para el cálculo del error muestral y el coeficiente de 
variación.
10
La fórmula para el cálculo del error muestral para proporciones es:
) ) ) )
ep) K N －n * p(1－ p)K*Corr* p(1－ p) (1)
N －1 n n
Donde:  Corr N －n (2)
N －1
K es el nivel de confianza (para 95%, K = 1.96)
N es el tamaño de la población
N es la cantidad de casos de la subpoblación de interés
p es la proporción estimada de la subpoblación respecto a la población
Corr      es la corrección para población finitas
Tratándose en el caso presente de un trabajo con poblaciones infinitas (donde el tamaño de la muestra es menor al 
10% de la población) la corrección Corr tiende a la unidad. En efecto,





≈ 1 cuando n pp 0.10N (3)
por lo que la fórmula (1) para poblaciones infinitas tomando en cuenta la aproximación (3) se transforma en:
ep K *Corr * p(1－ p)≈K* p(1－ p) (4)
n n
Fórmula que se utilizó finalmente en los cálculos.




De lo anterior se tiene la siguiente tabla:
10  
Rodríguez Osuna, Jacinto:Métodos de muestreo. CIS, España. 1991.
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Variable Estimación Desvío C.V (%)
Varones 16,107,491 153286.844 2.0
Mujeres 17,479,465 166343.227 1.8
Activos 13,146,110 122,221 2.4
Inactivos 20,142,420 187,992 1.6
Ocupados 9,868,288 85,626 3.0
Desocupados 3,277,823 18,530 5.8
Subocupados 3,611,661 21,313 5.5
Varones Activos 7,525,994 59,778 3.5
Varones Inactivos 8,460,841 69,965 3.3
Varones Ocupados 6,038,396 44,170 4.1
Varones Desocupados 1,487,597 5,830 8.8
Varones Subocupados 1,743,445 7,368 8.1
Mujeres Activas 5,620,116 39,961 4.2
Mujeres Inactivas 11,681,579 105,981 2.6
Mujeres Ocupadas 3,829,891 23,189 5.3
Mujeres Desocupadas 1,790,225 7,660 8.0
Mujeres Subocupadas 1,868,216 8,156 7.8
Población Menores A 26 Años 16,554,232 157,654 1.9
Población De 26 Años A 64 Años 13,614,008 127,321 2.3
Población De Más De 64 Años 3,403,229 19,562 5.7
Varones Menores A 26 Años 8,202,403 67,127 3.4
Varones De 26 Años A 64 Años 6,416,574 48,051 3.9
Varones De Más De 64 Años 1,480,187 5,787 8.9
Mujeres Menores A 26 Años 8,351,828 68,766 3.3
Mujeres De 26 Años A 64 Años 7,197,434 56,258 3.6
Mujeres De Más De 64 Años 1,923,043 8,511 7.7
Activos Menores A 26 Años 2,890,507 15,442 6.2
Inactivos Menores A 26 Años 13,385,991 124,842 2.3
Activos De 26 A 64 Años 9,723,157 84,000 3.0
Inactivos De 26 A 64 Años 3,885,367 23,672 5.3
Activos Mayores A 64 Años 528,456 1,253 15.1
Inactivos Mayores A 64 Años 2,861,694 15,219 6.2
Varones Activos Menores A 26 Años 1,650,796 6,798 8.4
Varones Inactivos Menores A 26 Años 6,443,141 48,326 3.9
Varones Activos De 26 A 64 Años 5,506,234 38,832 4.3
Varones Inactivos De 26 A 64 Años 908,991 2,810 11.4
Varones Activos Mayores A 64 Años 364,973 721 18.2
Varones Inactivos Mayores A 64 Años 1,106,502 3,762 10.3
Mujeres Activos Menores A 26 Años 1,239,711 4,452 9.7
Mujeres Inactivos Menores A 26 Años 6,942,850 53,556 3.7
Mujeres Activos De 26 A 64 Años 4,216,923 26,616 5.0
Mujeres Inactivos De 26 A 64 Años 2,976,377 16,113 6.1
Mujeres Activos Mayores A 64 Años 163,482 217 27.2
Mujeres Inactivos Mayores A 64 Años 1,755,192 7,441 8.1
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Variable Estimación Desvío C.V (%)
Varones Ocupados Menores A 26 Años 1,095,409 3,706 10.4
Varones Desocupados Menores A 26 Años 555,387 1,349 14.7
Varones Ocupados De 26 A 64 Años 4,664,292 30,725 4.7
Varones Desocupados De 26 A 64 Años 841,942 2,507 11.9
Varones Ocupados Mayores A 64 Años 274,705 471 21.0
Varones Desocupados Mayores A 64 Años 90,268 89 36.7
Mujeres Ocupados Menores A 26 Años 512,511 1,197 15.3
Mujeres Desocupados Menores A 26 Años 727,200 2,016 12.8
Mujeres Ocupados De 26 A 64 Años 3,195,616 17,861 5.9
Mujeres Desocupados De 26 A 64 Años 1,021,308 3,341 10.8
Mujeres Ocupados Mayores A 64 Años 121,765 139 31.6
Mujeres Desocupados Mayores A 64 Años 41,717 28 54.0
Varones Subocupados Menores De 26 Años 381,846 771 17.8
Varones Subocupados De 26 A 64 Años 1,253,906 4,528 9.7
Varones Subocupados Mayores A 64 Años 107,693 116 33.6
Mujeres Subocupados Menores De 26 Años 332,951 628 19.0
Mujeres Subocupados De 26 A 64 Años 1,471,859 5,739 8.9
Mujeres Subocupados Mayores A 64 Años 63,407 52 43.8
Total Jefe De Hogar 8,828,826 74,031 3.2
Total Jefes De Hogar Activos 6,104,767 44,846 4.0
Total Jefes De Hogar Inactivos 2,711,177 14,068 6.4
Total Jefes De Hogar Ocupados 5,264,789 36,461 4.4
Total Jefes De Hogar Desocupados 839,978 2,499 11.9
Total Jefes De Hogar Subocupados 1,659,393 6,850 8.4
Población Con Nivel Univers. Completo 1,570,431 6,316 8.6
Varones Con Nivel Univers. Completo 784,140 2,256 12.3
Mujeres Con Nivel Univers. Completo 786,292 2,265 12.3
Activos Con Nivel Univers. Completo 1,316,353 4,866 9.4
Inactivos Con Nivel Univers. Completo 254,079 419 21.8
Ocupados Con Nivel Univers. Completo 1,198,693 4,236 9.9
Desocuapdos Con Nivel Univers. Completo 117,659 132 32.1
Subocupados Con Nivel Univers. Completo 387,388 788 17.6
Población Con Nivel Medio Completo 5,264,778 36,461 4.4
Varones Con Nivel Medio Completo 2,463,165 12,232 6.8
Mujeres Con Nivel Medio Completo 2,801,613 14,756 6.3
Activos Con Nivel Medio Completo 3,244,618 18,259 5.8
Inactivos Con Nivel Medio Completo 2,011,427 9,091 7.5
Ocupados Con Nivel Medio Completo 2,433,986 12,021 6.8
Desocuapdos Con Nivel Medio Completo 810,632 2,370 12.1
Subocupados Con Nivel Medio Completo 696,955 1,893 13.1
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I.  DESCRIPCION DE LAS BASES DE DATOS
Se trata de dos bases de datos: personas y hogares. La primera de ellas corresponde a la información relevada a 
nivel individual para cada uno de los miembros: sexo, edad, relación con el jefe de hogar, situación ocupacional, 
situación educativa, acceso a salud. La base de hogares corresponde a las variables de características del hogar y 
a las preguntas específicas sobre el estudio de impacto de la crisis en los hogares. La variable nroenc indentifica 
al respondente de estas preguntas y equivale al número de miembro (variable miembro) de la base personas.
A. Variables relevadas en el cuestionario
DESCRIPCIÓN  DE  VARIABLES  DE  LA  BASE  HOGAR
Nombre de Descripción Categorías
la variable
codusu Identificador  del  hogar
muestra Identicación localidad que integra 1.00 25  de  mayo
2.00 anguil
la  muestra 3.00 azara
4.00 bahia  blanca






11.00 comodoro  rivadavia
12.00 concordia
13.00 coronel  cornejo
14.00 corrientes
15.00 el  tala
16.00 formosa
17.00 gran  cordoba
18.00 gran  jujuy
19.00 gran  la  plata
20.00 gran  mendoza
21.00 gran  posadas
22.00 gran  resitencia
23.00 gran  rio  cuarto
24.00 gran  rosario
25.00 gran  salta
26.00 gran  san  juan
27.00 gran  santa  fe
28.00 gran  tucumán
29.00 la  dormida
30.00 la  rioja
31.00 la  tigra
32.00 las  toninas
33.00 los  nuñez
34.00 maimara
35.00 mansilla
36.00 mar  del  plata





42.00 piedra  del  aguila
43.00 piedras  blancas
44.00 pozo  hondo
45.00 primer  cordón  conurbano
46.00 rancul
47.00 san  carlos
48.00 bariloche
49.00 san  fdo  de  catam
50.00 san  isidro
51.00 san  javier
52.00 san  lorenzo
53.00 san  luis
54.00 san  p  del  chañar
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55.00 santa  rosa-toay
56.00 santa  r  de  leales
57.00 santiago/labanda
58.00 sañogasta





64.00 villa  reduccion
65.00 villa  trinidad
nroenc Miembro  entrevistado  (corres-ponde  a
la    variable    miembro    en    la    base
personas)
vivien tipo  de  vivienda
1.00 casa
2.00 departamento
3.00 vivienda  en  lugar  de  trabajo
4.00 inquilinato  (fin  entrevista)
5.00 hotel  o  pensión  (fin  entrevista)
6.00 no  destinada  a  fines  a  habit  (fin)
7.00 vivienda  en  villa
9.00 otro  (especificar)
P44 desde  octubre  de  2001  quien  realiza 1.00 1
2.00 2la  mayor  parte  de  las  tareas  de  la
3.00 3
casa?  EL  NUMERO  CORRESPONDE  AL 4.00 4






97.00 serv  dom  que  no  vive  en  el  hogar
98.00 otra  pers  que  no  vive  en  el  hogar
99.00 ns/nc
P45 y  antes  de  octubre  de  2001  quien Idem  p44
realizaba  la  mayor  parte  de  las
tareas  de  la  casa?  EL  NUMERO
CORRESPONDE  AL  NUMERO  DE  MIEMBRO  DEL
HOGAR  EN  BASE  PERSONAS
P46 en  el  hogar  hay  algún  ingreso 1.00 si
2.00 nolaboral  o  no  laboral  pendiente
3.00 ns/nc(sueldos,  aguinaldos, prestamos,
alquileres,  etc).
P46A Monto  del  ingreso  laboral  pendiente
(si  en  p46)
P47 desde  octubre  de  2001,  algún  miembro 1.00 si
2.00 node  su  hogar  que  no  trabajaba  se  ha
3.00 no  correspondevisto  en  la  necesidad  de  buscar
trabajo  por  cuestiones  económicas?
P48 desde  octubre  de  2001,  algún  miembro 1.00 si
2.00 node  su  familia  ¿tuvo  que  dejar  del
3.00 no  corresponde
todo  sus  estudios  a  fin  de  trabajar?
P49a desde  octubre  de  2001,  ¿su  hogar  se
atrasó  en  el  pago  de:




P49a4 cuota  de  colegio? 2.00 no
3.00 no  correspondeP49a5 cuota  de  automovil?
4.00 nsncP49a6 cuota  del  club?
P49a7 seguro  de  vida?
P49a8 seguro  automovil?
P49a9 seguro  de  salud  (mutual,  prepaga,
obra  social,  etc.)?
P49a10 tarjeta  de  credito?
P49a11 cursos  en  gral  (idiomas,  etc)?
P49a12 otros  (especificar)?
P49b en  los  proximos  meses,  ¿cree  que  su 1.00 si
2.00 no(p49b1- hogar  debera  postergar  pagos  en
3.00 no  corresponde




P50 algún  miembro  de  su  hogar  tenia 1.00 si
2.00 noahorros  monetarios  antes  de  octubre
3.00 ns/nc
de  2001?
P51 el  corralito  financiero  impuesto  en 1.00 no  tiene  plata  en  el  banco
2.00 no  lo  afectodiciembre  del  año  pasado,  afectó  la
3.00 lo  afecto  parcialmente
disponibilidad  de  sus  ahorros  (para 4.00 lo  afecto  totalmente
los  que  si  tenian  ahorros)
5.00 ns/  nc
P52_1 a ¿cual  ha  sido  el  destino  del  dinero 1.00 no  uso  los  ahorros  todavia
2.00 los  deposito  en  un  bancop52_19 de  sus  ahorros  desde  octubre  de  2001
3.00 presto  el  dinero  a  terceros
hasta  la  actualidad?  (para  los  que 4.00 compro  una  propiedad
si  tenian  ahorros)  RESPUESTA 5.00 compro  moneda  extranjera
6.00 pago  estudios  escolares  o  universitarios
MULTIPLE 7.00 compro  un  automovil
8.00 afronto  gastos  de  salud
10.00      los  utilizo  para  reparacion  de  la  viv
11.00      los  invirtio  en  un  negocio
12.00 pago  deudas
13.00 compro  acciones
18.00 otros
19.00 ns-nc
P53 a  continuación  le  voy  a  mencionar
una  serie  de  inconvenientes  que  se
vienen  presentando  a  partir  de  la
puesta  en  marcha  del corralito
financiero.  Podría  decirme  si  ud.  se
vio  afectado  por  cada  uno  de  estos 1.00 si
inconvenientes: 2.00 no
P53a largas  colas  en  los  bancos  (perdida 3.00 ns/  nc
de  tiempo)
P53b tener  que  trasladarse  mas  seguido  a
los  bancos
P53c aumentos  de  los  costos
administrativos  bancarios  (apertura
de  cuentas  y  tarjetas)
P53d mayores  dificultades  en  los  tramites
bancarios  (burocracia)
P53e trastornos  ocasionados  por  la  falta
de  efectivo
P53f tener  que  comprar  en  lugares  que
acepten  cheques  y/o  tarjetas  de
debito
P53g otros  (especificar)
P54 obtuvieron  en  su  hogar  un  préstamo 1.00 si
2.00 noantes  de  octubre  de  2001?
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antes  de  octubre  de  2001?
3.00 ns/nc
P55 el  préstamo  recibido  ha  sido  ya 1.00 si
2.00 nocancelado  (para  los  que  si
3.00 ns/  nc
obtuvieron  el  préstamo)
P56 en  cuanto  tiempo  estima  ud.  que 1.00 no  bien  regularice  una  situación  transitoria
2.00 en  los  próximos  6  meseslogrará  cancelar  el  préstamo
3.00 entre  6  meses  y  1  año
otorgado  a  su  hogar  (para  los  que  no 4.00 mas  de  1  año
cancelaron  aun)
5.00 ns,  dada  la  incertidumbre  de  la  indexación
futura
6.00 nunca  (no  pagara  más)
7.00 ns  /  nc
P57 le  vamos  a nombrar  a  continuación
distintas  formas  para  sostener  un
hogar  y  quisiéramos  que  nos  diga
cuales  son  todas  las  que  ustedes
utilizan.  Actualmente  de  que  vive
este  hogar?:
P57a De  lo  que  ganan  en  el  trabajo.
P57b Retirando  dinero  o  mercadería  de  su
negocio,  taller  o  fabrica 1.00 si
P57c De  indemnizacion  o  seguro  de 2.00 no
desempleo. 3.00 nsnc
P57d De  alquileres,  rentas,  intereses  o
dividendos.
P57e De  ayudas  de  personas  que  no  viven  en
el  hogar.
P57f De  jubilacion  o  pension.
P57g De  limosna.
P57h De  la  modalidad  del  trueque
P57i Comprando  al  fiado.
P57j Pidiendo  prestado  (familiares  o
amigos)
P57k Pidiendo  prestamos  (bancos,
financieras)
P57l Retirando  de  sus  ahorros
P57m Comprando  a  credito  (libreta,  tarjeta
de  credito,  etc.)
P57n Teniendo  que  vender,  empeñar  o
hipotecar  alguna  de  sus  pertenencias
(ropa,  alimento,  joyas,  animales,
herramientas,  etc.)
P57o De  planes  de  ayuda  social  (gobierno,
iglesia,  instituciones  sin  fines  de
lucro,  etc.)
P57p De  alguna  otra forma
P58a hasta de  que  vivía  este  hogar  antes  de 1.00 si
2.00 no
p58p octubre  de  2001:  (idem  p57)
3.00 nsnc
P59 (solo  para  los  que  retiraron
ahorros/pidieron  un
préstamo/vendieron,  hipotecaron  o
empeñaron  algo/compraron  a  crédito)
¿cuál  ha  sido  el  destino  de  los
1.00 siingresos  del  hogar  mencionados 2.00 no
anteriormente,  desde  octubre  de  2001 3.00 nsnc
hasta  la  actualidad?:
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P59a
gastos  de  salud  (accidente,  muerte,
enfermedad,  etc)
P59b pago  de  estudios  escolares  o
universitarios.
P59c compra  de  alimentos  y  bebidas
P59d compra  de  indumentaria  y  calzado
P59e reparación  y  mantenimiento  de  la
vivienda
P59f inversión  en  negocio  (compra  de
insumos,  reparación  de  equipos,
etc.).
P59g pago  de  transporte  público
P59h pago  de  servicios  públicos
P59i pago  de  deudas  (préstamos,  alquiler,
compras,  etc)
P59j impuestos  o  cargas  sociales
P59k otro  (especifique)
P60a hasta (solo  para  los  que  retiraron 1.00 si
2.00 nop60k ahorros/pidieron  un
3.00 nsncpréstamo/vendieron,  hipotecaron  o
empeñaron  algo/compraron  a  crédito)
y  antes  de  octubre  de  2001  en  que
destinaba  los  ingresos  del  hogar
mencionados  anteriormente:
(idem  p59)
P61_1 ¿qué  tipo  de  pertenencias  tuvo  que 1.00 terrenos  urbanos
2.00 terrenos  agricolashasta vender,  hipotecar  o  empeñar?
3.00 vestimenta
p61_19 RESPUESTA  MULTIPLE  (PREGUNTAR  SOLO  A 4.00 casa  -depto
LOS  QUE  HAN  VENDIDO,  HIPOTECADO  O 5.00 artefactos-muebles
6.00 ropa
EMPEÑADO  ALGO) 7.00 vajilla
8.00 herramientas
9.00 adornos








P62_1 ¿cómo  obtuvieron  esa  ayuda  social?  A 1.00 iglesias
2.00 instit  privadas  sin  fines  de  lucro  /ongshasta través  de:  (SOLO  PARA  LOS  QUE  HAN
3.00 centro  de  salud
p62_19 RECIBIDO  AYUDA  SOCIAL)  RESPUESTA 4.00 escuela
MULTIPLE.
5.00 sindicatos
6.00 partidos  políticos
7.00 asociaciones  vecinales
8.00 fundación  vinculada  a  partidos  políticos
9.00 movimientos  de  desocupados
10.00 clubes
11.00 empresas  y/o  comercios
12.00 gobierno  nacional
13.00 gobierno  provincial
14.00 gobierno  municipal
18.00 otro
19.00 ns  /  nc
P63 la  ayuda  social  recibida  ha  sido  para 1.00 de  mucha  ayuda
2.00 de  mediana  ayudausted...?  (SOLO  PARA  LOS  QUE  HAN
3.00 de  ninguna  ayuda





9.00 ns/  nc
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P64 algún  miembro  de  este  hogar  ayuda 1.00 si
económicamente  o  de  otra  forma  a 2.00 no
3.00 ns/ncpersonas  que  no  viven  aquí  (padres,
suegros,  hermanos,  amigos,  etc.)
P65 ¿a  quien  recurriría  usted  en  caso  de 1.00 familia
2.00 amigos
una  emergencia  económica? 3.00 a  su  empleador
4.00 inst  priv  sin  fines  de  lucro  /ongs
5.00 sindicatos
6.00 partidos  políticos
7.00 asociaciones  vecinales
8.00 empresas  y/o  comercios
9.00 clubes
10.00 fundaciones  vinculadas  a  part  pol
11.00 gobierno  municipal
12.00 gobierno  provincial






19.00 ns/  nc
P66 según  su  opinión,  el  dinero  que 1.00 util
2.00 inutilinvierte  el  Estado  en  programas,
3.00 ns/  nc
servicios  y  subsidios  sociales  es:
P67 ¿quién  considera  usted  que  debería 1.00 los  propios  beneficiarios
2.00 los  partidos  políticos
controlar  los  programas  sociales? 3.00 el  gobierno  nacional
4.00 las  organizaciones  sindicales
5.00 el  gobierno  de  la  provincia
6.00 el  gobierno  municipal
7.00 grupo  de  especialistas  ajenos  a  pol  local
8.00 un  ente  publico  sin  depend  gubernam  o  pol
9.00 las  inst  privadas  sin  fines  de  lucro  /ongs
10.00 movimientos  de  desocupados
11.00 la  prensa
12.00 los  periodistas
17.00 otro
18.00 no  sabe
19.00 no  contesta
P68 desde  octubre  de  2001,  ¿qué  tipo  de
medidas  o  cambios  en  los  hábitos  de
1.00 si
consumo  ha  adoptado  el  hogar  para 2.00 no
hacer  un  mejor  uso  del  presupuesto 3.00 no  corresponde
4.00 ns/  ncdel  hogar?:
P68a ha  disminuido  la  cantidad  de  consumo
de  alimentos
P68b Ha  sustituido  el  consumo  de  alimentos
por  otros  mas  baratos
P68c ha  incrementado  la  elaboracion  en  su
propio  hogar  de  los  productos  para
consumo  propio.
P68d ha  sustituido  la  compra  de  productos
no  alimentarios  por  otros  mas  baratos
P68e ha  dejado  de  comprar  algunos
productos  no  alimentarios.
P68f ha  disminuido  la  frecuencia  de  compra
de  vestido  y/o  calzado
P68g ha  comenzado  a  comprar  artículos  de
segunda  mano
P68h hace  menor  uso  de  servicios  de
entretenimiento  (cine,  corto  el  TV
cable).
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P68i hace  menor  uso  de  servicios
informativos  (no  recibe  mas  el
diario,  corto  internet)
P68k se  reúne  menos  con  sus  amigos
P68l algún  miembro  del  hogar  se  ha
trasladado  de  escuelas  privadas  a
escuelas  públicas
P68m algún  miembro  del  hogar  se  ha
trasladado  de  escuelas  privadas  mas
caras  a  escuelas  privadas  mas  baratas
P68n algún  miembro  del  hogar  se  retiró  o
postergo  su  ingreso  a  la  escuela,  la
universidad  o  jardín  de  infantes
P68o algún  miembro  del  hogar  abandonó
cursos  particulares  de  idioma,
computación,  otros
P68p hace  mayor  uso  de  centros  de  salud
pública  con  mayor  frecuencia  que
privados
P68q ha  comenzado  a  fabricar  algo  en  su
hogar  para  luego  venderlo
P68r lleva  con  menor  frecuencia  al  control
medico  preventivo  de  niños  y  niñas
P68s ha  disminuido  el  acceso  a  vestimenta
(zapatillas,  guardapolvos)  y  útiles
del  colegio  para  sus  niños
P68t canceló  seguros  de  salud
P68u canceló  el  seguro  de  vivienda  o
automovil
P68v ha  despedido  o  reducido  la  carga
horario  del  servicio  domestico
P68w ha  cambiado  el  uso  del  transporte
público  o  automóvil  por  el  de  la
bicicleta  o  caminata
P68x ha  dejado  de  hacer  actividades
deportivas,  esparcimiento  o
recreación
P68y ha  cambiado  el  uso  del  automóvil
propio  o  taxi  por  el  transporte
público
P68z ha  cambiado  el  uso  de  colectivos  por
el  servicio  de  transporte  subterráneo
o  ferroviario
P68aa ha  disminuido  el  consumo  de  harina
(preguntar  solo  a  encuestas  rurales)
P68ab ha  disminuido  el  consumo  de
yerba/azucar  (preguntar  solo  a
encuestas  rurales)
P68ac ha  distinado  una  mayor  proporción  de
los  bienes  producidos  para  el  consumo
propio  (preguntar  solo  a  encuestas
rurales)
P68ad ha  disminuido  el  consumo  de  grasa  o
aceite  (preguntar  solo  a  encuestas
rurales)
P68ae ha  disminuido  el  consumo  de  kerosén
(preguntar  solo  a  encuestas  rurales)
P69 a  cual  de  todos  estos  consumos  le  fue 1.00 disminuyó  el  consumo  de  alimentos
2.00 sustituyó  el  consumo  de  alimentos  pordificil  renunciar  (sólo  para  área
otros  mas  baratos
urbana) 3.00 incrementó  elaboración  de  productos  para
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consumo  propio
4.00 sustituyó  productos  no  alimentarios  por
otros  más  baratos
5.00 dejó  de  comprar  algunos  productos  no
alimentarios
6.00 disminuyó  la  frecuencia  de  compra  de
vestido  y/o  calzado
7.00 ha  comenzado  a  comprar  artículos  de
segunda  mano
8.00 hace  menor  uso  de  servicios  de
entretenimiento
9.00 hace  menor  uso  de  servicios  informativos
10.00 se  reúne  menos  con  sus  amigos
11.00 algún  miembro  se  cambió  de  escuelas
privada  a  pública
12.00 algún  miembro  cambió  de  esc  priv  a  otra
privada  más  barata
13.00 algún  miembro  del  hogar  se  retiró  o
postergo  su  ingreso  a  la
14.00 algún  miembro  del  hogar  abandonó  cursos
partic  de  idioma
15.00 hace  uso  de  centros  de  salud  púb  con
mayor  frec que  privado
16.00 ha  comenzado  a  fabricar  algo  en  su  hogar
para  luego  venderlo
17.00 realiza  menos  controles  medicos
preventivos  de  niños
18.00 disminuyó  vestimenta  y  útiles  del
colegio  para  niños
19.00 canceló  seguros  de  salud
20.00 canceló  el  seguro  de  vivienda  o
automóvil
21.00 despidió  o  redujo  la  carga  horaria  del
servicio  doméstico
22.00 ha  cambiado  el  uso  del  transp  públ  o
auto  por  bici  o  caminat
23.00 dejó  de  hacer  actividades
deport,esparcimiento  y  recreacion
24.00 cambió  uso  del  automóvil  propio  o  taxi
por  el  transp  publico
25.00 ha  cambiado  el  uso  de  colectivos  por
subte  o  ffcc
48.00 otra  medida
49.00 nsnc
P69b a  cual  de  todos  estos  consumos  le  fue 1.00 disminuyo  el  consumo  de  harina
2.00 disminuyó  el  consumo  de  yerba/azucardificil  renunciar  (preguntar  solo  en
3.00 destina  mayor  cantidad  de  bienes
encuestas  rurales) producidos  a  consumo  propio
4.00 disminuyó  el  consumo  de  grasa  o  aceite
comestible
5.00 disminuyó  el  consumo  de  kerossene
6.00 nsnc
P70 y  a  cual  de  todos  estos  le  costaría 1.00 disminuyó  el  consumo  de  alimentos
2.00 sustituyó  el  consumo  de  alimentos  por
mas  renunciar  en  el  futuro otros  mas  baratos
3.00 incrementó  elaboración  de  productos  para
consumo  propio
4.00 sustituyó  productos  no
alimentarios  por  otros  más  baratos
5.00 dejó  de  comprar  algunos
productos  no  alimentarios
6.00 disminuyó  la  frecuencia  de
compra  de  vestido  y/o  calzado
7.00 ha  comenzado  a  comprar  artículos
de  segunda  mano
8.00 hace  menor  uso  de  servicios  de
entretenimiento
9.00 hace  menor  uso  de  servicios
informativos
10.00 se  reúne  menos  con  sus  amigos
11.00 algún  miembro  se  cambió  de
escuelas  privada a  pública
12.00 algún  miembro  cambió  de  esc  priv
a  otra  privada  más  barata
13.00 algún  miembro  del  hogar  se
retiró  o  postergo  su  ingreso  a  la
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14.00 algún  miembro  del  hogar  abandonó
cursos  partic  de  idioma
15.00 hace  uso  de  centros  de  salud  púb
con  mayor  frec  que  privado
16.00 ha  comenzado  a  fabricar  algo  en
su  hogar  para  luego  venderlo
17.00 realiza  menos  controles  medicos
preventivos  de  niños
18.00 disminuyó  vestimenta  y  útiles
del  colegio  para  niños
19.00 canceló  seguros  de  salud
20.00 canceló  el  seguro  de  vivienda  o
automóvil
21.00 despidió  o  redujo  la  carga
horaria  del  servicio  doméstico
22.00 ha  cambiado  el  uso  del  transp
públ  o  auto  por  bici  o  caminat
23.00 dejó  de  hacer  actividades
deport,esparcimiento  y  recreacion
24.00 cambió  uso  del  automóvil  propio
o  taxi  por  el  transp  publico
25.00 ha  cambiado  el  uso  de  colectivos
por  subte  o  ffcc
48.00 otra  medida
49.00 nsnc
P70b y  a  cual  de  todos  estos  le  costaría 1.00 disminuyo  el  consumo  de  harina
2.00 disminuyó  el  consumo  demas  renunciar  en  el  futuro  (preguntar
yerba/azucar
solo  en  encuestas  rurales) 3.00 destina  mayor  cantidad  de  bienes
producidos  a  consumo  propio
4.00 disminuyó  el  consumo  de  grasa  o
aceite  comestible
5.00 disminuyó  el  consumo  de
kerossene
6.00 nsnc
P71 desde  octubre  a  hoy  los  miembros  del 1.00 si
2.00 nohogar  pudieron:
3.00 no  corresponde
P71a comprar  los  medicamentos  que 4.00 nsnc
necesitaron
P71b atenderse  por  el  medico  todas  las
veces  que  lo  necesitaron
P71c hacerse  todos  los  estudios  que  le
indicaron
P72 desde  octubre  de  2001,  a  donde 1.00    por  obra  social/  prepaga/  planes  o  seguros
públicosconcurrieron  habitualmente  para
2.00    pagándolo  por  su  cuenta
realizar  estas  consultas  (si  contesto 3.00 consultorio  privado  sin  especificar
alguna  opción  que  si  en  la  pregunta 4.00 salita/centro  primario/centro  de  salud
5.00    en  guardia  de  htal  público
71) 6.00    en  consultorio  de  htal  público
7.00    en  hospital  público  sin  especificar
18.00 otro  (especificar)
19.00 ns/  nc
P73_1 por  qué  motivo  no  pudo?  RESPUESTA 1.00    no  tiene  mas  obra  social
2.00    tiene  sus  cuotas  atrasadas  y  no  le  permitehasta MULTIPLE  (si  contesto  alguna  opción
usar  la  cobertura
P73_19 que  no  en  la  pregunta  71) 3.00 la  obra  social/  prepaga  dejó  de  cubrir  la
prestación
4.00    la  obra  social/  prepaga  suspendió  los
servicios
5.00    es  muy  difícil  conseguir  turno  en  el  hospital
6.00    hay  que  esperar  demasiado  para  ser  atendido
7.00    no  le  alcanza  la  plata  para  pagar  los
coseguros  o  la  consult
8.00    no  le  alcanza  la  plata  para  comprar  los
remedios
9.00    no  tenia  plata  para  trasladarse
18.00 otro
19.00 ns/  nc
P74 ¿desde  octubre  de  2001  pudo  realizar 1.00 si
2.00 nolas  siguientes  actividades?:
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P74A atenderse  por  el  dentista  todas  las 3.00 no  corresponde
veces  que  lo  necesitaron 4.00 ns/nc
P74B atenderse  por  el
psicólogo/psicoanalista/psiquiatra
todas  las  veces  que  lo  necesitaron
P74C atenderse  por  el
kinesiologo/fonoaudiologo  todas  las
veces  que  lo  necesitaron
P75_1 ¿por  qué  motivo  no  pudo?  RESPUESTA 1.00    no  tiene  mas  obra  social
2.00    tiene  sus  cuotas  atrasadas  y  no  le  permitehasta MULTIPLE  (si  contesto  alguna  opción
usar  la  cobertura
P75_19 que  No  en  la  pregunta  74) 3.00 la  obra  social/  prepaga  dejó  de  cubrir  la
prestación
4.00    la  obra  social/  prepaga  suspendió  los
servicios
5.00    es  muy  difícil  conseguir  turno  en  el  hospital
6.00    hay  que  esperar  demasiado  para  ser  atendido
7.00    no  le  alcanza  la  plata  para  pagar  los
coseguros  o  la  consult
8.00    no  le  alcanza  la  plata  para  comprar  los
remedios
9.00    no  tenia  plata  para  trasladarse
18.00 otro
19.00 ns/  nc
P76 desde  octubre  de  2001,  ¿usted  o
1.00 sialguien  del  hogar  participa  y/o
2.00 no
realiza  actividades  en  algún  grupo  o 3.00 ns/nc
instituciones  privadas  sin  fines  de
lucro/ONG’s?
P77 y  antes  de  octubre  de  2001, 1.00 si
2.00 no¿particiba  usted  o  algún  miembro  del
3.00 ns/nchogar?
P78 su  participación  en  la  Organización 1.00 como  voluntaria
2.00 como  donantees  como...(solo  a  los  que  si
3.00    reuniones  o  actividades  esporádicas





9.00 ns/  nc
P79_1 ¿en  qué  ámbito  desarrolla  su 1.00 grupo  de  productores  agropecuarios
2.00    asociaciÓn  de  comerciantes  /  grupoHASTA actividad?  (solo  a  los  que  si
empresarial
P79_49 participan  o  participaron)  RESPUESTA 3.00 grupo  de  mujeres
MULTIPLE
4.00    grupo  de  credito  /  fnanciero  (formal)
5.00 grupo  de  madres
6.00 cooperadora  escolar
7.00    cooperadora  de  centro  de  salud/  hospital
8.00 organizaciones  de  derechos  humanos
9.00 organizaciones  no  gubernamentales
10.00 comitÉ  provivienda
11.00 grupo  de  voluntarios
12.00    club  de  padres  de  familia
13.00 grupo  de  jovenes
14.00 iglesia  catÓlica
15.00 centros  de  estudiantes
16.00 otras  iglesias
17.00 centros  vecinales
18.00    grupo  de  defensa  del  medio  ambiente
19.00 centro  de  jubilados
20.00    comedores  para  gente  con  necesidades  basicas
21.00    organizaciones  vecinales  para  la  prevenciÓn
del  delito
22.00 cooperativas
23.00 atenciÓn  de  adicciones
24.00    protecciÓn  de  chicos  de  la  calle
25.00 iniciativas  de  ayuda  solidaria
26.00 clubes  sociales
27.00 clubes  deportivos
28.00 sindicatos,  gremios  y  asociaciones
profesionales
29.00 agrupaciones  /  partidos  polÍticos
30.00 grupos  de  musica/  plastica/  danza  /
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culturales  en  general
48.00 otro
49.00 no  sabe
P80 ¿La  participación  en  esta/s 1.00 de  mucha  ayuda
2.00 de  mediana  ayudaorganización  no  gubernamental  ha  sido
3.00 de  poca  ayuda
para  ud  o  su  familia...  (solo  a  los 4.00 de  ninguna  ayuda
que  si  participan  o  participaron) 5.00 ns/  nc
P81 desde  octubre  de  2001,  ¿ha
1.00 siparticipado  usted  o  algún  miembro  de
2.00 no
su  hogar  en  alguna  de  las  siguientes 3.00 nsnc
actividades  vecinales  o  comunales  de
P81A
ayuda  mutua?:
organización  y  participación  en  el
comedor  escolar
P81B organización  y  participación  del
comedor  vecinal/olla  común
P81C sumándose  a  alguna  forma  de  compra
comunitaria  o  forma  de  compra
conjunta  con  amigos  o  parientes  para
disminuir  costos
P81D alguna  modalidad  de  trueque
P81E participación  en  ferias  americanas
P81F participación  en  taller  comunal  para
obtener  ingresos  adicionales
P81G participación  en  alguna  bolsa  de
trabajo  del  barrio
P81H actividades  para  recolectar  fondos
(fiestas,  colectas)
P81I cuidado  de  niños  y  niñas  en  forma
comunal
P81J gestión  para  acceder  a  programas  de
ayuda  del  gobierno
P81K construcción  colectiva  de  obras
comunales  (caminos,  escuelas,  etc.).
P81L ocupación  de  terrenos  para  vivienda
P81M comités  de  seguridad  y  protección
P81N cacerolazos  como  forma  de  protesta
P81O paro  de  actividades  (dejar  de
trabajar  individualmente  o
colectivamente  como  forma  de
protesta)
P81P asambleas  vecinales
P81Q piquetes  como  forma  de  protesta
P81R participación  en  marchas  como  forma
de  protesta
P81S reunión  con  funcionarios  públicos
P81T otro  (especificar)
P82 y  antes  de  octubre  de  2001, 1.00 si
2.00 no¿participaba  usted  o  algún  miembro  de
3.00 nsncsu  hogar  en  alguna  de  las  siguientes
actividades  vecinales  o  comunales  de
P82A
ayuda  mutua?:
organización  y  participación  en  el
comedor  escolar
P82B organización  y  participación  del
comedor  vecinal/olla  común
P82C sumándose  a  alguna  forma  de  compra
comunitaria  o  forma  de  compra
conjunta  con  amigos  o  parientes  para
disminuir  costos
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P82D alguna  modalidad  de  trueque
P82E participación  en  ferias  americanas
P82F participación  en  taller  comunal  para
obtener  ingresos  adicionales
P82G participación  en  alguna  bolsa  de
trabajo  del  barrio
P82H actividades  para  recolectar fondos
(fiestas,  colectas)
P82I cuidado  de  niñas  y  niños  en  forma
comunal
P82J gestión  para  acceder  a  programas  de
ayuda  del  gobierno
P82K construccion  colectiva  de  obras
comunales  (caminos,  escuelas,  etc).
P82L ocupación  de  terrenos  para  vivienda
P82M comités  de  seguridad  y  protección
P82N cacerolazos  como  forma  de  protesta
P82O paro  de  actividades  (dejar  de
trabajar  individualmente  o
colectivamente  como  forma  de
protesta)
P82P asambleas  vecinales
P82Q piquetes  como  forma  de  protesta
P82R participación  en  marchas  como  forma
de  protesta
P82S reunión  con  funcionarios  públicos
P82t otros  (especificar)
P83 ¿en  que  medida  considera  ud.  que  la 1.00 mucho





su  situación  personal
P83B las  posibilidades  de  su  familia?
P83C la  situación  de  la  comunidad  en  la
que  vive
P83D la  del  futuro  del  país
P89 ¿algún  miembro  de  su  familia  no  vive 1.00 si
2.00 nomas  en  este  hogar  porque  ha  emigrado
3.00 ns/ncdesde  octubre  de  2001?
P90 ¿cuántas  personas  han  emigrado?  SOLO
SI  CONTESTO  EMIGRARON
P91 podría  decirme  cual  fue  la  razón 1.00 bajos  ingresos
2.00 falta  de  trabajoprincipal  por  la  cual  esa/s  persona
4.00 por  matrimonio
emigro? Solo  a  los  que  contestaro  que 5.00 por  enfermedad
sí  en  la  pregunta  89.
6.00 por  razones  familiares
7.00 por  violencia
8.00    por  falta  de  acceso  a  servicios  públicos
9.00    por  falta  de  acceso  a  servicios  de  salud
10.00    buscando  mejorar  calidad  general  de  vida
(horizontes)
11.00 para  independizarse
18.00 otro
19.00 ns/nc
P92 ¿la  persona/s  que  emigro  ayudaba 1.00 si
2.00 noeconómicamente  al  sostenimiento  del
3.00 ns/nchogar?
P93 ¿desde  octubre  de  2001  hasta  la 1.00 si
2.00 noactualidad,  algún  miembro  de  su  hogar
3.00 ns/ncse  ha  ido  a  vivir  de  forma  permanente
a  otra  ciudad, provincia  o  país
(preguntar  solo  en  encuestas
rurales)?
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P94 ¿podria  decirme  cual  fue  la  razon 1.00 bajos  ingresos
principal  por  la  cual  esa  persona/s 2.00 falta  de  trabajo
4.00 por  matrimonio
se  fue  a  vivir  a  otra  ciudad, 5.00 por  enfermedad
provincia  o  país?  (solo  a  los  que 6.00 por  razones  familiares
7.00 por  violenciacontestaron  que  si  en  la  pregunta  93)
8.00 por  falta  de  acceso  a  servicios  públicos(preguntar  solo  en  encuestras 9.00 por  falta  de  acceso  a  servicios  de  salud
rurales) 10.00    buscando  mejorar  calidad  general  de  vida
(horizontes)
11.00    para  independizarse
18.00    otro
19.00    ns/nc
P95 ¿En  lo  que  va  del  año  2002,  algún 1.00 si,  tuvo  la  intención  y  pudo
2.00 si,  tuvo  la  intención  pero  no  pudomiembro  de  su  hogar  tuvo  la  intención
3.00 no  tuvo  la  intención
de  trasladarse  de  forma  temporal  a 4.00 ns/nc
otro  pueblo  o  ciudad  con  el  fin  de
trabajar?  (preguntar  solo  en
encuestras  rurales)
P96 ¿podría  decirme  cuales  fueron  las 1.00 no  le  realizaron  una  buena  oferta  de  trabajo
2.00 no  tenia  dinero  para  trasladarserazones  principales  por  las  cuales  no
19.00    otropudo  trasladarse  a  trabajar
temporalmente?  (solo  para  los  que  si
quisieron  pero  no  pudieron)
P97 ¿y  en  el  mismo  periodo del  2001  (de 1.00 si
2.00 noenero  a  mayo),  algún  miembro  de  su
3.00 ns/nchogar  se  traslado  de  forma  temporal  a
otro  pueblo/ciudad  con  el  fin  de
trabajar?  (preguntar  a  todos  rurales)
P98 podría  decirme  cual  fue  la  razon 1.00 empeoraron  los  ingresos
2.00 falta  trabajo  en  su  pueblo/  ciudadprincipal  por  la  cual  esa  persona/s
3.00 le  hicieron  una  mejor  oferta  de  trabajo
se  traslado  temporalmente  a  trabajar 18.00    otro
a  otra  ciudad,  provincia  o  pais  en  el 19.00ns/nc
años  2002  (solo  para  los  que  si  se
trasladaron  durante  el  año  2002  –preg
95-  y  no  durante  el  año  2001  –preg
97-)(preguntar  a  todos  rurales).
P99 podría  decirme  cual  fue  la  razon 1.00 mejoraron  los  ingresos
2.00 no  le  realizaron  una  buena  oferta  de  trabajoprincipal  por  la  cual  esa  persona/s
3.00 no  tenia  dinero  para  trasladarse
no  se  traslado  temporalmente  a 4.00 consiguió  trabajo  en  su  pueblo/  ciudad
trabajar  a  otra  ciudad,  provincia  o 5.00 mejoraron  las  cosechas
6.00 mejoraron  las  condiciones  de  trabajopais  en  el  años  2002  (solo  para  los
18.00    otroque  no  se  trasladaron  durante  el  año
19.00    ns/nc2002  –preg  95-  y  si  durante  el  año
2001  –preg  97-)
P100 ¿algún  miembro  del  hogar  esta 1.00 si  otra  ciudad
2.00 si  otra  provinciapensando  en  emigrar  del  hogar  a  otra
3.00 si  otro  país
ciudad,  provincia  o  país?(preguntar  a 4.00 si,  no  sabe
todos  –urbana  y  rural-)
5.00 no
6.00 nsnc
P101 ¿podría  decirme  cual  fue  la  razon 1.00 bajos  ingresos
2.00 falta  de  trabajoprincipal  por  la  cual  esa/s  persona
4.00 por  matrimonio
piensa  en  emigrar?(solo  para  los  que 5.00 por  enfermedad
si  estan  pensando  en  emigrar)
6.00 por  razones  familiares
7.00 por  violencia
8.00 por  falta  de  acceso  a  servicios  públicos
9.00 por  falta  de  acceso  a  servicios  de  salud
10.00    buscando  mejorar  calidad  general  de  vida
(horizontes)
11.00    para  independizarse
18.00   otro
19.00    ns/nc
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P102 ¿a  partir  de  octubre  de  2001  se  ha 1.00 si
incorporado  algún  nuevo  miembro  a  su 2.00 no
3.00 ns/nchogar  (ya  sea  que  haya  vuelto  un
miembro  anterior  o  que  se  haya
incorporado  uno  nuevo)?
P103 ¿cuántas  personas  se  han  incorporado?
(solo  a  los  que  contestaron  que  si  en
la  preg  102)
P104 de  la  semana  del...al...,  incluido 1.00 nunca  se  sintió  así
2.00 alguna  que  otra  vezhoy,  ¿se  sintió  desanimado  para
3.00 con  mucha  frecuencia
realizar  algo? 4.00 siempre
5.00 ns/  nc
P105 cree  que  se  siente  asi,  por  que? 1.00 no  encuentra  trabajo
2.00 (si  trabaja)  por  motivos  laborales(solo  a  los  que  contestaron  “alguna
3.00 por  motivos  económicos
que  otra  vez”,”con  mucha  frecuencia” 4.00 cansancio  general,  motivos  de  salud
y  “siempre”  en  la  preg  104)
5.00 ningún  esfuerzo  vale  la  pena
6.00 por  motivos  familiares
7.00 es  una  sensación  general  difícil  de  definir  y
explicar
18.00    otros  motivos
19.00    ns/  nc
P106 y  antes  de  octubre  de  2001,  ¿se 1.00 nunca  se  sentía  así
2.00 alguna  que  otra  vez  se  sentía  así
sentía  desanimado  para  realizar  algo? 3.00 con  mucha  frecuencia  se  sentía  así
4.00 siempre  se  sentía  así
5.00 ns/  nc
P107 de  la  semana  del...al...,incluido 1.00 nunca  se  sintió  así
2.00 alguna que  otra  vezhoy,  se  sintió  desesperanzado  con
3.00 con  mucha  frecuencia
respecto  al  futuro. 4.00 siempre
5.00 ns/  nc
P108 cree  que  se  siente  así,  por  que? 1.00 no  encuentra  trabajo
2.00 (si  trabaja)  por  motivos  laborales(solo  a  los  que  contestaron  “alguna
3.00 por  motivos  económicos
que  otra  vez”,”con  mucha  frecuencia” 4.00 por  motivos  familiares
y  “siempre”  en  la  preg  107)
5.00 es  una  sensación  general  difícil  de  definir  y
explicar
18.00    otros  motivos
19.00    ns/nc
P109 y  antes  de  octubre  de  2001,  ¿se 1.00 nunca  se  sentía  así
2.00 alguna  que  otra  vez  se  sentía  asísentía  desesperanzado  con  repsecto  al
3.00 con  mucha  frecuencia  se  sentía  así
futuro? 4.00 siempre  se  sentía  así
5.00 ns/  nc
P110 ¿ud.  o  algún  otro  miembro  del  hogar 1.00 si
2.00 noha  sido  victima  de  algún  delito  o
acto  violento  en  los últimos  seis
meses?
P111 ¿está  en  esta  vivienda  desde  octubre 1.00 si
2.00 node  2001?
P112 la  vivienda  que  usted  habita  en  este 1.00 de  uso  exclusivo
2.00 de  uso  compartidomomento  es:
P113 en esta  vivienda,  ¿hay  personas  o 1.00 si
2.00 nogrupos  de  personas  que  comparten  los
alimentos  a  nivel  grupo  o  de  todo  el
hogar?
P114 ¿cuántos  grupos  de  personas  en  esta
vivienda  comparten  los  alimentos  en
forma  separada,  como  si  fueran  grupos
diferentes?  Indicar  cantidad  de
grupos  que  comparten...(solo  a  los
que  si  comparten  los  alimentos)
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P115 es  usted...
1.00 propietario  de  la  vivienda  y  terreno
2.00 propietario  de  la  vivienda  solamente
3.00 inquilino  o  arrendatario  de  la  vivienda
4.00 ocupante  con  relación  de  dependencia
5.00 ocupante  gratuito  (se  la  prestaron)
8.00 otra  situación
9.00 ns  / nc
P116 ¿qué  cantidad  de  habitaciones  para
dormir  tiene  la  vivienda?  (no  contar
baños,  ni  cocina,  ni  garage,  excepto
que  el  garage  se  use  para  estar
dormido)
P117 ¿qué  cantidad  de  habitaciones  son  de
uso  exclusivo  del  hogar?  (no  contar
baños,  ni  cocina,  ni  garage,  excepto
que  el  garage  se  use  para  estar
dormido)
P118 ¿de  donde  viene  el  agua  para  beber  y 1.00 de  red  publica  (agua  corriente)
2.00 de  perforación  con  bomba  a  motor
cocinar? 3.00 de  perforación  con  bomba  manual
4.00 de  pozo
5.00 de  agua  de  lluvia
6.00 de  transporte  por  cisterna
7.00 de  río,  canal  o  arroyo
18.00 otra
19.00 ns  /  nc
P119 Ud  tiene  agua  en  su  vivienda:
1.00 por  cañería  dentro  de  la  vivienda
2.00 por  fuera  de  la  vivienda
3.00 dentro  del  terreno
4.00 fuera  del  terreno
5.00 ns/  nc
P120 y  su  vivienda  dispone  de  baño:
1.00 inodoro  con  botón  o  cadena  y  arrastre  de  agua
2.00 inodoro  sin  botón  o  cadena  y  arrastre  de  agua
3.00 letrina  (sin  arrastre  de  agua)
4.00 este  hogar  no  tiene  instalación  de  baño
5.00 ns/  nc
P121 podría  decirme  si  el  desague  del 1.00 a  red  publica  (cloacas)
2.00 a  cámara  séptica  y  pozo  ciegoinodoro  o  retrete  es...(solo  si
3.00 solamente  a  pozo  ciego
dispone  de  inodoro) 8.00 otro
9.00 no  sabe  /  no  contesta
P122 el  baño  es...(solo  si  dispone  de 1.00 de  uso  exclusivo  del  hogar
2.00 compartido  con  otro  hogar
inodoro)
3.00 ns  /  nc
P123 el  material  predominante  en  las 1.00 mampostería
2.00 madera
paredes  externas  es... 3.00 metal  o  fibrocemento  (chapas  lisas  o
acanaladas)
4.00 adobe
5.00 chorizo,  cartón  o  desechos
8.00 otros
9.00 ns/  nc
P124 ¿que  tipo  de  alumbrado  utiliza  dentro 1.00 electricidad
2.00 kerosén,  petróleo,  nafta o  gasdel  hogar?  (solo  a  las  encuestas
3.00 energía  solar
rurales) 4.00 vela
8.00 otros
9.00 ns/  nc
P125 en  la  cuadra  donde  esta  la  vivienda 1.00 si
2.00 nohay:
3.00 nsncP125A red  electrica
P125B red  de  agua  corriente
P125C red  de  cloacas
P125D red  de  gas
P125E recolección  diaria  o  día  por  medio  de
basura
P125F calle  pavimentada/empedrada
P125G veredas  completas  (baldosas,
mosaicos,  cementos)
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P125H desague  pluvial  entubado  (cordón,
cuneta,  alcantarilla)
P125G alumbrado  público  en  funcionamiento
P126 usted  tiene  acceso  a:
P126A red  electrica
P126B red  de  agua  corriente 1.00 si
P126C red  de  cloacas 2.00 no
3.00 nsncP126D red  de  gas
P126E recolección  diaria  o  día  por  medio  de
basura
P126F calle  pavimentada/empedrada
P126G veredas  completas  (baldosas,
mosaicos,  cementos)
P126H desague  pluvial  entubado  (cordón,
cuneta,  alcantarilla)
P126I alumbrado  público  en  funcionamiento
P126J telefono  fijo
P126K telefono  móvil
P127 y  antes  de  octubre  de  2001  poseía
P127A
dichos  servicios:
red  electrica 1.00 si
P127B red  de  agua  corriente 2.00 no
3.00 ns/ncP127C red  de  cloacas
P127D red  de  gas
P127E recolección  diaria  o  día  por  medio  de
basura
P127F calle  pavimentada/emped
P127G veredas  completas  (baldosas,
mosaicos,  cementos)
P127H desague  pluvial  entubado
P127I alumbrado  publico  en  funcionamiento
P127J telefono  fijo
P127K telefono  móvil
P128 desde  octubre  de  2001,  ¿se  ha  visto
obligado  a  retrasar  el pago  de  alguno
de  los  siguientes  servicios?: 1.00 si
P128A Electricidad 2.00 no
3.00 no  correspondeP128B Gas
4.00 nsncP128C agua
P128D telefono  fijo
P128E telefono  movil
P128F cable  TV
P128G acceso  a internet
P129 desde  octubre  de  2001,  su  hogar  ha
aumentado,  ha  seguido  igual  o  ha
disminuido  el  consumo  de  los 1.00 aumentado
siguientes  servicios 2.00 siguió  igual
3.00 disminuidoP129A Electricidad
4.00 no  corresponde
P129B Gas 5.00 ns  nc
P129C agua
P129D telefono  móvil
P129E cable  TV
P129F acceso  a  Internet
P130 desde  octubre  de  2001,  su  hogar  fue
desconectado  en  alguno  de  los
siguientes  servicios: 1.00 si
130A electricidad 2.00 no
3.00 no  correspondeP130B gas
4.00 nsncP130C agua
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P130D telefono  fijo
P130E telefono  móvil
P130F cable  TV
P130G acceso  a  Internet
P131 ¿porque  motivo  fue  desconectado?(solo 1.00 por  falta  de  pago
2.00    por  problemas  de  la  empresasi  contesto  que  si  fue  desconectado
3.00    porque  usted  lo  requirió
de  algún  servicio) 8.00 otro
9.00 ns/nc
P132 hay,  a  menos  de  diez  cuadras  de  su
1.00 sivivienda:
2.00 no
P132A transporte  público 3.00 nsnc
P132B telefono  público
P133 tiene  en  su  hogar  en  funcionamiento:
P133A heladera  sin  freezer
P133B heladera  con  freezer  o  freezer
independiente
1.00 si
P133C lavarropas  semiautomático 2.00 no
P133D lavarropas  automático 3.00 nsnc
P133E calefactores  móviles  (estufas
eléctricas,  gas,  kerosén,  etc).
P133F calefactores  por  instalación  (loza
radiante,  estufas  amuradas,  etc.).
P133G TV  (sin  cable  ni  satelital)
P133H TV  con  cable
P133I TV  satelital
P133J videoreproductor  o  videograbador
P133K computadora  personal  sin  conexión  a
internet




DESCRIPCIÓN DE VARIABLES DE LA BASE PERSONAS
Nombre de Descripción Categorías
la variable
codusu Identificador  del  hogar




1.00 25  de  mayo
2.00 anguil
3.00 azara
4.00 bahia  blanca






11.00 comodoro  rivadavia
12.00 concordia
13.00 coronel  cornejo
14.00 corrientes
15.00 el  tala
16.00 formosa
17.00 gran  cordoba
18.00 gran  jujuy
19.00 gran  la  plata
20.00 gran  mendoza
21.00 gran  posadas
22.00 gran  resitencia
23.00 gran  rio  cuarto
24.00 gran  rosario
25.00 gran  salta
26.00 gran  san  juan
27.00 gran  santa  fe
28.00 gran  tucumán
29.00 la  dormida
30.00 la  rioja
31.00 la tigra
32.00 las  toninas
33.00 los  nuñez
34.00 maimara
35.00 mansilla
36.00 mar  del  plata





42.00 piedra  del  aguila
43.00 piedras  blancas
44.00 pozo  hondo
45.00 primer  cordón
46.00 rancul
47.00 san  carlos
48.00 san  carlos  de  bariloche
49.00 san  fernando  del  valle  de  catamarca
51.00 san  javier
52.00 san  lorenzo
53.00 san  luis
54.00 san  patricio  del  chañar
55.00 santa  rosa-toay
56.00 santa  rosa  de  leales
57.00 santiago/labanda
58.00 sañogasta




63.00 villa  aberastain
64.00 villa  reduccion
65.00 villa  trinidad
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TIPO tipo  de  muestra
1.00 urbana
2.00 rural










10.00 otros  familiares
11.00 otros  no  familiares
12.00 servicio  domestico










10.00 otros  familiares
11.00 otros  no  familiares
12.00 servicio  domestico
EDAD Edad  del  miembro






P6 sabe  leer  y  escribir
1.00 si
2.00 no
P7 asiste  o  asistio  a  un 1.00 asiste  actualmente
2.00 no  asiste  pero  asistio
establecimiento  educativo 3.00 nunca  asistio
P8 estudio  que  cursa  o  curso  (sólo  para 1.00 preescolar
2.00 primario




7.00 otra  ensenanza  media
8.00 superior
9.00 universitario
P9 el  establecimiento  es/era  (sólo  para 1.00 estatal
2.00 privado
asisten  o  asistieron)
P10 finalizó  ese  estudio  (sólo  para 1.00 si
2.00 noasisten  o  asistieron)
P11 Cual  es  el  último  grado  o  año
aprobado  en  ese  estudio  (sólo  para
asisten  o  asistieron)




P12_3 otra  obra  social
P12_4 obra  social  sin  especificar
P12_5 mutual  o  prepaga
P12_6 Pami
P12_7 planes  y  seguros  medicos
P12_8 servicios  de  emergencia




P13 Tenía  la  misma  cobertura  de  salud 1.00 si
antes  de  octubre  de  2001 2.00 no
P14 podria  decirme que  cobertura  de 0.00 no
1.00 sisalud  tenia  (solo  para  los  que  no
tenian  la  misma  cobertura)
P14_1 sindical
P14_2 Provincial
P14_3 otra  cobertura
P14_4 otra  cobertura  sin  especificar
P14_5 mutual  o  prepaga
P14_6 Pami
P14_7 planes  y  seguros  medicos
P14_8 servicios  de  emergencia
P14_9 solo  hospital  publico
P14_10 Ninguna
P14_11 ns-nc
P15 realiza  aportes  al  sistema  de 1.00 si
2.00 nojubilacion  (preguntar  solo  a  los
mayores  de  10  años)
P16 y  realizaba  aportes  al  sistema  de 1.00 si
2.00 nojubilacion  antes  de  octubre  de  2001
(preguntar  solo  a  los  mayores  de  10
años)
P17 ha  trabajado  en  la  semana  del al 1.00 si
2.00 no(preguntar  solo  a  los  mayores  de  10
años)
P18 ha  buscado  trabajo  la  semana  del 1.00 si
2.00 noal (preguntar  solo  a  los  mayores
de  10  años)  (solo  para  los  que  no
trabajaron)
P19 desearia  ud  trabajar  (preguntar  solo 1.00 si
2.00 noa  los  mayores  de  10  años)  (solo  para
los  que  no  trabajaron)
P20 es  usted  (preguntar  solo  a  los 1.00 jubilado  o  pensionado
2.00 rentistamayores  de  10  años)  (solo  para  los
3.00 estudiante
que  no  trabajaron)  (solo  a  los  que 4.00 ama  de  casa
no  buscaron  trabajo)
5.00 incapacitado
9.00 otro
P21 Cuantas  ocupaciones  tiene  ud  (solo
para  ocupados  –trabajaron  durante  la
semana  de  referencia)
P22 Podria  decirnos  el  total  de  horas
trabajadas  del al (solo  para
ocupados  –trabajaron  durante  la
semana  de  referencia)
P23 el  total  de  horas  semanales 1.00 igual
trabajadas  actualmente,  en 2.00 mayor
3.00 menorcomparacion  con  el  total  de  horas
semanales  trabajadas  antes  de
octubre  de  2001  es...(solo  para
ocupados  –trabajaron  durante  la
semana  de  referencia)
P24 es  usted  (solo  para  ocupados  – 1.00 patron
trabajaron  durante  la  semana  de 2.00 cuentapropia
3.00 asalariado
referencia) 4.00 sin  salario
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P25 en  que  sector  o  rama  de  actividad 1.00 comercio,  hotelería,  restaurante
trabaja  ud  (solo  para  ocupados  – 2.00 empresa  de  servicios  públicos
3.00 industria  manufacturera
trabajaron  durante  la  semana  de 4.00
finanzas,  seguros,  inmuebles  y  
serv  a  empresas
referencia)
5.00 agricultura  y  minería
6.00 administración  pública
7.00 area  de  seguridad
8.00 docencia
9.00    fundaciones,  ongs,  inst  sin  
fines  de  lucro
10.00 construccion
19.00 otro
P26 el  establecimiento  es...  (solo  para 1.00 publico  municipal
2.00 publico  provincialocupados  –trabajaron  durante  la
3.00 publico  nacional
semana  de  referencia) 4.00 publico  sin  especificar
5.00 privado
9.00 otro
P27 en  esa  ocupacion  goza  usted
de...(solo  para  ocupados  –trabajaron
durante  la  semana  de  referencia)








P28 su  ocupacion  es  ...(solo  para 1.00 permanente
2.00 temporarioocupados  –trabajaron  durante  la
3.00 changa
semana  de  referencia) 4.00 duracion  desconocida
P29 trabajaba  antes  de  octubre  de  2001
1.00    si,  en  el  mismo  lugar
2.00 si,  en  otro  lugar
3.00 si,  ahora  sin  empleo
4.00 no  trabajaba
P30




estaban  ocupados  en  octubre  de  2001) 3.00 asalariado
4.00 sin  salario
P31 su  ocupacion  era  (solo  para  los  que 1.00 permanente
2.00 temporariosi  estaban  ocupados  en  octubre  de
3.00 changa
2001) 4.00 duracion  desconocida
P32 en  esa  ocupacion  gozaba  usted
de...(solo  para  los  que  si  estaban
ocupados  en  octubre  de  2001) 0.00 no










buscaba  trabajo  antes  de  octubre  
de
1.00 si
2.00 no2001  (solo  para  los  que  no
trabajaban  antes  de  octubre  de  2001)
P34
deseaba  trabajar  (solo  para  los  
que
1.00 si
2.00 nono  trabajaban  antes  de  octubre  de
2001)
P35 Podria  indicarnos  sus  ingresos  en
efectivo  durante  el  ultimo  mes
P35_1 Como  obrero  o  empleado
P35_2 por  bonificaciones  o  gratificaciones
no  habituales  (asalariados)
P35_3 como  trabajador  por  cuenta  propia
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P35_4 como  ganancia  de  patron  (incluye
sueldo  asignado)
P36 tuvo  otros  ingresos  en  especie
1.00 si
2.00 no
P37 recibe  vales,  ticket  o  similares 1.00 si
2.00 nopara  comida  o  compra  de  mercaderia
P38 el  total  de  ingresos  percibidos 1.00 mayor
2.00 igualactualmente,  en  comparacion  con  los
3.00 menor
que  recibia  antes  de  octubre  de 4.00 no  tenia  ingresos
2001,  es...
P40 antes  de  octubre  de  2001,  el 1.00 mayor




no  tenia  ingresos  
en  bonos
P41 Podria  decirnos,  para  cada  miembro
del  hogar,  el  monto  recibido  el  mes
pasado  por:
P41_1 jubilacion  o  pension
P41_2 alquileres,  rentas  o  intereses
P41_3 utilidades,  beneficios  o  dividendos
P41_4 seguro  de  desempleo  /  subsidio  a
jefas/es  de  familia  desocupados
P41_5 indemnizacion  por  despido
P41_6 beca  de  estudio
P41_7 cuota  de  alimentos
P41_8 aportes  de  personas  que  no  viven  en
el  hogar
P41_9 Otros
P42 Podria  decirme,  cual  es  el  ingreso 1.0
menos  de  200  
pesos
2.0
entre  200-400  
pesostotal  mensual  de  cada  uno  de  los
3.0
entre  401-600  
pesos
miembros,  es  decir,  el  monto  de 4.0
entre  601-800  
pesos
dinero  (pesos  o  bonos)  que  realmente 5.0
entre  801-1000  
pesos
6.0
entre  1001-1200  
pesosrecibe  cada  uno  de  los  miembros  a
7.0
entre  1201-1400  
pesosfin  de  mes  sumando  lo  que  percibe  en
8.0
entre  1401-1600  
pesos
sueldos,  ganancias,  jubilaciones, 9.0
entre  1601-1800  
pesos
alquileres,  seguros  de  desempleo, 10.0
entre  1801-2000  
pesos
11.0 mas  de  2000  pesosbecas,  etc.  (solo  si  no  contestan
12.0 no  sabe
ingresos  en  p35  y/o  p41) 13.0 no  contesta
P48 desde  octubre  de  2001,algun  miembro 1.00 si
2.00 node  su  familia  ¿tuvo  que  dejar  del
3.00 no  correspondetodo  sus  estudios a  fin  de  trabajar?
P84 donde  nació...?
1.00 en  este  lugar
2.00    en  otro  lugar  de  esta  
provincia
3.00 en  otra  provincia
4.00 en  otro  pais
P85 el  lugar  donde  nació  era:




P86 donde  vivía  habitualmente  antes  de 1.00 aqui
2.00    en  otro  lugar  de  la provincia
octubre  de  2001? 3.00 en  otra  provincia
4.00 en  otro  pais
P87 el  lugar  donde  vivía  antes  de 1.00 zona  rural
2.00 pueblooctubre  de  2001  era...(solo  a  los
3.00 ciudad
que  se  mudaron): 8.00 otro
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Methodology: Trietapic sample, probabilistic in the first two stages and age/sex
Date of Field work:
quota in the last stage.
24th April to 24th   May, 2002
Sample: 1200 cases
Margin of Error: +/-3% for a confidence level of 95%
Coverage: 75% of total population






[05]  Costa  Rica
[06]  Chile
[07]  Ecuador










P1WVS.- Generally speaking, would you say you are very happy, quite 
happy, not very happy, not at all happy?
(P1WVS)
2.3.Very  happy 
2.4.Quite  happy 
2.5.Not  very  happy 
2.6.Not  at  all  happy 
[0]  Don´t  know/No  answer
P2STA.- In general, how would you describe the present economic situation 
of the country? Would you say that it is very good, fairly good, about 
average, fairly bad, or very bad?
(P2STA)
[1] Very  good 
[2] Good 
[3] About  average 
[4] Bad 
[5] Very  bad 
[8]  DK
[0]  No  answer
P2STB.- Do you consider the current economic situation of the country to 
be better, the same, or worse than 12 months ago?
(P2STB)
[1] Very  good 
[2] Good 
[3] About  average 
[4] Bad 
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[5] Very bad 
[8] Don´t know 
[0] No answer
P2STC.- And in the next 12 months do you think that, in general, the 
economic situation of your country will improve, stay the same or get 
worse compared to the way it is now?
(P2STC)
[1] Much  better 
[2] A  little  better 
[3] About  the  same 
[4] A  little  worse 
[5] Much  worse 
[8]  DK
[0]  No  answer
P2STD.- In general, how would you describe your present economic 
situation and that of your family? Would you say that it is very good, 
good, about average, bad or very bad?
(P2STD)
[1] Much  better 
[2] A  little  better 
[3] About  the  same 
[4] A  little  worse 
[5] Much  worse 
[8] Don´t know 
[0] No answer
P2STE.- Do you consider your economic situation and that of your family 
to be better, the same, or worse than 12 months ago?
(P2STE)
[1] Much  better 
[2] A  little  better 
[3] About  the  same 
[4] A  little  worse 
[5] Much  worse 
[8] Don´t know 
[0] No answer
P2STF.- And in the next 12 months do you think that your economic 
situation and that of your family will improve, stay the same or get 
worse compared to the way it is now?
(P2STF)
[1] Much  better 
[2] A  little  better 
[3] About  the  same 
[4] A  little  worse 
[5] Much  worse 
[8] Don´t know 
[0] No answer
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P3ST.- Taking everything into consideration, would you way that your 
parents lived better, the same or worse off than how you live? And 
regarding you children, do you believe that they will live better, the 
same, or worse off than how you live today?
(P3STA)  Parents  better/worse  off  than  you?
(P3STB)  Will  children  be  better/  worse  off  than  you?
[1] Better 
[2] The  same 
[3] Worse  off 
[0]  Don´t  know/No  answer
P4ST.- SHOWCARD 1 From the list of problems that I am going to show you, 




[03] Terrorism/ political violence 
[04] Instability in the labor market 
[05] Education problems
[06] Inflation/ price rises 
[07] Unemployment
[08]  Lack  of  opportunities  for  the  youth
[9] Human  rights 
[10] Housing 
[11] Health 
[12] The  environment 
[13] Corruption 
[14] Drug  trafficking 
[15] Crime 
[16] Poverty 
[17] Drugs  consumption 
[18] Discrimination  problems 
[19] Other 
[98] Don´t know 
[00] No answer
P5UA.- Thinking about the problem you have just mentioned, do you think 
that this issue is being addressed already, more time is needed to solve 
it, it cannot be solved, the situation with respect to that issue is 
getting worse.
(P5UA)
[1] It  is  being  addressed 
[2] More  time  is  needed  to  solve  it 
[3] Solution  not  possible 
[4] Getting  worse 
[8]  Don´t  know
[9] Not applicable 
[0] No answer
P6ST.-  SHOWCARD  2.  From  the  list  of  issues  that  I  am  going  to  read  out  to
you,  do  you  think  they  have  increased  a  lot  or  a  little,  or  have
decreased  a  lot  or  a  little  or  have  remained  the  same  in the  last 12
months?
(P6STA)  Crime
(P6STB)  Drug  addiction
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(P6STC)  Corruption
[1] Increased  a  lot 
[2] Increased  a  little 
[3] Remained  the  same 
[4] Decreased  a  little 
[5] Decreased  a  lot 
[8] No  answer 
[0] Don´t  know 
P7ST.- Imagine the total number of civil servants in (country) is 100, 








[108] Don´t  know 
[0] No  answer 
P8ST.- Have you, or someone in your family, been assaulted, attacked, or 
been the victim of a crime in the last 12 months? Have you or someone in 
your family known of a corruption act in the last 12 months? Have you 
known if any of your friends or someone in your family has consumed drugs 
in the last 12 months? In the last twelve months ,have you known somebody 
who has bought or sold any drugs?
(P8STA)  Victim  of  a  crime




[8] Don´t know 
[0] No answer
P9NO2.- There is much talk about crime. Do you think that this is a real 
issue or that people are exaggerating?
(P9NO2)
[1] Real  issue 
[2] People  are  exaggerating 
[0] Don´t  know/No  answer 
P10NO2.- After the terrorist attacks on the Twin Towers in the United 
States some people say that there is a world terrorist threat, other 
people say there is no world terrorist threat. Which opinion is closest 
to your view?
(P10NO2)
[1] There  is  a  world  terrorist  threat 
[2] There  is  no  world  terrorist  threat 
[0] Don´t  know/No  answer 
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P11NO2.- Not considering what happens in the world. Would you say that 
terrorism is a very serious problem in your country, fairly serious, not 
very serious, not at all serious or would you say that there is no 
terrorism in your country?
(P11NO2)
[1] Very  serious 
[2] Fairly  serious 
[3] Not  very  serious 
[4] Not  at  all  serious 
[5] There  is  no  terrorism  in  (country) 
[0] Don´t  know/No  answer 
P12NO2.- Do you support or oppose the military actions undertaken by the 
United States against Afghanistan in retaliation to the terrorists 




[0]  Don´t  know/No  answer
P13ST.- With respect to the following statements, you think that… 
(P13STA) Success in life depends on connections
(P13STB)  Hard  work  does  not  guarantee  success
[1] Yes 
[2] No 
[8] Don´t know 
[0] No answer
P14ST.- Taking everything into consideration, what do you think is the 
most important thing to have success in life? Would you say the most 
important thing is education, hard work, connections or luck?
(P14ST)
[1] Education 
[2] Hard  work 
[3] Connections 
[4] Luck 
[0]  Don´t  know/No  answer
P15ST.- How much time do you think you need to attain the standard of 
living you think you are entitled to? Do you think you would get it in 
between 1 / 2 years? 3 / 5 years? 6 /10 years? 11 / 20 years? 21 / 30 
years? Never? Or “I already have it”
(P15ST)
[1] 1  to  2  years 
[2] 3  to  5  years 
[3] 6  to  10  years 
[4] 11  to  20  years 
[5] 21  to  30  years 
[6] Never 
[7] I  already  have  it 
[0] Don´t  know/No  answer 
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P16ST.- How fair do you think the income distribution is in [country]? 
Very fair, fair, unfair or very unfair?
(P16ST)
[1] Very  Fair 
[2] Fair 
[3] Unfair 
[4] Very  Unfair 
[8] Don´t  know 
[0] No  answer 
P17ST.- I am going read a statement. Please, tell me if you strongly 
agree, somewhat agree, somewhat disagree or strongly disagree. ´You can 
generally trust the people who run our government to do what is right´.
(P17ST)
[1] Strongly  agree 
[2] Somewhat  agree 
[3] Somewhat  disagree 
[4] Strongly  disagree 
[0] Don´t  know/No  answer 
P18NO2.- Do you approve or disapprove the way the President (NAME OF 




[0]  Don´t  know/No  answer
P19NO2.- Thinking about economic problems in (country), from the 
following list of institutions/organizations and issues, which, if any, 
do you think are responsible for the economic problems we face? 
(P19NO2A) Lack of entrepreneurial initiative
(P19NO2B)  The  banks
(P19NO2C) Lack of individual initiative 
(P19NO2D) Globalization
(P19NO2E) International Monetary Fund 
(P19NO2F) Government´s Economic policy 
(P19NO2G) World Trade Organization
(P19NO2H) Lack of domestically produced goods 
(P19NO2I) No-one is directly responsible 
(P19NO2J) Other
(P19NO2K) Don´t know/No answer 
(Multiple answer question)
[1]  Mentioned
[0]  Not  mentioned
P20NO2.- How long do you think it will take (country) to be a developed 
country?
(P20NO2)
[1] Less  than  5  years 
[2] 5  to10  years 
[3] 10  to  20  years 
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[4] 20  to  30  years 
[5] More  than  30  years 
[6] (Country)  will  never  be  a  developed  country 
[7] (Country)  already  is  a  developed  country 
[0] Don´t  know/No  answer 
P21NO2.- Based on your knowledge or what you have heard, which do you 
think is the best model of economic development: one where the State is 
in charge of health, education, of producing electricity water or one 
where the private sector offers health, education, electricity and water 
services.? Which of these two alternatives is closest to your views?
(P21NO2)
[1] State 
[2] Private  sector 
[0]  Don´t  know/No  answer
P22ST.- SHOWCARD 5. Do you strongly agree, somewhat agree, somewhat 
disagree, or strongly disagree with each of the following phrases that I 
am going to read:
(P22STA) The privatization of state companies has been beneficial to the 
country
(P22STB) The state should leave the economic activity to the private 
sector
(P22STC)  Market  economy  is  best  for  the  country
(P22ESSD) The less that government intervenes in the economy the better 
is for country
(P22ESSE) Some public services are too important to be left to private 
companies
(P22ESSF) Taxes should be as low as possible, even if welfare spending 
suffers
(P22ESSG)  If  people  really  want  a  job,  they  can  find  one
(P22ESSH) Workers need strong trade unions to protect wages and working 
conditions
[1] Strongly  agree 
[2] Somewhat  agree 
[3] Somewhat  disagree 
[4] Strongly  disagree 
[8] Don´t  know 
[0] No  answer 
P23ST.- In general, would you say that you are very satisfied, fairly 
satisfied, not very satisfied or not at all satisfied with the way market 
economy works in [country]?
(P23ST)
[1] Very  satisfied 
[2] Fairly  satisfied 
[3] Not  very  satisfied 
[4] Not  at  all  satisfied 
[8] Don´t  know 
[0] No  answer 
P24ST.- Imagine the following situation: two people, same age, working 
as computer programmer doing the same job. One of them earns more money
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than the  other but,  he makes  his work quicker,  more  efficient  and
more reliable  than  the other.  In your opinion,  is it  fair  that,  in  that




[8] Don´t know 
[0] No answer
P25NO2.- In the last 12 months has any adult member of your household 




[0]  Don´t  know/No  answer
P26ST.- How concerned would you say you are that you will be left without 
work or unemployed during the next 12 months? Very concerned, concerned, a 
little concerned, or not at all concerned?
(P26ST)
[1] Very  concerned 
[2] Concerned 
[3] A  little  concerned 
[4] Not  at  all  concerned 
[5] Out  of  work 
[0]  Don´t  know/No  answer
P27NO2.- We would like to ask you a question about your experience as 
(woman) (man). How often, if at all, have you felt discriminated 




[1] Every  day 
[2] Every  week 
[3] Once  a  month 
[4] A  few  times  a  year 
[5] Hardly  ever 
[6] Never 
[9]  Not  applicable
[0]  Don´t  know/No  answer
P28WVS.- SHOWCARD 6. Thinking on qualities that children can be 
encouraged to learn at home. Which do you consider to be especially 
important to teach to a child? Please choose up to five.
(P28WVSA) Good manners 
(P28WVSB) Obedience 
(P28WVSC) Hard work
(P28WVSD) Tolerance and respect for other people 
(P28WVSE) Saving money and things
(P28WVSF) Determination and perseverance 




[2] Not  mentioned 
P29ST.- Generally speaking, would you say that you can trust most people, 
or that you can never be too careful when dealing with others?
(P29ST)
[1] You  can  trust  most  people 
[2] You  can  never  be  too  careful  when  dealing  with  others 
[0] Don´t  know/No  answer 
P30ST.- To you, what does ´democracy´ mean?. What else? (OPEN- ENDED) 
(P30STA) 1st mention
(P30STB) 2nd mention 
(Multiple answer question)
[01] Civil liberties and personal freedom 
[02] Voting right
[03]  Economic  development
[04] Government by, for and of the people 
[05] Peace and unity
[06]  Good  government
[07] Equality and justice 
[08] Rule of law
[9] Personal  security 
[10] National  independence 
[11] Majority  rule 
[12] Groups  rights 
[13] Multi  party  competition 
[14] Movements 
[15] Other  significant  positive  meanings 
[16] Corruption  and  abuse 
[17] Social  and  economic  hardship 
[18] Bad  governance 
[19] Other  negative  meanings 
[20] Change  of  government 
[21] Other  neutral  meaning 
[98] Don´t know 
[00] No answer
P31ST.- SHOWCARD 7. People often differ in their views on the important 
characteristics of democracy. From the following list please choose which 
is for you the most important characteristic of democracy.
(P31ST)
[1] Open  and  fair  elections 
[2] Competitive  parties  system 
[3] An  economy  system 
[4] Equal  treatment  for  everybody  by  courts  of  law 
[5] Respect  of  minorities 
[6] Majority  rule 
[7] Freedom  of  speech 
[8] Members  of  parliament  who  represent  their  electors 
[0] Don´t  know/No  answer 
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P32ST.- With which of the following statements do you agree most? 
(P32ST)
[1] Democracy  is  preferable  to  any  other  kind  of  government 
[2] In certain situations, an authoritarian government can be 
preferable 
[3] It  doesn´t  matter 
[8] Don´t know 
[0] No answer
P33ST.- In general, would you say that you are very satisfied, fairly 
satisfied, not very satisfied or not at all satisfied with the way 
democracy works in [country]?
(P33ST)
[1] Very  satisfied 
[2] Fairly  satisfied 
[3] Not  very  satisfied 
[4] Not  at  all  satisfied 
[8] Don´t  know 
[0] No  answer 
P34ST.- SHOWCARD 8. Please look at this card and tell me how much 
confidence you have in each of the following groups/ institutions. Would 





(P34STE) Private enterprises 
(P34STF) Political parties
[1] A  lot 
[2] Some 
[3] A  little 
[4] No  confidence 
[8] Don´t  know 
[0] No  answer 
P35ST.- If you had to choose between democracy and economic development, 
which would you say is more important?
(P35ST)
[1] Democracy 
[2] Economic  development 
[3] Both  the  same 
[0]  Don´t  know/No  answer
P36ST.- SHOWCARD 8. Please look at this card and tell me how much 
confidence you have in each of the following groups/ institutions. Would 
you say you have a lot, some, a little or no confidence?
(P36STA) Television 
(P36STB) Armed forces 
(P36STC) Local Government
(P36STD) National Congress/Parliament 
(P36STE) Police
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[1] A  lot 
[2] Some 
[3] A  little 
[4] No  confidence 
[8] Don´t  know 
[9] No  applicable 
[0] No  answer 
P37NO2.- Do you think democracy is the system of government, so that 
(country) becomes a developed country? Or do you think it is possible to 
become a developed country with another system of government that is not 
democracy?
(P37NO2)
[1] Democracy  is  necessary  to  attain  development 
[2] It is possible to attain development with another system of 
government 
[0]  Don´t  know/No  answer
P38ST.- Do you strongly agree, agree, disagree or strongly disagree with 
the following statements.
(P38STA) It is ok for the government to disregard the law parliament and 
/ or the institutions in
order  to  deal  with  a  difficult  situation
(P38STB) I would not mind a non democratic government in power if it 
could solve the economic
problems
(P38NO2C) Democracy may have problems, but it is the best system of 
government
(P38NO2D) Not democracy but those who run the country are responsible for 
the solution of the
country´s  social  and  economic  problems
(P38ESSE) Whatever the circumstances the law should always be obeyed 
(P38ESSF) It is more important for the legal system to protect the 
innocent than to convict the
guilty
[1] Strongly  agree 
[2] Somewhat  agree 
[3] Somewhat    disagree 
[4] Strongly  disagree 
[0] Don´t  know/No  answer 
P39ST.- There are people who say that without a national congress there 
can be no democracy, while others say that democracy can work without a 
national congress. What is closer to your views?
(P39ST)
[1] Without  a  national  congress  there  can  be  no  democracy 
[2] Democracy  can  work  without  a  national  congress 
[8] Don´t know 
[0] No answer
P40ST.- There are people who say that without political parties there can 
be no democracy, while others say that democracy can work without parties. 
What is closer to your views?
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(P40ST)
[1] Without  political  parties  there  can  be  no  democracy 
[2] Democracy  can  work  without  political  parties 
[8] Don´t know 
[0] No answer
P41ST.- Some people say that democracy solves problems that we have in 
(Country). Other people say that democracy does not solve the problems. 
Which statement is closest to your views?
(P41ST)
[1] Democracy  solves  problems  that  we  have  in  (Country) 
[2] Democracy  does  not  solve  the  problems 
[8] Don´t know 
[0] No answer
P42ST.- SHOWCARD 9 How do you inform yourself about politics? 
(P42STA) The family
(P42STB)  Friends
(P42STC) People I work with 






(Multiple answer  question)
[0] Not  mentioned 
[1] Mentioned 
P43ST.- When people are asked to express their political opinion, do you 
think that most people say what they think about politics or do you think 
that they usually do not say what they really think?
(P43ST)
[1] People    usually  say  what  they  think  about  politics 
[2] People  do  not  say  what  they  think 
[8] Don´t know 
[0] No answer
P44ST.- Do you think that the political group you support has the same 
opportunity as others to get into power or do you think it does not have 
the same opportunity?
(P44ST)
[1] Same  opportunity 
[2] It  doesn´t  have  the  same  opportunity 
[0] Don´t  know/No  answer 
P46ST.- SHOWCARD 10. Do you think that the [nationals] are very, quite, a 
little or not at all....
(P46STA)  Are  (Countrymen)  lawful?
(P46STB)  Do  (Countrymen)  demand  their  rights?
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(P46STC) Are (Countrymen) conscious of their obligations and duties? 
(P46STD) Have(Countrymen) equal treatment in front of the law?
[1] Very 
[2] Quite 
[3] A  little 
[4] Not  at  all 
[0]  Don´t  know/No  answer
P47ST.- How proud are you to be (nationality)? Are you very proud, fairly 
proud, a little proud, or not proud at all?
(P47ST)
[1] Very  proud 
[2] Proud 
[3] Little  proud 
[4] Not  proud 
[5] I  am  not  (national) 
[8] Don´t  know 
[0] No  answer 
P48ST.- SHOWCARD 11 I am going to read out a variety of political 
activities. I would like you to tell me, for each one, if you have ever 
done any of them, if you would ever do any of them, or if you would never 
do any of them.?
(P48STA)  Signing  a  petition
(P48STB) Taking part in authorized demonstrations 
(P48STC) Participate in riots
(P48STD)  Occupy  land,  buildings  or  factories
[1] Have  done 
[2] Could  do 
[3] Would  never  do 
[0]  Don´t  know/No  answer
P49ST.- Could you tell me if you have recently known of someone or have 
heard of someone you know about somebody who has:
(P49STA) Pretended to be ill in order not to go to work 
(P49STB) Managed to avoid paying all his tax
(P49STC) Enjoyed a benefit he was not entitled to 




[0]  Don´t  know/No  answer
P50WVS.- I´m going to read out a list of various changes in our way of 
life that might take place in the near future. Please tell me for each 
one, if it were to happen, whether you think it would be a good thing, a 
bad thing, or don´t you mind?
(P50WVSA) Wore being less important in our lives 
(P50WVSB) More emphasis on technological development 
(P50WVSC) Greater respect for authority




[3] Don  t  mind 
[0]  Don´t  know/No  answer
P51WVS.- SHOWCARD 12 How important is God in your life? Please use this 
scale to indicate- 10 means very important and 1 means not at all 
important.
(P51WVS)
[01] 1. Not at all important 
[02] 2 [03] 3 [04] 4 [05] 5 
[06] 6 [07] 7 [08] 8
[9] 9 
[10] 10.  Very  important 
[0] Don´t  know/No  answer 
P52WVS.- SHOW CARD 13. Please tell me for each of the following 
statements whether you think it can always be justified, never be 
justified, or something in between, using this card.
(P52WVSA) Buying something you know is stolen 
(P52WVSB) Accept a bribe
(P52WVSC) Homosexuality 
(P52WVSD) Abortion
[01] Never be justified 
[02] 2 [03] 3 [04] 4 
[05] 5 [06] 6 [07] 7 
[08] 8
[9] 9 
[10] Always  be  justified 
[0] Don´t  know/No  answer 
P53WVS.- If you had to choose, which one of the things on this card would 
you say is most important?
(P53WVSA) 1st mention 
(P53WVSB) 2nd mention 
(Multiple answer question)
[1] Maintain  order 
[2] Citizen  participation 
[3] Fight  inflation 
[4] Freedom  speech 
[0]  Don´t  know/No  answer
P54ST.- How many days during the last week did you watch the news on 
television?
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(P54STA) On television 
(P54STB) In a newspaper 
(P54STC) On the radio






[07] 7 days 
[96] None
[98] Don´t know 
[00] No answer
P55ST.- SHOWCARD 15 From the list of institutions in the card, can you 
please evaluate each one on a scale from 0 to 10, being 0 very bad and 10 
very good or you have not heard enough to give an opinion.
(P55STA)  Mercosur
(P55STB) FTAA Free Trade Area of Americas 
(P55STC) Common market of Central America 
(P55STD) Andean pact
(P55STE) International monetary fund 
(P55STF) World bank
(P55STG)  United  nations
(P55STH) World trade organization 
(P55STI) European Union
[00] Very bad 
[01] 1 [02] 2 
[03] 3 [04] 4 
[05] 5 [06] 6 
[07] 7 [08] 8
[9] 9 
[10] Very  good 
[11] Don  t  Know  about  it  /  Never  heard  about  it 
[98] Don´t  know/No  answer 
P56ST.- I would like to know your opinion about the United States. Do 
you have a very good, good, bad or very bad opinion of the about the 
United States?
(P56STA) United States 
(P56STB) Japan 
(P56STC) China
[1] Very  good 
[2] Good 
[3] Bad 
[4] Very  bad 
[8] Don´t  know 
[0] No  answer 
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P57ST.- Generally speaking, are you very in favor, quite in favor, 
slightly against or very against of the economic integration of the 
countries of Latin America?
(P57ST)
[1] Very  much  in  favor 
[2] Somewhat  in  favor 
[3] Somewhat  against 
[4] Very  much  against 
[8] Don´t  know 
[0] No  answer 
P58NO2.- In general are you very in favor, quite in favor, slightly 
against or very against of a closer political cooperation between the 
Latin American countries?
(P58NO2)
[1] Very  much  in  favor 
[2] Somewhat  in  favor 
[3] Somewhat  against 
[4] Very  much  against 
[8] Don´t  know 
[0] No  answer 


















[17] Puerto  Rico 
[18] Panama 





[98] Don´t  know 
[0] No  answer 






[0]  Don´t  know  /  No  answer























[21] Puerto  Rico 
































[99] Not  applicable 
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[00]  Don´t  know  /  No  answer
P62NO2.- (SHOWCARD 16) What impact, if any, do the citizens of other 
countries who come to live in (country) have on your country? From each of 
the following statements that I am going to read out, please tell me if 
you strongly agree, tend to agree, neither agree nor disagree, tend to 
disagree or strongly disagree .
(P62NO2A)  Immigrants  take  away  our  jobs
(P62NO2B)  Immigrants  bring  new  ideas  and  cultures
(P62NO2C) There ought to be laws to prevent immigrants entry into 
(Country)
(P62NO2D) Rich countries have the responsibility to accept immigrants 
coming from poor countries
[1] Strongly  agree 
[2] Agree 
[3] Neither  agree  nor  disagree 
[4] Disagree 
[5] Strongly  disagree 
[0]  Don´t  know  /  No  answer
P64ST.- SHOWCARD 8 In politics, people normally speak of ´left´ and 
´right´. On a scale where 0 is left and 10 is right, where would you 
place yourself?
(P64ST) 
[00] 0. Left 
[01] 1 [02] 2 
[03] 3 [04] 4 
[05] 5 [06] 6 
[07] 7 [08] 8
[9] 9 
[10] 10.  Right 
[96] None 
[97] No  answer 
[98] Don´t  know 
P65ST.- What is your religion? (Open-ended) 
(P65ST)
[01]  Catholic









[11] Afro-American  cult 






[98] Don´t know 
[00] No reply
P66ST.- How would you describe yourself? Very devout, devout, not very 
devout, or not devout at all?
(P66ST)
[1] Very  devout 
[2] Devout 
[3] Not  very  devout 
[4] Not  devout  at  all 
[8] Don´t  know 
[9] Not  applicable 
[0] No  answer 
P67ST.- Does your salary and the total of your family´s salary allow you 
to satisfactorily cover your needs? Which of the following situations do 
you find yourself in?
(P67ST)
[1] Covers  them  well,  I  can  save 
[2] Covers  them  all  right,  without  great  difficulty 
[3] Does  not  cover  them,  there  are  difficulties 
[4] Does  not  cover  them,  there  are  great  difficulties 
[8] Don´t  know 







[16] 16-25 years 
[26] 26-40 years 
[41] 41-60 years 
[61] 61 and more




S4.-  Marital  status
(S4)




[0]  Don´t  know/No  reply  (don´t  read)
S5.-  Age  respondent  finished  education
(S5)
[01] 1-20 years old 
[21] 21-40 years old 
[41] 41-50 years old 
[51] 51 and old
[96] No  studies 
[97] R  is  studying 
[98] Don´t  know/Don´t  remember 
[0] No  reply 
S6.-  Years  in  education  of  respondent
(S6)












[13] 12  years 
[14] Incomplete  university 
[15] Completed  university 
[16] High  school/academies/Incomplete  technical  training 
[17] High  school/academies/Complete  technical  training 
S7.-  Years  in  education  of  parents
(S7)












[13] 12  years 
[14] Incomplete  university 
[15] Completed  university 
[16] High  school/academies/Incomplete  technical  training 
[17] High  school/academies/Complete  technical  training 
[98] Don´t  know/Don´t  remember 
[0] No  data/No  reply 
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S8A.- Respondent actual occupation 
(S8A)
[1] Freelance/self-employed  (GO  TO  S9) 
[2] Wage  earner  in  public  firm  (GO  TO  S9) 
[3] Wage  earner  in  private  firm  (GO  TO  S9) 
[4] Temporarily  respondent  doesn´t  work  (GO  TO  S8B) 
[5] Retired  (GO  TO  S8B) 
[6] Doesn´t work/the person in charge of going to shopping and keeping 
the house (GO TO S10) 
[7] Student  (GO  TO  S10) 
S8B.- ((FOR TEMPORARY UNEMPLOYED AND RETIRED - ONLY PEOPLE WHO ANSWER 4 
OR 5 IN S8A). Which were your occupational situation previously? (Write 
what respondent say exactly)
(S8B)
[1] Freelance-self-employed: Professional (doctor, lawyer, pawnbroker, 
architect) 
[2] Freelance-self-employed:  Owner  of  a  business 
[3] Freelance-self-employed:  Farmer 
[4] Freelance-self-employed:  self-employed,  salesman 
[5] Wage  earner,  employee:  Professional 
[6] Wage  earner,  employee:  high  executive  (Manager,  Director) 
[7] Wage  earner,  employee:  Medium  executive 
[8] Other  employee 
[9] No  applicable 
[0]  No  reply/No  data
S9.- ONLY PEOPLE WHO ANSWER 1,2 OR 3 IN S8A)(What type of job do you do? 
(Write what respondent say exactly)
(S9)
[1] Freelance-self-employed: Professional (doctor, lawyer, pawnbroker, 
architect) 
[2] Freelance-self-employed:  Owner  of  a  business 
[3] Freelance-self-employed:  Farmer 
[4] Freelance-self-employed:  self-employed,  salesman 
[5] Wage  earner,  employee:  Professional 
[6] Wage  earner,  employee:  high  executive  (Manager,  Director) 
[7] Wage  earner,  employee:  Medium  executive 
[8] Other  employee 
[9] No  applicable 
[0]  No  reply/No  data
S10.- Have you or any member of your household any of the following 
goods? (Read the list and write one answer for each one)
(S10A)  Color  television
(S10B) Refrigerator/Icebox/ freezer 
(S10C) Own home
(S10D)  Computer
(S10E) Washing machine 
(S10F) Telephone 
(S10G) Car
(S10H) A second home or holiday home 
(S10I) Drinking water
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(S10J) Hot water 
(S10K) Sewage system
(Multiple  answer  question)
[1] Yes 
[2] No 
[0]  No  reply
S11.-  Do  you  use  e-mail?
(S11)
[1] Yes,  every  day 
[2] Yes,  occasionally 
[3] Yes,  but  very  rarely 
[4] No,  never 
[0]  Don´t  know  /  No  answer
S12.-  Do  you  browse  /  surf  the  internet?
(S12)
[1] Yes,  every  day 
[2] Yes,  occasionally 
[3] Yes,  but  very  rarely 
[4] No,  never 
[0]  Don´t  know  /  No  answer







[0]  Don´t  know  /  No  answer
S14.- (FOR THOSE WHO HAVE ACCESS O INTERNET) No matter where you have the 
access to internet, What do you frequently use internet for? Use e-mail, 
search information, entertainment, work, other
(S14)
[1] E-mail 




[9]  No  applicable
[0]  Don´t  know  /  No  answer
S15.-  How  do  you  cover  your  health  expenses?
(S15)
[1] Private  insurance 
[2] Public  insurance 
[3] No  insurance 
[0]  Don´t  know  /  No  answer
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[3] Native  Language 
[4] Other 
S16.-  Age  Chief  Income  Earner  finished  education
(S16)
[01] 1-20 years old 
[21] 21-40 years old 
[41] 41-70 years old 
[71] 71 and old
[96] No  studies 
[97] R  is  studying 
[98] Don´t  know/Don´t  remember 
[99] No  applicable 
[00]  No  reply
S17.-  Years  in  education  of Chief  Income  Earner
(S17)
[01]  Without  education











[13] 12  years 
[14] Incomplete  university 
[15] Completed  university 
[16] High  school/academies/Incomplete  technical  training 
[17] High  school/academies/Complete  technical  training 
[0] No  data/No  reply 
[99] No  applicable  (Code  when  respondent  is  Head  of  Household) 
S18A.- Chief Income Earner current occupation 
(S18A)
[1] Freelance/self-employed  (TO  S19) 
[2] Wage  earner  in  public  firm  (TO  S19) 
[3] Wage  earner  in  private  firm  (TO  S19) 
[4] Temporarily  respondent  doesn´t  work  (GO  TO  S18B) 
[5] Retired  (GO  TO  S18B) 
[6] Doesn´t work/the person in charge of going to shopping and keeping 
the house 
[7] Student 
[9]  No  applicable
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[0]  No  reply  (Don´t  read  it)
S18B.- (ONLY PEOPLE WHO ANSWER 4 OR 5 IN S18A). Which was the head of 
household´s occupational situation previously? (Write what they say 
exactly)
(S18B)
[1] Freelance-self-employed: Professional (doctor, lawyer, pawnbroker, 
architect) 
[2] Freelance-self-employed:  Owner  of  a  business 
[3] Freelance-self-employed:  Farmer 
[4] Freelance-self-employed:  self-employed,  salesman 
[5] Wage  earner,  employee:  Professional 
[6] Wage  earner,  employee:  high  executive  (Manager,  Director) 
[7] Wage  earner,  employee:  Medium  executive 
[8] Other  employee 
[9] No  applicable 
[0]  No  reply/No  data
S19.- (ONLY PEOPLE WHO ANSWER 1,2 O 3 EN S18A). What type of job do you 
do? (Write what respondent say exactly)
(S19)
[1] Freelance-self-employed: Professional (doctor, lawyer, pawnbroker, 
architect) 
[2] Freelance-self-employed:  Owner  of  a  business 
[3] Freelance-self-employed:  Farmer 
[4] Freelance-self-employed:  self-employed,  salesman 
[5] Wage  earner,  employee:  Professional 
[6] Wage  earner,  employee:  high  executive  (Manager,  Director) 
[7] Wage  earner,  employee:  Medium  executive 
[8] Other  employee 
[9] No  applicable 
[0]  No  reply/No  data
REEDUC.- Respondent Education Summary 
(REEDUC1) Respondent
(REEDUC2) Respondent´s parents 
(REEDUC3) Head of the household
[1] Illiterate 
[2] Incomplete  primary 
[3] Complete  primary 
[4] Incomplete  Secondary,  technical 
[5] Complete  Secondary,  technical 
[6] Incomplete  high 
[7] Complete  high 
[9] No applicable 
[0] No reply/No data
S20.- Socioeconomic level. Very good, good, average, bad, very bad 
(S20)




[5] Very  bad 
